MEMORIES    OF    A    TURKISH 
STATESMAN-1913-1919 


^Memories  of  a  Turkish 
Statesman-  19  13  1919  ..    By 


al     *Pasha          .':  Formerly  governor 

of  Constantinople,    Imperial    Ottoman    Naval  Minister,    and 
Commander  of  the  Fourth  Army  in  Sinai,  Palestine  and  Syria 


NEW    fe*Utf!     YORK 


GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 
1922 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

INTRODUCTION 9 

CHAPTER 

I.  MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE,  1913     ...  n 

II.  THE  OUTBREAK  AND  END  OF   THE   SECOND   BALKAN 

WAR             43 

III.  AT  THE  ADMIRALTY      81 

IV.  IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  FOURTH  ARMY            135 

V.  OUR    PREPARATIONS    FOR    THE   EXPEDITION   AGAINST 

THE  SUEZ  CANAL 145 

VI.     THE  DESERT  FORCE     161 

VII.    THE  BATTLES  OF  GAZA           173 

VIII.     THE  ARAB  REBELLION 195 

IX,     THE  ARMENIAN  QUESTION       ...         ...         ...         ...  239 


500873 


INTRODUCTION 


MY  personal  participation  in  general  politics  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire  begins  with  the  coup  d'etat  of  January  23,  1913. 

On  the  evening  of  that  day  I  left  the  headquarters  of  the  Lines 
of  Communication  Inspectorate*  and  went  to  the  Sublime  Porte, 
to  which  a  great  crowd  was  flocking  at  the  time. 

At  that  moment  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha,  who  had  been 
appointed  Grand  Vizier  a  few  hours  before,  returned  from  the 
Imperial  Palace  and  met  me  at  the  entrance  to  the  Grand  Vizier's 
palace. 

He  had  hardly  seen  me  before  he  called  out :  "  Djemal  Bey,  I 
want  you  to  take  over  the  Military  Governorship  of  Constantinople 
at  once  and  you  must  not  lose  a  minute  in  taking  all  measures  you 
think  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  order  and  confidence  in  the 
capital/' 

As  I  have  said,  my  assumption  of  the  highly  important  and 
equally  responsible  office  of  Military  Governor  of  Constantinople 
meant  my  direct  participation  in  general  politics  in  my  Fatherland. 
I  thus  find  myself  compelled  to  start  my  memoirs  at  that  point. 

*  At  that  time  I  was  General  Inspector  of  the  Chataldja  Lines  of  Communica- 
tion. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE,  1913 


CHAPTER   I. 
MILITARY    GOVERNOR   OF    CONSTANTINOPLE,    1913. 

I  ENTER  UPON  MY  OFFICE. 

WHEN  I  was  commissioned  by  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha  to  take  over 
the  direction  of  the  Military  Government  of  Constantinople,  the 
corpse  of  Nazim  Pasha  was  still  lying  in  the  room  of  the  First 
Aide-de-Camp  of  the  Grand  Vizier  and  the  Ex-Grand  Vizier,  Kiamil 
Pasha,  as  well  as  the  Sheik-ul-Islam,  Djemaleddin,  the  Minister 
of  the  Interior,  Reschid  Bey,  and  the  Finance  Minister,  Abdurrah- 
man Bey,  were  lodged  for  safety  in  one  of  the  rooms  of  the 
Minister-President's  quarters. 

After  a  short  conversation  with  Talaat  Bey,  who  had  been 
entrusted  provisionally  with  the  administration  of  the  Ministry  of 
the  Interior,  we  decided  that  Nazim  Pasha's  corpse  should  be  taken 
to  the  hospital  at  Gulhane,  Kiamil  Pasha  and  Djemaleddin  Effendi 
should  be  sent  home,  and  that  we  should  keep  Reschid  Bey  and 
Abdurrahman  Bey  a  few  days  in  the  Military  Government  building, 
in  order  to  protect  them  against  the  rage  the  revolutionaries  were 
displaying  against  them. 

At  that  moment  Lieutenant-Colonel  Nadji  Bey,  Kiamil  Pasha's 
son-in-law,  and  a  friend  of  mine  since  school  days,  was  in  the  Grand 
Vizierate  building.  I  received  him  with  the  words  :  "  You  needn't 
have  any  anxiety.  Your  father-in-law  is  safe.  You  can  take  him 
home,  but  if  he  does  not  want  to  be  molested  by  some  excited 
fellow  it  would  be  advisable  for  him  to  leave  Constantinople  for  a 
time  and  go  to  Europe." 

Nadji  Pasha  thanked  me  very  warmly,  and  Kiamil  Pasha  and 
Djemaleddin  Effendi  reached  their  homes  without  mishap.  Reschid 
and  Abdurrahman  were  brought  to  the  Military  Government 
building,  and  Nazim  Pasha's  body  was  removed  to  the  hospital  at 

13 


14  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Gulhane.  I  myself  went  to  the  Military  Government  and  spent 
the  night  there  engaged  in  taking  such  measures  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  order  as  the  situation  required.  Lest  I  burden  my  story 
with  immaterial  details  I  will  not  describe  them  more  fully. 

I  made  the  doctors  at  Gulhane  give  me  a  report  on  Nazim 
Pasha,  and  also  had  a  detailed  report  of  the  affair  prepared. 


THE  BURIAL  OF  NAZIM  PASHA. 

On  the  next  day  the  burial  of  Nazim  Pasha  was  carried  out  in 
accordance  with  my  instructions. 

I  had  attached  importance  to  the  obsequies  being  carried  out 
with  every  mark  of  distinction,  and  therefore  insisted  that  the  high 
military  dignitaries,  ministers  and  civil  officials,  as  well  as  the 
military  attaches  of  foreign  Powers,  should  take  part. 

The  weather  was  bad  that  day.     I  was  a  prey  to  profound  melan- 
choly.      The  Bulgarians  stood  before  the  Chataldja  lines,  the 
Greek  Fleet  blockaded  the  Dardanelles,  the  warships  of  the  Great 
Powers  were  anchored  off  the  Bechiktach,  prepared    to    occupy 
Constantinople  at  any  moment.       But  we  ourselves,  who  unfor- 
tunately had  not  been  in  a  position  to  wrest  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment from  wreak  and  nerveless  hands  by  lawful  means,  had  seen 
ourselves  compelled  to  resort  to  a  coup  d'etat,  in  which  the  former 
War  Minister  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  our  army  had  unhappily 
lost  their  lives.     And  in  spite  of  all  our  efforts  and  such  great  sacri- 
fices the  future  of  our  country  was  still  in  the  greatest  jeopardy. 
Such  was  the  gloomy  vision  that  passed  before  the  eyes  of  my 
mind,  as  by  the  side  of  Major  Maucorps,  the  French  Military 
Attache,  I  accompanied  the  earthly  remains  of  Nazim  Pasha  to  the 
grave.     As  we  were  crossing  St.  Sophia  Square  I  turned  involun- 
tarily   to    Maucorps    and   said:     "  Look   here,    my    friend,    the 
Europeans  alone  are  responsible  for  this  victim,  for  by  your  per- 
petual injustices  you  have  enticed  the  Turkish  nation  into  the  arena 
and  compelled  it  to  fight  to  be  able  to  live  in  freedom  and  escape 
thraldom  and  misery.     Who  knows  how  many  more  obsequies  you 
will  attend  ?   It  will  be  no  surprise  if  you  have  to  follow  my  coffin 
to-morrow." 

He  made  as  if  he  did  not  understand  me,  and  asked  me  to 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  15 

make  my  meaning  clearer.  Passing  over  the  French  intrigues,  out 
of  courtesy,  I  spoke  of  the  machinations  of  the  English  and 
Italians,  and  especially  those  of  Russia,  and  referred  to  the  spirit 
of  revolt  they  aroused  in  the  country.  I  explained  to  him  how  the 
Balkan  peoples  had  been  compelled  to  form  an  alliance  by  these 
intrigues  and  added  that  now,  when  the  slightest  support  from 
England  or  France  could  still  save  us,  they  not  only  refused  us 
such  support,  but  did  not  hesitate  to  speak  evil  of  us  through  the 
heads  of  their  Governments,  so  that  the  poor  Turks,  after  so  many 
blows  of  adversity,  had  ended  up  by  tearing  each  other  to  pieces. 
The  English  Military  Attache,  Tyrrel,  followed  our  conversation 
with  interest,  though  he  took  no  part  in  it.  Maucorps,  however, 
replied  :  "  You're  right"  !  He  spoke  in  a  tone  which  left  me  in  no 
doubt  as  to  his  genuineness.  We  ultimately  lapsed  into  silence  and 
accompanied  Nazim  Pasha  to  his  last  resting-place. 

THE   GENERAL  AMNESTY. 

On  the  evening  of  the  coup  d'etat  the  President  of  Police  took 
the  precautionary  measure  of  arresting  the  most  prominent 
members  of  the  Opposition  and  bringing  them  to  headquarters. 
A  decision  with  regard  to  them  had  to  be  taken  quickly,  par- 
ticularly as  Reschid  and  Abdurrhaman  were  detained  at  the 
Military  Government  building. 

After  discussing  with  a  few  friends,  and  particularly  Talaat, 
we  decided  not  only  to  take  no  repressive  measures  against  them, 
but  rather  to  strive  to  come  to  some  understanding  with  them. 
Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha  entirely  approved  this  decision. 

Thereupon  I  sent  for  Abdurrhaman  Bey,  who  wished  to  speak 
to  me.  I  gave  him  an  assurance  that  he  and  his  friends  were  in 
no  danger,  that  their  detention  was  only  temporary,  and  merely 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  them  against  attempts  at  assassina- 
tion, and  that  they  could  go  home  in  a  day  or  two.  I  added, 
however,  that  in  my  opinion  they  would  be  wise  to  leave 
Constantinople  and  live  abroad  for  a  time.  I  gave  them  per- 
mission to  have  bedding  and  food  fetched  from  their  houses. 
Two  days  later  I  had  them  taken  back  to  their  homes  under  safe 
escort.  A  day  or  so  later  they  left  Constantinople,  as  did  Kiamil 
Pasha  and  Djemaleddin  Effendi. 


1 6  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

On  the  second  day  after  my  entry  into  office  I  went  to  the 
garrison  headquarters,  and  visited  AH  Kemal  Bey  as  well  as  Riza 
Nur  and  Ismael  Bey  of  Gumuldjina,  the  deputies  for  Sinope,  who 
were  interned  there.  I  gave  them  the  same  assurance  that  they 
were  in  no  danger  if  they  abandoned  all  idea  of  untimely 
opposition.  I  remarked  that  in  these  unhappy  times  the  country 
needed  the  help  of  all  reasonable  and  well-disposed  men,  and  that 
if  they  believed  in  my  good  intentions  I  could  give  them  an 
honourable  field  of  labour. 

Ali  Kemal  Bey  wanted  some  post  in  Europe.  Dr.  Riza  Nur 
asked  for  the  money  necessary  to  prosecute  his  medical  studies  in 
Paris.  Ismael  Pasha  gave  me  his  word  of  honour  that  if  he  were 
allowed  to  remain  in  the  country  he  would  refrain  from  any 
opposition  to  the  Government  until  normal  conditions  were 
restored. 

I  sent  Dr.  Riza  Nur  to  Paris  after  I  had  obtained  the  necessary 
approval  of  the  grant  of  money  he  had  requested.  Kemal  Bey  I 
sent  to  Vienna,  compensating  him  in  the  same  way  for  his  removal. 
1  had  several  letters  from  him  there. 

Four  or  five  days  after  these  negotiations  with  the  leaders  of 
the  Opposition,  the  political  atmosphere  cleared,  and  Mahmud 
Shefket  Pasha's  Ministry  could  settle  down  to  devote  itself  to  its 
great  task. 

As  Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  I  had  also  to  hold 
the  post  of  General  Officer  Commanding  the  operations  base  of  the 
army  at  Chataldja,  and  in  carrying  out  the  double  functions  of 
these  offices  I  made  it  my  principal  business  to  preserve  order  in 
the  city  and  at  any  cost  prevent  the  repetition  of  a  coup  d'etat 
against  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha's  Ministry. 

I  must  not  omit  to  refer  here  to  two  measures  which  I  found 
it  necessary  to  take: 

i.  There  were  in  Constantinople  a  number  of  smugglers  who 
were  offering  smuggled  tobacco  (in  Government  packets)  in  the 
streets  of  the  city,  Sultan  Hamam,  Sirkedji,  and  on  Mahmud  Pasha 
Hill  and  Bayadzid  Square. 

I  detected  an  open  proclamation  of  the  bankruptcy  of  state 
authority  in  the  cry,  "  Two  piastres'  worth  for  one,"  to  the  accom- 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  17 

paniment  of  which  these  people  had  the  audacity  to  offer  their 
wares  in  packets  under  the  tops  of  which  the  strands  of  light  yellow 
tobacco  could  be  seen,  even  if  indistinctly.  To  bring  the  strength 
of  the  Government  home  to  the  civil  population  I  therefore 
resorted  to  the  powers  conferred  on  the  Military  Government  by 
martial  law,  and  announced  to  all  those  concerned  that  anyone 
who  indulged  in  illicit  trading,  whether  wholesale  or  retail,  would 
be  arrested  and  banished  from  Constantinople. 

In  the  next  week  I  had  four  or  five  at  most  of  these  individuals 
deported,  and  the  court  martial  passed  sentence  on  a  few  smugglers 
who  were  caught  in  a  kiosk  not  far  from  the  Seraglio.  The  result 
was  that  the  common  swindling  which  had  become  an  everyday 
occurrence  was  soon  exceptional,  and  the  people  of  Constantinople 
and  its  suburbs  could  henceforth  enjoy  perfect  security. 

2.  There  were  many  people  in  Constantinople  who  indulged  in 
the  vicious  habit  of  making  amorous  remarks  to  Mohammedan 
ladies  as  they  passed  them  out  walking,  on  the  boats  and  bridges, 
or  in  the  streets  and  bazaars.  Among  them  were  even  old  women, 
who  made  indecent  suggestions  and  even  laid  hands  on  elegant  and 
well-dressed  women. 

I  had  always  had  a  violent  hatred  of  this  abuse,  and  I  had  never 
been  able  to  understand  the  neglect  to  take  strong  measures 
against  it  before.  Indeed,  the  evil  was  always  more  or  less  notice- 
able in  proportion  as  the  Government  was  strong  or  weak.  When 
I  became  Military  Governor  many  fathers  of  families  who  had 
reason  to  complain  applied  to  me  with  a  request  to  take  steps  to 
change  this  condition  of  things.  As  our  criminal  code  provided 
but  little  with  which  to  combat  it,  I  found  myself  once  more 
compelled  to  resort  to  the  powers  which  martial  law  conferred 
upon  the  Military  Governor. 

I  .issued  a  warning  that  men  who  used  insulting  language  and 
women  who  accosted  ladies  should  be  transported  to  the  interior. 
After  four  or  five  examples  had  been  made  our  women  were  able 
to  walk  in  the  streets  without  further  molestation.  For  the  first 
time  a  definite  step  had  been  taken  to  place  the  personal  freedom 
of  Turkish  women  on  a  secure  basis. 

During  my  period  of  office  as  Military  Governor  I  have  proved 
that  I  am  one  of  the  most  zealous  advocates  of  the  emancipation 

B 


1 8  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

of  women,  or,  to  put  it  more  accurately,  I  believe  firmly  in  the 
important  part  which  woman  is  called  upon  to  play  not  only  in 
social  life,  but  also  in  public  affairs.  It  is  true  that  for  that  reason 
I  was  subsequently  made  the  object  of  numerous  calumnies  on  the 
part  of  certain  persons.  Nevertheless  the  Women's  Movement 
which  began  with  my  term  of  office  not  only  did  not  die  out  as  time 
went  on,  but  extended  and  developed  continuously  and  rendered 
the  greatest  service  during  the  war.  I  am  absolutely  convinced 
that  the  civilising  agencies  of  a  country  can  best  and  soonest  be 
promoted  with  the  help  of  woman,  and  that  those  nations  which 
keep  their  womankind  in  a  state  of  slavery  are  on  the  high  road 
to  inevitable  decay. 

AN  ATTEMPT  TO  OVERTHROW  THE  GOVERNMENT. 

After  my  appointment  as  Military  Governor  of  Constantinople 
I  invited  the  editors  of  the  principal  newspapers  of  the  capital  to 
call  upon  me,  and  told  them  that  their  papers  would  be  subjected 
to  a  very  mild  censorship  only  if  they  would  undertake  to  publish 
no  articles  of  a  kind  to  imperil  public  order.  I  asked  them  to 
write  articles  of  a  general  and  helpful  nature,  to  enlighten  public 
opinion  and  rouse  the  new  forces  which  the  Fatherland  needed  for 
its  salvation.  I  desired  to  allow  even  the  most  violent  organs  of 
the  Opposition  to  continue  publication,  organs  which  dated  from 
the  time  of  the  previous  Ministry.  The  latter  certainly  exceeded 
on  occasion  the  instructions  given  them,  but  I  confined  myself 
to  making  representations  to  their  editors  or  responsible  directors. 

The  Government  worked  with  the  greatest  energy  to  arouse 
the  martial  spirit  of  the  nation  and  create  an  army  capable  at  any 
rate  of  beating  the  Bulgarians  facing  the  Chataldja  lines  during 
the  second  war  against  the  Allies.  On  the  one  hand  they  founded 
the  Committee  of  National  Defence,  and  endeavoured  to  accumu- 
late all  possible  material  and  military  resources,  and  on  the  other 
they  tried  to  raise  the  moral  of  the  army  and  did  everything  in 
their  power  to  create  opinion  favourable  to  Turkish  interests 
among  the  Great  Powers. 

At  that  moment  the  English,  French  and  Russian  diplomatists 
who  had  been  sent  to  Constantinople  were  doing  their  utmost  to 
induce  us  to  make  peace  with  the  Balkan  States  on  the  terms  that 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  19 

we  should  accept  the  Enos-Midia  line  and  abandon  the  islands  of 
the  Archipelago. 

When  I  called  one  day  at  the  French  Embassy  the  Ambassador, 
Monsieur  Bompard,  with  whom  I  had  been  on  friendly  terms  since 
the  days  when  I  was  Governor  in  Adana,  chose  this  topic  as  the 
subject  of  conversation. 

"  My  dear  Djemal  Bey/'  he  said,  "  why  are  you  so  obstinate 
about  keeping  Adrianople  and  the  islands  ?  You've  effected  a 
coup  d'etat.  You're  in  power.  We  know  that  your  party  repre- 
sents the  strongest  factor  in  the  country  and  that,  unlike  the  old 
Ministry,  you  wouldn't  hesitate  to  take  and  carry  out  decisions 
such  as  even  we  ourself  regard  as  in  the  best  interests  of  Turkey. 
You  must  make  it  your  business  now  more  than  ever  to  secure 
peace  and  order  at  home.  Don't  you  think  it  wiser  to  devote  the 
moral  and  material  resources  you  mean  to  squander  on  the  reten- 
tion of  Adrianople  to  the  reforms  you  intend  to  introduce  ? 
Broadly  speaking,  all  you  possess  in  the  city  is  a  few  historically 
notable  mosques,  and  as  for  the  islands,  they've  always  been 
inhabited  solely  by  Greeks." 

By  way  of  answer  I  took  the  Ambassador  up  to  a  map  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  which  was  hanging  on  a  wall.  I  pointed  out 
that  for  the  defence  of  Constantinople  a  hinterland  was  required 
which  must  at  any  rate  stretch  to  Adrianople,  and  that  if  Anatolia 
was  to  be  protected  against  the  attack  of  Greek  robber  bands  the 
possession  of  the  islands  off  our  coasts  was  absolutely  essential. 

"  My  dear  Monsieur  Bompard/'  I  ended  up,  "  we  regard  this 
question  of  Adrianople  and  the  islands  as  a  life  and  death  matter 
for  our  future.  We  should  be  eternally  grateful  to  any  European 
Government  which  supported  us  in  this  affair,  and  it  would  always 
find  us  at  its  side.  It  would  be  a  great  coup,  and  France  could 
thereby  win  a  position  of  moral  supremacy  in  the  East/' 

While  the  Government  was  thus  endeavouring  to  save 
Adrianople  I  was  getting  news  every  day  which  seemed  to  indicate 
that  the  Opposition  were  planning  a  coup  d'etat.  The  reports 
were  ultimately  so  numerous  and  became  so  urgent  that  I  found 
myself  compelled  to  come  to  some  decision  in  the  matter. 

One  day  fate  delivered  into  our  hands  a  certain  Serdar  Sidki 
Effendi  from  Erzerum.  This  man  was  caught  with  another 
individual  in  the  act  of  having-  proclamations  printed  at  a  printing 

B2 


20  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

»  -j> 

establishment  in  Pera.  The  ringleaders  of  this  group  were  work- 
ing under  the  moral  protection  of  Prince  Sabaheddin  Bey  and 
taking  direct  orders  from  his  Private  Secretary,  the  Bosniac  Satfet 
Lutfi  Bey.  Their  aim  was  a  coup  d'etat  with  the  intention  of 
making  Prince  Sabaheddin  Bey  Grand  Vizier. 

We  arrested  them  all.  We  did  not  get  hold  of  Satfet  Lutfi 
for  a  time  until  we  ultimately  found  him  in  the  house  of  Herr 
Lazare,  interpreter  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Consulate.  I  had 
him  arrested  and  imprisoned.  As  these  measures  were  contrary 
to  the  capitulations,  I  found  myself  compelled  to  get  orders  from 
Mahmud  Schefket  Pasha  and,  as  supreme  responsible  represen- 
tative of  the  executive  authority,  call  at  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Embassy  in  full  dress  and  present  my  apologies  to  Count 
Pallavicini. 

This  attempt  at  a  coup  d'etat  is  described  as  an  "  attempt  to 
overthrow  the  Government  "  in  the  record  relating  to  this  affair. 
These  documents,  which  were  most  carefully  drawn  up,  are  pre- 
served in  the  Military  Government,  the  Prefecture  of  Police  and 
the  War  Court.  The  prisoners  were  condemned  to  various 
penalties.  Prince  Sabaheddin  I  left  alone  for  the  time  being,  as 
Talaat  Bey,  who  was  then  performing  the  functions  of  Secretary- 
General  of  the  Committee  and  endeavouring  to  arrive  at  some 
understanding  with  the  Prince,  had  asked  me  to  postpone  his 
arrest  until  we  secured  some  obvious  and  irrefutable  proof  of 
his  guilt. 

In  spite  of  the  arrest  and  punishment  of  Satfet  Lutfi  and  his 
accomplices  Sabaheddin  Bey  continued  his  machinations.  This 
time  he  entrusted  the  conduct  of  the  business  to  his  close  friend, 
Dr.  Nihad  Reschad  Bey.  Nihad  Reschad  Bey  now  got  into 
touch  with  Talaat  Bey  with  a  view  to  finding  a  basis  for  compro- 
mise between  our  party  and  Prince  Sabaheddin's,  and  simul- 
taneously started  a  plot,  the  object  of  which  was  the  murder  of 
Talaat  Bey,  Mahomed  Shefket  Pasha,  and  other  persons.  But  I 
was  daily  kept  informed  of  his  intrigues,  and,  so  to  speak,  followed 
him  step  by  side.  The  Doctor's  double  game  was  so  well  con- 
cealed by  his  elegant  exterior  that  Talaat  Pasha,  who  was  in 
negotiation  with  him,  would  not  believe  in  the  machinations  of 
this  gentleman,  though  I  exposed  them  in  all  their  details  to  him. 
He  accused  my  intelligence  service  of  wishing  to  deceive  me  until 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  21 

I  ultimately  convinced  him  entirely  by  a  shattering  piece  of 
evidence. 

One  day  there  was  to  be  another  conference  between  Talaat 
and  the  Doctor.  This  conference  was,  however,  preceded  by 
another  meeting  which  the  Doctor  had  arranged  with  his  accom- 
plices. Highly  satisfied  with  the  course  of  the  discussion  with  his 
friends,  the  Doctor  took  leave  of  them,  remarking  with  a 
Machiavellian  smile :  "  Now  we'll  talk  to  Talaat  about  an  under- 
standing/' I  had  taken  good  care  that  someone  in  whom  Talaat 
Bey  had  perfect  confidence  should  witness  this  scene.  From  that 
moment  on  Talaat  Bey  doubted  no  longer.  Doctor  Nihad,  who 
had  obviously  got  wind  of  the  affair,  succeeded  in  escaping  when  I 
tried  to  have  him  arrested  also.  Several  of  his  friends  were  put 
under  lock  and  key,  and  formed  the  second  group  which  was 
brought  before  a  court  martial. 

Prince  Sabaheddin  disappeared  from  the  scene.  I  learned 
subsequently  that  under  the  protection  of  Mr.  FitzMaurice,  the 
first  interpreter  at  the  English  Embassy,  and  Major  Tyrrel,  the 
Military  Attache,  he  had  fled  to  a  house  in  English  occupation,  so 
that  our  hands  were,  of  course,  tied. 

I  could  not  understand  how  the  Prince,  who  had  planned  the 
conspiracy  with  extreme  boldness,  could  suddenly  abandon  his 
scheme  and  take  to  flight.  When  Talaat  Pasha  was  later  on 
returning  from  our  journey  from  Constantinople  to  Berlin  and 
came  to  speak  of  this  matter  he  remarked  with  a  smile:  "  When 
you  gave  me  palpable  proof  of  the  intrigues  of  the  doctor  and 
the  Prince  and  I  realised  that  you  were  determined  to  have  them 
arrested  I  had  the  Prince  warned  through  one  of  his  confidants  to 
disappear  as  quickly  as  possible.  That  is  how  he  got  away." 

Curiously  enough,  it  was  I  who  had  set  the  Prince  free  at  the 
time  of  the  events  of  April  I3th  (March  3ist)  after  he  had  been 
taken  prisoner  by  the  Army  of  Operations  and  brought  to  the 
Ministry  of  War.  I  had  hardly  heard  of  his  arrest  before  I  went 
to  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha  and  represented  to  him  that  these 
measures  against  the  Prince  were  not  permissible.  I  told  him  that 
inasmuch  as  we  had  come  to  Constantinople  to  remove  the  mischief 
makers  and  fight  the  nefarious  activities  of  the  street  politician,  it 
would  not  be  right  to  behave  in  the  same  way  towards  the  Prince 
and  certain  individuals  whose  political  opinions  and  convictions 


22  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

differed  from  our  own.  The  Pasha  at  once  ordered  his  release. 
I  thereupon  went  to  the  great  drawing-room  in  which  the  Prince 
was  waiting  with  his  mother,  the  Sultana,  and  told  him  with  polite 
apologies  that  he  was  free.  But  while  the  enquiries  into  the 
activities  of  Satfet  Lutfi  and  his  friends  were  in  progress  and 
Doctor  Nihad's  accomplices  were  being  searched  for  I  was  in- 
formed that  the  Prince  was  one  of  the  many  authors  of  the  events  of 
April  I3th.  This  time  he  was  enabled  to  escape  through  the  pro- 
tection of  Talaat  Pasha,  although  there  could  be  no  doubt  about 
his  participation  in  the  preparations  for  a  coup  d'etat. 

One  day  at  the  time  when  I  was  taking  proceedings  against  the 
Prince  and  his  fellow-conspirators  (it  was  before  his  flight)  his 
brother,  Prince  Lutfullah  Bey,  came  to  the  Military  Government 
to  ask  for  my  help  in  a  personal  matter.  In  the  course  of  our 
conversation  I  began  to  speak  about  Sabaheddin  Bey,  and  said : 
"  I  want  you  to  do  me  a  little  favour,  I  mean  take  your  brother 
Sabaheddin  Bey  a  message.  In  his  appeals,  both  here  and  in 
Europe,  he  asserts  that  the  leaders  of  '  Unity  and  Progress  '  are 
assassins  whose  hands  are  red  with  blood.  Although  this  allega- 
tion is  in  direct  contrast  to  the  evidence,  I  will  assume  for  the 
moment  that  it  is  true.  I  myself  maintain,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
all  the  members  of  the  Opposition,  Prince  Sabaheddin  included, 
have  blood  on  their  hands  as  well  as  we  ourselves. 

"  To  begin  with,  it  was  they  who  organised  the  events  of 
April  i3th ;  theirs  is  the  guilt  for  all  the  blood  which  was  then  shed 
as  well  as  for  that  which  flowed  when  the  Army  of  Operations 
entered  Constantinople.  Further,  the  Prince  took  an  active  part 
in  the  formation  of  the  group  of  t  Band  of  Delivers  '  Officers,  and 
was  not  unconnected  with  the  rising  in  Albania.  His  Highness 
thus  cannot  evade  partial  responsibility  for  the  blood  that  has 
flowed.  On  the  other  hand,  he  is  trying  to  brand  us  as  murderers. 
I  must  therefore  ask  the  Prince  to  recognise  these  facts  and  be 
good  enough  to  admit  that  those  whom  he  called  murderers  only 
proceeded  to  take  counter-measures  in  an  absolute  emergency. 
He  should  also  admit  that  the  sharper  measures  were  taken  by  his 
party  and  should  be  prepared  for  a  compromise  which  allowed  both 
parties  to  remain  true  to  their  different  political  convictions  and 
yet  to  work  for  the  common  welfare  of  the  Fatherland,  each  in  its 
own  way." 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  23 

Lutfullah  Bey  naturally  defended  his  brother  most  vigorously, 
and  vowed  that  he  was  incapable  of  dipping  his  hands  in  blood  and 
had  nothing  to  do  with  all  these  affairs.  Thereupon  I  said  to 
him:  "  I  can't  discuss  these  matters  with  you,  as  you  know 
nothing  about  them,  but  please  tell  me  whether  you  will  repeat  my 
words  to  your  brother.  That  will  satisfy  me." 

He  promised,  and  added:  "  Perhaps  I  can  do  some  good  this 
way." 

Two  or  three  days  later  Prince  Lutfullah  Bey  called  on  me 
again  and  told  me  that  he  had  repeated  my  words  to  his  brother, 
and  that  the  latter  had  replied  that  my  accusations  conflicted 
wholly  with  the  truth  and  that  I  either  desired  to  slander  him  or 
must  unquestionably  have  been  falsely  informed.  I  recognised 
but  one  political  principle  which  he  regarded  as  his  ideal,  and 
fought  for  its  realisation  by  the  methods  of  peace.  He  shrank 
with  horror  from  all  bloodshed,  and  he  could  not  understand  how 
anyone  could  regard  him  as  the  advocate  of  a  bloody  revolution, 
much  less  as  its  organiser.  He  was  bound  to  assume,  merely 
from  my  remark  as  communicated  to  him,  that  there  was  a  doud 
of  hatred  and  enmity  about  him,  and  he  therefore  considered  he 
must  withdraw  for  some  time  to  some  safer  place. 

"  I  will  make  Sabaheddin  a  proposal,"  I  replied.  "  We  will 
choose  the  three  best-known  English  lawyers.  I  will  show  this 
committee  of  judges  the  proofs  and  evidence  against  the  Prince 
which  I  can  produce  and  they  shall  decide  whether  the  Prince  was 
or  was  not  one  of  the  organisers  of  the  various  insurrections  and 
revolutionary  movements.  If  their  decision  is  against  him  the 
Prince  would  have  to  face  the  Ottoman  Courts." 

A  few  days  later  Prince  Lutfullah  Bey  returned  and  assured  me 
that  he  had  no  chance  of  seeing  his  brother  and  putting  my  proposal 
before  him.  As  a  matter  of  fact  Prince  Sabaheddin  had  dis- 
appeared the  night  before. 

ABUK  AHMED  PASHA. 

At  the  time  of  my  enquiries  into  the  coup  d'etat  planned  by  our 
enemies  my  attention  was  urgently  called  by  my  intelligence 
service  to  the  fact  that  Abuk  Ahmed  Pasha,  who  was  then  com- 
manding the  Chataldja  Army,  was  not  unconcerned  in  the  affair, 
and  had  instructed  his  nephew,  Prince  Sabaheddin,  and  their 


24  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

friends  to  promise  his  help.  I  have  always  considered  Abuk  Ahmed 
Pasha  a  man  of  honour,  and  do  not  think  any  different  of  him  now, 
and  I  am  convinced  that  the  greatness  and  prosperity  of  his  country 
has  always  been  his  dearest  wish,  and  that  he  has  genuinely  devoted 
himself  to  it.  For  that  reason  I  could  put  no  faith  in  the  numerous 
reports  which  I  received  from  my  agents,  and  I  remained  of  that 
opinion  even  when  he  resigned  after  Enver  Pasha  was  appointed 
War  Minister,  and  he  was  asked  to  reside  in  Damascus.  Even 
now  I  adhere  firmly  to  that  view  although  I  see  that  Abuk  Pasha 
has  become  a  Minister  in  the  Cabinet,  which  includes  individuals 
like  Marshal  Shakir  Pasha  Hadra  Sabri  and  others  who,  as  the 
most  prominent  and  influential  members  of  the  Liberal-Union,  were 
the  authors  of  the  attack  on  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha. 


DAM  AD  SALIH  PASHA. 

My  agents  displayed  the  greatest  zeal.  They  continuously 
brought  me  news  of  a  conspiracy  which  aimed  at  the  overthrow 
of  the  Ministry,  and  in  particular  contemplated  the  assassination  of 
Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha  and  the  deaths  of  Talaat  Bey  and  myself. 
This  time  the  conspirators  had  the  protection  and  direction  of  the 
first  interpreter  at  the  English  Embassy,  FitzMaurice,  and  Major 
Tyrrel,  the  Military  Attache.  I  was  also  informed  that  Muhib  Bey, 
the  director  of  the  Political  Section  of  the  Police  in  the  time  of 
Kiamil  Pasha's  Ministry,  Captain  Cherkess  Kiazim,  Ex-Captain 
Shefket  Ismael  of  Gumuldjina,  and  several  other  individuals  were 
concerned  in  the  conspiracy;  I  had  these  people  very  closely 
shadowed  by  my  secret  agents.  I  received  a  report  which  gave  me 
the  most  positive  indications  that  Damad  Salih  Pasha  and  Reshid 
Bey,  the  former  Minister  of  the  Interior,  were  at  the  head  of  the 
conspiracy.  As  I  knew  that  Damad  Salih  Pasha  was  a  member 
of  the  committee  of  Liberal-Union  I  could  not  believe  that  he 
would  participate  in  such  a  crime.  In  any  case  I  was  very  much 
concerned  to  protect  an  individual  closely  related  to  the  Imperial 
Family,  and  prevent  him  from  taking  any  part  in  a  plot. 

I  therefore  sent  one  of  my  aides-de-camp  to  him  and  asked  him 
to  give  me  an  appointment,  and  the  Military  Government.  He 
was  there  at  the  hour  agreed.  After  I  had  given  him  a  very 
respectful  reception  I  said  to  him  :  "  Would  Your  Excellency  allow 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  35 

me  to  tell  you  quite  straight  what  is  on  my  mind  ?  Certain  people 
who  wish  to  make  use  of  the  material  and  moral  advantages  of 
your  great  name  and  person  and  your  relationship  with  the 
Imperial  Family  are  secretly  engaged  in  underhand  intrigues  and 
misusing  your  name.  A  secret  committee  is  said  to  have  been 
formed  under  your  chairmanship  and  to  be  seeking  adherence  in 
civil  and  military  circles  with  the  intention  of  removing  the  heads 
of  the  present  Government  in  the  near  future  and  starting  a  revo- 
lutionary movement.  I  must  assume  that  your  Excellency  knows 
nothing  of  all  this,  but  please  be  good  enough  to  believe  that  the 
individuals  in  question  are  actually  doing  as  I  have  said,  and 
thereby  saddling  Your  Excellency  with  the  heaviest  responsibility. 
Please  believe  that  I  regard  it  as  my  sacred  duty  to  protect  you 
against  their  activities,  especially  having  regard  to  your  relation- 
ship to  the  Imperial  Family,  to  which  I  am  in  the  highest  degree 
devoted.  I  therefore  beg  you  very  respectfully  to  leave  Constanti- 
nople for  a  time  and  reside  somewhere  in  Europe,  so  that  if  the 
Government  has  to  take  strong  measures  against  the  leaders  of  the 
conspiracy  very  shortly  you  will  not  be  drawn  into  the  affair.  Be- 
sides, such  a  step  would  also  mean  that  these  people  were  deprived 
of  the  strongest  support  on  which  they  could  build. " 

To  these  words,  which  were  perfectly  honestly  meant,  he 
replied  in  a  manner  and  tone  which  were  utterly  incompatible  with 
the  rules  of  good  breeding  and  courtesy. 

"  Look  here,  Bey  Effendi,"  he  said,  "  I'll  speak  to  you  quite 
frankly.  Thanks  to  Her  Highness  the  Sultana,  I'm  leading  an 
extraordinarily  pleasant  life  here,  a  life  which  suits  me  so  well 
that  I  shouldn't  like  to  miss  a  moment  of  it.  I  must  therefore 
decline  your  suggestion  of  going  to  Europe.  Besides,  if  I  took 
your  advice  and  went  to  Europe  people  might  regard  it  as  an 
admission  and  start  accusing  me.  So  here  I  am,  and  here  I 
remain;  don't  you  hesitate  to  do  whatever  you  think  right.  My 
only  regret  is  that  you  had  me  fetched  to  frighten  me  with 
threats." 

While  asking  the  Pasha  not  entirely  to  forget  the  rules  of 
courtesy,  I  said  to  him:  "  I  can  see  Pasha  that  you  have  great 
confidence  in  the  strength  of  your  organisation,  which  is  known 
to  me,  and  are  convinced  that  your  hopes  will  be  realised  very 
shortly.  You  think  that  you  can  wait  here  for  their  realisation 


26  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

without  danger,  but  I  can  assure  you  that  I  have  a  magnificent 
intelligence  service  at  my  disposal,  and  there  is  nothing  doing  with 
conspiracies.  It  may  be  that  a  few  attacks  on  individuals  will 
succeed,  but  the  Government  will  never  be  overthrown.  I  must 
therefore  advise  your  Excellency  to  accept  my  proposal.  Her 
Imperial  Highness  the  Sultana  could  also  accompany  you  to  Europe 
if  ishe  thought  at  necessary.  It  would  not  be  difficult  to  gat 
His  Highness  the  Grand  Vizier  to  obtain  the  approval  of  His 
Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan  and  to  obtain  the  assurance  of  all 
requirements.  In  case  you  wrere  absolutely  determined  to  reject 
my  well-meant  advice,  I  should  regard  it  as  my  duty  to  have  you 
strictly  watched  from  this  day  on.  But  in  that  case  please  do 
not  complain  and  say  that  the  '  Military  Governor  has  us  shadowed 
by  his  spies!  '  He  sprang  up  angrily.  "  Don't  hesitate  for  a 
minute  to  do  what  you  think  good/'  he  replied.  "  I  am  not  the  sort 
of  man  to  be  sent  away  easily. "  Thereupon  I  rushed  away. 
From  that  day  I  had  Salih  Pasha  continuously  watched,  so  that 
nothing  he  did  was  unknown  to  me. 

Four  or  five  days  later  the  Director-General  of  the  Regie,  M. 
Weyl,  called  upon  me.  He  greeted  me  with  the  remark  that  he 
had  returned  from  Athens  the  previous  evening  and  that  his  first 
call  had  been  on  me.  After  a  few  polite  nothings  he  said : 
"  Djemal  Pasha,  I  am  really  very  angry  with  you  to-day.  You 
have  insulted  one  of  my  friends  who  is  as  much  to  me  as  you 
yourself  and  treated  him  in  a  way  not  in  keeping  with  his  posi- 
tion. I  mean  Damad  Salih  Pasha.  You  have  accused  him  of 
being  the  leader  of  a  conspiracy  and  advised  him  to  go  to  Europe. 
Why  have  you  done  that  ?  I  know  Salih  Pasha  as  well  as  I  know 
myself,  and  I  am  convinced  that  he  would  never  take  part  in  so 
horrible  a  business. " 

After  I  had  listened  to  him  very  quietly  I  replied:  "My  dear 
M.  Weyl,  please  don't  get  excited!  I  know  I  have  said  hard 
things  to  Damad  Salih  Pasha,  but  I  did  so  only  after  mature  con- 
sideration, and  I  am  interesting  myself  in  him  not  on  his  own 
account,  but  solely  out  of  regard  for  his  relations  with  the  Imperial 
Family,  whose  honour  I  have  to  preserve.  Unfortunately  the 
Pasha  seems  to  have  great  confidence  in  the  success  of  his  friends, 
as  he  would  not  listen  to  my  honest  advice.  Henceforth  I  shall 
find  myself  compelled  to  have  Salih  Pasha  watched  even  more 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  27 

closely.  To  show  you  how  effectively  he  is  shadowed  I'll  tell  you 
just  one  thing :  Just  ask  him  whether  an  anonymous  letter  has  not 
just  reached  him,  and  whether  in  that  letter  he  was  not  requested 
to  go  to  Pera.  Of  course,  the  Pasha  did  not  go.  But  why? 
Because  he  realised  he  was  under  close  observation  and  did  not 
wish  to  betray  to  me  his  accomplices'  haunts.  If  the  Pasha 
will  not  leave  Constantinople,  I  must  grant  myself  licence 
to  take  such  measures  as  I  think  necessary  to  deal  with  him. 
And  you  will  have  no  ground  of  complaint  against  me  on  that 


account/ 


M.  Weyl,  who  had  heard  me  out  attentively,  took  leave  of  me 
and  departed.  Next  day  he  came  back.  He  told  me  that  the 
Pasha  had  certainly  received  an  anonymous  letter  containing  the 
proposal  I  had  mentioned,  but  as  he  knew  neither  the  place  nor 
who  had  sent  the  letter,  and  was  afraid  that  it  was  a  trap,  he  had 
not  accepted  the  invitation.  Yet  he  was  as  determined  as  ever  to 
remain  in  Constantinople.  "  I  don't  wish  to  be  mixed  up  in  any 
way  in  this  ticklish  business/'  added  M.  Weyl.  "  It  is  only  my 
friendship  for  the  Pasha  which  has  moved  me  to  put  in  a  word 
for  him  with  another  friend.  Now  that  he  refuses  so  obstinately 
to  take  your  advice,  I  shall  intercede  for  him  no  longer.  All  I  ask 
is  that  you  won't  let  him  become  the  victim  to  calumny  and  intrigue. 
Of  course,  I've  boundless  confidence  in  your  probity  and 
conscientiousness. " 

The  house  to  which  Salih  Pasha  was  invited  belonged  to  Captain 
Cherkess  Kiazim,  who  had  arrived  in  Constantinople  about  a  week 
before  the  assassination,  and  been  enabled  to  land  by  the  protection 
of  FitzMaurice  and  Major  Tyrrel.  The  Pasha,  of  course,  knew 
this,  but  as  he  saw  that  he  was  being  watched  he  did  not  go  to  the 
rendezvous  that  evening. 

I  was  really  anxious  to  save  Salih  Pasha,  but  he  rejected  my 
advice  with  that  obstinacy  characteristic  of  those  who  are  certain 
of  their  success.  His  obduracy  ultimately  led  to  his  death.  I 
regret  this  tragedy  most  fervently,  particularly  as  I  am  entirely 
devoted  to  the  Ottoman  Imperial  Family,  and  must  involuntarily 
have  contributed  to  cause  a  royal  princess  so  terrible  a  sorrow. 
But  what  could  I  do  ?  His  crime  was  too  great  to  be  forgiven,  and 
if  he  had  been  pardoned  after  his  conviction  order  and  peace  in 
the  country  would  have  been  shaken  for  ever. 


28  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

ISMAIL   HAKKI   BEY   OF   GUMULDJINA. 

At  that  time  my  agents  were  also  watching  one  of  the  leaders 
of  the  Opposition,  Ismail  Hakki  Bey  of  Gumuldjina.  I  was  firmly 
convinced  that  this  most  audacious  individual  was  a  very  doubtful 
character,  and  positive  that  the  country  must  expect  great  trouble 
from  him.  But  the  scheme  of  my  plan  of  action  required  that  I 
should  make  skilful  use  of  him  and  have  him  arrested  only  when  I 
had  incontrovertible  evidence  against  him  in  my  hands.  I 
assumed  that  my  agents  must  have  got  him  in  a  corner,  for  one 
day  he  came  to  me  at  Military  Headquarters  in  great  excitement 
(it  was  about  a  week  before  the  assassination  of  Shefket  Pasha), 
and  said : 

"In  view  of  the  fact  that  I  am  under  observation  by  your 
agents,  I  must  assume  that  the  Government  suspects  me.  Look 
here,  Djemal  Bey !  I'm  talking  to  you  as  a  man  of  honour,  and 
can  assure  you  that  I  shall  keep  the  promise  I  made  to  you  when 
I  was  in  prison  at  headquarters.  Not  a  word  passes  my  lips  which 
has  any  wrong  intention.  Neither  publicly  nor  privately  am  I 
concerned  in  any  movement  against  the  Government.  As  your 
men  are  now  spreading  untrue  reports  about  me,  and  may  be 
deceiving  you,  I  think  it  better  to  speak  to  you  personally.  I  give 
you  my  word  of  honour  that  I  am  not  engaged  in  any  sort  of 
enterprise  against  the  Government  and  have  nothing  to  do  with 
those  who  are  working  against  the  Government. " 

As  I  knew  that  this  individual  was  one  of  the  chief  organisers 
of  the  conspiracy  which  was  being  definitely  hatched  against 
Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha,  I  was  surprised  and  felt  extremely  dis- 
gusted at  his  perjuring  himself  in  this  way.  Even  at  the  time 
when  he  was  released  from  prison  by  my  intervention  after  the 
coup  d'etat  of  January  he  had  sworn  on  his  honour  and  conscience 
that  he  would  refrain  from  opposition  until  peace  was  concluded 
and  order  restored.  Hardly  a  month  had  passed  before  he  was 
working  with  all  his  might  to  arrange  an  abominable  crime.  When 
I  heard  him  thus  repeat  this  false  oath  I  could  not  refrain  from 
showing  my  disgust : 

"Enough  of  oaths-,  Ismail  Bey !  "'  I  said.  "You  may  be 
certain  that  I  condemn  no  one  without  incontrovertible  proof. 
Otherwise  I  should  never  have  released  you  from  prison  as  I 
did.  But  I  advise  you  really  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  certain 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  29 

people  who  are  hatching  plots,  as  otherwise  my  Intelligence  Ser- 
vice may  not  feel  exactly  well-disposed  towards  you.  For  this 
time  you  may  withdraw/' 

He  thanked  me  and  went.  But  I  had  made  a  great  mistake, 
for  if  I  had  been  more  prudent  and  given  an  order  for  his  arrest 
at  that  moment  it  would  not  have  been  possible  for  him  to  make 
good  his  escape  after  the  murder  of  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha.  He 
would  also  undoubtedly  have  been  convicted  on  the  facts  disclosed 
at  the  enquiry  into  the  assassination,  and  the  country  would  have 
been  freed  for  ever  from  a  man  who  had  been  bribed  by  Greek 
money  to  betray  his  country. 

As  I  write  these  lines  I  read  in  the  papers  that  Ismail  Bey  of 
Gumuldjina  has  become  Minister  of  the  Interior  in  Damad  Ferid 
Pasha's  Ministry,  and  even  been  appointed  president  of  an  extra- 
ordinary court,  which  is  sitting  in  judgment  on  the  leaders  of 
"  Unity  and  Progress."  All  I  need  say  here  is  that  we  shall 
probably  see  in  a  very  short  time  what  a  fatal  thing  for  his 
country  his  appointment  means. 

In  spite  of  the  greatest  efforts  on  my  part,  Ismail  of  Gumuldjina 
succeeded  in  escaping  after  Mahmud  Pasha's  death. 


KIAMIL  PASHA. 

Early  one  morning,  a  week  or  ten  days  before  the  murder  of 
Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha,  the  Prefect  of  Police,  Azmi  Bey,  told  me 
that  Kiamil  Pasha  was  on  board  a  ship  of  the  Messageries  Man- 
times.  It  had  arrived  at  the  quay  during  the  night,  but  he  had 
not  yet  gone  ashore.  He  asked  me  to  issue  the  necessary  order 
for  his  arrest.  I  ordered  him  to  send  the  Director  of  the  Political 
Department  to  the  Pasha  at  once  and  request  His  Highness  not  to 
set  foot  on  land,  but  return  to  Egypt  by  the  same  ship.  Half  an 
hour  later  Azmi  Bey  informed  me  that  Kiamil  Pasha  had  landed 
during  the  night  and  gone  to  his  house  in  Stambul.  I  knew  that 
the  conspirators  had  decided  on  the  Pasha's  return  to  Constanti- 
nople, but  I  did  not  think  Kiamil  Pasha  would  have  the  courage 
to  respond  to  their  invitation.  The  arrival  of  the  Pasha  in  Con- 
stantinople was  the  surest  sign  that  the  insurrection  was  immediate. 
The  situation  demanded  very  speedy  and  strong  measures.  I  sum- 
moned Azmi  Bey  to  me  and  asked  him  to  proceed  as  follows  :  — 


30  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

"  I  shall  send  an  officer  from  Military  Headquarters  with  some 
military  police  to  Kiamil  Pasha's  house.  They  will  have  a  com- 
missary and  an  adequate  number  of  civil  police  under  their  orders. 
The  officer  and  the  commissary  with  their  party  must  go  to  Kiamil 
Pasha's  house.  They  must  distribute  their  men  and  watch  the 
entrances  so  that  not  a  soul,  whether  a  native  or  a  foreigner, 
can  communicate  with  the  occupants.  The  officer  and  the  com- 
missary will  ask  the  Pasha  to  see  them  and  convey  the  following 
decision  of  the  Government :  '  The  presence  of  His  Highness 
Kiamil  Pasha  is  a  danger  to  the  internal  tranquillity  of  the  country 
at  the  moment.  The  Government  requests  the  Pasha  to  be  good 
enough  to  return  to  Egypt  by  the  ship  in  which  he  came.  Even  if 
the  ship  lies  at  anchor  here  for  three  days  His  Highness  is  re- 
quested to  go  on  board  within  twelve  hours  at  the  latest.  Other- 
wise the  Government  would  find  itself  compelled  to  take  pre- 
cautionary measures  which  His  Highness  might  find  very  uncom- 
fortable/ The  officer  and  the  commissary  will  then  bring  us  back 
the  Pasha's  answer.  You  yourself  must  remain  in  the  house  and 
prevent  anyone  from  entering." 

These  orders  were  immediately  carried  out.  The  Pasha  replied 
that  he  was  very  tired  and  could  not  stand  the  discomforts  of  a 
second  sea  voyage  within  so  short  a  time.  He  did  not  consider 
it  necessary  to  comply  with  the  Government's  illegal  request.  In 
view  of  this  reply  I  gave  orders  that  his  house  should  be  guarded 
so  closely  that  no  one  could  go  out  or  in  until  the  Pasha  left 
Constantinople. 

While  these  orders  were  in  force  the  First  Dragoman  of  the 
English  Embassy,  FitzMaurice,  came  to  the  Pasha's  house  to 
welcome  the  Pasha  in  the  name  of  the  Embassy.  The  police, 
however,  refused  to  admit  him.  This  gentleman  immediately 
decided  to  take  counter-measures  to  prevent  the  deportation  of 
Kiamil  Pasha  from  Constantinople,  and  at  once  went  to  Mahmud 
Shefket  Pasha  in  the  name  of  the  Ambassador.  He  said  that  he 
did  not  understand  how  he  could  be  prevented  from  calling  on 
Kiamil  Pasha,  an  old  friend  of  the  Embassy,  and  it  would  have  a 
very  bad  effect  on  public  opinion  in  England.  In  this  and  other 
ways  he  revealed  his  animosity  towards  us.  About  mid-day 
Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha  rang  me  up  and  asked  me  to  go  to  him 
at  once. 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  31 

He  was  sitting  in  the  Grand  Vizier's  room  with  the  Naval 
Minister,  Churuk  Sulu  Mahmud  Pasha.  Halil  Bey  was  also  to  be 
received  by  the  Grand  Vizier.  We  entered  together.  The  Grand 
Vizier  said,  looking  extremely  gloomy : 

"  Here's  a  pretty  state  of  things !  Apparently  you're  holding 
Kiamil  Pasha  prisoner  in  his  own  house.  You  mean  to  compel 
him  to  leave  Constantinople  ?  " 

"  Certainly,  Your  Highness.  I  consider  it  necessary  to  take  the 
precautionary  measure  you  mention." 

"  I  order  you  to  stop  guarding  his  house  at  once  and  leave  him 
alone.  The  Pasha  can  please  himself  whether  he  lives  here  or 
abroad. " 

"  In  my  opinion,  Your  Highness,"  I  replied,  "  it  would  be 
extremely  dangerous  to  cancel  the  measures  we  have  taken, 
and  .  .  ." 

He  bellowed  at  me:  "  You're  a  soldier,  aren't  you?  I  give 
you  orders !  Carry  out  my  orders  at  once,  or  I  shall  deal 
with  you  very  severely.  Do  you  want  to  make  the  English  my 
enemies  ?  If  you'd  heard  what  the  First  Dragoman  told  me  you'd 
see  that  you're  wrong." 

It  was  impossible  for  me  to  ask  the  Pasha  what  right  the 
representative  of  a  foreign  Power  had  to  intervene  in  the  action  of 
the  Government  against  X.  or  Y.,  for  the  Pasha  was  in  such  a 
state  that  he  was  not  open  to  reason.  I  felt  extremely  bitter  at 
the  severe  and  unjust  condemnation  of  the  measures  I  had  taken 
against  Kiamil  Pasha  in  view  of  his  secret  machinations.  With 
tears  in  my  eyes  I  replied :  "It  shall  be  done,  Your  Highness  !  " 
and  left  the  room. 

Churuk  Sulu  Mahmud  Pasha,  who  understood  how  hurt  I  was, 
followed  me  out  and  took  me  into  the  Ambassador's  drawing- 
room.  We  stood  by  the  window  in  silence  for  five  minutes.  At 
last  I  said : 

'  Did  you  see  how  I  was  treated?    Can  anyone  stand  things 
like  that  without  loving  his  country  ?  " 

"  You're  right,"  replied  Mahmud  Pasha,  "  but  don't  be 
impatient." 

After  I  had  recovered  my  composure  somewhat  I  thanked  the 
Pasha,  took  my  leave,  and  returned  to  Headquarters.  I 
summoned  Azmi  Bey,  and  said : 


32  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

"  On  the  order  of  His  Highness  the  Grand  Vizier  the  police 
guarding  Kiamil  Pasha's  house  are  to  be  withdrawn  and  he  is  to 
be  allowed  unhindered  communication  with  anyone,  but  I  consider 
it  necessary  to  take  the  following  measure :  One  military  police- 
man and  one  civil  detective  must  remain  near  the  house  and  observe 
everyone  coming  out  or  going  in." 

Then  I  wrote  two  letters  to  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha.  In  the 
first  I  informed  him  that  his  orders  as  regards  Kiamil  Pasha  had 
been  carried  out.  In  the  second  I  asked  to  be  relieved  of  my  post 
as  Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  in  view  of  the  fact  that  my 
health  had  given  way  under  the  strain  of  my  work.  I  was  per- 
fectly conscious  that  this  request  was  not  in  the  interests  of  the 
country,  but  I  had  no  option  but  to  decide  as  I  did,  as  without  free- 
dom to  take  all  necessary  measures,  it  was  impossible  for  me  to 
secure  the  safety  of  the  capital. 

The  Pasha,  who  very  soon  regretted  the  violent  way  in  which 
he  had  spoken  to  me,  called  me  up  on  the  telephone  and  asked  me 
to  see  him  even  before  he  got  my  letters.  As  I  did  not  wish  to  see 
him  again  before  he  received  my  resignation  I  excused  myself  for 
the  moment  on  the  ground  of  urgent  business,  and  told  him  that  I 
could  not  be  at  his  disposal  until  the  evening  at  some  hour  con- 
venient to  him.  He  ordered  me  to  go  to  the  Grand  Vizier's  palace 
at  9  p.m. 

That  day  my  resignation  was  laid  before  the  Council  of 
Ministers,  and  the  Pasha  asked  the  Ministers  what  he  was  to  do. 
The  latter  frankly  advised  him  to  insist  that  I  should  remain  at  the 
head  of  the  Military  Government.  The  Pasha  said  that  this  was 
his  opinion  also,  but  that  there  was  bound  to  be  a  difficult  situation 
if  I  insisted  on  the  deportation  of  Kiamil  Pasha,  and,  in  any  case, 
he  wished  to  speak  to  me  first.  That  evening  I  met  Ibrahim  Bey, 
who  greeted  me  with  the  words :  "I'm  told  you  want  to  resign. 
How  on  earth  is  that?  We  shall  all  resign."  My  other  friends 
also  opposed  my  intention.  But  to  me  there  wrere  two  alternatives 
only :  to  be  absolutely  independent  and  assume  all  responsibility 
for  my  orders,  or  to  resign.  For  the  delicate  situation  and  my 
responsibility  for  public  safety  demanded  nothing  less  than  entire 
freedom  of  action. 

At  9  p.m.  I  went  to  see  the  Pasha  at  the  Grand  Vizier's  palace. 
He  gave  me  a  very  friendly  reception. 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  33 

"  Why  did  you  take  my  remarks  this  morning  to  heart  so?  " 
he  said.  "  Don't  you  know  I  love  you  like  a  son.  When  a  father 
is  upset  he  can't  treat  his  children  quite  as  he  would  like.  Please 
regard  the  incident  as  a  little  altercation  between  father  and  son 
and  don't  be  angry  with  me  any  more." 

"  Pasha,"  I  replied,  "  please  don't  doubt  that  I  take  your 
behaviour  to-day  only  as  it  was  meant.  I  always  regard  myself  as 
your  son  and,  as  I  know  your  worth  only  too  well,  I  can  stand  even 
the  hardest  treatment  from  you.  Thus  it  is  not  your  violence 
towards  me  which  has  compelled  me  to  ask  for  permission  to 
resign,  but  simply  the  impossibility  of  working  under  such  circum- 
stances. Your  Highness  is  not  aware  of  what  is  brewing  and  not 
au  courant  of  the  secret  revolutionary  conspiracies.  I  did  not 
wish  to  trouble  Your  Excellency  with  police  matters,  and  would 
prefer  not  to  do  so  even  now.  But  I  can  assure  Your  Excellency 
that  Kiamil  Pasha  has  been  brought  to  Constantinople  in  order 
to  be  made  Grand  Vizier  over  your  corpse.  The  arrival  of  the 
Pasha  is  the  surest  sign  that  a  revolution  is  imminent.  To  compel 
him  to  leave  Constantinople  is  to  clip  the  wings  of  the  plot.  Your 
Highness  knows  well  enough  that  those  whose  duty  it  is  to  take 
measures  against  secret  menaces  and  attempts  at  assassination  do 
not  always  have  a  free  hand  in  the  selection  of  their  means. 
When  you  appointed  me  to  my  post  you  promised  me  the  freest 
possible  hand,  and  now,  when  faced  with  totally  unjustifiable 
interference  by  the  English  Embassy,  you  prevent  me  from  taking 
the  most  urgent  steps.  In  these  circumstances  I  am  quite  unable 
to  carry  on  my  work." 

After  long  consideration  he  replied:  "  All  right,  I  give  you 
an  entirely  free  hand,  but  don't  take  any  stronger  measures 
against  Kiamil  than  are  absolutely  necessary  and  allow  him  to 
stay  here  three  days." 

On  that  I  withdrew  my  request  to  resign.  When  I  got  back 
to  Headquarters  I  immediately  asked  Abdullah  Bey,  Kiamil 
Pasha's  son,  and  a  member  of  the  State  Council,  to  call  upon  me 
next  day.  He  accepted  the  invitation,  and  I  told  him  that  in  any 
case  the  Pasha  must  leave  Constantinople,  that  it  was  impossible 
to  withdraw  the  orders  given,  and  that  he  need  expect  no  support 
from  the  English  Embassy  or  any  other  foreign  representatives. 
I  added  that  if  he  had  not  left  the  city  by  Friday  at  the  latest  I 


34  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

should  have  to  have  him  arrested  and  probably  sent  to  somewhere 
in  Anatolia. 

After  considerable  discussion  Abdullah  Bey  entirely  approved 
my  decisions,  and  went  away  after  promising  that  he  would  try 
and  induce  his  father  to  abandon  his  futile  opposition.  He 
returned  in  the  evening  to  tell  me  that  the  Pasha  would  leave  by 
sea  next  day.  And,  true  enough,  the  following  day,  a  Friday, 
Kiamil  Pasha  left  his  house,  accompanied  by  Sir  Gerald  Lowther, 
the  English  Ambassador,  drove  past  the  Sublime  Porte,  and  went 
on  board  ship  at  Galata.  The  same  evening  the  vessel,  gay  with 
lights,  left  Constantinople  bearing  Kiamil  Pasha  with  her. 


THE  ASSASSINATION  OF  MAHMUD  SHEFKET  PASHA. 

Many  signs,  not  to  mention  the  reports  of  my  agents,  seemed 
to  show  that  the  conspirators  had  made  their  preparations  and 
that  a  general  onslaught  would  be  made  in  the  next  few  days. 

On  the  day  of  the  murder,  Wednesday,  June  15,  1913,  I  went 
to  the  War  Office  early  in  the  morning  to  get  the  Pasha's  orders 
and  to  impress  on  his  aides-de-camp  the  necessity  of  guarding 
him  with  special  care  on  his  visits  to  the  Sublime  Porte.  I  talked 
to  the  Pasha  for  about  half  an  hour,  and  he  was  particularly 
jovial  that  morning  and  felt  quite  safe  as  the  result  of  the  measures 
which  had  been  taken.  As  I  did  not  want  to  make  him  unduly 
anxious,  I  told  him  casually  that  attempts  at  assassination  were 
to  be  expected  at  that  time,  and  for  that  reason  it  would  perhaps 
be  necessary  to  make  a  few  arrests  the  next  day  or  the  day 
following.  I  added  that,  with  all  our  precautions,  it  was  impos- 
sible to  prevent  individual  attacks,  and  it  was  therefore  advisable 
for  him  to  be  very  careful  when  he  was  in  the  streets.  I  had 
therefore  told  his  aides-de-camp  to  keep  a  particularly  sharp 
watch  over  him. 

"  I  know,"  he  said,  "  it's  in  God's  hands!  " 

I  left  him  and  went  up  to  the  next  floor  to  speak  to  Major 
Saadullah  and  Major  Keival  Bey  in  the  3rd  Section  of  the  Head- 
quarters Staff.  We  dfscussed  a  regulation.  It  was  perhaps  a 
quarter  of  an  hour  later  that  a  sound  was  heard  coming  from  the 
War  Office  Square — five  regular  taps  as  if  someone  was  knocking 
a  large  drum  with  a  hammer.  As  I  was  expecting  an  attempt  at 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  35 

assassination  any  moment,  I  asked  Kemal  Bey  whether  they  were 
not  revolver  shots. 

"  I  don't  think  so/'  he  said.  "  It's  someone  beating  carpets 
or  knocking  nails  in  somewhere." 

But  I  was  anything  but  satisfied  with  that  answer,  and  expected 
bad  news  at  any  moment.  Five  minutes  later  my  faithful  servant 
Ramazan  rushed  into  the  room  and  screamed  out :  4 '  The  Pasha 
has  just  been  killed  !  "  I  was  in  the  vestibule  at  a  bound.  "  Which 
Pasha  ?  Who  killed  him  ?  Where  ?  "  I  shouted.  "  In  the  Bayazid 
Square,  on  his  way  to  the  Sublime  Porte.  I  don't  know  who 
killed  him." 

As  I  was  rushing  up  to  the  first  floor  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha, 
streaming  with  blood,  was  brought  up  to  the  steps  to  his  room. 
I  can  still  hear  his  husky  death-rattle.  I  stopped  for  a  moment  in 
the  corridor  and  looked  into  the  Pasha's  pallid  face.  Then  I 
reflected,  where  does  duty  call  me  ?  I  made  up  my  mind  at  once. 
My  first  task  was  to  pursue  and  catch  the  assassins  and  hasten  to 
Military  Headquarters  to  preserve  order  in  the  capital.  My  aide- 
de-camp  Hilmi  came  up  to  me.  "  Come  along,"  I  said,  and  sped 
away  to  the  Ministry  of  War.  I  called  at  the  Garrison  Head- 
quarters to  get  the  first  reports.  Just  as  I  was  turning  the  corner 
I  was  met  by  a  lieutenant  in  the  Military  Police.  "  Have  the 
assassins  been  caught  ?  "  I  cried.  "  I  don't  know,  Effendi,"  he 
answered,  "I'm  just  looking  for  a  patrol."  "  What  do  you  want  a 
patrol  for?  "  I  shouted,  "  turn  back  at  once  and  arrest  the  mur- 
derers before  they  have  time  to  get  away  or  find  a  hiding  place." 
The  officer,  amazed  at  the  violence  of  my  order,  was  on  his  feet 
in  a  moment,  and  ran  to  the  scene  of  the  crime. 

When  I  reached  the  place  a  few  minutes  later  in  my  car  he  told 
me  that  he  had  just  arrested  a  certain  Topal  Tewfik  who  was  un- 
questionably one  of  the  assassins,  but  the  others,  according  to 
report,  had  made  good  their  escape  in  a  motor  car.  Of  course  I 
had  to  remain  satisfied  with  this  first  report.  I  then  went  to  Head- 
quarters and  had  military  measures  taken  in  Pera,  Skutari,  and 
Stambul. 

Hardly  half  an  hour  had  passed  since  the  crime  when  military 
patrols,  mounted  and  on  foot,  appeared  in  the  streets  of  the  capital, 
and  an  hour  later  a  proclamation  was  issued  in  which  the  public 
was  informed  of  the  crime  and  the  intensification  of  the  state  of 

C  2 


36  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

siege  was  announced.  The  patrols  would  take  the  strongest 
measures  against  anyone  who  caused  the  slightest  disturbance. 

As  I  thought  it  possible  that  the  conspirators  might  go  to  the 
Imperial  Palace  and  trouble  His  Majesty  I  rang  up  the  First  Sec- 
retary of  the  Palace ;  gave  him  certain  instructions  and  asked  him 
to  inform  His  Majesty  at  once  that  all  necessary  measures  had 
been  taken. 

At  the  same  time  I  got  into  telephone  communication  with  the 
Deputy  Commander-in-Chief,  Izzet  Pasha,  in  Hadem  Koj,  and  gave 
him  a  general  summary  of  the  situation.  I  told  him  of  the  steps 
for  the  preservation  of  order  which  had  already  been  taken  and 
asked  him  temporarily  to  place  at  my  disposal  two  cavalry  regi- 
ments which  were  quartered  in  the  Daud  Pasha  Barracks,  and 
also  to  send  two  infantry  regiments  from  Hadem  Koj  to  Kuchuk 
Chekmedje  to  help  in  preserving  public  order.  Simultaneously  I 
rang  up  Said  Halim  Pasha  and  the  other  Ministers  to  tell  them 
what  had  happened,  and  asked  them  to  come  to  the  Ministry  of 
War  as  soon  as  possible  to  take  the  necessary  decisions. 

SOME  PRECAUTIONARY  MEASURES. 

Anticipating  some  such  occurrence,  I  had  previously  made  the 
officials  at  the  Police  Prefecture  draw  up  a  list  of  all  persons  of 
every  class  who  might  be  expected  to  attempt  to  exploit  the  situa- 
tion and  start  riots  in  the  different  quarters  of  the  city.  I  had 
given  instructions  to  the  Prefect  of  Police,  Azmi  Bey,  to  arrest 
offhand  every  one  on  this  list  at  the  first  serious  attempt  at  a 
rising.  Azmi  Bey  reported  to  me  that  this  order,  given  long 
before,  had  just  been  carried  out,  and  asked  where  the  persons 
arrested  were  to  be  taken  to.  Said  Halim  Pasha,  the  interim 
Grand  Vizier,  Hadji  Adil  Bey,  the  Minister  for  the  Interior,  and 
I  decided  that  in  order  to  keep  the  capital  quiet  it  was  necessary 
to  send  the  prisoners  to  Sinope  and  supply  them  with  sufficient 
money. 

I  asked  the  Shipping  Administration  to  fit  out  a  ship  to  take 
them,  and  asked  Azmi  Bey  to  have  all  the  arrests  carried  out  in 
the  course  of  the  night  'so  that  they  could  be  put  on  board  and  sent 
away  by  the  next  evening.  I  also  had  Damad  Salih  Pasha  and 
others  whom  I  knew  to  be  involved  in  the  plot  arrested  and 
examined  by  the  police. 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  37 

THE  BURIAL  OF  MAHMUD  SHEFKET  PASHA. 

I  wanted  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha's  obsequies  to  be  as  sump- 
tuous an  affair  as  possible  in  order  to  show  that  peace  and  order 
were  being  maintained  in  the  capital,  notwithstanding  the 
assassination  of  the  Grand  Vizier.  I  asked  the  appropriate 
authorities  to  send  out  the  notices  of  his  death  and  invitations  to 
the  funeral  to  all  leading  people,  high  officials  of  state  and  staff 
officers  who  were  in  the  capital.  A  large  escort  of  troops  was  to 
follow  the  funeral  cortege.  The  ambassadors  of  foreign  Powers 
and  the  captains  and  officers  of  the  foreign  warships  in  the  harbour 
were  also  invited  to  be  present  at  the  ceremony.  Invitations  were 
issued  to  the  military  and  naval  attaches,  and  so  forth.  More  than 
five  thousand  people  took  part  in  the  procession.  The  weather  was 
splendid,  and  the  streets  were  thronged.  Under  the  impression 
of  this  great  ceremony,  many  women  were  seen  weeping  bitterly, 
and  the  general  effect  was  thus  all  the  greater.  The  large  scale  on 
which  the  obsequies  were  planned  had  the  desired  effect.  Person- 
ally I  should  have  preferred  to  pass  through  the  streets  of  Stambul 
at  the  head  of  a  mounted  patrol,  but  as  I  wanted  to  get  a  general 
view  of  the  cortege  I  entered  my  car  on  the  Pera  side,  and  going 
by  a  roundabout  way  through  Pankaldi,  I  joined  the  procession  at 
the  School  of  Notre  Dame  de  Sion.  The  general  impression  was 
more  or  less  exactly  what  I  had  hoped,  but  the  moment  I  beheld 
the  coffin  of  the  dead  statesman,  on  whom  I  had  placed  so  many 
hopes,  I  was  plunged  into  the  deepest  distress. 

After  the  funeral  the  French  Commandant  of  Gendarmerie, 
Saron,  came  up  to  congratulate  me  on  the  perfect  order  which 
reigned  in  the  city.  He  told  me  of  a  conversation  between  the 
Commander  of  the  Italian  Fleet  and  General  Baumann  (who  had 
been  sent  to  reorganise  the  gendarmerie),  which  he  had  overheard 
when  standing  on  the  Hill  of  Freedom  waiting  for  the  funeral 
procession  to  pass.  The  Admiral  had  said  to  Baumann :  "  This 
Djemal  Bey  is  extraordinarily  bold.  It  needs  great  courage  and 
equally  great  confidence  in  the  efficiency  of  one's  precautions  to 
arrange  a  funeral  procession  on  this  scale  in  a  limited  area  on  the 
very  day  after  the  crime,  and  with  the  criminals  still  at  large,  and 
then  to  assemble  the  ambassadors  of  foreign  Powers,  and  even  the 
commanders  of  their  men-of-war.  If  some  revolutionary  were 
to  throw  a  bomb  and  injured  one  or  more  of  us  the  Turkish  capital 


38  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

would  be  immediately  occupied  by  contingents  from  our  warships. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  that,  contingency  has  been  under  discussion, 
and  the  necessary  measures  have  been  taken.  But  here  we  are 
and  nothing  has  happened  !  If  the  criminals  and  their  accomplices 
are  caught  within  a  day  or  two  Djemal  Bey  will  have  rendered  his 
country  a  great  service  and  he  won't  fail  to  utilise  that  result  to 
demand  the  withdrawal  of  the  fleets  from  the  capital  and  the  Bos- 
phorus.  In  my  opinion  we  are  totally  superfluous  here/' 

The  murder  had  taken  place  on  a  Wednesday.  The  funeral 
was  on  Thursday,  and  on  the  Friday  I  was  able — at  the  price  of  my 
aide-de-camp  Hilmi's  life — to  hunt  out  and  arrest  the  ringleaders 
of  the  conspiracy,  Kiazim,  the  Circassian,  and  some  of  his  con- 
federates, and  bring  them  before  the  Committee  of  Enquiry  of  the 
Court  Martial. 

The  examination  and  enquiry  revealed  that  the  party  as  a  whole 
and  individual  members  of  it  were  working  for  the  same  end,  to 
deprive  the  country  of  its  government,  get  the  leaders  of  "  Unity 
and  Progress  "  out  of  the  way  by  assassination,  and  by  putting 
pressure  on  His  Majesty  the  Sultan  to  get  Marshal  Shakir  Pasha 
temporarily  appointed  Grand  Vizier.  Under  his  presidency  a 
Provisional  Cabinet  was  to  be  formed,  and  in  three  days  and  nights 
all  adherents  of  the  Committee  of  "  Unity  and  Progress  "  were  to 
be  massacred.  At  a  later  stage  a  new  Cabinet  was  to  be  formed, 
with  Kiamil  Pasha  or  Prince  Sabaheddin  at  its  head. 

I  need  not  fear  that  anyone  will  dispute  the  accuracy  of  these 
facts.  My  assertions  will  be  confirmed  if  the  report  of  the 
examination  and  the  results  of  the  enquiry  are  published.  If  men 
read  the  confession  of  Salih  Bey,  interpreter  to  the  Tramway  Com- 
pany, who  took  part  in  the  doings  of  very  highly-placed  individuals 
who  were  involved  in  the  plot,  further  proofs  will  be  unnecessary. 

Salih  Bey  is  still  alive.  I  consider  him  a  man  of  honour.  Even 
after  the  punishment  of  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha's  assassins  and 
their  confederates  I  was  inspired  by  a  desire  to  secure  the  cause 
of  peace  and  order  in  the  country  once  and  for  all,  and  therefore 
sent  Salih  Bey  to  Europe  to  make  overtures  to  several  individuals 
who  had  been  sentenced  to  death  in  contumaciam  My  proposals 
were  very  simple.  If  these  persons  would  write  to  me  personally 
in  their  own  hand  and  tell  me  in  what  way  they  had  participated  in 
the  various  revolutionary  movements  and  assassinations  since  the 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  39 

proclamation  of  the  constitution,  I  would  at  once  procure  a  general 
amnesty  in  their  favour.  Of  course  my  purpose  was  to  enlighten 
public  opinion  both  at  home  and  abroad  and  to  prove  that  there 
was  nothing  in  the  slanders  on  "  Unity  and  Progress/'  When 
Salih  Bey,  who  knew  how  far  each  of  them  was  involved,  laid  these 
proposals  before  the  individuals  concerned,  they  openly  expressed 
their  astonishment,  and,  of  course,  rejected  them,  obviously 
accusing  Salih  Bey  of  having  received  money  from  the  Govern- 
ment. I  repeat  once  more  that  I  have  not  given  Salih  Bey  a  penny. 
His  confession  shows  that  Marshal  Shakir  Pasha  had  accepted  the 
interim  Grand  Viziership  with  full  knowledge  of  the  end  in  view, 
and  that  among  those  who  were  to  influence  His  Majesty  the 
Sultan  in  favour  of  his  selection  there  were  individuals  who  held 
very  high  positions  in  the  State.  Legal  actions  against  these 
highly-placed  persons  would  only  have  complicated  the  situation 
still  more  and  to  no  purpose. 

SAID  HALIM  PASHA'S  CABINET. 

After  the  death  of  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha  it  was  decided  to 
propose  Prince  Said  Halim  Pasha  as  the  party's  candidate  for  the 
office  of  Grand  Vizier.  For  reasons  which  I  cannot  judge  His  ' 
Majesty  had  appointed  Said  Halim  Pasha  as  Grand  Vizier  for  the 
interim,  and  ordered  that  the  other  Ministers  should  also  carry  on 
their  work  for  the  time  being.  After  a  few  days  Said  Halim 
Pasha's  Cabinet  was  reformed,  the  only  change  being  that  Talaat 
Bey  took  over  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior. 

A  DIGRESSION. 

I  must  ask  to  be  allowed  a  short  digression  at  this  point  so  that 
I  can  lay  a  foundation  for  certain  political  remarks  to  which  I  shall 
return  later  on  in  my  memoirs. 

There  was  great  agitation  over  the  fact  that  Damad  Salih 
Pasha  was  condemned  to  death.  The  trial  was  over,  but  the  J 
judgment  had  not  yet  received  Imperial  consent.  One  day  I  was 
asked  by  the  French  Councillor  of  Embassy,  Monsieur  Boppe,  who 
was  deputising  for  the  Ambassador,  then  on  leave,  to  call  at  the 
Embassy  on  an  important  matter. 

"  My  dear  Djemal  Bey,"  he  said,  "  I've  just  had  a  telegram 


40  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

from  Monsieur  Pichon,  the  Foreign  Minister.  You  know  what  a 
good  friend  to  Turkey  Pichon  is.  I  am  convinced  of  your 
friendly  feelings  for  France,  and  I  wanted  to  have  your  opinion  on 
the  attitude  I  am  to  adopt/* 

The  telegram  which  he  handed  to  me  read  as  follows : 
"  According  to  news  just  received,  Salih  Pasha,  the  son  of 
Haireddin  Pasha  of  Tunis,  has  been  arrested  and  condemned  to 
death.  This  news  has  caused  great  excitement  in  Tunis  where 
Salih  Pasha  is  held  in  high  esteem.  The  French  Government  is 
certain  that  the  conviction  of  one  of  its  proteges  may  lead  to  great 
unrest  in  Tunis,  and  feels  compelled  to  intervene  on  behalf  of 
Salih  Pasha.  Speak  to  the  Grand  Vizier  at  once  and  insist  that 
Salih  Pasha  shall  be  released  and  allowed  to  return  without 
hindrance  to  Tunis/' 

After  I  had  read  the  telegram  I  said  nothing  for  a  time.  I  now 
understood  why  Salih  Pasha  had  not  abandoned  the  organisation 
of  the  plot  in  spite  of  my  pleading.  The  nearer  I  arrived  to  the 
truth,  the  more  I  pitied  our  unhappy  country.  At  length  I  said  to 
Monsieur  Boppe :  "  You  know  my  great  sympathy  for  France, 
and  notwithstanding  the  adverse  comment  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment in  recent  times,  I  have,  as  you  know,  not  abandoned  my 
efforts  to  revive  our  French  friendship.  If  you  want  to  alienate 
public  opinion  in  Constantinople  and  throughout  the  East  you  will 
certainly  proceed  with  your  intervention.  I  must  tell  you  before- 
hand, however,  that  that  step  will  have  no  success.  Salih  Pasha 
has  been  condemned  on  the  strength  of  much  incontrovertible 
evidence.  The  execution  of  the  sentence  on  him  and  his  con- 
federates awaits  His  Majesty's  confirmation.  We've  had  enough 
of  seeing  the  Government  perpetually  weakened  by  such  crimes. 
This  time  we  have  made  up  our  minds  to  exact  the  extreme  penalty, 
however  high  their  rank  may  be.  We  hope  that  by  so  doing  we 
shall  check  similar  attempts  in  the  future.  The  influence  you  pro- 
pose to  bring  to  bear  on  the  Grand  Vizier  will  not  save  Salih  Pasha, 
but  public  opinion  will  accuse  the  French  Embassy  of  favouring 
coups  d'etat  in  Constantinople,  and  that  may  lead  to  permanent 
estrangement.  In  my  opinion,  your  better  course  is  to  ask 
Monsieur  Pichon  to  give  up  his  idea." 

Monsieur  Boppe  agreed  with  me,  and,  in  fact,  did  not  call  on 
the  Grand  Vizier  at  all. 


Military  Governor  of  Constantinople  41 

Two  days  after  the  judgment  had  received  the  Imperial  approval 
it  was  decided  that  the  sentence  should  be  carried  out  next  day. 
At  eleven  o'clock  at  night  I  was  rung  up  by  the  French  Embassy, 
and  Monsieur  Boppe  asked  me  personally  to  go  to  him  at  once. 
I  was  hardly  in  his  presence  when  he  handed  me  in  great  excite- 
ment a  second  telegram  from  Monsieur  Pichon.  The  latter  had 
been  very  angry  at  the  reply  of  the  Charge  d'Affaires,  who  had 
advised  against  intervention,  and  instructed  him  most  definitely  to 
speak  to  the  Grand  Vizier  without  a  moment's  delay  and  save  Salih 
Pasha  at  any  cost.  As  I  didn't  want  to  increase  Monsieur  Boppe's 
agitation,  I  said:  "  It's  too  late,  my  friend.  The  sentence  has 
been  confirmed  by  His  Majesty  and  will  be  carried  out  at  daybreak. 
It's  too  late  for  you  to  speak  to  the  Grand  Vizier  to-night.  The 
sentence  will  have  been  executed  before  it  is  possible  to  issue  a 
counter-order.  But  I  cannot  understand  why  Monsieur  Pichon  is 
so  obstinate  and  what  are  his  motives  in  blaming  you  instead  of 
thanking  you  for  your  wise  advice."  Monsieur  Boppe  took  the 
whole  responsibility  on  his  own  shoulders,  again  refused  what  he 
knew  would  be  a  futile  intervention,  and  next  morning  learned  that 
the  sentence  had  been  carried  out.  A  few  days  before  Salih 
Pasha's  execution  I  had  had  his  brothers,  Tahir  and  Mahmet 
Haireddin  Bey,  put  under  arrest.  I  had  not  the  slightest  doubt  that 
Tahir  Haireddin  Bey  was  still  a  bolder  and  more  dangerous  person 
than  Salih  Pasha.  The  French  Embassy  wanted  to  intervene  in 
favour  of  these  two.  We  understood  that  this  intervention  was  of 
a  semi-official  character,  and  stipulated  as  the  basis  of  our  consent 
that  these  two  men  should  for  the  future  take  no  part  whatever  in 
the  affairs  of  the  Turkish  Government,  and  that  they  would  re- 
nounce their  Turkish  nationality  entirely,  adopt  French  nationality, 
and  go  to  France.  The  necessary  formalities  were  completed  on 
that  basis. 

These  were  the  last  services  which  the  sons  of  Haireddin  ren- 
dered to  the  Turkish  nation.  I  hoped  that  we  should  never  hear 
of  them  again.* 

As  these  gentlemen  hail  from  Tunis,  they  would  be  better 
employed  in  trying  to  free  their  Fatherland  from  the  French  yoke. 

*  I  heard  subsequently  that  Tahir  Haireddin  had  returned  to  Constantinople 
and  been  appointed  Minister  of  Agriculture  with  the  title  "  Minniran  "  (What 
a  marvel !). 


42  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

We  should  then  see  whether  Monsieur  Pichon  would  intervene 
to  save  their  heads  from  the  guillotine. 

Before  I  close  this  digression  I  should  like  to  add  one  more 
word.  The  malicious  rumour  that  I  and  Talaat  Bey  went  to  the 
Imperial  Palace  to  put  pressure  on  His  Majesty,  who  did  not  wish 
to  confirm  the  sentence,  is  utterly  false.  The  Grand  Vizier's  report 
and  appendices  were  sent  to  the  Sublime  Porte  the  same  day, 
together  with  the  Imperial  confirmation. 


THE  OUTBREAK  AND   END  OF  THE 
SECOND    BALKAN  WAR 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  OUTBREAK  AND  END  OF  THE  SECOND  BALKAN 

WAR. 

THE  RECOVERY  OF  ADRIANOPLE. 

IT  was  at  the  beginning  of  his  term  of  office  as  Grand  Vizier  and 
after  the  failure  of  the  Sharkoj  offensive,  the  fall  of  the  fortress 
of  Adrianople,  as  well  as  Janina  and  Scutari  in  Albania,  that  Mah- 
mud  Shef  ket  Pasha  had  to  sign  the  preliminary  peace  and  accept  the 
Enos-Midia  line.  A  short  time  after  the  Pasha's  death  the  second 
Balkan  war  broke  out,  and  the  Serbs,  Greeks  and  Rumanians 
marched  against  the  Bulgarians. 

The  situation  demanded  that  we  should  utilise  this  state  of 
affairs  and  attack  the  Bulgarians  ourselves  in  order  to  recover 
Adrianople.  All  the  members  of  the  party  thought  that  the 
Government  had  come  to  a  decision  in  that  sense,  and  hoped  with 
good  reason  that  the  army  would  be  set  in  motion.  The  English 
Foreign  Secretary,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  aware  of  the  state  of  public 
feeling  on  this  matter  in  Constantinople,  worked  with  all  his  might 
and  the  intervention  of  the  English  Embassy  to  persuade  the 
Sublime  Porte  to  abandon  this  plan.  He  even  used  threatening 
language  in  his  speeches  in  the  House  of  Commons.  In  the 
Ministry  opinions  were  divided. 

I  shall  never  forget  the  following  occurrence.  One  Friday 
evening  I  went  to  Said  Halim  Pasha's  Palace  in  Jenikoj.  All  the 
Ministers  were  present,  as  a  Ministerial  Council  was  in  progress. 
Before  my  arrival  they  had  been  discussing  various  questions,  and 
at  the  moment  were  enjoying  an  interlude  on  the  marble  balcony 
ovei looking  the  sea.  Osman  Nizami  Pasha  remarked  to  his  neigh- 
bour, Mahmud  Pasha,  the  Naval  Minister:  "HI  now  succeed 
in  persuading  everyone  here  to  abandon  the  idea  of  recovering 

45 


46  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Adrianople,  I  believe  I  shall  have  rendered  the  country  the  greatest 


service/ 


The  madness  of  his  intentions,  which  were  utterly  opposed  to 
the  interests  of  the  country,  made  me  gasp. 

In  one  of  the  rooms  I  found  Said  Halim  Pasha  and  Talaat  Bey 
feeling  very  depressed.  Said  Halim  Pasha  turned  to  me  and  said : 
"  We've  quite  failed  to  bring  the  majority  round  in  favour  of  inter- 
vention, and  we  simply  don't  know  what  to  do." 

Talaat  Bey  informed  me  that  he  would  be  able  to  settle  the 
money  question  next  day  in  a  conference  Hvith  M.  Weyl,  the 
Director-General  of  the  Regie.  He  actually  discussed  the  matter 
with  M.  Weyl  next  day,  and  I  was  present.  M.  Weyl  promised 
the  Government  a  loan  of  a  million  and  a  half  on  condition  that 
the  Regie's  concession  was  extended  for  fifteen  years.  Acting 
on  the  decision  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  the  Finance  Minister, 
Rifat  Bey,  and  Talaat  Bey,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  accepted 
these  conditions.  Such  is  the  explanation  of  the  Regie  business, 
which  for  the  last  two  or  three  years  has  been  denounced  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  as  a  crime  of  Djavid  Bey's. 

I  am  convinced  that  a  Government  which  has  accepted  these 
conditions  at  such  a  moment  cannot  undo  what  has  been  done. 

The  same  day  Talaat  Bey  motored  to  Headquarters  at  Hadem 
Koj  to  take  the  opinion  of  Izzet  Pasha,  the  Deputy  Commander- 
in-Chief,  at  the  War  Ministry. 

Izzet  Pasha  considered  that  two  questions  were  particularly 
important,  but  was  prepared  to  give  the  army  the  order  to  advance 
if  he  could  be  given  satisfactory  assurances  on  these  two  points  : 

1.  Would  not  the  political  complications  which  might 
arise  out  of  the  advance  of  the  army  bring  the  country  into 
very  great  danger? 

2.  Have  we  the  necessary  money  to  secure  the  supplies 
for  the  army  ? 

Talaat  Bey  was  commissioned  to  explain  the  standpoint  of 
the  minority  among  the  Ministers  as  regards  the  first  point,  and 
to  add  that,  as  a  result  of  the  extension  of  the  concession  to  the 
Regie,  the  financial  problem  was  solved.  He  returned  the  next 
day  and  brought  us  Izzet  Pasha's  approval.  Yet,  in  spite  of  all, 
the  majority  of  the  Ministers  was  convinced  that  the  advance  would 
have  disastrous  results  for  us. 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    47 

Next  morning  I  and  Midhat  Shukri  Bey  called  on  the  Ministers 
who  were  still  wavering.  We  explained  to  them  that  we  should 
lose  our  moral  right  to  guide  the  State  and  must  send  in  our  I 
resignations  if  we  allowed  this  opportunity  of  recovering 
Adrianople  to  pass  unutilised,  for  this  has  been  the  object  which 
had  necessitated  our  coup  d'etat  and  for  which  our  Deputy 
Commander-in-Chief  and  War  Minister  had  had  to  give  his  life. 

Some  of  them  were  convinced,  but  others  announced  their 
intention  of  resigning.  We  told  them  that  it  was  their  duty  to 
show  their  devotion  to  the  cause  by  not  retiring.  At  long  last 
a  majority  was  secured  before  the  Council  of  Ministers  assembled. 
In  this  part  of  my  memoirs  I  have  no  authority  to  give  names. 

I  was  concerned  in  this  affair  solely  in  my  capacity  as  leading 
member  of  our  party,  and  because  I  was  in  the  friendliest  and 
closest  relations  with  the  Ministers  of  that  party.  It  was  not,  as 
one  journal  asserted  subsequently,  because  I  wanted  to  bring 
pressure  or  force  to  bear.  As  I  have  never  allowed  others  to 
intervene  in  matters,  whether  great  or  small,  pertaining  to  my 
Department,  I  have  never  myself  interfered  in  matters  which  do 
not  concern  me,  and  always  confined  myself  to  expressing  my 
wishes  or  giving  friendly  advice  to  my  colleagues.  Thus,  I  have 
never  failed  to  avoid  hurting  their  feelings  or  any  suspicion  of 
encroaching  on  their  spheres.  I  am  able  to  refute  all  statements 
to  the  contrary  at  any  time,  and  will  give  the  following  example. 

The  smiling  faces  with  which  the  Ministers  returned  from  the 
sitting  of  the  Supreme  Porte  they  had  so  much  dreaded  filled  us 
with  happy  confidence.  When  the  order  to  advance  and  re-occupy 
Adrianople  was  given  to  the  army  the  Foreign  Minister  informed 
the  Powers  in  a  Note  communicated  through  our  Embassies  that 
the  object  of  the  army  was  to  free  Adrianople;  that  when  that 
object  had  been  attained  the  advance  would  cease,  and  under  no 
circumstances  would  the  right  bank  of  the  Maritza  be  crossed. 
In  my  opinion  this  Note  was  a  political  mistake.  In  the  first 
place  we  could  not  rest  satisfied  with  the  recovery  of  Adrianople. 
It  was  essential  that  the  Maritza  should  remain  a  Turkish  river, 
and  absolutely  vital  that  Dedeagatch  should  be  returned  to  us,  as 
it  forms  the  natural  boundary  on  the  ^Egean  side.  Secondly,  it 
was  necessary  that  Dimotska,  Saffanti  and  all  the  adjoining  terri- 
tory should  be  left  in  our  possession  if  the  safety  of  Adrianople 


48  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

was  to  be  secured.  And  when  it  is  remembered  that  85  per  cent, 
of  the  population  of  Gumuldjina,  Isketsche  and  their  neighbour- 
hood is  Mussulman,  it  was  a  sacred  duty  to  make  an  attempt  to 
get  back  those  places.  Of  course,  it  was  difficult  to  be  certain 
of  the  success  of  this  enterprise,  but  the  issue  of  this  Note,  which 
bound  the  Government  by  a  formal  promise  from  the  outset,  was 
certainly  anything  but  evidence  of  political  foresight. 

Subsequently  I  shall  show  how,  at  the  time  of  the  Constanti- 
nople Conference,  the  Ottoman  delegates,  in  their  efforts  to  bring 
over  their  opponents,  attempted  to  rest  their  case  on  the  existing 
situation,  as  they  could  not  find  any  logical  ground  for  refusal 
in  view  of  the  very  clear  promise. 

THE  POLICY   OF  ENGLAND. 

The  moment  the  Ottoman  Government  decided  to  tree 
Adrianople  and  issued  the  order  to  the  army  to  advance,  English 
policy  threw  off  the  mask  and  showred  its  true  face.  Through  the 
English  Embassy  energetic  representations  were  made  to  the 

j  Sublime  Porte  to  prevent  the  Turkish  army  from  crossing  the 
Enos-Midia  line.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  Foreign  Secretary, 
announced  in  a  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  if  the  Turks 
exploited  the  defeat  of  the  Serbs  by  the  Bulgarians  to  make  an 
attempt  to  recover  Adrianople,  in  defiance  of  the  Treaty  of 
London,  they  would  be  heavily  punished  for  it  afterwards,  and 
would  lose  not  only  all  their  possessions  in  Europe,  but  even 
Constantinople  itself. 

It  was  clear  from  the  note  addressed  to  the  Sublime  Porte 

.  and  the  speeches  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  the  policy  pursued  by 
England  was  utterly  hostile  to  the  Turkish  Government,  and  that 

,  she  was  taking  every  opportunity  of  making  things  difficult  for 
the  Turks,  and  had  made  it  her  object  to  make  full  use  of  the 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  internal  consolidation  of  Turkey. 

It  must  seem  very  curious  that  at  the  time  of  our  reoccupation 
of  Adrianople  the  Russians  were  entirely  favourable  to  us.  1 
spent  much  time  in  considering  what  were  the  motives  wrhich  then 
inspired  the  Russians  to  work  against  the  interests  of  the  Bulgarian 
Government  in  this  way.  When  I  was  commissioned  to  establish 
a  basis  for  negotiations  for  a  Turco-Bulgarian  understanding  and 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    49 

was  talking  one  day  with  the  Bulgarian  envoy,  Tocheff,  I  referred 
to  this  matter  and  asked  him  for  his  opinion.  "The  Russians," 
he  replied,  "  consider  Constantinople  their  natural  inheritance. 
Their  main  concern  is  that  when  Constantinople  falls  into  their 
hands  it  shall  have  the  largest  possible  hinterland.  If  Adrianople 
is  then  in  the  possession  of  the  Turks  they  will  get  it  too,  and  in 
case  of  an  invasion  of  Bulgaria  they  will  have  plenty  of  room  in 
which  to  manoeuvre  their  armies. " 

This  explanation  seemed  to  me  thoroughly  sound  and 
convincing. 

Among  the  opponents  of  our  reoccupation  of  Adrianople  was 
France,  and  French  policy  was  in  no  way  behind  England's.  The 
French  Ambassador  issued  a  verbal  note  to  the  Sublime  Porte  to 
the  effect  that  the  French  Government  was  against  the  advance 
of  the  army,  and  simultaneously  the  French  Press  indulged  in  a 
heated  denunciation  of  the  enterprise.  But,  thank  God,  we  occu- 
pied Adrianople,  notwithstanding  all  these  obstacles,  and 
ultimately  the  Bulgarians  had  to  recognise  the  fait  accompli  in 
the  Treaty  of  Constantinople. 


THE  PROVISIONAL  GOVERNMENT  IN  WESTERN  THRACE. 

When  the  army  advanced  on  Adrianople  the  Government 
had  issued  a  note  in  which  clear  assurances  were  given  that  the 
Maritza  would  not  be  crossed.  But,  notwithstanding  this 
fact,  a  few  individuals  who  were  the  leading  spirits  in  the  army 
succeeded  in  convincing  the  Government  and  the  General  Staff  that  \ 
this  promise  was  untimely,  and  compelling  them  to  shut  their  eyes  • 
to  the  activities  of  an  unofficial  "  special  organisation  "  (Techkilat- 
i-Mahsussa)  which  had  been  formed.  In  this  way  this  organisa- 
tion has  a  free  field  on  the  far  side  of  the  river.  This  "  special 
organisation  "  was  successful  in  occupying  the  whole  of  Western 
Thrace  as  far  as  the  valley  of  the  Kara-Su  in  a  rapid  and  very 
skilfully  conducted  advance. 

Western  Thrace,  consisting  of  the  kazas  of  Orta  Koj  and 
Kirdja  Ali  and  the  sandjaks  of  Dedeagatch  and  Gumuldjina  and 
comprising  the  vilayet  of  Adrianople,  is  a  considerable  region 
with  a  population  of  which  85  per  cent,  is  Mussulman.  The  leader 
of  the  "  special  organisation  "  which  occupied  the  district  was 

D 


50  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Suleiman  Askeri  Bey,  who  has  died  since.  Captain  Cherkess 
Reschid,  Jzmirli  Echref  and  his  brother  Sami,  Fehmi  Bey  (now 
dead),  and  a  few  others  formed  its  general  staff. 

Suleiman  Askeri  Bey  summoned  the  Mussulman  notables  to  a 
congress,  and  through  this  congress  the  formation  of  a 
"  Mussulman  Provisional  Government  of  Western  Thrace/'  with 
headquarters  at  Gumuldjina,  was  proclaimed.  The  president  of 
the  communal  council  of  Gumuldjina  was  appointed  President  of 
the  Provisional  Government.  The  armed  forces  were  placed 
under  the  command  of  Suleiman  Askeri  Bey.  The  divisions  into 
kazas  which  had  prevailed  in  the  days  of  Turkish  domination  was 
retained,  and  each  of  them  was  given  a  president  and  commander 
of  the  forces.  The  presidents  of  the  kazas  were  under  the  orders 
of  the  President  of  the  "  Provisional  Government/'  and  the  local 
commanders  took  their  orders  from  Suleiman  Askeri  Bey.  The 
latter  was  an  energetic  and  extremely  good  administrator,  though 
somewhat  headstrong  and  too  optimistic.  This  West-Thrace 
enterprise,  for  which  we  have  to  thank  the  extraordinary  man 
whose  high  intelligence,  invincible  courage  and  proved  devotion 
gave  those  about  him  confidence  and  a  sense  of  security,  brought 
us  substantial  political  advantages  at  the  Constantinople  Con- 
ference later  on,  and  subsequently  when  the  basis  in  the  Turco- 
Bulgarian  alliance  was  being  discussed. 

This  Provisional  Government,  which  existed  from  the  middle  of 
July  to  the  middle  of  September,  came  to  an  end  in  the  latter  month 
as  a  result  of  the  decisions  of  the  Constantinople  Conference. 
But  not  without  previous  difficulties. 

Notwithstanding  the  obligations  undertaken  by  the  Govern- 
ment, some  of  Suleiman  Askeri  Bey's  companions  wanted  the 
"  Provisional  Government  "  to  remain  in  existence,  and  contem- 
plated armed  resistance  to  occupation  by  the  Bulgarians.  The 
Turkish  Government,  on  the  other  hand,  had  undertaken  to  inter- 
vene energetically  to  secure  that  the  region  of  Western  Thrace 
should  be  occupied  by  the  Bulgarian  forces  without  resistance. 
The  Bulgarians  in  return  had  granted  the  Mussulman  population 
of  Western  Thrace'  very  considerable  legal  privileges  and 
guaranteed  that  they  should  not  be  subjected  to  barbarities  or 
reprisals.  An  immediate  general  amnesty  was  also  promised. 

Armed  resistance  to  the  Bulgarian  occupation  by  the  Mussulman 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    51 

population  would  not  only  have  brought  them  no  advantage,  but 
would  have  meant  the  loss  of  the  many  political  and  economic 
concessions  which  we  had  won  for  them. 

Suleiman  Bey,  who  had  failed  to  overcome  the  resistance  of 
his  comrades,  sent  a  letter  to  Constantinople  in  which  he  wrote : 
"  If  Djemal  Bey,  the  Military  Governor  of  Constantinople,  in 
whom  my  companions  have  great  confidence  and  who  can  exercise 
such  great  moral  influence  upon  them,  cannot  come  here  at  once  to 
explain  the  attitude  and  obligations  of  the  Government,  the 
Bulgarian  troops  which  cross  the  frontier  and  advance  into 
Western  Thrace  will  meet  with  armed  resistance,  and  it  will  be 
impossible  to  avoid  bloodshed." 

Four  or  five  hours  after  this  letter  arrived  in  Constantinople 
Suleiman  Askeri  Bey  turned  up  in  Constantinople  himself.  After 
a  conference  with  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  the  War 
Minister  and  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  it  was  decided  that  1 
should  go  to  Gumuldjina  and  Isketche  and  attempt  to  bring  the 
officers  there  round  to  the  views  of  the  Government.  At  the  same 
time  the  Bulgarian  Government  was  informed  of  the  situation 
through  Tocheff,  who  had  just  been  appointed  envoy  and  was  in 
Constantinople  at  the  moment.  Tocheff  was  asked  to  have  an 
order  sent  to  the  commander  of  the  division  which  was  to  occupy 
Western  Thrace  not  to  start  operations  before  all  methods  of 
persuasion  had  been  tried  on  the  "  Provisional  Government,"  and 
with  that  end  in  view  to  wait  till  he  heard  from  me. 

I  left  Constantinople  and  travelled  through  Adrianople, 
Dimotika  and  Dedeagatch  to  Gumuldjina  and  Isketche.  The 
next  day  I  met  Sulieman  Askeri  Bey  and  had  a  conversation  with 
the  commanders  of  the  national  forces.  We  settled  all  the  condi- 
tions on  which  the  Bulgarian  occupation  was  to  proceed.  I  sent 
all  these  conditions  direct  to  the  Bulgarian  general.  After  they 
had  been  accepted  in  toto  the  occupation  began,  and  a  week  later 
I  returned  to  Constantinople. 

THE    CONSTANTINOPLE    CONFERENCE. 

After  the  recovery  of  Adrianople  by  us,  the  Bulgarians,  who 
found  themselves  deserted  all  round,  sent  M.  Nachivitch  to  Con- 
stantinople to  ascertain  semi-officially  the  Peace  conditions  which 

oa 


52  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

we  should  be  inclined  to  grant.  This  venerable  old  man,  who  was 
an  old  Stambuloffist,  was  also  one  of  the  oldest  and  warmest  advo- 
cates of  a  Turco-Bulgarian  rapprochement.  After  some  semi- 
official discussions  it  was  ascertained  that  this  gentleman  Nachi- 
vitch  was  not  possessed  of  the  necessary  plenary  powers  to  initiate 
peace  negotiations.  Shortly  afterwards  a  Bulgarian  delegation 
came  to  Constantinople  to  negotiate  the  terms  of  a  Treaty  of 
Peace  between  Turkey  and  Bulgaria.  This  delegation  was  lead  by 
General  Savoff,  and  Tocheff  and  Nachivitch  were  also  members 
of  it.  The  Turkish  delegation,  under  Talaat  Bey,  consisted  of 
Tchuruk  Sulu,  Mahmud  Pasha,  and  Halil  Bey.  An  advisory  com- 
mittee, consisting  of  military,  financial  and  legal  experts,  was 
attached  to  the  Bulgarian  delegation,  and  in  the  same  way  a  com- 
mittee with  the  same  duties  was  associated  with  the  Ottoman  dele- 
gates. I  and  Ismet  Bey,  Major  of  the  General  Staff,  were 
appointed  military  advisers.  The  delegations,  whose  task  it  was 
to  fix  the  frontier,  deputed  to  us  the  business  of  settling  details. 
I  may  say  that  I  made  the  greatest  effort  to  keep  Demotica  with  a 
substantial  slice  of  territory  for  Turkey,  and  to  secure  a  number  of 
special  rights  for  the  Mussulman  population  of  West  Thrace,  and 
particularly  the  Turks  settled  in  Bulgaria. 

THE  TURCO-BULGARIAN   OFFENSIVE  AND   DEFENSIVE  ALLIANCE. 

The  members  of  the  Bulgarian  Government  displayed  a  note- 
worthy spirit  of  conciliation.  We  were  at  the  beginning"  of  the 
third  conference  and  I  was  just  discussing  various  matters  with 
Talaat  Bey,  who  was  presiding.  "  Let's  finish  our  work  quickly, 
gentlemen, "  said  General  Savoff,  "  so  that  we  can  get  on  to  the 
discussion  of  far  more  important  affairs.  I  haven't  come  here  to 
haggle  over  a  couple  of  yards  of  territory,  or  whether  they  are  to 
remain  Turkish  or  Bulgarian.  My  mission  is  connected  with  a 
project  the  realisation  of  which  has  been  my  dearest  wish  for  many 
years,  I  mean  a  Turco-Bulgarian  alliance.  I  am  here  to  see  this 
plan  carried  through/' 

The  two  other  Bulgarian  delegates  nodded  approvingly.  As 
we  knew  that  the  general  was  fond  of  throwing  a  sop  to  Cerberus 
we  attached  no  other  meaning  to  these  words,  and  in  drawing  up 
the  terms  of  peace  we  endeavoured  to  insert  as  many  advantages 
as  possible  in  the  text.  Ultimately  we  attained  our  end. 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    53 

Towards  the  end  of  the  conferences  General  Savoff  returned  in 
a  more  concrete  fashion  to  the  alliance  and  the  substantial  mutual 
advantages  which  it  would  bring  with  it.  When  the  work  of  the 
Peace  Conference  was  concluded,  Said  Halim  Pasha,  Talaat  and 
Halil  Bey  agreed  that  I  should  go  with  General  Savoff  to  Prinkipo 
and  that  we  should  there  decide  upon  the  material  provisions  of  a 
Turco-Bulgarian  offensive  and  defensive  alliance. 

Lest  remark  should  be  excited  it  was  decided  to  announce  pub- 
licly that  the  General,  who  had  worn  himself  out  in  the  Balkan  War, 
had  asked  the  Turkish  Government  for  permission  to  recuperate  for 
a  few  days  on  the  Prince  Islands,  and  that  he  would  subsequently 
reside  in  one  of  the  hotels  in  Prinkipo  as  the  guest  of  the  Govern- 
ment. I  was  to  go  to  the  island  one  day  and  give  a  luncheon  to 
the  General  in  the  House  of  Nedjineddin  Mollah.  We  were  to 
withdraw  to  one  of  the  rooms  after  lunch  and  discuss  the  basis  of 
a  treaty  of  alliance. 

'.  These  matters  were  duly  carried  out  and  we  began  to  draw  up 
with  General  Savoff  the  skeleton  of  a  defensive  and  offensive  alli- 
ance between  Turkey  and  Bulgaria. 

A  few  days  later  we  went  to  my  house  in  Schischli  one  evening 
to  discuss  the  various  articles  of  the  draft  treaty,  make  the  necessary 
changes,  and  affix  its  final  form.  Of  the  Bulgarians,  General 
Savoff  and  M.  Tocheff  were  present,  while  Talaat  Bey,  Halil 
Bey  and  I  represented  Turkey. 

The  defensive  alliance  decided  in  principle  that  "  in  case  one  of 
the  contracting  parties  were  attacked  by  one  or  two  Balkan  States 
the  other  contracting  party  engaged  unconditionally  to  assist  it 
with  all  its  resources. "  In  the  offensive  alliance  it  was  agreed 
that  "  if  one  of  the  contracting  parties  with  the  approval  of  the 
other  attacked  one  of  the  Balkan  States,  and  in  the  course  of  the 
hostilities  were  itself  attacked  by  another  State,  the  other  con- 
tracting party  would  render  it  every  assistance.  If  either  of  the 
two  contracting  parties  found  itself  compelled  to  make  war  upon 
one  only  of  the  Balkan  States  the  other  would  observe  a  benevolent 
neutrality  towards  it." 

As  regards  territorial  advantages  to  be  obtained  in  a  war  waged 
jointly,  the  following  provisions  were  to  have  effect :  "  If  Bulgaria 
obtained  possession  of  Cavalla  and  Drama  the  port  of  Dedeagatch 
would  be  assigned  to  us.  If  the  Bulgarians  extended  their  frontier 


54  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

to  the  Struma,  Monastir  and  Ochrida  on  one  side,  and  to  Uskub 
on  the  other,  we  should  receive  Western  Thrace  as  far  as  the  Kara 
Su.  Lastly,  if  Bulgaria  obtained  Salonika  with  Karaferia  and 
Vodena  we  should  receive  the  line  of  the  Struma,  and  our  frontier, 
which  ran  up  stream  and  reached  the  defile  of  Kresna, 
would  run  between  Nevrokop  and  Razlik,  and  leaving  the  former 
Kaza  of  Ropdjoz  in  our  possession,  reach  the  old  Turco-Bulgarian 
frontier  at  Dospat."  This  text  was  signed  by  both  parties  with 
the  reservation  that  it  had  no  sort  of  binding  force. 

General  Savoff  returned  to  Sofia  to  discuss  the  different  clauses 
of  the  Treaty  with  the  Minister-President  Radoslavoff  and  the 
Foreign  Minister  Genadieff,  and  to  obtain  the  sanction  of  the  King. 
General  Savoff  assured  us  that  he  would  return  to  Constantinople 
within  eight  to  ten  days  at  the  latest  with  the  Bulgarian  counter 
proposals  which  he  would  get  M.  Tocheff  (who  had  just  been 
appointed  Envoy  in  Constantinople)  to  hand  over,  to  avoid  public 
excitement.  Weeks  passed,  however,  and  we  received  no  news 
from  Sofia,  and  Tocheff  did  not  say  a  word. 

After  the  ratification  of  the  peace  treaty  by  both  sides  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Bulgaria  were  resumed,  and  the  Secretary- 
General  of  the  Committee,  Fethi  Bey,  was  appointed  Minister  at 
Sofia.  Fethi  Bey  knew  about  the  project  for  a  Turco-Bulgarian 
alliance,  and  was  a  supporter  of  it.  After  his  arrival  at  Sofia  he 
asked  the  Bulgarian  Government  what  was  the  position  as  regards 
the  treaty  of  alliance  which  had  been  agreed  upon  with  General 
Savoff  at  Constantinople.  In  spite  of  repeated  attempts  Fethi  Bey 
could  get  no  satisfactory  answer.  Indeed,  no  explanation  what- 
ever could  be  given  for  the  delay  caused  by  the  Bulgarians  in  this 
matter,  seeing  that  in  the  peace  conferences  they  had  displayed 
such  zeal  in  getting  this  alliance  concluded. 

On  the  other  hand,  contrary  to  the  text  of  the  peace  treaty 
and  the  many  verbal  promises  the  Bulgarians  had  made,  they 
began  to  practise  cruelties  against  the  Mussulman  population  of 
West  Thrace;  they  had  tried  to  proselytise  the  Pomaki  by  force. 
Fethi  Bey  informed  us  that,  disgusted  at  this  two-faced  behaviour 
of  the  Bulgarians,  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  retain  his  post  at 
Sofia  any  longer,  and  with  a  view  to  facilitating  negotiations  over 
this  matter  and  save  the  Mussulman  population  of  West  Thrace 
from  any  more  Bulgarian  illegalities,  and  with  the  further  idea  of 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    55 

discussing  the  alliance  question  and  getting  it  settled,  a  meeting 
between  Talaat  and  Halil  Bey  on  one  side  and  Radoslavoff  and 
Genadieff  on  the  other  was  arranged  in  a  Bulgarian  town.  At 
this  conference  the  two  Bulgarian  Ministers  promised  to  treat  the 
Mussulman  population  better  and  to  send  a  special  delegate 
with  the  Bulgarian  Government's  proposal  to  Constantinople  at 
a  very  early  date. 

In  due  course  Colonel  Jekoff,  Deputy  Chief  of  the  Bulgarian 
General  Staff,  came  to  Constantinople  during  November,  1913. 
The  Colonel  was  an  exceptionally  intelligent  man,  thoroughly 
conscientious,  and  endowed  with  a  very  intuitive  mind  and  solid 
education.  And  when  Toscheff  announced  his  arrival  he  added 
that  he  enjoyed  the  conference  of  Radoslavoff  and  his  party  asso- 
ciates. At  that  time  I  was  Minister  of  Public  Works,  but,  as  before, 
I  participated  with  Talaat  and  Halil  Bey  in  the  conferences  on  the 
Turco-Bulgarian  alliance.  At  the  hour  appointed  for  the  meeting 
we  went  to  the  Bulgarian  Legation,  which  was  in  the  Taxim  quarter 
of  the  city.  Here  we  were  presented  with  an  astonishing  proposal 
of  the  Bulgarians,  so  far  as  territorial  concessions  were  concerned. 

So  long  as  that  part  of  Macedonia  which  extends  to  the  Struma, 
Monastir  and  Ochrida  was  not  incorporated  in  Bulgaria,  the  Bui-  \ 
garians  could  not  agree  to  cede  to  us  the  port  of  Dedeagatch,  and  \ 
only  when  they  occupied  Salonika  would  they  agree  that  the  port  of  ' 
Karaagatch  should  become  Turkish.    After  four  or  five  meetings 
with  Colonel  Jekoff  we  drew  up  the  preliminary  outlines  of  an 
alliance  the  form  and  sense  of  which  we  could  accept. 

The  alliance  with  Bulgaria  was  important  to  us,  for  it  was 
certain  that,  sooner  or  later,  we  should  have  war  with  the  Greeks. 
It  was  impossible  for  us  to  leave  to  Greece  the  islands  of  the  ^Egean 
like  Lemnos,  Mytilene  and  Chios.  It  was  therefore  necessary 
to  take  precautions  that,  in  case  of  a  war  with  Greece,  we  should 
not  find  the  Bulgarians  once  more  on  the  side  of  our  foes.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  knew  that  in  the  Macedonian  matter  the  Bul- 
garians would  not  accept  the  situation,  and  for  the  satisfaction 
of  their  national  claims  would  find  themselves  compelled  to  seek 
our  help.  We  wanted  to  draw  every  possible  advantage  from  this 
situation  and  not  run  the  risk  of  finding  ourselves  faced  with  a 
second  Balkan  alliance. 

If  we  succeeded  in  associating  Rumania  in  the  Turco-Bulgarian 


56  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

alliance  by  securing  her  against  a  Bulgarian  attack  in  the  Dobrudja, 
the  whole  of  which  she  had  occupied,  opposing  allied  groups 
would  be  formed  in  the  eastern  and  western  halves  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula,  and  we  should  at  length  have  been  able  to  look  forward 
to  a  time  in  which  our  peace  would  no  longer  have  been  at  the 
mercy  of  any  little  Balkan  State  at  any  moment.  From  this  point 
of  view,  the  realisation  of  which  was  one  of  the  objects  of  the 
Young  Turk  party,  we  attached  great  importance  to  the  Bulgarian 
alliance,  and  for  that  reason  we  tried  to  arrive  at  a  speedy  under- 
standing. As,  however,  it  is  a  characteristic  of  Bulgarian  policy, 
or,  to  speak  more  accurately,  one  of  the  distinguishing  features 
of  the  Bulgarian  temperament,  to  extract  every  possible  benefit 
and  take  advantage  of  even  the  most  honest  ally,  it  was  quite 
obvious  to  us  that  the  Bulgarians  would  protract  the  affair  as 
long  as  possible  in  the  hope  that  a  time  would  come  when  we  should 
find  ourselves  in  a  dangerous  situation  and  faced  with  the  necessity 
of  signing  a  treaty  within  twenty-four  hours,  a  treaty  which  would 
have  become  incomprehensible  as  a  result  of  the  innumerable 
alterations  which  had  been  made  in  it.  The  Bulgarians  tried  to 
hold  us  up  continuously  right  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  World 
War.  After  the  essential  outlines  of  the  Treaty  had  been  agreed 
with  Colonel  Jekoff,  I  bothered  about  the  matter  no  longer.  I 
learned  subsequently  that  when  the  Bulgarians  entered  into  nego- 
tiations with  us  and  the  Central  Powers  in  the  course  of  the  war, 
with  a  view  to  joining  us,  not  one  of  the  originally  excepted  clauses 
were  taken  into  account,  and  they  not  only  refused  to  sanction  an 
extension  of  territory  in  West  Thrace  for  us,  but  even  declined 
to  discuss  the  other  articles  until  we  had  accepted  the  cession  of 
Dimotika,  Karaagatch,  Mustapha  Pasha,  and  a  strip  more  than  a 
kilometre  in  width  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Maritza.  As  I  shall 
have  occasion  to  return  to  our  relations  with  Bulgaria  in  that  part 
of  my  memoirs  which  deals  with  the  beginning  of  the  World  War, 
I  will  conclude  my  discussion  of  this  subject  for  the  moment. 

THE  ALLIANCE  WITH  THE  SYRIANS  AND  ALL  ARABS. 

I  am  convinced  that  in  our  country,  even  among  the  most 
enlightened  of  our  youth,  there  are  few  men  who  have  really 
considered  the  Arab  question  and  the  ideal  which  was  before  the 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    57 

eyes  of  those  who  were  called  upon  to  deal  with  it.  In  that  part 
of  my  memoirs  which  relates  to  the  time  I  was  Commander  of 
the  Fourth  Army  I  will  deal  with  this  matter  in  detail,  and  for  the 
moment  will  confine  myself  to  a  short  discussion  of  affairs  cover- 
ing the  time  when  I  was  Military  Governor  of  Constantinople. 

As  a  result  of  many  causes  a  number  of  Arabs,  under  the  pretext 
of  obtaining  reforms  for  their  country  and  with  the  express  per- 
mission of  the  Vali,  Edhem  Bey,  had  succeeded  in  convoking  a 
national  assembly  at  Beirut  during  the  period  when  Kiamil  Pasha 
was  Prime  Minister.    At  this  conference  they  indicated  the  reforms 
which  they  desired  should  be  introduced  in  Syria  and  throughout 
all  the  Arabian  vilayets.    When  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha's  Ministry 
took  office  the  Government  dissolved  this  assembly,  partly  because  t 
of  the  changes  which  had  meanwhile  been  made  in  the  personnel  k 
of  the  governorships  and  partly  because  it  considered  the  National  I 
Council  illegal.      The  Government  also  announced  that,  as  the 
promulgation  of  regulations  for  the  provincial  administration  was 
exclusively  the  business  of  Parliament,  the  principles  laid  down 
by  the  Congress  of  Beirut  could  not  be  considered. 

The  agitation  for  independence  in  Syria  and  Beirut  had  assumed 
such  proportions  and  the  prestige  of  the  Government  had  thereby 
suffered  such  diminution  that  there  were  people  who  carried  their 
audacity  to  the  point  of  hanging  cards  bearing  the  name  of 
the  Governor-General  (Ebu  bekir  Hazim)  round  their  dogs'  necks. 
In  Damascus  Shukri  el  Asly  and  Mehemed  Kurd  Ali  had  gone  to 
the  Vali,  Mardini  Arif  Bey,  and  demanded  that  the  Secretary- 
General  of  the  Province  should  be  expelled  from  the  vilayet  on 
the  ground  that  he  had  not  understood  a  petition  in  Arabic  which 
had  been  presented  to  him,  and  therefore  demanded  a  Turkish 
translation.  They  lost  no  opportunity  of  indulging  in  similar 
impertinences.  All  the  Syrian  papers  attacked  the  Government 
with  the  utmost  violence,  and  filled  their  space  with  horrible 
insults  against  the  Turkish  race.  The  Sheik  Reschid  Riza  of 
Tripolis,  in  Syria,  published  in  Egypt  a  journal  which  was  written 
in  so  provocative  a  tone  against  the  heads  of  the  Committee  of 
Unity  and  Progress  that  it  seemed  impossible  for  anyone  who  had 
read  it  not  to  be  anti-Turkish.  When  the  Government  was 
absorbed  in  the  Balkan  War,  officers  of  an  Arabian  Division  in 
the  Gallipoli  Peninsula  supported  the  political  blackmailing  efforts 


58  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

of  the  Arabian  patriots  at  Constantinople  instead  of  honourably 
doing-  their  duty. 

Subsequently  they  wanted  to  arrange  a  general  congress  of 
the  Arabs,  though  the  Government  had  forbidden  it,  but,  anticipat- 
ing that  the  Government  would  certainly  stop  them  this  time  and 
that  legal  action  would  be  taken  against  the  organisers,  they 
decided,  with  the  approval,  or  rather  on  the  express  initiative,  of 
the  French  Government,  to  assemble  the  Congress  in  Paris,  and 
issued  a  proclamation  throughout  the  Arabian  world  with  an 
invitation  to  send  delegates  to  the  assembly.  At  the  head  of  the 
organisation  were  Abdul  Hamid  Zehravi,  then  deputy  for  Hama, 
Abdul  Ghani  el  Ureysi,  owner  of  the  Beirut  paper  El  Mufid, 
and  Abdul  Kerim  el  Haleli,  President  of  the  "  El  Muntedi  el 
Edebi."  In  this  way  the  Congress,  under  the  patronage  of  the 
French  Government,  changed  its  form  and  constitution,  and  it 
seemed  certain  that  it  would  be  followed  by  French  intervention  in 
Syria. 

At  that  time  I  paid  very  little  attention  to  these  Arabian 
affairs.  My  wish  was  only  to  let  it  be  known  that  foreign  intrigues 
were  sowing  discord  between  two  great  Islam  races,  the  Turkish 
and  the  Arabian.  I  also  desired  that  we  should  use  some  highly 
placed  Arabian  individuals,  on  whose  patriotism  and  religious 
fervour  we  could  rely,  to  ascertain  which  of  the  Arab  demands  we 
could  accept  without  endangering  the  common  interests  and  unity 
of  the  Islam  world  and  ultimately  to  take  the  steps  necessary  to 
carry  through  these  reforms.  Fortunately  this  view  was  shared 
by  the  Government,  and  Midhad  Shukri  Bey  and  some  others  were 
sent  to  Paris  to  negotiate  with  the  influential  Arabs  who  had 
assembled  the  Congress  in  the  hope  of  finding  a  basis  for  an 
understanding.  The  Congress  did,  in  fact,  assemble,  but  as  the 
meeting  of  Midhad  Shukri  Bey  and  his  companions  with  the 
Mussulman  Arabs  had  given  the  affair  another  complexion,  the 
Congress  dissolved  after  communicating  to  him  a  few  of  its  dearest 
desires. 

One  day  Talaat  Bey  came  into  the  Military  Government  building 
and  told  me  that  we  were  invited  to  visit  the  Sheik  Abdul  Asis 
Shavish  on  the  following  Friday  with  a  view  to  finding  some  basis 
for  an  understanding  with  the  Arabs.  We  should  there  meet  the 
President  of  the  secret  political  committee  of  the  Arabs,  and  the 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    59 

Government  had  decided  that,  as  one  of  the  warmest  advocates  of 
that  understanding,  and  in  view  of  the  experience  I  had  gained  of 
all  Arabian  affairs  when  I  was  Governor-General  of  Baghdad,  I 
should  take  part  in  the  conference. 

On  the  day  fixed  we  went  to  the  place  of  meeting.  There 
appeared  before  us  an  individual  of  short  stature,  perhaps  twenty- 
eight  or  thirty  years  of  age,  dark,  and  with  great  black,  sparkling 
eyes  which  betrayed  high  intelligence  and  a  general  air  which 
seemed  to  indicate  an  enterprising  and  bold  character.  It  was 
Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil,  delegate  of  the  Arab  secret  political 
committee.  The  conference  began  after  dinner.  *~- 

I  at  once  observed  that  what  he  desired  most  of  all  was  that 
positions  of  influence  in  Constantinople  should  be  assigned  to 
certain  individuals,  and  I  said  to  myself  gloomily  that,  judging  by 
the  views  of  these  leaders,  the  Arabian  reforms  meant  nothing 
more  than  satisfying  the  ambitions  of  a  few  persons  who  were 
hankering  after  offices  and  dignities.  Yet  we  proceeded  to  draw 
up  an  agreement  which  enshrined  the  following  principles : 
(i)  The  administrative  work  to  be  handed  over  to  the  native  authori- 
ties in  accordance  with  the  special  law  relating  to  the  administration 
of  the  vilayets ;  (2)  the  secondary  school  teaching  and  quite  general 
national  school  teaching  to  be  in  Arabian ;  (3)  the  Arabian  tongue 
to  be  used  for  certain  legal  formalities ;  (4)  the  Arabian  text  to  be 
appended  to  summonses  as  well  as  criminal  and  civil  judgments; 
(5)  petitions  to  the  official  authorities  to  be  in  Arabian ;  (6)  certain 
Arabians  to  be  appointed  to  the  Senate,  the  State  Council,  the 
Court  of  Appeal,  the  staff  of  the  Sheik  ul  Islam,  and  the  Fetvahane.J 

We  had  other  meetings  with  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil  and  Sheik 
Abdul  Hamid  Zehravi  in  the  Hotel  Kroecker  in  Pera,  and 
thoroughly  discussed  the  above  subjects.  These  reforms  were 
subsequently  carried  out  in  toto  after  they  had  received  the  approval 
and  confirmation  of  the  Government.  Talaat  alone  was  very 
unwilling  to  approve  the  appointment  to  the  Senate  of  Abdul 
Hamid  Zehravi  Effendi,  whom  many  Arabs  regarded  as  unstable. 
Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil  came  to  me  on  several  occasions  to  ask  me 
to  take  the  matter  up  with  Talaat  Bey  and  get  it  put  right.  Abdul 
Hamid  Zehravi's  wish  was  ultimately  fulfilled,  but  as  his  heart  was 
set  on  the  office  of  Sheik  ul  Islam,  he  was  not  satisfied  with  his  seat 
in  the  Senate. 


60  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

From  this  time  on  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil  was  a  gentleman  of 
great  importance,  and  he  arrogated  to  himself  the  title  of  an 
Inspector-General  of  the  "  Ella  Mirkezie  K  (Decentralisation 
Committee)  of  all  Syria.  Thanks  to  the  particularly  effective 
measures  taken  by  Talaat  Bey,  he  had  little  success  in  the  elections 
for  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  in  spite  of  the  great  activity  of  his 
supporters.  He  was  beaten  by  the  Government  candidate,  or,  to 
speak  more  accurately,  the  candidate  of  the  party  for  the  Arabian 
vilayets. 

As  I  am  on  the  Arabian  question  I  cannot  omit  to  mention  a 
matter  which,  in  my  opinion,  is  of  very  great  importance.  Enver 
Pasha  was  War  Minister  and  I  held  the  portfolio  of  Public  Works. 
Asis  Ali  Bey,  an  Egyptian  who  was  a  major  on  the  General  Staff 
and  the  most  ambitious  and  vainglorious  man  the  earth  has  ever 
seen,  could  not  endure  that  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil  and  Abdul  Hamid 
Zehravi  should  have  exercised  a  greater  influence  than  himself 
when  the  Arabian  affair  was  being  settled.  He  was  audacious 
enough  to  proclaim  openly  that  the  Arabs  could  not  rest  satisfied 
with  the  clauses  of  the  agreement,  that  their  only  desire  was  for 
internal  independence,  with  their  own  army,  and  certainly  could 
not  go  further  than  form  a  dualistic  state  with  the  Turks  on  the 
model  of  the  dualistic  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  though,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  Arabs  went  further  than  the  Hungarians  and 
demanded  that  the  official  language  of  their  army  should  be 
Arabian.  He  added  that  with  such  an  ideal  in  view,  those  who 
would  not  work  for  its  realisation,  but  desired  merely  to  secure  a 
brilliant  position  for  themselves,  and  therefore  remained  satisfied 
with  a  few  insignificant  reforms,  would  be  considered  traitors  to 
their  nation,  and  must  expect  to  pay  heavily  for  it  subsequently. 

I  knew  Asis  Ali  Bey  at  the  time  when  he  left  the  Military  School 
witrj  a  captain's  commission.  I  think  it  was  somewhere  about  the 
year  1320  (1904).  He  displayed  great  activity  in  chasing  the  Bul- 
garian bands  in  the  Kazas  of  Petric,  Osmanie,  and  Macedonia. 
Subsequently  he  had  a  good  deal  of  fighting  on  the  Greek  frontier 
with  Greek,  Bulgarian,  and  Albanian  bands,  and  before  the  pro- 
mulgation of  the  Constitution  he  joined  the  Committee  of  Union 
and  Progress,  on  which  he  did  valuable  work.  When  the  Army 
of  Operations  marched  on  Constantinople  after  the  reactionary 
movement  of  March  3ist  (April  I3th)  he  was  commanding  one  of 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    61 

its  detachments,  and  after  Galata  Bridge  had  been  seized  he 
attacked  Tophaus  Barracks  and  displayed  great  skill  in  clearing  the 
rebels  out  of  them.  Up  to  that  time  I  did  not  know  that  this  man 
had  Arabian  connections.  Whenever  I  met  him  he  behaved  most 
courteously  towards  me,  and  was  always  a  model  of  discretion  in 
his  language. 

While  I  was  Governor  in  Adana  I  once  went  to  Constantinople, 
where  I  met  Asis  Ali  Bey,  and  we  had  a  few  words  about  the 
celebrated  "  letters  from  Beirut  and  Syria  "  which  had  been  pub- 
lished by  Achmed  Sherif  Bey,  the  correspondent  of  the  newspaper 
Ik  dam.  When  I  told  him  that  these  letters  provoked  tendencies 
dangerous  to  the  maintenance  of  Ottoman  unity  and  the  authority 
of  the  Mussulman  Caliphate  in  the  Arabian  vilayets  Asis  Ali  Bey 
replied  in  a  haughty  tone  :  "  The  Arabs  are  perfectly  right.  What 
have  you  Turks  done  for  us  Arabs — except  try  to  exterminate  us. 
insult  and  despise  us— that  you  should  now  expect  friendly  treat- 
ment on  our  part  ?  Are  you  forgetting  that  in  Constantinople 
when  you  want  to  call  a  dog  you  shout  '  Arab,  Arab,  Arab!  ' 
When  you  want  to  say  that  anything  is  obscure  and  incomprehen- 
sible you  say  it's  *  like  the  hair  of  an  Arab.'  One  of  your  pet 
phrases  is  '  a  fig  for  the  splendours  of  Damascus  if  only  we  needn't 
see  another  Arabian  face !  '  Are  not  the  lines  of  your  poet : 
'  On  the  evening  I  left  Damascus  I  said,  "  Blessed  be  this  holy 
night/'  '  one  of  your  favourite  expressions  ?  And  as  if  that  wasn't 
enough,  didn't  you,  on  the  very  day  after  the  issue  of  the  Consti- 
tution, purposely  affront  the  Arabs  by  appointing  as  Marshal  of  the 
Army  in  Syria  a  descendant  of  Hulagus,  the  man  who  despised 
Baghdad  and  all  Irak,  a  Tartar  without  any  morals,  an  envoy  from 
Hell  ?  You  know  well  enough  how  the  Arabs  hate  the  Tartars, 
and  therefore  the  only  object  of  appointing  Osman  Pasha  to 
command  the  5th  Army  can  have  been  to  humiliate  the  Arabs." 

I  was  very  astonished  to  hear  such  absurdities  from  the  lips  of 
so  intelligent  a  man.  I  ascribed  his  aspersions  on  Osman  Pasha 
to  personal  hatred,  perhaps  the  result  of  a  previous  contretemps 
in  Macedonia  between  the  two  men.  Asis  Ali  Bey  was  at  that 
time  employed  in  a  military  department  at  Kotchana.  During  an 
inspection  Osman  Pasha,  who  was  then  Commandant  of  the  Uskiib 
area,  had  addressed  him  in  a  somewhat  offensive  tone,  and,  thanks 
to  his  bad  habit  of  always  speaking-  ironically  to  everyone,  he  had 


62  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

received  a  sharp  reply  from  Asis  Ali  Bey.  Osman  Pasha  was  at 
first  quite  taken  aback  at  such  an  answer  in  public,  and  to  cover 
up  his  own  mistake  and  assert  the  dignity  of  his  position  and 
authority  he  took  strong  measures  and  ordered  that  Asis  Ali  Bey 
should  be  put  under  arrest.  Since  then  the  latter  had  cherished  a 
feeling  of  hatred  against  him  which  nothing  could  assuage. 

I  answered  Asis  Ali  Bey  that  the  Turks,  and  particularly  the 
Anatolian  Turks,  had  a  high  regard  for  the  Arabs,  that  it  was 
very  wrong  to  throw  doubt  upon  that  sentiment  merely  on  the 
ground  of  a  few  popular  expressions,  and  that  if  educated  people 
like  himself  allowed  themselves  to  be  inspired  by  personal  aversions 
the  result  would  be  disorders,  which  would  do  irremediable  harm 
to  the  Turkish  world. 

After  this  incident  Asis  Ali  Bey  was  sent  at  his  own  request 
to  join  Izzet  Pasha's  staff  in  the  Yemen.  I  learned  subsequently 
that  he  there  made  a  great  show  with  his  Arab  ideals  and  made  all 
sorts  of  trouble  for  poor  Izzet  Pasha.  I  also  knew  that  at  the 
time  of  the  Italian  attack  on  Tripoli  he  went  to  Cyrenaica,  and 
with  Enver  and  Mustapha  Kemal  Bey  made  a  wonderful  effort  at 
the  defence  of  the  town  of  Benghazi. 

As  I  am  convinced  that  Asis  Ali  Bey  is  one  of  the  outstanding 
personalities  among  the  Arab  revolutionaries,  I  think  it  advisable 
to  draw  particular  attention  to  some  of  his  services  and  mistakes 
which  are  closely  related  to  his  past.  I  was  told  that  when  he  was 
in  Tripoli  he  simply  could  not  bear  having  Enver  Bey  as  his 
superior  officer,  and  had  done  everything  he  could  to  make  him 
unpopular  with  the  Arab  officers.  But  Enver  Bey  had  more  or  less 
disregarded  all  this,  and  when,  after  the  peace  treaty  with  Italy 
had  been  signed,  he  returned  to  Turkey  in  order  to  serve  in  the 
Balkan  War,  he  handed  over  the  command  to  Asis  Ali  Bey  and 
advised  him  to  form  an  Arab  government.  But  very  soon  Asis 
Ali  Bey  had  estranged  first  the  Sheik  Achmed  Sherif  Senussi  and 
then  the  Arab  officers,  and  he  therefore  decided  not  to  remain  in 
Cyrenaica,  and  returned  to  Turkey.  At  that  time  he  had  only  one 
object  in  life,  to  show  himself  a  bitter  enemy  of  Enver  Pasha  when 
he  was  in  the  company  of  Turkish  officers  and  his  erstwhile 
friends,  and  to  agitate  against  the  Turks  when  he  was  in  the 
company  of  Arab  officers. 

When  Enver  Pasha  ultimately  became  Minister  of  War  Asis 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    63 

All  Bey  was  literally  beside  himself.  He  could  not  bear  the 
thought  that  he,  who  had  been  Enver's  contemporary  at  the 
military  school  and  had  done  such  good  work  and  displayed  such 
a  high  degree  of  patriotism,  should  have  been  left  a  simple  major 
on  the  General  Staff  while  his  rival  became  Minister  of  War,  and 
he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  co-operation  with  the  Turks  brought 
him  neither  profit  nor  glory.  "  Long  live  the  Arab  Revolution  !  " 

The  intrigues  of  Asis  AH  Bey  assumed  such  proportions  that 
Enver  Pasha's  patience  was  at  length  exhausted.  He  had  him 
arrested  and  brought  before  a  court  martial  on  the  charge  of  not 
having  accounted  for  the  twenty  or  thirty  thousand  which 
he  had  handed  over  to  him  as  Government  funds  when  he  left 
Cyrenaica,  and  also  embezzling  that  sum. 

On  the  news  of  Asis  Ali  Bey's  arrest  there  was  tremendous 
excitement  among  all  the  Arab  youth  of  Constantinople.  I  was 
then  Minister  of  Labour.  The  members  of  the  "  El  Muntidi  el 
Arabi  "  never  ceased  making  representations  to  Ministers  and 
influential  people.  Among  others  a  deputation  of  five  young  men 
from  Beirut  and  Damascus,  headed  by  Dr.  Ezad  Haikar  of  Baalbek, 
came  to  me  to  beg  me  to  procure  a  pardon  for  the  Egyptian  Asis. 
They  said  it  would  make  an  excellent  impression  on  the  young 
Arab  intellectuals.  The  Ministry  of  War  sent  the  sentence  to  the 
Sublime  Porte  with  a  request  that  the  Sultan  would  be  pleased 
to  commute  the  death  penalty  into  penal  servitude  for  life.  On  the 
same  evening  on  which  this  revised  sentence  was  accordingly  to 
be  submitted  for  Imperial  approval  there  was  a  great  banquet  at 
the  French  Embassy  to  which  almost  all  the  Ministers,  several 
foreign  ambassadors  and  many  French  notables  were  invited. 
Enver  Pasha  and  I  myself  were  also  among  the  guests.  When  we 
adjourned  to  the  drawing-room  after  dinner  there  were  whispered 
conversations  about  the  conviction  of  Asis  Ali  Bey.  Georges 
Remond,  the  war  correspondent  of  the  Illustration,  came  up  to 
me.  "  Monsieur  le  General/'  he  said,  "  if  Asis  Ali  Bey  is  con- 
demned to  death  on  the  ground  of  the  differences  of  opinions  and 
quarrels  between  him  and  Enver  Pasha  in  Tripoli,  the  only  con- 
clusion I  can  draw  is  that  in  this  country  the  law  takes  second 
place  to  arbitrary  and  capricious  action.  As  I  am  informed,  the 
charge  against  Asis  Ali  Bey  is  that  he  has  embezzled  money 
entrusted  to  him  for  the  defence  of  the  country.  Asis  Ali  Bey  is 


64  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

possibly  an  Arab  revolutionary,  his  political  opinions  may  differ 
from  those  of  Enver  Pasha,  but  he  is  certainly  no  thief.  I'm 
positive  you  know  as  well  as  I  do,  and  equally  positive  that  you 
can  save  Asis  AH  Bey  from  an  unmerited  punishment  by  your 
intervention. " 

After  Georges  Remond  many  of  my  Turkish  and  French 
friends,  both  civilians  and  soldiers,  came  and  implored  me  to  inter- 
vene in  Asis  AH  Bey's  favour,  and  in  the  looks  cast  at  Enver 
Pasha  (he  was  present  in  the  room)  that  evening  it  was  easy  to 
read  the  thought:  "There's  the  man  who  does  not  shrink  from 
satisfying  his  thirst  for  revenge  by  destroying  a  splendid  officer 
who  defended  Cyrenaica  at  his  side !  >: 

I  realised  at  once  that  public  opinion  condemned  Enver  Pasha 
more  severely  than  Asis  AH  Bey.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to 
have  it  out  with  him.  Besides,  I  considered  Asis  AH  Bey  one  of 
the  bravest  and  most  honest  of  the  Arab  revolutionaries.  I 
thought  it  would  be  illogical  to  proclaim  a  general  amnesty  in 
favour  of  all  other  revolutionaries  and  except  Asis  AH  Bey  from 
its  operation.  For  this  reason  I  was  extremely  and  sincerely 
anxious  to  save  him.  I  therefore  wrote  a  few  lines  to  Enver  Pasha 
when  I  got  back  home  that  evening.  My  letter  ran  as  follows : 

My  dear  Enver, 

Notwithstanding  all  the  evidence  which  the  court  martial  has  accumulated 
against  Asis  All  Bey,  and  the  fact  that  sentence  has  been  passed  upon  him,  it 
is  you  whom  public  opinion  condemns.  Your  condemnation  in  this  way  will 
do  you  a  thousand  times  more  harm  than  anything  Asis  Ali  Bey  will  suffer  from 
a  few  years  in  prison.  Please  try  and  get  him  the  Imperial  pardon  and  I  will 
take  good  care  that  he  leaves  Constantinople,  and  never  returns  to 
Constantinople. 

The  next  day  Enver  Pasha  rang  me  up  to  say  that  His  Majesty 
had  pardoned  Asis  AH  Bey.  His  brother,  who  had  already  heard 
the  news,  came  with  Georges  Remond  to  call  on  me  and  thank  me. 
I  told  him  that  Asis  AH  Bey  must  leave  for  Egypt  at  once,  and  for 
the  future  leave  Turkish  politics  severely  alone,  but  must  never 
tell  anyone  that  he  owed  his  pardon  to  my  intervention. 

I  heard  subsequently  that  although  Asis  Ali  Bey  had  given  me 
his  word  of  honour  at  the  time,  he  placed  himself  at  the  service  of 
Sherif  Hussein  during  the  World  War  when  the  latter,  a  monster 
of  ingratitude,  rose  in  arms  against  the  Caliphate  and  deliberately 
drove  the  world  of  Islam  into  the  deplorable  condition  in  which  it 
finds  itself  to-day.  To-day  it  is  I  who  cannot  forgive  him. 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    65 

THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION. 

I  doubt  whether  there  is  a  single  man  in  Europe  or  America 
who  really  knows  the  circumstances  under  which  the  German  Mili- 
tary Mission  came  to  Constantinople  to  reorganise  the  Turkish 
Army. 

The  numerous  accounts  published  by  our  enemies  always  aver 
that  this  Mission  arrived  during  Enver  Pasha's  term  of  office  as 
War  Minister  and  impute  it  as  a  crime  against  him.  My  revelations 
will  show  how  the  affair  really  came  about. 

When  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha  had  convinced  himself  that  it 
was  impossible  to  beat  the  Bulgarians,  and  signed  the  Peace  pre- 
liminaries of  London  which  gave  us  the  Enos-Midia  line  as  our 
frontier  with  Bulgaria,  and  the  Islands  of  Imbros  and  Kenedos,  he 
decided  that  the  whole  national  energies  must  be  husbanded  for 
domestic  reforms  if  the  country,  which  was  already  very  exhausted, 
was  not  to  be  weakened  yet  further.  In  accordance  with  this 
resolve  he  authorised  our  delegates  to  affix  their  signatures  to  the 
Preliminary  Peace. 

In  his  opinion  what  we  needed  most  was  money,  and  he  was 
contemplating  raising  a  substantial  loan  from  one  of  the 
European  Powers.  First  he  applied  to  the  Germans,  but  they 
pointed  out  that  the  Berlin  money  market  was  in  no  position  to 
arrange  a  new  Turkish  loan,  and  they  frankly  advised  us  never 
to  count  on  Germany  in  financial  matters,  but  always  to  apply  to 
France  in  that  respect.  Thereupon  the  Government  decided  to 
follow  that  advice  and  sent  Djavid  Bey  to  Paris.  Djavid  was  not 
indeed  a  member  of  the  Ministry,  but  he  was  regarded  as  the  soul 
of  the  efforts  being  made  by  the  party  of  "  Unity  and  Progress  " 
in  the  direction  of  organisation  in  the  politico-financial  sphere. 
He  was  commissioned  to  lead  the  Turkish  financial  delegation 
which  was  to  negotiate  the  financial  clauses  of  the  peace 
preliminaries. 

But  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha  also  considered  that  the  system  of 
loans  was  unlikely  of  itself  to  restore  the  financial  position  of  the 
state,  and  he  was  very  anxious  for  the  abolition  of  the  financial 
capitulations,  the  only  measure  which  could  re-establish  our  Budget 
once  more.  Djavid  Bey  was  instructed  in  that  sense. 

Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha  next  proceeded  to  settle  certain  ques- 
tions which  had  already  formed  subjects  for  differences  of  opinion 

E 


66  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

between  ourselves  and  certain  foreign  Governments,  particularly 
the  Russian  and  English  Governments.  One  of  the  most  impor- 
tant at  that  time  was  that  of  the  Persian  frontier,  a  question  upon 
which  Russia  and  England  sought  to  put  a  very  peculiar  interpre- 
tation. The  Pasha  went  into  this  problem  personally.  He  had 
asked  both  Governments  to  appoint  missions  to  determine  the 
frontier  and  send  them  to  the  locality  as  the  Turkish  Government 
had  done. 

Last  but  not  least  he  took  up  the  question  of  the  re-organisation 
of  the  army  and  navy.  A  British  Naval  Mission  was  already  at 
work.  He  got  into  personal  touch  with  the  head  of  that  Mission 
and  asked  him  to  accelerate  the  reorganisation  of  the  Navy.  As 
regards  the  organisation  of  the  Army  I  will  now  relate  the  facts, 
the  details  of  which  were  given  to  me  by  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha 
personally,  so  that  their  accuracy  cannot  be  doubted. 

During  the  Pasha's  term  of  office  as  Grand  Vizier  he  usually 
spent  the  night  and  slept  at  the  Sublime  Porte,  and  as  I  slept  at  the 
Military  Governor's  Headquarters  he  called  me  to  the  telephone 
after  dinner  on  several  evenings  when  he  felt  very  tired  after  heavy 
work  during  the  day  and  asked  me  to  go  round  and  see  him.  On 
these  occasions  he  often  told  me  of  his  ideas  and  plans  and  asked 
my  opinion. 

On  one  of  these  evenings  he  remarked : 

"  I  believe  that  everything  we  have  done  hitherto  with  regard 
to  the  reorganisation  of  our  army  has  been  only  half  measures,  if 
not  bad  measures.  All  the  organisers  whom  we  have  had  here, 
both  during  the  reign  of  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  and  since  the 
promulgation  of  the  constitution,  have  been  selected  quite  casually, 
and  on  no  definite  principle.  We  have  never  thought  of  inviting  a 
serious  mission  with  an  adequate  and  well-thought-out  programme 
and  personnel,  whose  selection  must  be  determined  exclusively  with 
reference  to  that  programme. 

"  Look  at  the  Greeks,  for  example.  They  were  much  cleverer 
than  ourselves.  They  have  entrusted  the  reorganisation  of  their 
navy  to  the  English,  and  that  of  their  army  to  the  French.  Veni- 
zelos  has  reserved  the  .offices  of  War  Minister  and  Naval  Minister 
to  himself.  He  has  ruthlessly  crushed  all  who  dared  to  put  the 
slightest  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  missions.  He  has  not  paid  the 
slightest  attention  to  the  criticisms  of  his  political  opponents.  He 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    67 

is  always  in  the  closest  touch  with  the  Directors  of  the  French  and 
English  Missions,  and  done  everything  they  asked  of  him.  The 
result  was  the  creation  of  the  Greek  Army  which  we  learned  to 
respect  during  the  Balkan  War,  and  of  a  fleet  with  which  the  old 
fleet  of  the  Turco-Greek  War  cannot  be  compared. 

"In  my  view  the  greatest  service  Venizelos  has  rendered  his 
country  was  in  organising  the  armed  forces  of  the  nation  and  thus 
presenting  the  diplomatists  with  an  effective  argument — I  might 
say  the  only  effective  argument — for  the  realisation  of  the  national 
ideal.  I  want  to  perform  the  same  service  for  my  country.  There 
is  already  an  English  Mission  for  our  fleet.  I  will  get  into  touch 
with  the  head  of  that  mission  and  ask  him  what  he  requires  to 
make  a  complete  success  of  it,  and  I  intend  to  comply  with  all  his 
wishes. 

"  As  regards  our  army,  I  don't  think  we  must  hesitate  any 
longer  to  adopt  the  methods  of  the  Germans.  For  more  than 
thirty  years  we  have  had  German  instructors  in  our  army,  our 
Corps  of  Officers  is  trained  entirely  on  German  lines,  and  our  army 
is  absolutely  familiar  with  the  spirit  of  German  training  and  military 
education.  It  is  quite  impossible  to  change  all  that  now.  I  there- 
fore intend  to  send  for  a  German  military  mission  on  the  grand 
scale  and,  if  necessary,  I  shall  even  appoint  a  German  general  to 
command  a  Turkish  army  corps,  place  German  staff  and  regimental 
officers  in  command  of  every  unit  comprising  it,  and  in  this  way 
form  a  model  army  corps.  The  staff  and  regimental  officers  of 
the  other  corps  would  have  to  be  posted  to  this  corps  for 
a  definite  period  in  order  to  expand  and  complete  their  training. 
I  will  also  have  this  mission  accompanied  by  many  specialists 
whose  task  it  will  be  to  reorganise  the  various  departments  of  the 
War  Office,  the  General  Staff  and  the  military  schools  and  factories. 
I  think  that  we  shall  have  no  occasion  for  a  war  for  a  long  time, 
and  I  will  therefore  reduce  the  cadres  as  much  as  possible  and 
restore  the  peace  establishment,  so  that  we  can  effect  economies 
which  will  enable  me  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  reorganisation 
mission.  I  will  give  the  Turkish  world  an  army  which  will  certainly 
be  small  but,  on  the  other  hand,  well  organised  and  trained.  In 
time  of  war  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  bring  this  army  up  to  maximum 
strength  by  expanding  the  cadres.  I  am  now  inquiring  of  the 
Germans  on  what  terms  they  would  be  prepared  to  send  us  some 

E2 


68  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

such  mission,  and  consider  it  advisable  to  leave  the  question  of 
their  conditions  entirely  to  them." 

Such  are  the  circumstances  under  which  General  Liman  von 
Sanders'  mission  for  the  reorganisation  of  our  army  was  invited 
to  Constantinople.  Enver  Pasha  had  nothing  to  do  with  this 
affair  and  played  no  part  whatever  in  it. 

After  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha's  death  his  successor  at  the 
War  Office,  Izzet  Pasha,  had  the  same  idea,  and  took  up  the  same 
line  as  his  predecessor.  During  his  period  of  office  the  agreement 
wkh  reference  to  the  mission  was  drawn  up  and  concluded.  On 
the  day  of  the  arrival  in  Constantinople  of  Liman  von  Sanders  and 
his  officers  they  were  met  at  the  station  by  Izzet  Pasha  and,  in  fact, 
it  was  a  month  or  six  weeks  after  the  arrival  of  the  mission  that 
Enver  Pasha  became  War  Minister. 

It  was  Enver  Pasha  who  first  pointed  out  the  obstacles  to  be 
overcome  if  the  command  of  the  First  Army  Corps  was  to  be 
entrusted  to  Liman  von  Sanders  Pasha.  He  thought  that  it  would 
be  better  to  employ  the  head  of  the  mission  in  the  capacity  of  an 
Inspector-General  rather  than  give  him  the  command  of  an  army 
corps.  It  was  wholly  and  solely  as  a  result  of  his  suggestion,  not 
under  pressure  from  the  Russians,  French  and  English,  that  this 
change  was  made. 

On  the  day  the  military  mission  arrived  in  Constantinople  I  was 
commanding  the  First  Army  Corps,  and  in  that  capacity  Supreme 
Military  Authority  during  the  state  of  siege.  Two  days  later  I  had 
to  hand  over  my  command  to  Liman  von  Sanders,  but  as  a  German 
general  could  not,  of  course,  be  commandant  during  the  state  of 
siege,  we  decided  to  proceed  by  a  different  method.  Faik  Pasha 
was  then  Commandant.  He  was  to  be  appointed  Governor  of  the 
fortress  with  the  powers  of  a  divisional  commander,  and  the  super- 
vision of  the  state  of  siege  was  to  be  entrusted  to  him.  For  reasons 
which  I  will  discuss  later  I  was  temporarily  to  take  over  the  office 
of  Minister  of  Public  Works.  The  Imperial  decree  relating  to  my 
appointment  was  issued  the  day  after  the  arrival  of  the  mission. 
On  the  next  day  I  went  to  the  headquarters  of  the  First 
Army  Corps  and  handed  it  over  officially  to  General  Liman  von 
Sanders. 

In  these  circumstances   it   is  clear   that   there   is  an   end   of 
slanderous  observations  and  opinions  which  Ambassador  Mor- 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    69 

genthau  sets  forth  on  pages  44  and  45  of  his  Memoirs  on  the 
strength  of  totally  false  information. 

The  arrival  of  the  mission  in  Constantinople  was  the  signal  for 
the  most  violent  attacks  upon  us  by  the  Russians,  French  and 
English.  The  fact  which  the  Russians  put  in  the  forefront  of 
their  grounds  of  protest  was  that,  if  the  troops  appointed  to  guard 
the  Straits  were  commanded  by  German  officers,  the  defence  would 
be  strengthened,  and  that  this  step,  adopted  out  of  suspicion  and 
specially  directed  against  Russia,  would  seem  to  ascribe  ambiguous 
intentions  to  that  Power. 

The  French  arid  English  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  the 
Russians.  The  French  and  English  Ambassadors  adopted  the 
arguments  of  the  Russian  Ambassador.  The  Press  of  bothjthese 
countries  slavishly  followed  the  Russian  Press.  In  this  connection 
I  must  ask  our  political  opponents  one  question :  was  this  the  way 
to  manifest  the  good  intentions  of  the  English  and  French  of  which 
they  boasted  to  us  from  morning  to  night  ? 

We  wanted  to  reorganise  our  army,  and  for  that  reason  we 
had  applied  to  Germany.  We  made  our  plans  both  for  the  introduc- 
tion and  realisation  of  the  scheme.  The  German  military  mission 
came  to  Constantinople,  and  the  result  was  an  addition  to  the 
defensive  resources  of  the  Turkish  armies,  particularly  in  the 
Straits.  It  was  quite  natural  that  the  Russians  should  endeavour 
to  oppose  the  scheme,  because  they  regarded  themselves  as  the 
natural  heirs  to  Constantinople,  and  were  convinced  that  one  day 
they  would  be  engaged  in  a  terrific  struggle  with  the  Turks  on 
land  and  sea  in  the  vicinity  of  Constantinople.  Was  their  action, 
which  meant  intervention  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  a  neighbouring 
State,  possible  without  the  support  and  approval  of  England  and 
France  ?  Certainly  not,  I  say !  Under  these  circumstances,  and 
remembering  that  in  this  affair  the  French  and  English  shed  even 
more  tears  than  the  Russians  themselves,  must  we  not  assume  that 
even  then  the  Triple  Entente  had  promised  Constantinople  to  the 
Russians?  Great  Heavens!  When  I  think  of  those  days  I  go 
cold  all  over.  I  cannot  describe  the  torments  I  had  to  go  through 
in  the  discussions  with  the  French  Military  Attache,  Maucorps,  the 
French  Ambassador,  Bompart,  Councillor  of  Embassy  Boppe,  the 
Inspector  of  Gendarmerie,  General  Baumann,  and  Major  Sarrou. 
One  day  I  ended  up  with  the  words : 


yo  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

"Just  look  how  unreasonable  you  are,  gentlemen!  Don't 
suggest  that  you  are  putting  forward  these  views  without  fully 
realising  the  situation.  You  know  as  well  as  we  ourselves  that  we 
have  the  right  to  call  in  a  German  reorganisation  mission.  The 
question  whether  the  German  officers  are  or  are  not  competent  to 
organise  an  army  is  no  doubt  open  to  debate,  but  it  is  irrelevant  at 
the  moment,  as  we  are  now  definitely  convinced  of  their  efficiency, 
and  our  choice  has  fallen  upon  them.  Every  country  has  armed 
forces  of  three  kinds — first,  the  army,  then  the  navy,  and,  thirdly, 
the  police.  We  have  entrusted  the  organisation  of  the  first  to  the 
Germans,  that  of  the  second  to  the  English,  that  of  the  third  to  the 
French.  So  where's  the  quarrel?  Do  you  want  us  to  commit 
the  reorganisation  of  our  army  to  the  Russians  ?  Just  remember 
what  it  is  the  Russians  are  saying:  4  If  German  officers  take 
command  of  the  First  Army  Corps,  the  defensive  resources  of  the 
Straits  will  be  strengthened/  That  means  that  if  we  applied  to  the 
French  or  English  for  a  similar  mission  on  the  same  terms  the 
Russians  would  be  bound  to  make  the  same  objection,  for  I  cannot 
assume  that  in  taking  over  command  of  the  First  Corps  the  French 
or  English  officers  would  deliberately  intend  to  open  the  Straits  to 
the  Russians  when  occasion  arose.  These  protests  of  yours  neces- 
sarily arouse  in  us  a  feeling  that  you  are  anything  but  well-inclined 
towards  us." 

As  these  gentlemen  could  not  refute  the  logic  of  my  words  and 
did  not  know  what  to  answer  they  admitted  that  they  were  wrong- 
by  repeating :  '  What  do  you  expect  ?  In  the  first  place,  we  are 
Russia's  allies  and  are  thus  compelled  to  support  all  their  claims. 
Secondly,  the  Germans  are  our  enemies,  and  we're  compelled  to 
remember  the  danger  to  ourselves  inherent  in  everything  they  do. 
And  even  if  there  were  no  danger  we  consider  it  a  patriotic  duty  to 
assert  that  as  what  is  at  stake  is  something  to  which  the  Germans 
make  a  claim  we  are  bound  to  oppose  it." 

MINISTER  OF  PUBLIC  WORKS,  MIDDLE  OF 
DECEMBER,  1913,  TO  FEBRUARY,  1914. 

I  TAKE  UP  MY  DUTIES. 

Prince  Said  Halim  Pasha's  Ministry,  which  followed  that  of 
Mahrmid  Shefket  Pasha,  had  taken  over  its  political  programme 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    71 

in  its  entirety,  i.e.,  to  avoid  external  complications  as  much  as 
possible  and  devote  the  whole  resources  of  the  nation  to  internal 
reforms.  But  that  did  not  mean  that  he  let  slip  the  opportunity  of 
recovering  Adrianople,  and  he  also  succeeded  in  concluding  the 
Treaty  of  Constantinople  with  the  Bulgars,  the  Treaty  of  Athens 
with  the  Greeks,  and  subsequently  a  second  Treaty  of  Constanti- 
nople with  Serbia,  which  had  become  the  most  ambitious  of  the 
Balkan  States. 

To  secure  the  success  of  the  domestic  reforms  it  was  necessary 
to  make  an  end  of  the  questions  which  were  always  cropping  up 
owing  to  the  difference^  between  the  nationalities  and  always 
giving  the  small  Balkan  States  an  opportunity  for  loud  and 
vehement  protest. 

As  regards  the  Bulgarians,  after  the  final  loss  of  Macedonia  all 
that  was  left  to  the  Turkish  Empire  was  a  few  scattered  villages 
along  the  northern  boundary  of  the  sandjak  of  Kirk  Kilisse  in  the 
vilayet  of  Adrianople.  On  the  other  hand,  a  few  Turks  remained 
distributed  in  certain  parts  of  Bulgarian  territory  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  Turkish  frontier.  As  an  appendix  to  the  Treaty  of  Constanti- 
nople a  secret  agreement  was  signed  by  the  Bulgars  in  which  it 
was  provided  that  any  Bulgarians  residing  on  Turkish  territory 
should  be  removed  to  Bulgaria  and  any  Turks  still  left  in  Bulgarian 
territory  should  be  removed  to  Turkey.  This  exchange  was  carried 
out  to  the  satisfaction  of  both  sides. 

To  us  the  most  important  of  the  racial  problems  was  that  pre- 
sented by  the  very  numerous  Greek  elements  which  were  scattered 
about  the  coast  side  of  the  vilayet  of  Aidin.  There  was  no  doubt 
that  the  Greeks  who,  after  their  easy  victories  in  the  Balkan  War, 
had  occupied  Macedonia  as  far  as  Drama  on  one  side  and  seized  the 
islands  off  Asia  Minor  (Mytilene,  Chios,  and  Lemnos)  on  the  other, 
would  now  concentrate  all  their  efforts  on  the  acquisition  of  the 
vilayet  of  Aidin.  With  a  view  to  having  no  internal  difficulties  if 
we  sooner  or  later  came  to  blows  with  the  Greeks  (that  was 
inevitable  owing  to  the  question  of  the  islands),  it  was  suggested 
to  the  Greek  Government  that  there  should  be  an  exchange  of  these 
Greek  nationals  for  the  Mussulman  nationals  who  had  been  left 
behind  in  Greek  Macedonia  and  wished  to  emigrate  to  Turkey. 
Venizelos,  however,  was  not  particularly  enthusiastic  about  this 
proposal,  which  looked  like  compromising  the  evil  designs  he  had 


72  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

in  store  for  us.  Yet  at  that  time  the  nationalist  sentiments  of  the 
Turkish  clans  had  begun  to  assert  themselves  very  actively,  and  the 
consequences  began  to  make  themselves  felt,  particularly  in  the 
vilayet  of  Aidin,  where  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Mussulman 
refugees  who  had  not  been  able  to  bear  the  oppression  of  the 
Greeks,  Serbs,  and  Bulgarians  any  longer,  and  had  taken  refuge 
within  the  Turkish  Empire,  often  seriously  molested  the  Greeks 
settled  in  that  region. 

The  Government  was  entirely  out  of  sympathy  with  their  action 
because  of  the  difficulties  to  which  it  would  presumably  give  rise. 
The  European  Powers,  which  are  in  the  habit  of  manifesting  their 
humane  sentiments  when  it  is  a  question  of  intervention  against 
Turkey,  had  not  a  word  to  say  against  the  abominations  of  the 
Greeks,  Serbs,  and  Bulgarians,  who  had  slaughtered  in  the  most 
bestial  manner  more  than  five  hundred  thousand  Turks,  most  of 
them  women,  old  people,  and  children.  When  Carnegie's  Com- 
mission of  Enquiry  had  published  its  special  report  upon  these 
horrors  there  was  not  a  single  newspaper  in  the  whole  of  Europe 
or  America — with  the  exception  of  a  few  socialist  journals — which 
had  a  word  to  say  in  favour  of  the  poor  Mohammedans  who  had 
been  killed  off  like  flies. 

The  American  Ambassador,  Morgenthau,  made  the  Armenian 
massacres  which  took  place  during  the  World  War  an  excuse  for 
heaping  upon  the  Turks  insults  and  affronts  which  are  hardly  fit  to 
be  reproduced.  Every  line  of  his  Memoirs  reveals  the  deepest 
hatred  and  enmity.  Mr.  Morgenthau  should  appoint  a  committee 
to  enquire  into  the  Macedonian  massacres  and  then  read  through 
his  book  again  and  see  if  he  can  justify  his  charges. 

When  thousands  of  Mohammedans,  after  suffering  all  manner 
of  oppression  and  cruelties,  fled  to  their  motherland  and  found  not 
a  cottage  to  shelter  them  or  a  yard  of  ground  on  which  to  settle,  nay, 
found  themselves  daily  exposed  to  the  insults  of  those  who  were 
responsible  for  their  misfortunes,  they  allowed  themselves  to  be 
carried  away  by  a  very  natural  and  human  craving  for  revenge  and 
to  commit  a  few  excesses.  The  Greeks  made  the  fullest  use  of 
these  occurrences,  and,  true  to  their  nature,  raised  a  tremendous 
outcry  about  them.  They  said  they  were  being  threatened  by  the 
Turks,  and  a  few  of  them  accordingly  began  to  take  to  the  moun 
tains.  The  boldest  of  these  actually  set  fire  to  a  few  Mussulman 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    73 

villages  and  murdered  a  large  number  of  emigrants.  This  state  of 
affairs  contributed  to  fan  the  flames  of  Mohammedan  rage  still 
higher.  Venizelos  began  to  chant  his  unending  song  about  the 
Balkans,  and  it  had  its  effect  all  over  the  world :  "  The  Turks  are 
massacring  the  Greeks  in  the  vilayet  of  Aidin  with  the  approval, 
and,  indeed,  with  the  assistance,  of  the  Government !  ' 

Fortunately  Talaat  Bey,  who  acted  quicker  than  Venizelos. 
urged  the  Ambassadors  of  England,  France,  Germany,  and 
Austria  to  send  their  First  Dragomans  to  conduct  a  joint  enquiry 
on  the  spot.  This  committee  established  the  true  facts,  the 
accuracy  of  which  Mr.  Morgenthau  must  admit,  however 
reluctantly.  In  other  words,  the  enquiry  showed  clearly  that  there 
had  been  no  kind  of  oppression  of  the  Greeks  and  that  the  sorely- 
tried  emigrants  who  here  and  there  had  been  guilty  of  some  crime 
had  been  severely  punished  by  the  Ottoman  Government. 

Venizelos  stipulated  that  the  emigrants  should  take  with  them  all 
movable  property,  while  immovables  should  be  treated  as  subjects 
for  exchange,  but  finally  adopted  the  view  of  Talaat  Bey  and  agreed 
to  enter  into  negotiations  on  the  footing  that  the  Greek  nationals 
inhabiting  the  coastal  region  of  the  vilayet  of  Aidin  should  be  sent 
back  to  Greece,  while  the  Mohammedans  of  Macedonia  should  be 
allowed  to  settle  in  the  vilayet  in  question  if  they  so  desired. 

After  a  basis  of  agreement  with  the  Arabs  had  been  found,  as 
I  have  already  related,  we  decided  to  tackle  our  thorniest  domestic 
problem,  the  Armenian  question. 

I  think  it  better  to  devote  a  special  chapter  later  on  to  this 
extremely  important  and  all-embracing  matter. 

ECONOMIC   NEGOTIATIONS   WITH    THE   ENGLISH   AND   FRENCH. 

While  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha  was  Grand  Vizier,  Hakki  Pasha, 
the  former  Grand  Vizier,  went  to  London  to  settle  various  current 
questions  relating  to  the  Gulf  of  Basra  and  the  seven  disputed 
districts  between  the  Yemen  and  Aden. 

Djavid  Bey  was  sent  to  Paris  at  the  same  time.  The  object  of 
his  mission  was: 

1.  To  negotiate  for  a  substantial  loan. 

2.  The  abolition  of  the  financial  capitulations. 

As  regards  the  loan,  the  French  imposed  conditions  which  were 


74  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

utterly  impossible  for  us.     I  give  some  of  them  so  far  as  I  can 
remember : 

1.  No  other  lines  to  be  constructed  by  the  management  of  the 
Hedjaz  Railway  in  Syria  and  Palestine. 

2.  The  management  of  the  Hedjaz  Railway  were  immediately 
to  stop  the  construction  (which  had  already  begun)  of  the  branch 
line  from  Afuleh  via  Djenin  Naplus  to  Jerusalem,  which  belonged 
to  the  Haifa-Deraa  sector,  and  had  already  got  as  far  as  Seb'  otia. 

3.  The  French  were  to  be  granted  the  concession  for  a  oroad- 
gauge  line  from  Afuleh  to  a  point  on  the  Jaffa-Jerusalem  line  as 
yet  undecided. 

4.  The  French  were  also  to  be  granted  the  concession  of  a 
broad-gauge  line,  one  terminus  of  which  was  to  be  the  station  of 
Rayaak  on  the  Damascus-Hamah  line,  and  the  other  at  Afuleh,  the 
line  passing  by  the  shores  of  Lakes  Huleh  and  Tiberias. 

5.  The  Ottoman  Government  shall  have  no  right  to  approve  any 
railway  rates  on  the  Haifa-Deraa  sector  which  could  compete  with 
the    railway   rates    on    the    Beirut-Damascus-Hauran    line.     The 
Ottoman  Government  must  also  indemnify  the  Damascus-Hamah 
Railway  Company  for  the  Damascus-Hauran  sector. 

6.  The  concession  for  any  line  to  be  constructed  east  of  the 
Damascus-Medina  and  Rayak-Aleppo  must  be  reserved  exclusively 
for  the  French. 

7.  The  extension  of  the  Syrian  harbours  of  Jaffa,  Haifa  and 
Tripolis  must  be  reserved  exclusively  for  French  capitalists. 

8.  The  right  of  working  the  Yemen  Railway  must  be  bought 
back  by  the  Government  and  the  Company  must  be  indemnified. 

9.  The   concession   of    the    Samsun-Sivas    Railway    must    be 
granted  to  the  French. 

10.  The  buildings,  real  property  and  estates  of  all  kinds  belong- 
ing to  the  very  numerous  French  convent  schools,  hospitals  and 
other  foundations  must  be  exempt  from  all  taxation. 

11.  The  proceeds  of  the  loan  granted  by  France  must  be  used 
to    procure    the    necessary    military    armament    from    France 
exclusively. 

It  was  only  on  these  and  other  conditions  I  no  longer  remember 
that  Turkey  was  granted  a  9  per  cent,  loan  of  a  few  million  francs, 
payable  in  two  instalments. 

As  reigards  the  abolition  of  the  financial  capitulations,   the! 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    75 

French  would  not  even  hear  of  it.  Only  if  we  conceded  various 
other  demands  would  they  grant  us  an  increase  of  the  ad  valorem 
duty  from  n  to  14  per  cent.,  a  monopoly  of  alcohol,  matches  and 
cigarette  paper,  increase  the  royalties  payable  by  foreign 
merchants,  and  allow  us  to  introduce  a  city  tariff  and  enjoy  a  few 
other  minor  advantages. 

All  these  negotiations  were  carried  on  not  without  difficulty, 
and  Djavid  Bey,  who  had  been  commissioned  to  conduct  them, 
was  ultimately  reduced  to  despair,  as  he  had  to  cope  with  the 
slackness  of  the  Government  in  Constantinople,  which  was  always 
delaying  its  answer,  and  also  with  the  obstacles  placed  in  his 
way  by  the  French. 

Among  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  at  this  time  was  Osman 
Nizami  Pasha,  the  Minister  of  Public  Works.  Although  most  of 
these  questions  concerned  his  Ministry,  he  was  in  the  habit  of 
resting  content  with  sending  every  matter  on  to  the  department 
concerned,  and  then  forwarding  to  the  Sublime  Porte  the  opinions 
of  the  departments  on  both  the  legal  and  utilitarian  aspects.  As 
the  general  situation  of  the  country  required  the  Government  to 
make  up  its  mind  quickly,  Osman  Nizami  Pasha's  bureaucratic 
methods  made  him  unpopular  with  the  Cabinet  and  the  party.  As 
the  party  had  also  decided  to  accept  the  programme  of  the 
Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  as  soon  as  possible,  it  wanted 
the  Government  to  get  rid  of  this  man,  who  had  no  following  in 
the  party  and  had  opposed  the  reoccupation  of  Adrianople,  a  line 
of  action  which  revealed  a  lack  of  sound  judgment. 

Since  my  appointment  as  Military  Governor  of  Constantinople 
I  had  lost  no  opportunity  of  bringing  about  a  rapprochement 
between  the  French  and  the  Turks.  In  view  of  the  friendly  rela- 
tions which  I  had  established  with  the  French  Embassy,  and  with 
Frenchmen  generally,  my  friends  were  convinced  that  if  the 
examination  and  solution  of  the  problems  of  public  works  were 
entrusted  to  me  the  appointment  would  strongly  recommend  itself 
to  the  French.  They  therefore  warmly  advocated  my  taking  over 
that  Ministry. 

As  I  knew  then  that  I  should  have  to  hand  over  the  ist  Corps, 
which  I  was  commanding,  to  General  Liman  von  Sanders,  and 
that  by  entering  the  Cabinet  I  could  possibly  render  my  country 
greater  service,  I  complied  with  the  request. 


76  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

As  Osman  Nizami  Pasha  had  neglected  to  get  the  French  affair 
settled  up  quickly  and  the  Government  had  not  the  time  to  wait 
indefinitely,  it  was  suggested  to  him  that  he  should  retire  from  his 
office  and  send  in  his  resignation.  He  at  once  adopted  the 
suggestion,  and  his  Ministry  was  transferred  to  me  for  the  interim. 
A  month  after  Osman  Nizami  Pasha  resigned  I  definitely  took  over 
the  portfolio  of  Public  Works. 

The  very  first  thing  I  did  was  to  settle  within  a  very  short  time 
the  various  matters  which  had  been  put  before  the  Ministry  for 
its  examination  and  opinion  and  which  the  French  had  made  a 
sine  qua  non  for  the  loan.  A  solution  of  the  difficulty,  which  even 
the  French  would  accept,  was  immediately  laid  before  the  Grand 
Vizier's  Department  by  the  Ministry.  Thanks  to  this  action,  the 
efforts  of  Djavid  Bey  were  at  length  crowned  with  success,  and  the 
loan  was  granted. 

THE  AD  ALIA  RAILWAYS. 

During  my  term  of  office  as  Minister  of  Public  Works  I  had  a 
little  contretemps  with  the  Italian  Embassy  over  the  Adalia  Rail- 
ways. It  is  well  known  that  Italy  had  been  in  occupation  since  the 
war  in  Tripoli  of  several  of  our  islands,  Rhodes,  Stankoj,  etc.,  and 
had  entered  into  an  obligation  to  restore  them  to  the  Ottoman 
Government.  As  the  Balkan  War  intervened,  however,  the 
Italians  forgot  to  evacuate  the  islands,  and  defended  their  action 
with  the  excuse  that  they  wanted  to  prevent  their  occupation  by 
the  Greeks.  When  the  First  Treaty  of  London  ended  the  Balkan 
War  and  we  demanded  the  restoration  of  our  islands  by  the 
Italians  they  treated  us  to  all  sorts  of  pretexts.  They  alleged, 
for  instance,  that  Achmed  el  Sherif  el  Senussi  wras  still  proving 
refractory,  and,  as  he  still  had  Turkish  officers  in  his  service,  we 
had  hot  fulfilled  our  obligation.  We  proved  to  them  by  all  kinds  of 
argument  that  their  assertions  were  unfounded,  that  there  was  not 
a  single  Turkish  soldier  in  Tripolitana,  and  the  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment was  giving  no  assistance  whatever  to  Sheik  el  Seid  Achmed 
el  Sherif  el  Senussi.  Therefore  the  Italians  referred  to  public 
opinion  in  Italy,  and  explained  that  if  they  restored  these  islands 
to  the  Turks  without  getting  something  in  the  way  of 
compensation  it  would  make  a  very  bad  impression. 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    77 

This  course  of  action  made  us  very  angry.  The  question 
cropped  up  again  when  I  became  Minister  of  Public  Works.  One 
day  the  Marquis  Garroni,  the  Italian  Ambassador,  came  to  me  and 
told  me  that  Halladjan  Effendi,  a  Turkish  subject,  and  several 
other  persons  acting  in  the  name  of  a  group  of  Italian  capitalists 
intended  to  ask  me  for  the  concession  of  a  railway  northwards 
from  Adalia  and  from  Makri  to  Mughla.  For  the  moment  he 
asked  me  to  permit  preliminary  surveys  for  the  railway  to  be  carried 
out  and  to  grant  Government  protection  to  the  engineers  and 
workmen  to  be  employed.  I  told  him  in  sharp  terms  that  for  the 
time  being  the  Government  was  not  contemplating  the  construc- 
tion of  railways  northward  from  Adalia  or  between  Makri  and 
Mughla. 

This  peremptory  answer  was  a  very  great  surprise  to  the  skilled 
diplomat.  "  Making  a  survey,"  he  replied,  "  does  not  necessarily 
mean  building  a  railway.  The  first  business  is  merely  to  find  out 
whether  it  is  at  all  possible  to  construct  such  a  railway.  If  the 
result  is  satisfactory,  the  Ottoman  Government  can  make  up  its 
mind  later  on.  Besides,  we  have  a  written  undertaking  of  the 
Government  which  empowers  the  Italians  to  make  surveys.  The 
Ministry  refusal  is  a  matter  for  comment !  " 

When  I  replied  to  the  Ambassador  that  there  was  no  such  under- 
taking in  the  archives  of  the  Ministry,  he  showed  me  a  paper  bear- 
ing the  signature  of  the  Foreign  Minister,  Prince  Said  Halim 
Pasha.  But  this  document  had  no  official  value  at  all.  I  therefore 
told  the  Ambassador  once  and  for  all  that  we  refused. 

Thereupon  he  said  to  me:  "  My  dear  Djemal  Pasha,  I  don't 
think  it  right  of  you  to  give  me  an  answer  of  that  kind  in  this  very 
complicated  matter  just  at  the  moment  when  I  am  making  every 
effort  to  secure  the  restoration  to  Turkey  of  the  islands  in  Italian 
occupation.  You  must  know  that  public  opinion  in  Italy  attaches 
very  great  importance  to  the  question  of  the  Adalia  Railway.  If 
we  could  announce  in  our  papers  that  the  Italian  engineers  had 
started  on  their  surveys,  public  opinion  would  cease  to  make  diffi- 
culties for  the  Government  in  the  question  of  the  islands  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  the  Government  had  secured  material  advantages 
as  compensation  for  the  sacrifice  involved  in  the  restoration  of  the 
Dodecanese.  In  this  way  you  would  find  yourselves  in  possession 
of  your  islands  once  more !  " 


78  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

I  was  now  extremely  angry,  and  replied:  "  You  forget,  Mr. 
Ambassador,  that  a  man  who  is  returning  the  property  of  another 
which  he  has  only  managed  for  him  is  not  justified  in  demanding 
compensation  therefor.  The  Italian  Government  has  to  give  us 
back  these  islands  in  accordance  with  its  obligations.  I  don't 
understand  how  a  nation  can  blame  its  Government  and  put  diffi- 
culties in  its  way  because  it  fulfils  an  obligation  it  has  expressly 
entered  into.  What  would  Turkish  public  opinion  think  of  our 
Government  if  it  saw  that  unhappy  Turkey,  after  being  the  victim 
of  countless  attacks  for  three  or  four  years  and  losing  99  per  cent, 
of  her  European  territory  and  the  whole  of  her  African  colonies, 
had  now  to  give  compensation  for  the  recovery  of  her  own  islands 
to  which  she  had  a  claim  by  treaty?  I  am  Minister  of  Public 
Works,  and  it  is  my  duty  to  secure  to  my  country  the  execution  of 
works  necessary  to  its  prosperity  in  a  manner  dictated  by  require- 
ments. As  regards  enterprises  which  are  to  be  undertaken  by  way 
of  political  compensation,  these  have  nothing  to  do  with  my  depart- 
ment, and  must  be  discussed  with  the  Foreign  Office  or  the 
Grand  Vizier.  As  I  entirely  disagree  with  you  on  this  matter, 
I  regret  that  I  cannot  give  Your  Excellency  the  answer  you 
desire. " 

Subsequently  I  reported  this  conversation  to  Prince  Said  Halim 
Pasha,  Enver  Pasha,  who  was  then  War  Minister,  and  Talaat 
Pasha,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  They  all  agreed  with  me. 
The  next  day  a  number  of  journalists,  who  had  got  wind  of  the 
affair  somehow  or  other,  came  to  ask  me  for  an  interview.  I  sent 
for  Yonus  Nadi,  the  editor  of  the  Tasfir-Efkier,  and  granted  him 
an  interview. 

The  very  decided  article  which  then  appeared  under  the  title 
"  Neither  Compensation  nor  Concessions  "  was  received  every- 
where with  enormous  pleasure  and  satisfaction,  and  my  friends 
congratulated  me  on  my  clear  and  categorical  declarations.  How- 
ever, on  the  very  day  the  article  appeared  the  Marquis  Garroni, 
who  was  very  excited  about  it,  requested  an  audience  of  the  Grand 
Vizier.  He  complained  bitterly  about  me,  and  said  that  this  article 
would  make  a  very  bad  impression  in  Italy. 

There  was  a  Ministerial  Council  that  day.  When  I  entered  the 
Grand  Vizier's  Palace  I  saw  that  the  Grand  Vizier  was  very  upset. 
Talaat  was  present.  Prince  Said  Pasha  received  me,  and  said  in  a 


The  Outbreak  and  End  of  the  Second  Balkan  War    79 

very  imperious  voice:  "  Pasha,  so  you  have  been  talking  to 
journalists  about  the  Adalia  Railway  ?  " 

"  Yes,"  I  answered.  "  And  why  not?  Have  I  said  anything 
that  is  contrary  to  the  truth?  " 

"  No !     But  I  don't  think  you  had  any  authority  to  do  so." 

"  Will  Your  Highness  allow  me  to  say  that  that  is  a  mistake? 
A  Minister  has  the  right  to  make  announcements  to  the  Press  when 
he  thinks  it  advisable  about  any  question  which  concerns  his  depart- 
ment, particularly  when  no  State  secrets  are  involved  and  the 
general  policy  of  the  Government  is  not  imperilled.  The  question 
put  to  me  by  the  editor  was  this :  '  Does  the  Government  intend 
to  give  the  Italians  compensation  in  the  shape  of  a  concession  to 
construct  the  Adalia  Railway  in  order  to  secure  the  restoration  of 
the  ^Egean  Islands  ?  '  I  replied :  '  No  !  '  Is  not  my  statement 
true  ?  Is  the  Government  of  which  Your  Highness  is  the  head  of 
a  contrary  opinion?  Not  so  far  as  I  know.  That  being  so,  the 
Ambassador  has  no  right  to  complain." 

To  this  reply  the  Prince  had  not  a  word  more  to  say.  I  don't 
think  he  has  ever  forgiven  me  for  making  that  declaration  to  the 
journalists,  whom  he  cannot  endure. 

A  few  days  after  this  incident  the  English  Ambassador,  Sir 
Lewis  Mallet,  came  to  me  at  the  Ministry  and  told  me  he  had 
heard  that  the  Ottoman  Government  was  about  to  grant  the 
Italians  a  concession  for  the  Adalia  Railway,  and  that  such  action 
would  be  an  encroachment  upon  the  rights  of  the  English  Aidin 
Railway  Company. 

I  had  enquiries  made  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  English  com- 
pany had  received,  with  the  right  to  extend  its  lines  to  Burdur  and 
Sparta  and  start  a  service  of  steamers  on  Lake  Beyschir,  a  formal 
assurance  that  no  other  line  to  the  Mediterranean  would  be  built 
within  a  radius  of  I  don't  how  many  kilometres  south  of  that 
stretch.  Its  profit-earning  power  would  thus  be  guaranteed. 

When  I  informed  his  Highness  Said  Halim  Pasha  accordingly 
he  told  me  that  he  was  very  satisfied  that  I  had  made  no  agreement 
with  the  Italians. 

Ultimately  I  found  another  way  of  arriving  at  an  understanding 
with  the  Italian  Ambassador.  I  told  him  I  would  send  an  official 
technical  commission  of  railway  engineers,  who  should  ascertain 
definitely  whether  it  was  possible  or  impossible  to  construct  rail- 


8o  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

ways  from  Adalia  and  Makri  into  the  interior.  The  Ambassador 
pretended  he  was  satisfied  with  that,  although,  in  fact,  he  was 
anything  but  satisfied. 

Another  affair  which  I  settled  during  my  period  of  office  in 
the  Ministry  of  Public  Works  was  the  composition  of  the  numerous 
differences  which  had  arisen  between  the  Road  Construction  Com- 
pany and  the  Technical  Commission  of  the  Ministry.  Instead  of 
getting  to  work  like  reasonable  beings  and  thus  settling  the 
problem,  both  parties  endeavoured  to  refute  the  arguments  of  the 
other  with  an  obstinacy  which  aroused  the  greatest  mistrust  on 
both  sides.  After  getting  Burhaneddin  Bey,  the  Director  of 
Railways  and  Transport,  to  agree  with  Monsieur  Chublier,  the 
Director  of  Roads,  I  went  into  all  the  questions  myself  and  secured 
their  speedy  settlement. 

In  February,  1914,  I  took  over  the  Admiralty  by  way  of 
exchange  with  Tchuruk  Sulon  Mahmud  Pasha. 


AT  THE  ADMIRALTY 


CHAPTER  III. 
AT  THE  ADMIRALTY. 

MY  APPOINTMENT  AS  MINISTER. 

WHEN  Enver  Pasha  was  appointed  Minister  of  War  he  occupied 
himself  with  the  reorganisation  of  the  army,  and  his  first  act  was 
to  make  changes  in  all  the  higher  posts.  He  transferred  all 
Generals  to  the  Peace  Establishment,  and  also  all  higher  officers, 
and  such  other  officers  as  had  no  military  merit  beyond  wearing 
the  epaulets.  He  made  Colonels,  Army  Commanders;  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonels, Divisional  Commanders;  Majors,  Regimental 
Commanders;  and  Captains,  Battalion  Commanders.  On  the 
advice  of  the  reorganisation  mission  he  undertook  a  thorough 
reform  of  the  different  sections  of  the  Ministry  of  War,  and  put 
German  officers  in  charge  of  most  of  them;  he  also  began  to  pre- 
pare the  mobilisation  plans  of  the  army. 

No  effort  was  spared.  Extraordinary  care  was  taken  with  the 
theoretical  and  practical  training  of  the  army,  and  after  a  month 
or  two  we  could  already  see  that  a  new  spirit  inspired  every  part 
of  it. 

While  these  extremely  far-reaching  changes  were  being  made 
in  the  army,  no  changes  could  be  observed  in  the  internal  routine 
of  the  navy.  The  Naval  Minister,  Tchuruk  Sulon  Mahmud  Pasha, 
although  an  extremely  honest  and  able  man,  did  not  possess  the 
courage  required  to  press  through  fundamental  reforms,  and  paid 
not  the  slightest  attention  to  those  members  of  the  Cabinet  who 
advised  him  to  follow  Enver  Pasha's  example. 

Thejre  was  not  the  slightest  hurry  to  press  on  the  construction 
of  the  dreadnought  Sultan  Osman  which  had  been  bought  in 
Brazil;  there  was  delay  on  delay  in  the  building  of  the 

83  F2 


84  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Reschadieh.  The  necessary  efforts  were  not  made  to  repair 
the  damage  which  our  ships  had  suffered  in  the  Balkan  War;  the 
proposals  of  the  chief  of  the  English  Naval  Mission  with  regard 
to  the  organisation  of  the  Ministerial  department,  as  well  as  the 
Corps  of  Officers,  were  not  dealt  with,  under  the  excuse  that  they 
must  be  examined  by  the  Naval  Council.  The  Government's  view 
was  that,  as  a  war  with  the  Greeks  was  inevitable  within  a  very 
short  time,  it  was  urgently  necessary  to  proceed  with  the  reor- 
ganisation and  training  of  our  fleet,  in  fact  even  more  necessary 
than  in  the  case  of  the  army.  For  that  reason  the  Grand  Vizier, 
Enver  Pasha  and  Talaat  Bey  proposed  to  Tchuruk  Sulon  Mahmud 
Pasha  that  he  should  exchange  with  me.  He  adopted  the  sugges- 
tion, and  as  a  result  of  that  decision  I  took  over  the  post  of  Naval 
Minister. 

THE  REORGANISATION  OF  THE  ADMIRALTY  DEPARTMENTS. 

My  first  business  on  taking  over  the  Admiralty  was  a  long  con- 
ference with  Admiral  Limpus,  the  Chief  of  the  English  Naval  Mis- 
sion. I  asked  him  to  give  me  a  copy  of  all  the  proposals  he  had 
ever  made  and  to  point  out  the  most  important  of  them.  I  also 
made  the  Director  of  the  Archives  collect  all  the  reports  on  the 
general  reorganisation  of  our  Navy  which  had  been  sent  in  by 
Admirals  Limpus,  Williams  and  Gamble,  and  which  were  to  be 
found  in  the  Naval  Council  and  the  various  sections.  I  made  it 
my  personal  business  to  lgo  through  them.  Admiral  Limpus' 
main  proposal  was  that  the  departments  of  the  Admiralty  should 
be  reorganised,  and  I  entirely  agreed  with  him  on  that  point.  Both 
Admiral  Limpus  and  the  two  other  English  Admirals  who  had  been 
his  predecessors  complained  about  the  Naval  Council.  They  laid 
stress  on  the  fact  that  the  heads  of  the  departments,  who  were 
reluctant  to  take  any  sort  of  responsibility  in  important  depart- 
mental affairs,  were  always  shifting  it  on  to  the  Naval  Council, 
which  did  not  meet  for  months  at  a  time,  and  even  when  it  did 
meet  it  was  so  alarmed  at  the  accumulation  of  matters  that  it  con- 
tented itself  with  examining  a  few  files  and  then  adjourned  again 
and  left  the  most  important  questions  lying  in  the  document  box. 
In  that  way  the  departmental  heads  shelved  their  responsibility. 

I  therefore  made  up  my  mind  to  abolish  the  Naval  Council  at 
once. 


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At  the  Admiralty  85 

The  office  of  which  Admiral  Limpus  complained  the  most 
bitterly  was  that  of  the  Naval  Under-Secretary  of  State.  The 
English  Admiral  regarded  Rustem  Pasha,  the  Under-Secretary  of 
State,  as  one  of  the  most  obstinate  opponents  of  the  reorganisation 
of  the  Ottoman  Navy. 

He  told  me  that  even  when  he  had  won  over  the  various  depart- 
mental heads  to  hi$  views  they  always  came  to  entirely  opposite 
conclusions  after  speaking  to  Rustem  Pasha,  and  explained  that 
they  could  not  act  contrary  to  his  orders.  But  the  Admiral's 
greatest  grievance  was  against  the  Fourth  Section,  and  the 
directors  of  the  Accounts  and  Audit  Departments.  Until 
these  departments,  which  clung  slavishly  to  the  most  anti- 
quated bureaucratic  traditions,  were  reformed  from  top  to 
bottom,  there  was  no  chance  of  getting  anything  done  at  the 
Admiralty. 

After  this  verbal  enquiry  I  made  myself  thoroughly  familiar 
with  the  carefully  elaborated  scheme  for  the  reforms  to  be  intro- 
duced into  the  Ministry  which  had  been  drawn  up  by  Admiral 
Limpus  and  Admiral  Gamble.  Acting  on  the  suggestions  con- 
tained in  this  scheme,  and  supplementing  it  with  my  own  proposals, 
I  began  the  preparation  of  reorganisation  regulations.  The 
Under-Secretariat,  as  well  as  the  Naval  Council,  were  to  be 
abolished.  The  Admiralty  was  to  consist  of  four  departments  in 
addition  to  a  Medical  Inspectorate  and  an  Accounts  Department. 
The  head  of  Department  i  was  to  have  the  title  of  a  Chief  of  the 
Naval  General  Staff.  Each  head  of  a  section  was  to  settle  all 
questions  relating  to  his  department,  and  on  his  own  responsibility 
lay  his  decisions  before  the  Minister  for  his  approval.  In  matters 
which  might  affect  other  departments,  though  primarily  concerning 
one  particular  department,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  departmental 
head  to  arrive  at  a  decision  in  concert  with  the  other  departments. 
All  departmental  heads  were  also  under  a  duty  to  keep  the  Chief  of 
the  Naval  General  Staff  fully  informed  as  to  all  matters  affecting 
their  sections. 

The  Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff  was  responsible  for  the 
reorganisation  of  the  Fleet,  its  preparedness  for  war,  the  instruc- 
tion and  training  of  the  Corps  of  Officers,  and  even  the  production 
and  management  of  war  material,  and  he  had  the  right  to  all  neces- 
sary information,  either  verbal  or  written,  from  the  competent 


86  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

authorities,  and  to  acquaint  them  with  the  views  of  the  Naval 
General  Staff. 

When  the  reorganisation  scheme  was  in  draft  and  took  practical 
shape  (having  regard  to  the  changes  which  experience  dictated),  I 
considered  it  advisable  to  embody  it  in  a  temporary  ordnance. 
Lastly,  I  got  rid  of  the  Under-Secretary  of  State,  Rustem  Pasha, 
two  other  admirals,  Faik  Pasha,  the  Medical  Inspector,  and  a  few 
captains,  commanders  and  lieutenant-commanders. 

Admiral  Limpus  was  ve^y  pleased  with  these  decisive  steps  and 
told  me  he  was  sure  that  he  would  now  undoubtedly  be  able  to  make 
swift  and  satisfactory  progress  with  his  work  at  the  Admiralty. 

In  accordance  with  the  reorganisation  ordnance,  I  divided  the 
harbours,  which  had  hitherto  been  under  the  control  of  the  Admiral 
Commanding  Constantinople  Harbour,  into  six  zones,  and  for  the 
first  time  established  Naval  Prefectures  at  Samsun,  Stambul, 
Smyrna  and  Beirut.  I  put  the  Red  Sea  ports  under  the  command 
of  the  Commodore  of  the  Red  Sea,  and  the  ports  of  Basra  and  the 
Euphrates  and  Tigris  under  the  command  of  the  Commodore  of  the 
Gulf  of  Basra.  My  object  in  establishing  these  naval  prefectures 
was  to  try  and  put  a  stop  to  smuggling  on  the  Ottoman  coasts  by 
setting  up  a  coastguard  service  and  to  keep  the  harbour  captains 
under  close  and  continuous  control.  Hitherto  they  had  had  prac- 
tically no  sort  of  supervision.  For  that  reason  I  assigned  the  gun- 
boats we  had  just  received  from  France,  and  the  older  gunboats 
we  already  possessed,  for  service 'on  the  coasts  of  the  Black  Sea, 
the  Mediterranean,  Syria  and  the  Red  Sea.  I  put  them  under  the 
orders  of  the  Naval  Prefects. 

If  the  World  War  had  not  broken  out  five  months  after  I  went 
to  the  Admiralty  the  authorities  administering  indirect  taxes,  State 
monopolies  and  the  national  debt  would  have  derived  great  profit 
from  these  measures  and  smuggling  would  have  been  more  or  less 
suppressed. 

As  my  naval  prefects  I  selected  the  most  active  of  the  senior 
naval  officers  and  impressed  on  them  the  necessity  of  thorough  and 
continuous  inspection.  Their  reports  enabled  me  to  decide  which 
of  the  captains  it  was  advisable  to  remove  from  their  posts  and  also 
revealed  to  me  the  deplorable  condition  of  the  ships  in  the 
provinces. 

To  take  the  place  of  the  harbour  captains  whom  I  put  on  the 


At  the  Admiralty  87 

general  list  I  appointed  officers  who  enjoyed  a  good  name  and  a 
reputation  for  efficiency,  but  who  had  not  been  as  successful  as  was 
desired  in  their  service  with  the  fleet. 

I  intended  to  divide  all  naval  officers  into  three  categories.  The 
first  was  to  consist  of  officers  who  could  serve  in  the  fleet;  the 
second  comprised  officers  who  were  to  go  to  ships  engaged  in 
coastal  protection,  and  the  third  was  to  be  composed  of  officers  on 
harbour  duties.  The  officers  were  to  interchange  frequently  within 
their  own  categories,  and  those  of  the  first  category,  for  example, 
who  were  not  fitted  to  remain  in  it  were  transferred  to  the  second, 
officers  of  the  second  to  the  third.  Officers  in  the  third  category 
who  proved  inefficient  were  to  be  retired  altogether. 

Unfortunately  the  World  War  prevented  me  from  carrying  out 
this  plan  in  its  entirety. 

Let  me  give  a  few  examples. 

The  first  was  during  the  first  weeks  of  my  period  of  office  at 
the  Admiralty.  I  had  ordered  the  departure  of  a  gunboat  and 
myself  fixed  the  exact  date  and  hour.  It  was  a  ship  which  it  had 
been  arranged  in  Mahmud  Pasha's  time  should  be  placed  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Commodore  of  the  Red  Sea.  On  the  evening 
before  the  ship  was  to  leave  I  went  with  Admiral  Limpus  on  board 
the  gunboat,  which  was  lyingf  off  Tophane  roads.  I  asked  the 
Admiral  to  conduct  the  inspection  himself  and  to  tell  me  without 
hesitation  whether  everything  was  really  in  order  in  view  of  the 
long  cruise  ahead. 

The  Admiral  told  me  that,  apart  from  a  few  details,  the  ship 
could  be  regarded  as  equipped  for  the  journey. 

I  asked  the  commander  whether  he  had  sufficient  stores  on 
board,  whether  the  men  were  provided  with  summer  uniforms,  and 
if  they  had  money.  My  enquiries  led  me  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
clothing  and  stores  needed  supplementing  to  a  certain  extent.  I 
regarded  it  as  essential  that  the  ship's  chest  should  have  a  supply  of 
money  for  three  months  so  that  the  officers  would  not  have  money 
difficulties  on  the  way.  I  told  the  commander  to  send  his  second  in 
command  and  his  paymaster  to  the  Ministry  so  that  the  deficiencies 
could  be  made  good  during  the  night  and  he  could  start  at  the 
appointed  time  next  morning.  I  returned  to  the  Ministry  myself, 
had  the  depots  opened  in  the  night,  made  them  disgorge  food  and 
summer  clothing,  and,  notwithstanding  the  objections  of  the 


88  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

accounts  officials,  ordered  them  to  pay  out  to  the  ship  a  sum  on 
account. 

Next  morning  the  moment  I  arrived  at  the  Ministry  I  enquired 
whether  the  gunboat  had  left.  To  my  intense  astonishment  I 
learned  that  she  had  not  yet  lifted  anchor.  I  had  the  commander 
fetched  at  once  and  asked  him  why  he  had  not  gone. 

"  Effendim,"  he  replied,  "  my  second  in  command  and  pay- 
master have  not  yet  returned  on  board,  and  I  thought  I  dare  not 
leave  without  them  !  ' 

Without  a  moment's  hesitation  I  put  that  commander  on  the 
half-pay  list  and  appointed  someone  else  in  his  place.  1  placed  the 
second  in  command  on  the  general  list  and  compelled  the  paymaster 
to  go  with  the  ship,  though  he  had  promised  himself  that  he  would 
not  go  to  the  Red  Sea. 

ANOTHER  EXAMPLE. 

It  was  a  festival  day  before  the  outbreak  of  tlie  World  War.  I 
desired  to  review  the  officers  and  crews  of  the  Fleet,  and  had  given 
orders  that  they  were  all  to  be  present  at  a  certain  hour  on  the 
square  in  front  of  the  Admiralty  building.  The  weather  was  wet 
on  the  morning  of  the  day  in  question.  However,  I  appeared  in 
full  dress  on  the  review  ground  at  the  hour  fixed.  The  men  were 
not  there. 

As  I  was  leaving  my  car  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Fleet, 
Tahir  Bey,  and  several  of  his  officers  came  out  of  the  office  of  the 
Commodore  of  the  Golden  Horn.  When  I  asked  him  why  the  fleet 
was  not  assembled  he  answered  : 

"  I  thought,  Effendim,  that  in  view  of  the  wet  weather,  you 
would  certainly  not  come,  and  so  I  have  not  brought  the  men  to  save 
them  from  getting  wet  unnecessarily. " 

I  gave  Tahir  Bey  three  days'  arrest  for  being  afraid  of  getting 
wet  and  a  week  later  he  was  made  to  retire. 


ANOTHER  CASE. 

During  the  year  1916  I  had  to  visit  Constantinople  in  connection 
with  various  matters  affecting  the  Fourth  Army.  It  had  been 
proved  beyond  doubt  that  a  naval  officer  had  been  guilty  of  more 
than  one  fraud.  Unfortunately,  it  was  at  this  time  that  the  moral 


At^the  Admiralty  89 

of  the  army,  no  less  than  that  of  the  navy,  had  begun  to  sink,  and  I 
was  determined  to  make  an  example.  I  handed  the  officer  over  to 
the  court  martial  with  a  request  that  judgment  should  be  given  as 
soon  as  possible. 

In  spite  of  the  accumulation  of  evidence,  the  court  martial 
acquitted  him,  although,  in  my  judgment,  and  in  that  of  all  his 
superiors,  there  could  not  be  the  slightest  doubt  about  his  fraudu- 
lent dealings.  Of  course  I  had  to  respect  the  verdict  of  the  court 
martial,  but  I  put  the  officer  on  the  retired  list  all  the  same. 

I  put  Ismail  Bey  (the  president  of  the  court  martial)  and  some  of 
its  members  on  the  half-pay  list  on  the  ground  that  they  had 
revealed  a  lack  of  judgment  and  discrimination  in  questions  ot 
military  honour. 

ONE  LAST  EXAMPLE. 

I  had  returned  to  Constantinople  after  sending  home  the  com- 
manders of  the  Fourth  Army.  The  peace  with  Russia  had  been 
signed  and  shipping  had  been  resumed  in  the  Black  Sea.  It  was 
considered  necessary  to  prepare  for  sea  the  Res  chid  Pasha,  which 
had  previously  served  as  a  depot  for  men  undergoing  a  course  of 
instruction  on  the  Yawus.  After  difficulties  innumerable  I 
managed  to  get  the  ship  from  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Fleet 
and  have  her  brought  into  the  inner  harbour.  Next  morning  the 
Under-Secretary  of  State,  Wassif  Pasha,  came  to  me  with  the 
report  that  the  Res  chid  Pasha,  which  had  only  just  been  thoroughly 
repaired,  was  in  a  deplorable  condition,  and  that  if  an  end  was  not 
put  to  the  neglects  and  omissions  of  the  captains  and  commanders, 
the  collapse  of  the  navy  would  be  inevitable  before  long.  There- 
upon I  summoned  the  President  of  the  Third  Department,  who 
confirmed  this  news.  I  then  ordered  Ramzi  Pasha,  the  Commo- 
dore of  the  Golden  Horn,  to  go  on  board  the  Reschid  Pasha,  pre- 
pare a  report  on  the  condition  of  the  ship,  and  give  me  the  names  of 
those  members  of  the  ship's  company  who  were  responsible  for 
this  state  of  affairs. 

The  next  day  he  presented  his  report,  which  proved  beyond 
doubt  the  responsibility  of  the  captain  and  his  second  in  command. 
I  at  once  went  on  board  myself,  accompanied  by  Wassif  Pasha  and 
Hamid  Bey. 

I  ascertained  from  my  own  observation  that  the  men  had  drawn 


90  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

and  scribbled  obscene  things  upon  the  doors  of  the  officers'  cabins, 
that  the  officers  had  permitted  this,  and  that  the  ship's  beautiful 
wardroom  was  in  an  indescribable  state. 

I  immediately  ordered  the  dismissal  from  the  service  of  the 
captain  and  fourteen  days'  imprisonment  for  the  second  in  com- 
mand, and  I  circulated  the  information  that  if  such  a  thing  ever 
occurred  on  any  ship  again  the  captain  and  commander  would  be 
dismissed  the  service  at  once. 

Although  Captain  Hakki,  who  was  expecting  the  reversion  to 
the  post  of  commander  of  the  Yawus,  was  a  very  honest,  clever, 
and  educated  officer,  he  was  lacking  in  practical  experience  at  sea. 
I  think  he  did  not  fully  realise  that  a  commander  is  responsible  for 
everything  and  everyone  on  board  his  ship. 

Among  our  naval  officers  the  view  prevailed,  a  wholly  erroneous 
view,  that  the  commander  alone  was  responsible  for  cleanliness, 
discipline,  and  so  forth  on  board  ship.  In  a  certain  sense  that  view 
was  right.  But  in  any  case  the  commander  is  responsible  only  to 
his  captain,  and  the  captain  in  turn  is  responsible  to  the  Squadron 
Commander  or  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Fleet.  Many  of  our 
naval  officers  had  not  grasped  that  if  ultimate  responsibility  is  not 
concentrated  in  the  captain,  there  is  no  means  of  assuring  unity  of 
command  on  board.  Several  short-sighted  people  have  alleged 
that  the  real  reason  for  Captain  Hakki's  dismissal  was  that  he  was 
on  good  terms  with  the  German  officers.  A  more  ridiculous 
hypothesis  is  hard  to  imagine.  To  ascribe  such  a  motive  to  me  is 
absolutely  absurd,  as  I  was  one  of  the  warmest  advocates  of 
discipline  and  a  good  understanding  between  the  Turkish  and 
German  personnel. 

I  often  acted  in  a  similar  fashion  when  I  wished  to  raise  the 
moral  standard  of  our  naval  officers.  I  shall  deal  with  this  matter 
fully  when  I  get  back  home,  and  shall  be  able  to  resort  to  the 
archives,  so  that  I  can  complete  my  memoirs  with  special  reference 
to  the  period  of  my  activities  as  Naval  Minister. 

ACCELERATING  THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  "  SULTAN  OSMAN  "  AND  THE 
"  RESCHADIEH."  RECONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  FACTORIES  AND  HARBOURS. 
ESTABLISHMENT  OF  AN  ARSENAL  AT  ISMID.  ORDERS  FOR  WAR  VESSELS. 

Immediately  after  I  took  over  my  duties  at  the  Admiralty  I  had 
our  ships  like  the  Barbaras,  Turghud,  and  Messadieh  thoroughly 


At  the  Admiralty  91 

overhauled  and  repairs  were  put  in  hand  at  once  so  far  as  our  poor 
resources  would  allow.  I  inspected  the  work  of  restoration  almost 
daily,  and  I  made  it  my  special  business  to  remove  all  obstacles 
from  the  path.  My  main  purpose  was  to  get  the  Sultan  Osman, 
the  construction  of  which  in  England  was  almost  finished,  into  the 
Sea  of  Marmora  and  to  fix  a  definite  time  for  the  delivery  of  the 
battleship  Reschadieh,  which  had  been  ordered  even  before  the 
war  with  Italy  and  the  building  of  which  had  suffered  one  delay 
after  another. 

For  six  months  and  more  the  departments  concerned  had  not 
been  able  to  give  satisfactory  answers  to  Wassif  Bey  and  Reuf  Bey, 
who  had  demanded  certain  alterations  in  the  Sultan  Osman  and 
Reschadieh.  As  I  wanted  to  know  for  myself  the  true  state  of 
affairs  I  ordered  Reuf  Bey  and  Wassif  Bey,  who  were  in  London, 
to  come  to  Constantinople.  From  the  departments  involved  I 
collected  the  documents  they  had  sent  in.  I  made  all  the  experts 
come  to  the  Ministry,  and  after  consultation  with  Admiral  Limpus 
I  gave  each  of  them  the  instructions  they  required.  I  wrote  a  letter 
to  the  yards  asking  them  to  give  me  a  final  date  for  the  delivery  ot 
the  Sultan  Osman  and  Reschadieh. 

As  Reuf  Bey  had  reported  to  me  that  part  of  the  crew  of  the 
Sultan  Osman  ought  to  go  on  board  at  once  in  order  to  familiarise 
themselves  with  the  complicated  technique  of  the  instruments,  I 
immediately  made  a  selection  of  certain  petty  officers  and  men 
and  sent  them  to  England  on  the  Res  chid  Pasha,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Captain  Ismail,  the  Commodore  of  the  Golden  Horn. 

I  asked  Reuf  Bey  and  Wassif  Bey  to  refrain  from  demanding 
further  changes  in  these  ships  every  day,  so  that  the  yards  could 
at  last  deliver  them  on  the  date  appointed,  and  then  sent  both 
officers  back  to  London. 

During  Mahmud  Pasha's  term  of  office  negotiations  had  been 
opened  with  the  firms  of  Armstrong  and  Vickers  for  the  modern- 
ising of  the  arsenal  at  the  Golden  Horn  and  the  establishment  of 
an  arsenal  (on  the  most  modern  lines)  and  floating  docks  in  the 
Gulf  of  Ismid.  The  plans  for  these  had  already  been  prepared. 

In  view  of  the  high  importance  of  this  matter  I  decided  to 
get  the  question  definitely  settled,  and  asked  the  two  companies  to 
send  their  representatives  to  London.  Thus  Mr.  Vincent  Caillard, 


92  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

member  of  the  Administrative  Board,  and  two  directors  of  Arm- 
strong and  Vickers  came  to  the  capital.  The  Stambul  lawyer, 
Count  Ostrorog,  was  appointed  legal  adviser  to  the  companies, 
and  Deputy  Halladjian  Effendi  legal  adviser  to  the  Naval  Ministry. 

After  numerous  meetings,  at  which  our  legal  advisers  were 
also  present,  the  terms  of  the  contract  were  definitely  drawn  up. 
Though  I  must  admit  that  this  contract  had  its  drawbacks,  I  had 
at  any  rate  the  great  pleasure  of  knowing  that  within  a  short  time 
we  should  find  ourselves  in  possession  of  an  arsenal,  building 
yards,  harbours  and  factories  of  the  latest  pattern. 

From  my  earliest  days  I  have  had  one  principle — when  the 
Government  had  once  come  to  a  final  decision  in  a  matter  I  made 
it  my  business  to  see  that  it  was  carried  out  without  dilatoriness  or 
delay. 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  agreement  with  Armstrong  and 
Vickers  the  development  of  the  Golden  Horn  Arsenal  was  to  be 
entrusted  £0  a  committee  Consisting  of  representatives  of  the 
Naval  Ministry  and  the  companies,  and  an  English  Director- 
General  was  put  in  charge  of  it.  People  may  say  what  they  like, 
but,  personally,  I  am  entirely  convinced  that  it  would  have  been 
of  the  greatest  advantage  to  the  country  if  this  scheme  had  been 
thoroughly  and  carefully  carried  out.  The  probity  of  the 
Director-General  who  was  appointed,  the  ability  and  efficiency  he 
always  displayed  filled  me  with  a  great  sense  of  satisfaction.  We 
were  entirely  in  agreement  as  regards  the  provisional  plans  (for 
the  improvement  of  the  factories  and  docks)  which  he  drew  up  a 
short  time  after  his  arrival  in  Constantinople.  I  will  give  one 
example  of  his  integrity. 

According  to  the  contract  with  the  companies  the  Government 
was  bound  to  produce  the  capital  wrhich  was  required  for  the  con 
struction  of  the  new  arsenal  in  the  Gulf  of  Ismid. 

After  two  months'  investigation  the  Director-General  said  to 
me: 

"  The  position  of  the  arsenal  at  the  Golden  Horn  is  so  excep- 
tionally good  that  I  see  no  reason  whatever  to  transfer  the  arsenals 
of  the  Ottoman  Navy  to  Ismid.  If  the  existing  buildings  are  con- 
verted into  modern  works  and  certain  improvements  made  in  the 
docks  it  will  be  possible  to  build  even  the  largest  dreadnoughts  in 
the  Golden  Horn  arsenal  within  four  years  at  the  latest.  I  there- 


At  the  Admiralty  93 

fore  think  it  would  be  advisable  to  abandon  the  establishment  of 
the  Ismid  arsenal  and  concentrate  all  our  efforts  on  the  transforma- 
tion of  the  Golden  Horn  arsenal.  We  can  do  that  with  a  relatively 
small  outlay.  I  promise  you  I'll  bring  the  companies  round  to 
this  point  of  view." 

Unfortunately,  at  the  beginning  of  the  World  War  our  papers 
published  a  lying  report  taken  from  the  German  Press.  The 
report  was  to  the  effect  that  at  the  time  the  repairs  to  our  ships 
were  carried  out  the  Director-General,  acting  on  the  orders  of  the 
English  Naval  Mission,  had  removed  the  most  important  parts, 
and  thus  rendered  our  ships  unseaworthy.  When  this  report 
appeared  I  was  at  the  4th  Army  Headquarters.  As  it  was  abso- 
lutely contrary  to  the  truth  (for  the  English  Naval  Mission  and 
the  engineers  of  the  company  who  had  undertaken  to  organise  and 
modernise  our  arsenals  had  applied  themselves  to  their  work  with 
the  greatest  devotion  up  to  the  day  they  left  our  service),  I  asked 
Enver  Pasha  to  issue  a  dementi  in  the  name  of  the  Ministry,  as  he 
was  temporarily  in  charge  of  naval  affairs  at  the  time. 

I  do  not  yet  know  whether  this  dementi  has  been  published  or 
not.  Unhappily  the  lying  report  spread  with  amazing  rapidity, 
and  from  my  perusal  of  many  papers  I  saw  that  it  had  given  rise  to 
a  whole  series  of  attacks  on  ourselves  and  the  Germans. 

I  think  I  am  under  a  moral  obligation  to  affirm  here  once  more 
that  the  officers  of  the  English  Naval  Mission,  under  Admiral 
Limpus'  command,  and  the  English  engineers  and  workmen  to 
whom  was  entrusted  the  reorganisation  of  the  Golden  Horn 
arsenal,  did  their  duty  with  absolute  honesty.  I  had  such  confi- 
dence in  their  honesty  that  I  had  commissioned  them  to  fix  the 
torpedo  lines  in  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Red  Sea,  and  entrusted 
them  with  the  task  of  ascertaining  the  best  minefields  and  the  best 
method  of  mine-laying.  I  had  attached  a  torpedo-boat  officer  &  la 
suite  of  Admiral  Limpus  and  a  Turkish  officer. 

The  first  torpedo  lines  in  the  Dardanelles  were  actually  laid  in 
accordance  with  that  plan. 

As  I  desire  that  this  book  shall  contribute  in  every  way  to  make 
known  the  truth,  I  think  I  ought  to  relate  the  following  incident. 

At  a  time  when  it  was  becoming  more  and  more  probable  that 
the  Straits  would  be  closed,  Admiral  Limpus  came  to  me  one  day 
and  said: 


94  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

"  If  you  think  you'll  have  to  close  the  Straits  with  mines,  I've 
a  proposal  to  make  to  you.  You  can  lay  as  many  mines  as  you 
like  in  the  Dardanelles,  but  you  should  leave  the  Bosphorus  open. 
What  you  want  to  do  is  to  distribute  buoys  to  make  it  look  as  if 
mines  had  been  laid  and  inform  all  shipping  that,  owing  to  the 
Bosphorus  being  closed  by  mines,  it  is  forbidden  to  attempt  to 
pass  through  it  without  a  pilot.  Not  knowing  that  in  fact  no 
mines  have  been  laid,  the  Russians  will  certainly  not  venture  to 
force  the  Straits.  The  Germans  adopted  that  course  in  the  year 
1870.  They  announced  that  they  had  laid  mines  along  the  North 
Sea  coast,  though  in  fact  they  hadn't  laid  a  single  one.  The 
announcement  made  the  French  fleet  afraid  and  kept  them  away 
from  the  coast.  But  if  you  strew  mines  in  the  narrows  of  the 
Black  Sea,  one  of  them  may  break  from  its  moorings  in  the  very 
strong  current  and  come  down  into  the  Golden  Horn,  and  if  it  is 
unlucky  enough  to  hit  a  trading  or  passenger  vessel  and  there  is  a 
catastrophe,  you  will  have  incurred  an  enormous  responsibility  in 
the  eyes  of  public  opinion  throughout  Europe." 

I  thanked  the  Admiral  for  his  warning,  but  told  him  that  one 
could  not  always  rely  on  the  success  of  such  a  stratagem,  and  the 
Bosphorus  was  not  to  be  compared  with  the  North  Sea  coast,  for, 
if  the  enemy  fleet  ever  got  wind  of  the  real  situation  and  forced 
the  Straits,  the  result  would  be  irremediable  harm  to  us. 

I  will  not  discuss  here  whether  the  Admiral's  proposal  was 
inspired  by  any  consideration  of  the  political  situation  at  the 
moment  or  whether  he  was  giving  his  real  professional  opinion, 
but  in  view  of  my  confidence  in  the  Admiral's  probity  and  the  fact 
that  he  did  not  make  the  same  suggestion  with  regard  to  the 
Dardanelles  (where  the  English  fleet  was  in  particularly  great 
strength),  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  the  advice  was  dictated 
solely  by  technical  considerations. 


The  order  for  a  dreadnought  of  the  latest  design  and  two  light 
cruisers,  six  destroyers  and  two  submarines  formed  the  second 
part  of  our  negotiations  with  the  directors  of  Armstrong  and 
Vickers,  who  had  come  to  Constantinople. 

The  agreements  containing  all  the  requirements  of  our  tech- 
nical experts  and  those  of  Admiral  Limpus  were  drawn  up  by  the 


At  the  Admiralty  95 

companies.  They  were  now  signed  by  both  parties,  and  the  con- 
tracts distributed  accordingly.  The  ammunition  for  our  older 
units,  troop  manoeuvres  and  exercises,  and  war  itself  was  also 
ordered.  The  dreadnought  was  given  the  name  of  Fatih,  and 
Commander  Hamdy  Bey  was  commissioned  to  supervise  its  con- 
struction. The  dates  for  the  high-speed  trials  and  gunnery  tests 
of  the  Sultan  Osman  had  been  finally  fixed. 

In  view  of  all  this  activity,  it  will  at  once  be  admitted  that  our 
one  object  in  life  was  to  make  our  fleet  superior  to  the  Greek  fleet 
at  the  first  possible  moment.  I  did  everything  conceivable  to 
remove  all  obstacles  and  prevent  any  delay  in  the  realisation  of 
this  project. 

About  this  time  the  French  manifested  a  desire  to  build  ships 
for  us.  After  discussion  with  the  representatives  of  the 
Mediterranean  Ironworks  and  Dock  Company,  whom  I  had 
invited  to  Constantinople,  six  destroyers  were  ordered  from  their 
yards.  A  contract  for  two  submarines  was  also  placed  with 
Creusot. 

The  battleship  Fatih  was  to  be  ready  in  twenty-two  months,  and 
the  other  units  which  had  been  ordered  in  England  and  France 
were  to  be  constructed  in  approximately  the  same  period.  The 
dreadnought  Snlta\n  Osman  was  to  be  delivered  by  the  end  of 
July,  1914,  and  the  Reschadieh  by  the  beginning  of  1915.  In  1916 
we  should  thus  have  been  in  possession  of  a  new  fleet  of  three 
dreadnoughts,  two  light  cruisers,  twelve  destroyers  and  four 
submarines,  as  well  as  a  second  fleet  consisting  of  our  old 
units,  and  the  combined  fleets  would  have  been  superior  to  the 
Greek  fleet. 

In  close  co-operation  with  Admiral  Limpus  we  had  drawn  up  a 
very  comprehensive  programme  of  training  and  exercises  for  the 
education  of  the  crews  who  were  to  man  the  ships,  but  our  main 
concern  was  to  proceed  with  the  improvement  of  our  old  units  in 
order  to  prepare  them  for  sea  as  soon  as  possible. 

This  was  the  first  business  of  the  English  Director-General,  who 
had  just  taken  up  his  duties.  At  last,  on  July  22nd,  1914,  I  saw 
our  fleet,  comprising  the  Messudieh,  Barbaras,  Turghud,  and 
our  old  destroyers  and  torpedo-boats,  leave  the  quays  of  the  Golden 
Horn.  I  sent  them  out  to  the  islands  where  they  were  to  begin 
their  fleet  exercises  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Limpus. 


96  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Our  tireless  activities  gave  the  Greeks  food  for  thought.  They 
set  about  strengthening  their  fleet,  and  ordered  from  France  a 
dreadnought,  which  was  to  be  delivered  within  two  years,  six 
torpedo-boats,  and  also  six  new  torpedo-boats  from  German  yards. 
The  construction  of  these  ships  meant  no  danger  to  us,  for  the 
reason  that  the  Sultan  Osman  arrived  in  Constantinople  at  the  end 
of  August,  so  that  we  had  already  secured  superiority  over  the 
Greek  fleet.  Five  or  six  months  later  the  arrival  of  the  Reschadieh 
would  increase  that  superiority,  and  we  were  all  the  more  sure  of 
our  advantage,  because  the  Fatih  would  balance  the  Greek  dread- 
nought ordered  in  France.  The  Greeks  themselves  realised  the 
situation  only  too  well,  and  did  everything  they  possibly  could  to 
prevent  the  arrival  of  the  Sultan  Osman  in  Stambul. 

After  the  Goeben  came  in  the  middle  of  May,  1914,  the  English 
sent  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Mediterranean  fleet,  Admiral 
de  Robeck,  to  present  his  respects  to  His  Majesty.  He  came  on 
the  Invincible.  Either  during  his  official  visit  to  the  Admiralty  or 
in  one  of  the  various  conferences  we  had  together  the  Admiral 
asked  me  what  steps  we  had  taken  to  secure  the  safe  arrival  of 
the  Sultan  Osman  in  Constantinople. 

"  The  Greeks  are  terribly  frightened  of  the  arrival  of  the  Sultan 
Osman  in  Turkish  waters/'  he  told  me,  "  and  they  are  doing 
everything  they  possibly  can  to  protect  themselves  against  this 
danger.  According  to  my  information,  if  their  agent  failed  to 
destroy  the  ship  before  its  last  trials  in  England  they  are  deter- 
mined to  send  a  submarine  to  sink  it  on  its  way  through  the  Straits 
of  Gibraltar,  and  if  this  last  method  fails  they  will  attack  it  with 
their  whole  fleet  immediately  it  reaches  Greek  waters.  You  can't 
be  careful  enough  if  you  want  to  get  your  ship/' 

To-day  I  think  I  must  assume  that  the  object  of  the  Admiral  in 
pressing  this  advice  upon  me  was  to  frighten  me  into  giving  up 
the  idea  of  allowing  the  Sultan  Osman  to  come  to  Constantinople 
before  the  Reschadieh  was  ready,  but  at  the  time  I  thought  that 
the  Admiral  gave  me  this  advice  out  of  friendliness,  and  was  point- 
ing out  the  greatness  of  the  peril  so  that  I  could  take  all  necessary 
measures  to  avert  it. 

According  to  the  reports  which  I  received  from  my  agents  in 
England  and  Greece,  apart  from  the  Admiral's  advice,  it  certainly 
seemed  necessary  to  take  the  most  elaborate  precautionary 


At  the  Admiralty  97 

measures  to  secure  the  safety  of  the  Sultan  Osman  during  her 
voyage  from  England  to  Constantinople. 

After  I  had  discussed  this  matter  with  Admiral  Limpus  it  was 
decided  that  at  the  beginning  of  August  our  fleet  should  cruise 
into  the  Mediterranean  and  meet  the  Sultan  Osman  on  the  latitude 
of  Crete. 

During  my  visit  to  France  for  the  French  naval  manoeuvres  I 
summoned  Reuf  Bey,  who  was  in  England,  to  Paris,  and  gave  him 
personally  secret  orders  which  the  Admiral  had  drawn  up  in  his 
capacity  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  fleet.  These  orders 
described  the  route  to  be  taken  by  the  Sultan  Osman  on  its  way 
through  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  and  the  rendezvous  where  it  was 
to  meet  our  fleet. 

Unfortunately  the  English  Government  laid  hands  on  our 
dreadnought  on  July  21,  and  fate  willed  that  our  flag  should  never 
fly  on  that  magnificent  vessel. 

THE  ATTEMPT  AT  A  FRANCO-TURKISH   RAPPROCHEMENT. 

I  have  already  briefly  explained  that  as  a  result  of  the  Balkan 
War  the  Committee  of  Unity  and  Progress  adopted  the  principle 
that  the  old  passive  policy  must  be  abandoned  in  favour  of  an 
active  foreign  and  domestic  policy.  Their  reason  was  that  it  had 
become  clear  that  this  was  the  only  way  of  saving  Turkey  from  the 
complications  which  threatened  on  every  side,  building  up  her 
strength  and  giving  her  her  true  place  among  the  nations. 

It  seems  to  me  necessary  to  enumerate  once  more  the  essential 
features  of  that  active  policy  which  drove  the  Government  into  the 
World  War. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  domestic  politics,  the  most  important 
question  was  to  determine  the  rights  of  the  minority,  to  use  a 
current  phrase,  and  to  bring  about  an  amicable  understanding 
between  them  and  the  majority.  As  I  have  already  carefully 
explained,  a  modus  Vivendi  with  the  Arabs  had  already  been  found, 
and  if  it  did  not  completely  satisfy  all  the  Arabian  politicians,  there 
was  no  doubt  that  the  great  mass  of  Arab  Mohammedans, 
who  were  heart  and  soul  in  the  cause  of  Islam,  regarded  it  as 
adequate. 

The  racial  problem  had  been  finally  settled  so   far   as   the 


98  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Bulgarians  were  concerned,  and  not  a  single  Bulgarian  was  to  be 
found  within  the  frontiers  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Greeks,  who  had  childishly  given  their 
King  the  name  of  Constantine  XIIL,  and  hoped  to  revive  the 
Byzantine  Empire,  left  us  in  no  kind  of  doubt  that  a  final  reckoning 
with  them  was  a  matter  of  the  immediate  future.  It  therefore  seems 
necessary  to  take  precautionary  measures  at  once,  so  that  in  that 
eventuality  we  should  not  be  at  the  mercy  of  Greek  treachery  within 
our  own  borders. 

We  therefore  began  to  proceed  with  the  exchange  of  the  Greek 
population  of  the  vilayet  of  Idin  for  the  Mohammedans  of  Mace- 
donia and  other  regions,  and  to  take  in  hand  the  organisation  and 
increase  of  our  army  and  navy.  We  also  tried  to  make  agreements 
with  foreign  Powers. 

But  the  most  important  domestic  problem  was  the  Armenian.  I 
wish  I  could  convince  my  readers  by  all  the  proofs  available  to  me 
that  it  was  the  Armenian  question,  above  all  others,  which  the 
Committee  of  Unity  and  Progress  desired  to  solve  in  a  way  which 
would  satisfy  and  benefit  the  Armenians.  I  can  produce  those 
proofs,  and  also  recount  the  causes  which  prevented  our  success, 
but  it  seems  to  me  better  to  deal  with  this  extremely  important 
matter  in  a  special  chapter. 

Whenever  an  Armenian  question  cropped  up  in  Turkey  there  was 
always  a  Russian  question  behind  it.  At  the  meeting  of  the  Jenikoi 
Commission  (which  was  composed  of  the  First  Dragomans  of  the 
Great  Powers),  which  had  to  decide  on  the  form  and  nature  of  the 
reform  to  be  introduced  in  Armenia,  the  Russian  First  Dragoman 
always  put  forward  a  maximum  programme,  while  the  German 
First  Dragoman  advocated  a  minimum  programme.  The  First 
Dragomans  of  England  and  France,  on  the  one  side,  and  Austria 
and  Italy  on  the  other,  played  the  mediator.  After  several  meetings 
the  commission  failed  to  reach  a  final  decision,  and  laid  a  minimum 
and  maximum  programme  before  their  Embassies.  Subsequently 
the  discussion  was  continued  at  the  Sublime  Porte  between  the 
German  and  Russian  Ambassadors  and  the  Grand  Vizier,  while  the 
other  Ambassadors  withdrew  from  active  participation  in  the 
affair,  explaining  that  they  would  accept  any  decision  ultimately 
reached  by  the  two  Ambassadors  representing  the  extreme  points 
of  view. 


At  the  Admiralty  99 

This  business  proves  quite  clearly  that  if  we  were  to  be  safe 
against  Russia  we  had  no  other  resource  but  to  win  the  sympathy 
of  France  and  England,  and  particularly  of  public  opinion  in  those 
two  countries.  We  never  dreamed  of  a  general  European  war, 
and  still  less  that  Germany  would  declare  war  on  Russia  on  our 
behalf.  What  we  said  to  ourselves  was  this  :  "  What  has  Germany 
been  doing  to  allow  our  closest  ally  to  rob  us  of  all  our  illusions 
by  annexing  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  a  few  days  after  the  pro- 
mulgation of  our  constitution  ?  Is  not  Italy,  which  has  suddenly 
attacked  Tripoli,  an  ally  of  Germany,  though  apparently  none  too 
loyal  an  ally  ?  Did  not  Italy  declare  that  she  was  only  acting  as 
Austria-Hungary  had  acted?  The  Germans  want  to  exploit  us 
economically,  and  will  stop  at  nothing  to  prevent  their  interests 
being  menaced.  The  only  purpose  of  their  intervention  in  the 
matter  of  the  Armenian  reforms  is  to  prevent  Russian  influence 
extending  beyond  the  Bagdad  railway.  Otherwise  it  would  never 
occur  to  the  Germans  to  aid  us  if  danger  threatened. " 

Such  were  the  ideas  in  our  minds.  Besides,  at  the  time  when 
we  were  devoting  our  attention  to  getting  the  money  needed  for 
Turkey's  development  and  progress,  had  not  Germany  roundly 
declared  that  they  could  not  help  us  in  this  matter,  and  that  our 
only  chance  was  to  remain  on  good  terms  with  France  and  keep 
open  the  door  through  which  we  could  get  money  from  the  Paris 
Bourse  ? 

In  these  circumstances  we  were  determined  to  cultivate  the 
best  relations,  primarily  with  the  French,  but  also  with  the  English, 
and  to  convince  them  beyond  any  possible  doubt  that  our  only 
desire  was  to  introduce  serious  reforms  at  home  and  assure  our- 
selves of  their  protection  against  a  Russian  attack. 

We  were  extremely  anxious  that  the  negotiations  of  the 
Foreign  Ministry  and  Hakki  Pasha  should  lead  to  a  final  solution 
of  the  various  questions  at  issue  between  the  English  and  our- 
selves. We  had  delimited  the  Turkish  and  English  zones  of 
influence  in  the  Gulf  of  Basra  and  in  the  southern  part  of  the 
Arabian  peninsula,  and  we  had  also  solved  the  problem  of  Aden 
in  a  way  which  satisfied  the  English. 

We  had  not  opposed  the  English  demands  in  the  question  of 
the  extension  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  to  Basra,  nor  in  the  matter 
of  shipping  routes  on  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris.  We  gave  English 

G2 


ioo  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

companies  the  concessions  for  petroleum  in  Mesopotamia,  for  the 
extension  of  the  Aidin  Railway,  the  construction  of  several  new 
sections  and  the  development  of  the  harbours  of  Trebizond  and 
Samsun.  As  I  have  said  before,  we  had  called  in  an  English 
Inspector-General  and  several  English  inspectors  to  reform  the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior  and  the  organisation  of  the  Civil  Service. 
Mr.  Graves,  who  had  been  in  Turkey  for  a  long  time,  wras  selected 
for  the  post  of  Inspector-General.  The  reorganisation  of  our 
customs  system  was  entrusted  to  Sir  Richard  Crawford,  and  we 
had  decided  to  appoint  a  number  of  English  inspectors  for  our 
customs  offices. 

We  had  considerably  enlarged  the  powers  of  the  English  naval 
mission  which  we  had  called  in  for  the  reorganisation  of  our  navy, 
and  we  now  began  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  its  labours.  Sir  Louis 
Mallet,  the  English  ambassador,  with  whom  I  was  on  the  best 
of  terms,  told  me  how  grateful  the  Admiral  was  to  me,  and  that 
he  was  rapidly  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Turkish  navy 
had  a  future. 

We  had  handed  over  the  reorganisation  of  our  arsenals  to 
English  companies,  the  administrative  committee  of  which  was 
under  the  chairmanship  of  gentlemen  like  Sir  Adam  Block,  long 
known  as  an  advocate  of  Anglo-Turkish  friendship.  Sir  Adam 
Block  often  told  me  how  grateful  he  was  that  the  agreement 
between  the  companies  and  the  Turkish  Admiralty  had  been 
observed  so  meticulously,  and  that  the  matter  was  now  on  a  really 
sound  footing. 

Unfortunately,  owing  to  Russian  opposition,  England  declined 
our  proposal  that  we  should  call  in  English  officials  to  administer 
the  vilayets  inhabited  by  Armenians. 

As  we  attributed  the  unpopularity  of  our  political  party  in 
England  to  the  intrigues  of  the  First  Dragoman,  FitzMaurice, 
and  the  Military  Attache,  Tyrrel,  in  the  days  of  Ambassador  Sir 
Gerald  Lowther,  Prince  Said  Pasha  at  once  asked  the  new  English 
Ambassador,  Sir  Louis  Mallet,  to  transfer  these  gentlemen  from 
Constantinople.  The  Ambassador  promised  that  it  should  be  done 
immediately,  and  both  of  them  left  our  country  a  month  or  so  later. 
Henceforth  we  had  most  active  and  amicable  relations  with  Sir 
Louis  Mallet,  who  was  a  particularly  fine  man,  thoroughly  honest, 
and  very  kind. 


At  the  Admiralty    3  101 

•        »  T  ,j  t  *     »    ,  •  0  I    *    J  .    J     j  '     »     •>  j  J 

We  strengthened  all  our  private  ties  and  endeavoured  to  remove 
English  prejudices  with  regard  to  the>  Turks  in  the  hope  of  finding 
some  means  of  bringing  England  back  to  her  former  views, 
England,  which  had  always  shown  herself  disposed  to  support  and 
strengthen  Turkey,  but  had  revolutionised  her  traditional  policy 
as  a  result  of  her  understanding  with  Russia.  Apart  from  our 
efforts  in  Constantinople  to  get  on  friendly  terms  with  the 
Ambassador,  the  staff  of  the  Embassy  and  a  number  of  other 
Englishmen,  we  neglected  no  opportunity  of  trying  to  establish 
good  relations  with  gentlemen  like  Sir  Thomas  Barclay,  one  of 
the  strongest  opponents  of  the  Anglo-Russian  understanding,  and 
an  advocate  of  an  Anglo-Turkish  association,  and  other  important 
Englishmen. 

The  Government  in  general  and  its  individual  members  worked 
tirelessly,  both  officially  and  in  private,  to  strengthen  the  bonds 
of  friendship  with  the  English,  and  also  let  no  opportunity  slip 
of  bringing  about  a  rapprochement  with  France. 

The  reorganisation  of  our  gendarmerie  had  long  been  com- 
mitted to  the  French  General  Baumann.  His  powers  were 
continually  being  extended,  and  with  a  view  to  pleasing  the  French 
he  was  also  asked  to  reorganise  the  gendarmerie  of  the  Lebanon, 
which  had  hitherto  held  a  special  position. 

As  the  construction  of  the  roads  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  had 
been  entrusted  to  a  French  company,  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works 
engaged  a  number  of  French  engineers.  Their  pay  was  to  be 
increased. 

For  the  purpose  of  putting  our  financial  house  in  order,  we 
conferred  wide  powers  on  the  financial  reform  committee  we  had 
accepted  a  short  time  before,  and  did  everything  in  our  power  to 
ensure  that  no  finance  bill  should  be  laid  before  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  until  it  had  been  approved  by  this  commission. 

With  a  view  to  keeping  our  finance  officials  under  continuous 
control  and  encouraging  their  sense  of  duty  and  responsibility 
we  appointed  a  Frenchman,  Monsieur  Joly,  Inspector-General  of 
Finance,  and  gave  him  a  number  of  French  officials  to  assist 
him. 

At  that  time  the  desire  to  win  the  friendship  of  England  and 
France  was  so  strong  that  we  should  not  have  hesitated  even  to 
entrust  the  organisation  of  our  army  to  a  French  mission  if 


102  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

that  had  been  in  any  way  possible.  But  it  was,  in  fact,  impossible. 
In  the  first  place  a  large  number  of  our  officers  had  completed 
their  training  in  Germany,  and  the  rest  of  them  had  been  trained 
and  educated  according  to  German  military  methods.  It  is  a  fact 
recognised  by  all  experts  that  when  the  organisation  and  training 
of  an  army  have  proceeded  on  certain  principles  it  is  impossible 
to  revolutionise  that  organisation  offhand,  and  particularly  to  force 
new  methods  upon  it,  without  great  confusion.  In  the  second 
place  Germany  had  been  asked  by  us,  in  Mahmud  Shefket  Pasha's 
time,  to  send  a  military  mission  to  reorganise  our  army,  and  the 
request  had  been  put  into  writing.  It  was  not  open  to  us  to  retrace 
our  steps  after  we  had  once  taken  that  course. 

Besides,  it  would  have  been  very  foolish  to  offend  a  State  which 
had  no  evil  designs  upon  us  in  order  to  please  other  governments 
which,  very  probably,  contemplated  doing  us  a  bad  turn.  For 
these  reasons  we  had  no  intention  of  reversing  our  decision  so 
far  as  the  army  was  concerned,  and  we  paid  no  attention  what- 
ever to  the  noisy  agitation  which  followed  on  the  arrival  of  Liman 
von  Sanders'  military  mission. 

While  we  were  thus  giving  the  French  all  the  material 
advantages  they  demanded  of  us  in  the  negotiations  for  the  loan, 
we  endeavoured  to  influence  public  opinion  in  France  in  our 
favour. 

From  the  technical  point  of  view,  serious  objections  could  be 
urged  against  having  warships  of  different  types,  but  notwith- 
standing this  drawback,  we  did  not  hesitate  to  order  six  destroyers 
from  the  Havre  yards  and  two  submarines  from  Creusot  in  order 
to  please  the  French. 

We  also  ordered  from  France  a  number  of  mountain  guns  as 
soon  as  the  superiority  of  the  French  mountain  gun  to  that  of 
Krupp  had  been  ascertained  by  our  leading  artillery  expert,  General 
Hassan  Riza  Pasha.  We  entrusted  the  establishment  of  our  naval 
flying  school  to  French  experts,  and  a  contract  for  twelve  seaplanes 
was  given  to  a  French  company. 

Lastly,  I  founded — with  great  success — a  Franco-Turkish 
friendship  committee,  which  was  to  meet  alternately  in  Constanti- 
nople and  Paris.  In  Constantinople  I  was  to  be  president  of  this 
committee,  while  in  Paris  the  ex-Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
Cruppi,  was  to  be  chairman. 


At  the  Admiralty  103 

The  statutes  for  the  organisation  of  this  committee  were  drawn 
up  in  Constantinople  by  a  commission  which  I  called  the  "  Founda- 
tion Committee."  Many  well-known  Frenchmen  and  Turks  were 
members  of  it.  After  the  principles  had  been  worked  out  and  the 
committee  had  informed  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  of  its  con- 
vocation, the  inauguration  took  place  in  the  club  rooms  of  the 
Union  Frangaise  in  Pera,  and  the  election  of  the  sub-committees 
then  took  place.  The  programme  contemplated  by  the  committee 
was  so  comprehensive  that,  if  it  had  been  followed  up  and  carried 
into  execution,  it  would  have  proved  the  most  effective  agent  for 
improving  Franco-Turkish  relations  in  the  next  year  or  two. 

One  day,  about  the  middle  of  June,  1914,  when  I  was  calling  at 
the  French  Embassy,  Monsieur  Bompard  said  to  me : 

"  The  French  Government  have  observed  the  different  efforts 
you  have  been  making  to  improve  Franco-Turkish  relations,  and 
want  to  invite  you  to  France  to  make  your  personal  acquaintance 
and  introduce  you  to  the  French  nation.  Would  the  Turkish 
Government  like  an  invitation  to  be  present  at  the  great  French 
naval  manoeuvres  which  are  to  be  held  in  the  middle  of  July? 
Before  I  ask  the  Grand  Vizier,  I  should  like  to  be  certain  of  your 
approval. " 

I  replied  that  if  the  Grand  Vizier  agreed  and  His  Majesty  the 
Sultan  gave  me  his  permission,  I  should  accept  the  invitation  with 
the  greatest  pleasure. 

A  few  days  later  Monsieur  Bompard  communicated  the  French 
Government's  invitation  officially  to  the  Sublime  Porte. 

It  was  at  this  very  moment  that  the  Serajevo  murder  took  place.  «/ 
I  asked  His  Highness,  the  Grand  Vizier,  for  instructions  as  to 
what  line  I  was  to  take  in  Paris,  particularly  in  my  conferences 
with  the  Foreign  Minister. 

"  As  you  are  quite  familiar  with  our  political  views/'  he  replied, 
"  you  will  emphasise  at  every  suitable  opportunity  how  much 
importance  we  attach  to  the  friendship  of  France  and  the  advan- 
tages we  hope  to  derive  from  French  policy  in  connection  with  the 
approaching  settlement  of  the  question  of  the  islands,  a  question 
of  vital  importance  to  us.  You  must  do  everything  in  your  power 
to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Foreign  Minister  to  this  ticklish 
question/' 

I  left  Constantinople,  accompanied  by  two  naval  officers,  in 


104  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

the  last  days  of  June  and  went  straight  to  Paris,  where  I  arrived 
early  in  July. 

In  Paris  I  found  Wassif  and  Reuf  Bey,  whom  I  had  asked  to 
meet  me.  When  I  gave  Reuf  Bey  his  instructions  to  arrange  for 
the  gunnery  and  speed  trials  of  the  Sultan  Osman  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment  he  told  me  that  he  had  observed  that  the  English 
were  in  a  very  peculiar  frame  of  mind.  They  seemed  to  be  always 
searching  for  some  new  excuse  for  delaying  the  completion  and 
delivery  of  the  warship.  I  replied  that  we,  too,  must  keep  all  our 
wits  about  us  in  this  matter,  for  it  was  essential  that  we  should  get 
possession  of  the  ship  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  constructing  company  now  informed  us  that  they  could  not 
fix  two  of  the  fourteen  guns  of  which  the  ship's  armament  was  to 
consist  by  the  time  previously  agreed  upon.  I  gave  Reuf  Bey  a 
crowd  of  instructions,  and  also  my  answer  to  the  company  in  which 
I  declared  my  readiness  to  allow  the  trials  to  proceed  without 
the  two  guns,  which  could  then  be  fitted  in  Constantinople. 
I  sent  the  Bey  back  to  England  and  kept  Wassif  Bey  alone 
with  me. 

After  staying  two  days  in  Paris  I  went  to  Toulon,  where  I  met 
Admiral  Boue  de  Lapeyrere,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Frenjch  Fleet.  Together  we  went  on  board  the  dreadnought 
Courbet,  his  flag-ship.  I  shall  never  forget  those  three  days  and 
nights  of  fleet  manoeuvres  on  the  coast  of  the  beautiful  Riviera. 
I  could  not  speak  too  highly  of  the  hospitality  shown  me  by  the 
Admiral,  a  real  old  sailor. 

There  was  a  review  of  the  Marines,  and  after  three  days  I  bade 
farewell  to  the  Admiral  and  returned  by  rail.  After  passing  three 
or  four  days  visiting  gun  and  rifle  establishments  and  submarine 
construction  yards,  I  went  back  to  Paris.  Nor  did  I  omit  to  visit 
the  yards  at  Le  Havre  before  the  I4th  July. 

During  my  visit  to  Paris,  I  several  times  called  on  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  Viviani.  On  my  second  call  he  suddenly  said 
with  a  look  full  of  meaning : 

'  Your  Excellency,  though  I  am  very  anxious  to  discuss  several 
extremely  important  matters  with  you,  the  debates  now  taking 
place  in  the  Chamber  are  absorbing  my  attention  to  such  a  degree 
that  I  cannot  attend  to  anything  else.  It  is  very  important  that 
I  should  go  to  Russia  with  the  President  of  the  Republic.  The 


At  the  Admiralty  105 

Socialists  will  oppose  the  idea  and  refuse  to  vote  the  necessary 
credits  for  the  voyage.  I've  given  Monsieur  de  Margerie,  the 
Director  of  Political  Affairs  in  the  Ministry,  the  necessary 
instructions,  and  asked  him  to  discuss  everything  with  Your 
Excellency.  I'll  be  grateful  if  you  will  grant  his  request  to  see 
you." 

I  thought  my  hopes  and  desires  were  drawing  nearer  to 
realisation,  and  was  very  happy  at  the  idea.  The  meeting  took 
place  shortly  afterwards  at  the  Foreign  Office. 

The  first  thing  M.  de  Margerie  told  me  was  how  gratefully  all 
my  efforts  for  a  Turco-French  rapprochement  had  been  received 
both  by  the  Government  and  by  public  opinion,  and  that  the 
misunderstandings  which  had  arisen  between  the  two  peoples  might 
now  be  considered  as  removed. 

I  interrupted  him  with  the  remark:  "If  you  don't  mind, 
Monsieur  le  Directeur,  let's  get  straight  to  business.  You  know 
that  the  Turkish  Empire  has  been  greatly  weakened  by  the 
numerous  attacks  to  which  it  has  been  subjected.  It  has  not 
only  emerged  quite  helpless  out  of  the  Balkan  War,  but  has  had  to 
sacrifice  almost  the  whole  of  its  European  territory  and  most  of 
the  islands.  We  are  now  devoting  all  our  efforts  to  heal  its  wounds 
and  breathe  new  life  into  our  nation.  But  the  present  state  of 
affairs  condemns  all  these  efforts  to  failure.  The  result  is  that  we 
are  under  an  imperious  duty  to  recover  from  this  precarious 
position. 

"  I  want  to  speak  first  of  the  question  of  the  islands,  which 
is  a  subject  of  dissension  between  us  and  our  Greek  friends.  You 
consider  it  a  wise  policy  always  to  back  the  Greeks  and  give  them 
your  sympathy  in  the  hope  that  they  may  prove  of  use  to  you  in 
the  future.  But  if  you  will  be  good  enough  to  look  at  a  map 
you  will  see  that  one  day  we  shall  be  in  a  position  to  be  more  useful 
to  you  than  the  Greeks.  The  Ottoman  Government  says  to  itself : 
4  The  object  of  the  policy  of  France  and  England  is  to  forge  an  iron 
ring  around  the  Central  Powers/  That  ring  is  closed  except  in 
the  south-west.  If  Turkey  associated  herself  with  the  plans  of 
the  Entente,  Bulgaria,  which  would  then  be  left  entirely  isolated 
in  the  Balkans,  would  necessarily  be  compelled  to  come  in  too. 

If  you  want  to  close  your  iron  ring  once  and  for  all,  you  must 
try  to  find  some  solution  of  this  question  of  the  islands  between 


io6  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

us  and  the  Greeks.  You  must  take  us  into  your  Entente  and  at 
the  same  time  protect  us  against  the  terrible  perils  threatening  us 
from  Russia.  If  you  support  us  in  our  upward  strivings,  you  will 
soon  have  a  very  faithful  ally  in  the  East !  It  seems  to  me  that 
the  Serajevo  crime  may  lead  to  a  world  war.  At  such  a  moment  it 
is  of  the  very  highest  importance  that  decisions  of  this  kind  should 
be  taken  quickly." 

The  proposal  was  straight  and  unambiguous ;  in  the  question  of 
the  islands  a  solution  must  be  found  acceptable  to  Greeks  and 
Turks  alike,  then  an  Alliance  with  Turkey,  and  Germany  is 
completely  cut  off  from  the  road  to  the  East. 

After  a  moment's  reflection,  M.  de  Margerie  asked  me  what 
was  the  solution  of  the  islands  question  which  we  desired.  I 
replied  that  the  archipelago,  including  the  Dodecanese  (which 
must  be  restored  to  us  by  Italy),  could  be  granted  autonomy  under 
the  suzerainty  of  Turkey,  and  its  revenues  could  be  applied  solely 
to  its  own  needs.  Exemption  from  military  service  and  a  number 
of  other  privileges  might  also  be  conceded. 

Ultimately  M.  de  Margerie  replied: 

"  I  consider  the  proposal  you  have  made  with  regard  to  the 
question  of  the  islands  as  worthy  of  the  most  serious  consideration. 
It  seems  to  me  quite  possible  that  the  problem  should  finally  be 
solved  on  that  basis.  You  have  a  very  accurate  idea  of  the  iron 
ring  we  are  thinking  of  forging  round  the  Central  Powers.  But 
before  we  can  conclude  an  alliance  with  you  we  must  have  the 
approval  of  our  allies,  and  that  approval  seems  to  me  very 
doubtful.  The  Turkish  Government's  proposal  is  certainly  frank 
and  clear.  I  will  communicate  your  observations  to  our  Allies 
before  I  go  with  the  President  of  the  Republic  and  the  Minister- 
President  on  their  voyage  to  Russia.  We  will  give  our 
Ambassador  the  necessary  instructions  when  we  and  our  Allies 
have  made  our  joint  decision.  For  the  moment,  unfortunately, 
the  French  Government  cannot  take  any  initiative  on  its  own." 

It  was  obvious  enough  that  this  answer  was  only  a  veiled  refusal. 
I  understood  perfectly  that  France  was  convinced  that  it  was  quite 
impossible  for  us  to  escape  the  iron  claws  of  Russia,  and  that  under 
no  circumstances  would  she  vouchsafe  us  her  help. 

That  evening  my  friend,  Georges  Remond,  who  went  with  me 
everywhere  during  my  visit  in  France,  asked  me  whether  I  was 


At  the  Admiralty  107 

satisfied  with  the  result  of  my  conference.  I  simply  replied:  "  I 
could  never  have  believed  I  was  in  for  so  gross  a  disappointment ! " 

When  I  left  Paris  on  my  return  journey  on  July  i8th,  Georges 
Remond  gave  me  a  pamphlet  on  the  station ;  the  French  editor  of 
this  document,  whose  name  I  cannot  remember,  wrote  under  a 
pseudonym  somewhat  in  the  following  strain  : 

"  Djemal  Pasha  has  been  in  Paris.  He  has  attended  the 
manoeuvres  of  the  Mediterranean  Fleet.  The  official  and  semi- 
official authorities  have  given  him  the  warmest  of  welcomes,  and 
he  has  been  decorated  with  the  order  of  the  Legion  of  Honour. 
All  this  is  very  nice !  But  what  are  the  actual  promises  which 
Djemal  Pasha,  who  loves  his  country  above  anything  else,  can 
take  home  with  him  from  the  French  Government  ?  From  all  we 
hear  Djemal  Pasha  is  one  of  the  greatest  Turkish  patriots.  All 
the  marks  of  favour  showered  upon  him  personally  cannot  make 
him  forget  the  advantages  in  hope  of  securing  which  he  has  come 
to  us.  If  Djemal  Pasha  now  goes  home  without  having  done 
anything  for  his  country  we  shall  have  no  right  to  be  angry  if  he 
finds  himself  compelled  to  take  steps  which  may  not  be  to  the  taste 
of  France." 

What  remarkably  sound  judgment  that  French  editor  had ! 

After  my  return  I  gave  His  Highness  the  Grand  Vizier  and  my 
friends  a  detailed  report  of  my  conversation  with  M.  de  Margerie 
and  the  conclusions  it  had  brought  me  to. 


THE    TURCO-GERMAN    ALLIANCE. 

The  Turco-German  alliance  was  not  concluded  during  the 
war,  as  people  have  believed  hitherto.  It  was  certainly  signed  on 
August  2nd,  1914,  but  negotiations  had  been  in  progress  long 
before  the  war. 

A  few  days  after  my  return  to  Constantinople  Talaat  Bey  said  / 
to  me : 

'  What  would  you  say,  Pasha,  if  Germany  proposed  an  alliance 
with  us  on  such  and  such  terms  ?  Would  you  accept  it  ?  You  can 
see  for  yourself  that  we  have  nothing  to  hope  for  from  France. 
As  France  has  declined,  would  you  decline  Germany's  suggestion 
too?" 

I  immediately  answered: 


io8  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

"  I  should  not  hesitate  to  accept  any  alliance  which  rescued 
Turkey  from  her  present  position  of  isolation. " 

During  the  great  military  review  on  July  23rd,  which  took  place 
on  the  Levend  Tchiflik  on  the  occasion  of  the  national  festival, 
the  German  Ambassador,  Baron  von  Wangenheim,  came  up  to  me. 

"  Djemal  Pasha,"  he  said,  "  just  look  at  the  amazing  results 
achieved  by  German  officers  in  quite  a  short  time.  You  have 
now  a  Turkish  army  which  can  be  compared  with  the  best  organised 
armies  in  the  world!  All  German  officers  are  at  one  in  praising 
the  moral  strength  of  the  Turkish  soldier,  and  indeed  it  has 
proved  itself  beyond  all  expectation.  We  can  claim  we  have  won 
a  great  victory  if  we  could  call  ourselves  the  ally  of  a  Government 
which  has  such  an  army  at  its  disposal !  ' 

In  thanking  the  Ambassador  for  this  compliment  I  had  not 
the  slightest  suspicion  of  the  negotiations  which  had  been  in 
progress  for  a  Turco-German  alliance. 

A  few  days  later,  just  as  I  was  entering  my  car  at  the  door  of 
my  house  in  Schichli,  I  saw  another  car  in  which  Enver  Pasha, 
Talaat  Bey,  and  Halil  Bey  were  seated,  turning  the  corner  of 
Osman  Bey's  garden  into  the  street  leading  to  Enver  Pasha's 
house.  The  car  was  coming  from  the  Maslok  direction.  I 
wondered  what  on  earth  could  bring  them  there  at  that  time  of 
day,  and  almost  certainly  from  the  Grand  Vizier's  palace  in 
Yenikoi.  I  at  once  suspected  that  my  friends  might  be  engaged 
in  the  discussion  of  affairs  which  they  did  not  want  me  to 
know. 

Up  to  that  time  nothing  had  happened  which  could  have  started 
such  a  suspicion.  When  I  got  home  I  rang  up  Enver  Pasha  on  the 
telephone.  I  asked  where  he  had  been  going  at  so  late  an  hour. 
He  replied  that  he  had  been  whiling  away  the  time  by  paying  a 
visit  to  the  Grand  Vizier,  and  as  he  had  met  Talaat  Bey  and  Halil 
Bey  they  had  driven  home  together.  The  way  in  which  he  gave 
me  this  answer  only  confirmed  my  suspicions. 

Next  afternoon  I  was  summoned  to  a  Council  of  Ministers 
which  was  in  progress  at  the  Grand  Vizier's  palace.  When  I 
reached  Aya  Pasha's  kiosk  it  was  raining  and  blowing  so  hard  that 
it  was  impossible  for  me  to  proceed  in  my  car.  Constantinople  had 
not  known  such  a  storm  for  a  very  long  time.  I  returned  to  the 
Ministry  and  went  to  Yenikoi  in  my  motor  launch. 


At  the  Admiralty  109 

"Where  have  you  been,  Djemal  Pasha?"  said  the  Grand 
Vizier.  "  We  waited  for  you  a  long  time  and  the  Ministers  have 
gone  now.  As  we  were  told  by  the  Ministry  that  you  were  on  your 
way  we  feared  that  you  had  met  with  some  accident  in  the  storm. 
I'm  going  to  tell  you  something  new  which  will  certainly  be  a 
pleasant  surprise  to  you.  Can  you  think  what  it  is  ?  " 

"  I  suspect/'  I  replied  after  some  consideration,  "  that  it 
relates  to  what  you,  Enver  Pasha,  Talaat  Bey,  and  Halil  Bey  have 
just  decided  upon  when  I  was  absent,  though  I  haven't  the  slightest 
idea  what  it  is." 

"  The  German  Government  has  offered  us  an  alliance,"  he  said, 
"  and  as  the  proposal  seems  to  us  in  the  interests  of  the  country 
we  have  signed  the  compact  with  Ambassador  von  Wangenheim 
to-day  !  Now,  are  you  satisfied  ?  " 

The  importance  of  the  news,  for  which  I  was  not  prepared, 
moved  me  to  the  depths. 

"  If  the  terms  of  the  treaty  are  really  in  accordance  with  the 
interests  of  the  country  it  may  be  considered  an  outstanding 
political  success,"  I  replied. 

"  It  is  an  agreement  which  had  due  regard  for  the  interests  of 
both  parties,  and  secures  their  rights  in  a  manner  which  no  other 
Government  has  yet  done,"  he  said. 

He  went  into  his  cabinet  and  drew  from  a  drawer  in  his  writing- 
table  the  treaty,  which  comprised  several  articles.  I  read  it,  and 
saw  that  it  was  an  excellent  compact  between  two  independent 
Governments  on  the  basis  of  equality  of  rights. 

"  What  about  Austria?  "  I  asked. 

"  A  few  minutes  after  my  colleagues  went  away,  and  about 
half  an  hour  before  you  came,  I  received  a  letter  from  Ambassador 
Pallavicini  in  which  he  told  me  that  his  Government  agreed  with 
every  point  of  the  compact  we  had  made  with  Germany.  Here's 
the  letter !  " 

He  showed  it  to  me. 

"  And  Italy?  "  I  could  not  help  enquiring. 

"  As  Germany  has  not  yet  informed  Italy  of  our  entry  into 
the  Triple  Alliance  I  have  no  news  for  the  moment  on  that  point. 
Germany  will  first  prepare  the  ground,  and  we  have  no  doubt  that 
Italy  will  accept  our  alliance  in  the  same  way  that  Austria  has 
done." 


no  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

I  could  not  help  asking  for  what  reason  it  had  been  thought 
necessary  to  keep  me  out  of  the  negotiations,  which  must  certainly 
have  been  in  progress  for  some  considerable  time  to  have  led  to 
such  a  conclusion. 

The  Grand  Vizier  passed  lightly  over  my  question  with  the 
remark  that  he  had  conducted  the  negotiations  personally,  had  told 
his  colleagues  nothing  whatever  about  them  until  the  affair  took 
definite  shape,  and  that  they  had  only  learned  of  the  matter  that 
very  day.  "  Djavid  Bey,"  he  added,  "  still  knows  nothing  about 
it.  I  have  asked  him  to  come  here.  He  is  on  his  way,  and  when 
he  arrives  I  shall  show  him  the  treaty/' 

I  asked  him  whether  all  the  Ministers  now  knew  about  the  affair. 

"  As  there  are  individual  members  of  the  Ministry  who  are 
frightened  of  a  scheme  of  such  importance  and  might  divulge  this 
state  secret — a  matter  which  is  highly  undesirable  at  the  present 
moment — I  thought  it  my  duty  to  inform  only  His  Highness  the 
Sheik  ul  Islam,  Halil,  Talaat  and  Djavid  Bey,  Enver  Pasha,  and 
yourself.  The  other  Ministers  have  not  yet  been  initiated.  Ibrahim 
Bey  and  Shukri  Bey  will  be  told  by  Talaat  Bey,  and  the  secret  is 
to  be  kept  from  the  others.  You  will  appreciate  that  in  so  delicate 
a  matter  we  shall  have  to  proceed  with  the  greatest  caution.  Now 
you  know  everything,  and  you  have  not  even  given  me  your  own 
opinion  !  "  he  said  by  way  of  conclusion. 

"  May  God  make  this  of  real  use  to  the  country !  El  Hair  ft 
ma  vag'a,"*  I  replied.  And  that' was  all  I  said. 

I  was  not  slow  to  congratulate  the  Grand  Vizier  on  his  success 
in  concluding  such  an  alliance,  which  undoubtedly  represented  a 
fact  of  the  highest  historical  significance. 

The  importance  of  this  occurrence  gave  me  much  to  think 
about.  I  may  say  that  I  did  not  sleep  a  wink  that  night.  I  kept 
the  general  political  situation  before  my  eyes,  and  asked  myself 
what  had  been  the  real  motives  of  the  Government,  for  I  saw 
myself  faced  with  a  situation  I  had  never  even  imagined  hitherto. 

Judging  by  all  the  signs,  a  terrible  conflict  at  a  very  early  date 
between  the  countries  of  the  Alliance  and  those  of  the  Entente 
seemed  inevitable.  If  at  such  a  time  we  were  not  bound  to  either 
side,  it  would  always  be  possible  for  us  to  throw  in  our  lot  with 

*  An  Arab  expression,  meaning  that  a  fait  accompli  is  of  good  augury. 


At  the  Admiralty  in 

the  party  which  offered  us  the  greater  advantages.  And  now  we 
had  taken  our  decision  beforehand  and  chosen  our  partner.  The 
result  was  we  had  deprived  ourselves  of  our  freedom  of  choice. 
Was  the  party  in  whose  favour  we  had  decided  such  as  our  national 
aspirations  dictated?  If  we  had  waited,  would  not  its  opponent 
have  made  us  better,  more  profitable  proposals  ?  By  accepting 
those  proposals  should  we  not  have  rendered  our  country  a  greater 
service  ? 

In  spite  of  every  possible  outward  expression  of  sympathy, 
Germany  had  never  actually  come  to  our  help,  and  was  always  re- 
commending us  to  maintain  the  best  possible  relations  with  France. 
Why  was  she  now  endeavouring  to  form  an  alliance  with  us  ?  And 
why  an  alliance  which  assigned  the  same  status  to  the  Ottoman 
Government  as  to  Germany  and  Austria  ?  What  had  moved  the 
two  Powers  to  such  a  sacrifice  ?  All  these  questions  passed  through 
my  mind  and  I  found  no  answer  to  them. 

At  length  I  came  to  the  following  conclusion.     There  is  one 
fact  that  no  one  in  the  world  can  deny — that  Russia  is  the  hereditary  , 
enemy  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  that  her  greatest  desire  is  the  / 
possession  of  Constantinople.    It  is  absolutely  impossible  to  make' 
her  abandon  that  ideal.    After  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  and  Czarism 
had  fully  realised  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  Russia  to  get 
Constantinople,  her  ambitions  had  been  turned  towards  India.    As 
the  artful  policy  of  England  had  then  blocked  her  path  in  that 
quarter,  she  turned  her  eyes  to  the  Far  East.    But  the  hand  which 
she  stretched  out  to  Port  Arthur  received  a  hard  knock  from  the 
Japanese,  and  she  had  to  withdraw  the  bleeding  member.    Thus 
her  only  course  was  to  return  to  the  object  of  her  century-old 
ambition,  and  was  making  her  preparations  to  begin  her  last 
mighty  onslaught  on  poor  Turkey,  the  booty  for  which  she  had 
been  yearning  for  hundreds  of  years.     Her  allies,  so  far  from 
opposing  her  design,  were  now  entirely  in  agreement  with  that 
design.    The  circumstances  prevailing  at  the  time  of  the  Crimean 
War  and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  had  now  wholly  changed.    England, 
mistress  of  Egypt,  looked  with  far  more  jealous  eyes  at  Germany's 
economic  plans  in  the  Gulf  of  Basra,  than  at  Russia's  ambitions 
with  regard  to  Constantinople  and  the  whole  of  Anatolia.    Russia 
was  to  have  Constantinople  as  compensation  for  Mesopotamia. 
As  for  France,  she  was  not  of  those  who  would  oppose  the. 


ii2  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

partition  of  Turkey  so  long  as  she  was  given  a  free  hand  in 
Syria. 

The  fundamental  plan  to  be  pursued  by  Russia,  which  saw  the 
realisation  of  her  schemes  at  hand,  was  to  isolate  Turkey  and 
always  do  everything  which  would  keep  her  weak. 

That  had  been  the  only  reason  and  motive  for  M.  de  Margerie's 
refusal,  or  rather  the  refusal  which  Viviani  had  communicated 
through  him.  If  England  and  France  desired  to  please  Russia 
they  could  not  act  otherwise.  That  was  why  I,  who,  indeed, 
expected  no  advantages  of  any  kind  from  Germany,  had  received 
a  categorical  refusal  from  France,  to  which  I  had  turned  in  order 
to  have  some  security  against  Russia.  In  declining  to  send  the 
officials  for  which  we  had  asked  for  the  eastern  provinces  of  Asia 
Minor,  England  had  declared  that  she  could  not  go  against  the 
wishes  of  Russia.  Besides,  one  of  England's  most  fervent  desires 
was  that  the  title  "  Khalif  of  Islam  "  held  by  the  Ottoman 
sovereign  should  be  transferred  to  some  insignificant  individual  in 
one  of  the  countries  under  her  influence.  The  power  of  the  Turkish 
Sultan  had  thoroughly  worried  her  in  the  last  few  years. 

In  view  of  all  these  considerations,  I  had  turned  to  France  in 
order  to  secure  her  support  and  that  of  England  in  case  we  found 
ourselves  exposed  to  attack  by  Russia.  While  I  was  in  the  grip  of 
these  phantoms  my  colleagues  had  found  themselves  presented 
with  extremely  plain  and  important  proposals — an  association  with 
the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  or,  to  speak  more  accurately, 
an  alliance  with  Germany. 

A  mighty  Empire  like  Germany  was  offering  us  an  alliance 
based  on  equality  of  status,  we  who  five  or  six  months  before  had 
tried  to  escape  from  our  isolation  and  associate  ourselves  with  a 
group  of  Powers  by  making  an  attempt — a  vain  attempt — to  form 
an  alliance  with  Bulgaria,  from  which  we  promised  ourselves 
great  profit. 

I  myself  had  followed  a  policy  favourable  to  the  Entente  group, 
but  had  I  found  myself  personally  faced  with  such  an  offer  would 
I  have  discovered  the  moral  force  to  refuse  it  ?  Would  such  a 
refusal  have  been  reasonable  ? 

Let  us  consider  the  matter  frankly  and  calmly. 

What  was  the  position  of  the  two  groups  of  Powers  so  far  as 
Turkey  wa  s  concerned  ? 


At  the  Admiralty  113 

Among  the  Entente  Powers,  England  had  got  Egypt  com- 
pletely in  her  power,  and  would  undoubtedly  strive  to  possess 
Mesopotamia,  possibly  Palestine  also,  and  secure  her  exclusive 
influence  over  the  whole  of  the  Arabian  Peninsula. 

Russia  was  so  utterly  anti-Turkish  that  it  was  quite  unnecessary 
to  look  round  for  proofs. 

All  this  did  not  exactly  suggest  benevolent  intentions  towards 
Turkey ! 

As  regards  the  Triple  Alliance  group,  Austria  and  Italy  had 
nothing  more  to  ask  from  Turkey.  They  had  already  done  that 
country  all  the  harm  they  possibly  could.  Thus  they  "coveted  no 
more.  The  most  that  could  be  said  was  that  Italy  might  be 
indulging  in  visions  which  were  in  conflict  with  those  of  the 
Entente  Governments.  (With  regard  to  the  coasts  of  Adalia  and 
Phoenicia,  for  example.) 

Germany,  whatever  else  might  be  said,  was  the  only  power 
which  desired  to  see  Turkey  strong.  Germany's  interests  could 
be  secured  by  the  strengthening  of  Turkey,  and  that  alone. 
Germany  could  not  lay  hands  on  Turkey  as  if  she  were  a  colony, 
for  neither  the  geographical  position  nor  her  resources  made  that 
possible.  The  result  was  that  Germany  regarded  Turkey  as  a  link 
in  the  commercial  and  trading  chain,  and  thus  became  her  stoutest 
champion  against  the  Entente  Governments  which  wanted  to 
dismember  her,  particularly  as  the  elimination  of  Turkey  would 
mean  the  final  "  encirclement  "  of  Germany.  Her  south-western 
front  remained  open  thanks  to  Turkey  alone.  The  only  way  in 
which  she  could  escape  the  pressure  of  the  iron  ring  was  to  prevent 
the  dismemberment  of  Turkey. 

Thus  we  had  two  groups  of  Powers  before  us,  the  ideal  of  one 
of  which  was  to  get  us  in  its  power,  while  the  aim  of  the  other 
was  to  make  friendly  approaches  to  us  in  view  of  certain  prospective 
advantages,  and  to  conclude  an  alliance  with  us  based  on  equal 
rights  and  obligations. 

Could  this  offer  be  rejected? 

In  the  first  place,  none  of  the  small  Balkan  States  would  dare 
to  assert  itself  with  a  view  to  intervening  in  the  domestic  affairs  of 
a  government  which  was  a  member  of  so  powerful  an  alliance, 
so  that  we  should,  at  any  rate,  be  left  in  peace. 

In  the  second  place,  no  member  of  the  Entente  group  would 

H 


ii4  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

venture  to  lay  hands  on  us  for  fear  of  starting  a  general  European 
war.  Above  all,  Germany's  savants,  her  art  and  commercial 
experts  would  place  their  services  at  the  disposal  of  Turkey  in  the 
way  she  desired.  Thus,  within  a  short  time  we  should  be  able  to 
obtain  our  release  from  the  bonds  of  the  capitulations. 

Although  this  alliance  made  us  the  enemy  of  the  Entente  Powers 
in  case  of  a  European  war,  as  long  as  the  conflict  was  postponed 
for  between  five  and  ten  years  we  should  have  brought  up  the 
fortifications  of  the  Straits  and  our  different  coasts  to  such  a 
standard,  made  our  army  so  strong,  and  developed  our  country  to 
such  a  degree  that  we  need  not  hesitate  to  take  our  part  in  such  a 
war. 

But  if  the  great  war  were  to  break  out  in  a  week  or  two,  or  a 
month  or  two,  in  view  of  our  weakened  condition  at  the  moment 
should  we  not  find  ourselves  in  a  terrible  position  if  we  were 
involved  in  a  war  with  France,  England,  and  Russia  ? 

Had  not  Germany  made  up  her  mind  so  quickly  to  conclude  an 
alliance  with  us  just  because  she  suspected  that  war  would  break 
out  in  the  immediate  future  ? 

There  can  be  no  doubt  about  that !  To  compel  Germany  to 
enter  into  an  alliance  with  us,  based  upon  equality  of  rights  and 
each  and  every  term  of  the  Triple  Alliance  compact,  she  must 
have  been  alarmed  at  the  preparations  being  made  by  her 
opponents.  She  must  have  •  been  feeling  the  necessity  of 
strengthening  her  position  in  every  possible  way.  Otherwise  it 
was  inconceivable  that  a  rationally-minded  state  should  take  upon 
its  shoulders  such  a  burden  as  Turkey  merely  for  the  beaux 
yeux  of  the  Turks  and  from  a  desire  to  oblige  the  Turkish 
sovereign. 

The  outbreak  of  a  general  European  War  in  the  very  near 
future  must  be  regarded  as  a  great  misfortune  for  us. 

Yet  when  the  pros  and  cons  were  considered,  it  would 
undoubtedly  be  more  profitable  for  the  country  not  to  abandon 
the  scheme.  If  I  had  been  in  my  friends'  shoes  I  should  have 
taken  that  course  and  done  exactly  what  they  did — i.e.,  accept  this 
alliance  without  hesitation.  At  the  same  time  I  should  have  taken 
good  care  to  insert  certain  reservations  in  the  treaty.  For 
example,  I  should  have  preferred  that  one  stipulation  for  our 
acceptance  should  be  that  if  the  European  War  broke  out  within 


At  the  Admiralty  115 

two  years  of  the  day  of  signature  and  the  exchange  of  documents 
Turkey  should  merely  observe  a  benevolent  neutrality  towards  the 
Triple  Alliance  and  enter  into  an  obligation  to  give  it  moral 
support  by  mobilising  her  army  and  closing  the  Straits  to  war  and 
trading  vessels.  If  the  war  lasted  more  than  two  years  Turkey 
would  intervene  in  the  struggle  with  the  Entente.  If  a  general 
war  were  declared  more  than  two  years  after  the  signature  of  the 
treaty,  Turkey  would  be  under  an  obligation  to  carry  out  the 
terms  of  the  alliance  at  once. 

Of  course,  I  cannot  say  whether  Germany  would  have  accepted 
these  terms  or  not. 

After  considering  everything  very  carefully  from  every  point 
of  view  I  repeated  to  myself  the  words  I  had  used  to  the  Grand 
Vizier:  "  May  God  let  this  alliance  turn  out  profitably  for 
us!"  Ultimately  I  entirely  approved  the  new  situation  thus 
created. 

As  these  memoirs  of  mine  have  clearly  revealed  when  and  how 
the  alliance  between  the  Ottoman  Government  and  Germany  was 
concluded,  everyone  can  judge  of  the  falsity  of  the  versions  given 
to  the  world  by  the  American  Ambassador,  Morgenthau,  and  by 
Mandelstam,  the  First  Dragoman  of  the  Russian  Embassy,  and 
how  they  are  based  on  nothing  but  street-corner  chatter. 


AFTER  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR. 
THE  DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AND  THE  MOBILISATION  OF  THE  TURKISH 

ARMIES. 

AFTER  the  reception  of  the  Serbian  Note,  which  she  regarded  as 
unsatisfactory,  Austria  mobilised  a  portion  of  her  forces,  and  as 
Russia  replied  generally  with  mobilisation,  and  thereupon 
Germany  and  France  proceeded  to  mobilise  also,  there  was  no 
longer  any  doubt  that  we,  too,  would  be  involved  in  a  general 
European  War. 

After  the  German  declaration  of  war  on  Russia,  and  the  war 
began  on  August  ist,  1914,  we  saw  ourselves  bound  by  our  treaty, 
the  ink  of  which  was  not  yet  dry,  to  intervene  in  the  struggle  at 
once.  The  agreement  made  our  intervention  independent  of  the 
causes  of  the  war.  We  had  to  intervene  with  all  our  forces  in  a 


n6  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

war  in  which  Germany  and  Austria  engaged  with  all  theirs.  Yet 
I  was  extremely  anxious  to  postpone  our  entry  in  the  conflict  for 
as  long  as  possible.  I  developed  my  views  in  the  Council  of 
Ministers  which  at  this  time  met  practically  every  evening  in 
Prince  Said  Halim's  palace  in  Yenikoi  (Enver  Pasha,  Talaat, 
Halil,  Djavid  Bey,  and  myself,  with  the  Prince  presiding).  I 
said  that  not  only  would  it  be  of  no  benefit  to  Germany  for  us  to 
take  an  active  part  in  the  war  before  our  mobilisation  was  complete, 
but  it  would  simply  mean  suicide  on  our  part.  If  the  English, 
French,  and  Russians,  who  knew  perfectly  well  that  we  had  not 
a  single  man  at  the  Dardanelles,  in  Constantinople,  or  on  the 
Russian  frontier,  made  a  sudden  attack  on  the  Dardanelles  and 
the  Bosphorus,  simultaneously  advanced  on  Erzerum,  and  after 
occupying  Constantinople  and  Erzerum  approached  the  interior 
of  Anatolia  through  Sivas,  our  army  would  be  unable  to  complete 
its  mobilisation  during  the  war,  and  the  downfall  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  would  be  decreed  at  the  very  outset. 

My  colleagues  admitted  the  justice  of  my  reasoning,  and 
brought  the  German  Ambassador  round  to  the  same  point  of  view. 
So  after  discussion  in  the  Council  of  Ministers,  we  decided  to 
proclaim  the  neutrality  of  Turkey,  though  the  country  would 
commence  a  general  mobilisation  of  the  army  in  order  to  enforce 
that  neutrality  against  either  side.  We  immediately  translated 
words  into  deeds.  Even  those  of  our  colleagues  in  the  Ministry 
who  did  not  know  of  our  alliance  with  Germany  and  the  obligations 
it  involved  approved  the  general  mobilisation  of  the  army  as  a 
wise  precaution. 

Two  or  three  days  after  the  mobilisation  decree  I  took  over  the 
command  of  the  Ottoman  2nd  Army,  while  retaining  my  office 
at  the  Admiralty. 

On  the  ist  or  2nd  of  August,  after  Turkey  had  paid  the  last 
instalment  for  the  Sultan  Osman,  the  English  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty  prevented  the  Turkish  flag  being  hoisted  on  the  ship, 
and  commandeered  both  the  Sultan  Osman  and  the  Reschadieh. 
Never,  never  shall  I  forget  my  mental  anguish  when  I  heard  this 
frightful  news.  That  day  I  clearly  realised  that  the  apparently 
friendly  advice  of  Admiral  Robeck,  Commander  of  the  English 
Mediterranean  Fleet,  on  his  visit  to  Constantinople,  and  the 
thousand  and  one  difficulties  raised  by  Armstrong  to  delay  the 


At  the  Admiralty  117 

completion  of  the  ship  had  been  nothing  but  pretexts  which,  once 
for  all,  revealed  the  design  England  had  long  cherished  of  making 
these  ships  her  own. 

Even  if  the  English  Government  had  a  right  to  commandeer 
ships  under  construction  in  their  arsenals  in  war,  they  were  not  at 
war  when  they  took  our  ships.  Indeed,  they  had  not  even  begun 
to  mobilise  their  army  and  fleet.  This  question  was  debated  for 
a  very  long  time  at  this  period,  but  as  England's  wrongdoing  was 
admitted  even  by  her  own  diplomatists,  I  see  no  reason  to  open 
this  question  again  here. 

This  incident  justified  the  mobilisation  of  our  army,  and  thus 
gave  us  a  good  reason  for  returning  a  tu  quoque  answer  to  the 
Entente  Ambassadors  who  found  this  general  mobilisation  un-    ^ 
necessary.     They  justified  the  Ottoman  Government  once  more  x 
when,  as  I  shall  now  relate,    they  permitted   the   Goeben   and 
Breslau  to  enter  the  Sea  of  Marmora. 


THE  CRUISE  OF  THE  "  GOEBEN  "  AND  "  BRESLAU  "  THROUGH  THE 
DARDANELLES  AND  THEIR  ARRIVAL  IN  CONSTANTINOPLE. 

Several  German  officers  (and  in  particular  the  aides-de-camp 
of  Marshal  Liman  von  Sanders),  who  more  or  less  knew  about 
the  Turco-German  alliance,  but  did  not  know  the  reason  why 
Turkey  had  for  the  time  being  declared  her  neutrality,  came  to  me 
with  unreasonable  and  untimely  suggestions,  and  regarded  me 
with  deep  dislike  and  even  enmity,  as  they  supposed  I  belonged  to 
the  party  which  alone  was  restraining  the  Government  from  in- 
tervening in  the  war  at  once.  As,  of  course,  they  did  not  dare  to 
show  any  want  of  respect,  I  went  on  as  if  I  had  not  noticed  their 
unfriendly  behaviour. 

One  day  we  were  on  the  quay  by  Prince  Said  Halim  Pasha's 
house.  A  steamer  coming  from  Russia  and  full  of  mobilised  men 
was  passing  through  the  Bosphorus,  setting  a  course  for  the  Sea 
of  Marmora.  A  number  of  German  officers  and  members  of  the 
German  Embassy  Staff  were  also  on  the  quay.  They  were  discus- 
sing the  passage  of  this  steamer.  One  of  Liman  von  Sanders' 
aides-de-camp  remarked  in  a  fairly  audible  voice  so  that  I  was 
bound  to  hear : 

"  If  His  Excellency  the  Ottoman  Naval  Minister  had  refused 


n8  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

to  allow  that  ship  to  pass  through  the  Dardanelles,  our  comrades 
on  the  western  front  would  have  at  least  fourteen  thousand  fewer 
French  soldiers  to  cope  with.  This  very  profitable  initiative  lies 
exclusively  in  his  hands  !  ' 

Of  course  I  acted  as  if  I  had  heard  nothing,  and  the  ship 
continued  its  voyage.  ^ 

On  August  8th,  1914,  Captain  Ha'mann,  Naval  Attache  to  the 
German  Embassy,  came  to  the  Ministry.  He  informed  me  that 
the  German  Mediterranean  squadron,  pursued  by  the  English,  was 
withdrawing  in  the  direction  of  the  Dardanelles,  and  as,  to  judge 
by  his  reports,  the  Goeben  had  practically  no  more  coal,  they  were 
compelled  to  send  some  from  Constantinople.  But  as  there  was 
no  English  coal  available  he  asked  me  to  lend  him  five  or  six 
thousand  tons  from  our  naval  depots.  I  immediately  telephoned 
to  the  Grand  Vizier,  Enver  Pasha,  and  Talaat  Bey  to  ascertain 
their  opinion. 

They  replied  that  I  should  agree.  I  ordered  that  the  required 
quantity  of  coal  should  be  supplied  from  the  Derindji  depots,  and 
also  sent  a  naval  labour  section  to  assist  with  the  loading  of  the 
vessel.  It  was  loaded  within  a  few  hours,  and  then  set  out  for  the 
^Egean  Sea. 

As  usual,  the  evening  of  August  nth  found  us  assembled  in 
council  at  dinner  at  the  Prince's  house.  Talaat,  Djavid,  and  I  had 
been  the  first  to  arrive.  Enver  Pasha,  who  came  in  later,  remarked 
with  that  quiet  smile  which  was  peculiar  to  him :  "  Unto  us  a  son 
is  born !  '  Of  course  we  did  not  know  what  he  meant.  To  put 
an  end  to  our  feverish  impatience  he  continued:  "  The  Goeben 
and  the  Breslau  appeared  off  the  Dardanelles  this  morning,  and 
as  they  were  being  followed  by  the  English  fleet,  they  asked  that 
they  should  be  allowed  to  pass  through  the  Narrows.  I  granted 
the  permission,  as  I  did  not  wish  to  condemn  the  ships 
of  an  allied  State  to  certain  destruction,  and  by  now  the 
ships  are  in  the  Dardanelles  under  the  protection  of  the  forts 
of  the  Narrows.  The  sequel  is  that  we  are  faced  with  a  political 
problem.  We  shall  have  to  come  to  a  decision  about  it  this 
evening !" 

It  was  certainly  a  very  ticklish  question.  Two  ships  of  one 
of  the  combatants  had  fled  into  Turkish  waters. 

According  to  the  rules  of  neutrality,  we  were  bound  either  to 


At  the  Admiralty  119 

make   them  leave   our   waters   within   twenty-four  hours    or   to 
disarm  and  intern  them  in  one  of  our  harbours. 

As  Germany's  ally  we  could  not  for  a  moment  consider  the  first 
alternative,  as  it  would  have  been  equivalent  to  handing  the  ships 
over.  Besides,  such  a  course  conflicted  as  much  with  our  interests 
as  our  duty. 

Yet,  as  regards  the  second  alternative,  it  was  certain  that  the 
Germans  would  never  consent.  Looked  at  from  that  point  of  view, 
the  Allies  were  entitled  to  consider  our  action  a  casus  belli  and 
declare  war  upon  us.  Of  course  that  was  bound  to  happen  sooner 
or  later,  and  we  should  be  forced  to  intervene  in  the  war.  Yet  the 
state  of  our  army  compelled  us  to  postpone  that  intervention  for 
as  long  as  possible. 

At  this  point  the  French  and  English  Ambassadors  called  on 
the  Grand  Vizier  in  a  state  of  great  excitement  to  protest  against 
the  passage  of  the  German  warships  through  the  Dardanelles  and 
against  the  audacity  of  their  commanders  in  searching  a  post 
steamer  which  had  left  Constantinople  the  previous  evening  with  a 
number  of  Frenchmen  as  passengers  on  board.  They  alleged  that 
this  was  an  infringement  of  the  neutrality  which  the  Imperial 
Government  had  declared. 

After  a  very  thorough  discussion  we  decided  to  ask  the  German 
Government  to  consent  to  the  two  ships  being  disarmed — tempo- 
rarily and  superficially  only.  Talaat  Bey  and  Halil  Bey  went  to 
the  German  Embassy  in  Therapia  to  communicate  our  decision  to 
the  Ambassador,  von  Wangenheim.  An  hour  later  they  returned" 
with  the  news  that  the  Ambassador  had  declared  that  under  no 
circumstances  could  he  consent.  He  had  consented  to  the  Ottoman 
Government's  refraining  from  taking  part  in  the  war  under  the 
form  of  neutrality,  but  was  convinced  that  the  arrival  !of  the 
German  ships,  compelled  to  withdraw  into  Turkish  waters,  had 
completely  changed  the  situation.  If  this  piece  of  provocation 
involved  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations,  or  even  war 
between  the  Entente  and  the  Ottoman  Government,  we  must 
accept  it  as  the  logical  consequence  of  events. 

Enver  Pasha  identified  himself  with  the  views  of  the  Ambas- 
sador, but  I  insisted  that,  come  what  may,  we  must  arrive  at  some 
compromise,  so  that  in  view  of  our  position  at  the  moment  we 
could  delay  our  entry  into  the  war  as  much  as  possible. 


Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

The  Grand  Vizier  and  Djavid  Bey  were  of  my  opinion.  Ulti- 
mately one  of  us  proposed  the  following  formula:  "  Could  not 
the  Germans  have  previously  sold  us  these  units  ?  Could  not  their 
arrival  be  regarded  as  delivery  under  the  contract  ?  ' 

Everyone  heaved  a  sigh  of  relief.  The  ground  for  a  friendly 
settlement  of  the  affair  had  been  discovered !  Shortly  afterwards 
we  decided  to  ask  Wangenheim  to  come  to  the  Prince's  house 
to  hear  what  we  had  agreed  to  do.  One  of  Enver  Pasha's 
aides-de-camp  was  sent  to  the  Embassy,  and  a  quarter  of 
an  hour  later — after  midnight — the  Ambassador  reached  the 
palace. 

After  an  hour  of  lively  discussion  between  the  Grand  Vizier, 
Talaat  Bey,  and  the  Ambassador,  the  latter  promised  to  get  into 
communication  with  Berlin  the  same  night  and  get  a  favourable 
answer  before  morning.  We  then  decided  to  wait  at  the  Grand 
Vizier's  house  until  the  answer  arrived.  It  came  about  four  o'clock 
in  the  morning.  It  empowered  us,  on  condition  that  we  accepted 
Admiral  Souchon  in  the  Ottoman  service,  to  say  that  the  ships  had 
been  sold  to  Turkey.  It  was  not  a  real,  but  merely  fictitious,  sale. 
We  were  informed  that  as  the  Emperor  could  not  sell  a  single  ship 
in  the  navy  without  a  decree  of  the  Reichstag,  the  real  sale  could 
not  be  carried  out  until  the  end  of  the  war  and  the  Reichstag 
had  conveyed  its  assent.  As  a  solution  which  saved  appearances 
had  now  been  found,  the  Ministers  separated  about  live  o'clock. 
All  matters  of  detail  were  to  be  left  to  the  Naval  Ministry  in 
accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  agreement. 

Early  next  morning  I  sent  to  the  papers  an  official  communique 
referring  to  the  purchase  of  the  Goeben  and  Bretlau  by  the 
Government  and  the  arrival  of  these  two  ships  in  the  Dardanelles. 
I  asked  the  Press  to  speak  enthusiastically  of  the  circumstance  that 
we  had  obtained  possession  of  the  ships  as  compensation  for  the 
Sultan  Osman  and  the  Reschadiek,  of  which  the  English  had 
robbed  us. 

The  most  delicate  part  of  the  business,  however,  was  to  get 
the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Fleet,  Admiral  Limpus,  and  all 
the  English  officers  out  -of  the  fleet  without  causing  excitement 
The  very  next  day  I  had  a  report  from  the  Admiral  in  question. 
He  congratulated  the  Ottoman  Government  on  having  secured 
possession  of  two  such  vessels,  and  assured  me  that  as  the  two 


At  the  Admiralty  121 

ships  came  under  his  direct  command,  he  would  have  the  selected 
officers  and  men  ready  within  a  month  to  manoeuvre  with  these 
most  modern  units.  I  asked  the  Admiral  to  call  on  me,  and  began 
to  discuss  the  matter  with  him.  I  asked  him  that,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  German  Admiral  and  ships'  companies  were  very 
exhausted,  so  that  the  date  on  which  they  would  leave  the  ship  was 
still  uncertain,  he  would  occupy  himself  in  making  out  the  list  of 
officers  and  men  who  were  to  be  employed  on  them. 

By  a  stroke  of  luck  it  happened  that  four  or  five  days  later  I 
received  a  short  letter  from  the  Admiral  in  which  he  told  me  that 
he  was  enclosing  a  copy  of  a  report  in  English  which  he  had 
submitted  direct  to  the  Grand  Vizier.  I  had  the  report  translated. 
In  view  of  the  condition  of  our  fleet  and  army,  he  recommended 
the  Government  to  preserve  the  strictest  neutrality,  and  expressed 
his  opinion  that  the  Turkish  officers  and  men  needed  at  least  four 
or  five  years'  training  instruction  before  they  would  be  efficient 
enough  to  handle  the  recently-acquired  units.  I  immediately 
replied  to  the  Admiral  that  he  was  there  solely  to  reorganise  the 
fleet,  that  he  was  directly  responsible  to  the  Ministry,  and  must 
therefore  present  his  reports  to  that  Ministry  alone.  As  those 
reports  were  to  concern  themselves  with  the  reorganisation  of  the 
fleet  and  nothing  else,  he  had  no  authority  to  recommend  any 
political  course  to  the  Ottoman  Government  when  dealing  with  the 
situation  in  the  navy  ! 

The  next  day  I  received  a  very  short  reply  from  the  Admiral. 
"  Your  letter  shows  me  the  true  position.  For  the  future  I  will 
be  extremely  careful  not  to  exceed  the  limits  you  have  imposed 
for  my  activities.  In  any  case,  I  am  feeling  very  tired,  and  I  should 
be  very  grateful  to  you  if  you  would  allow  me  to  spend  some  time 
with  my  daughter,  who  is  living  in  Therapia." 

I  told  him  that  his  wish  was  granted,  but  also  pointed  out  that 
during  his  absence  there  might  be  many  misunderstandings  in  the 
fleet  between  the  English  officers,  mechanics,  &c.,  and  the  Turkish 
crews,  and  asked  him  to  prevent  such  occurrences  by  sending  the 
officers  to  the  Ministry,  so  that  they  could  be  distributed  among  the 
different  sections  of  the  arsenal. 

The  day  after  this  order  was  carried  not  a  single  English 
officer  remained  on  service  with  our  fleet.  Thereupon  an  Imperial 
irade  was  issued,  wherein  Admiral  Souchon  was  appointed  to  the 


122  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

service  of  the  Ottoman  Government  with  the  title  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Imperial  Fleet.  The  next  day  the  Goeben  and 
Breslau,  which  were  now  called  Jawus  anS  Midilli,  hoisted  the 
Turkish  ensign,  entered  Stambul  harbour,  and  anchored  in  the 
roads  of  Moda. 

A  few  days  later  His  Majesty  the  Sultan,  who  had  gone  on 
board  the  yacht  Erthogrul,  reviewed  the  Turkish  Fleet,  which  now 
definitely  included  the  Jawus  and  Midilli,  during  the  regatta  which 
was  in  progress  at  the  Princes  Islands.  It  is  utterly  impossible  to 
describe  the  enthusiasm  and  pleasure  which  seized  on  the  people  of 
Constantinople  in  those  days.  Everyone  had  confidence  in  the 
military  preparations  of  the  Government,  and  not  a  Mussulman 
was  to  be  found  who  did  not  long  for  the  victory  of  the  Germans 
and  Austrians.  This  revelation  of  popular  sentiment  greatly 
pleased  the  Germans  and  Austrians  and  correspondingly  aroused 
the  fury  of  the  English,  French,  and  Russians. 


VARIOUS  CONVERSATIONS  WITH  THE  ENGLISH,  FRENCH,  AND  RUSSIAN 

AMBASSADORS. 

After  the  arrival  of  the  Goeben  and  Breslau  in  the  Sea  ot 
Marmora  we  had,  of  course,  closed  the  Straits.  On  the  ground 
that  the  German  crews  still  remained  on  board  the  two  German 
warships,  the  English  and  French  Ambassadors  insisted  that  a 
situation  had  been  created  inconsistent  with  neutrality,  and  on  that 
account  made  continuous  protests,  both  official  and  personal.  The 
Entente  represetatives,  who  knew  nothing  of  the  alliance,  main- 
tained that  sooner  or  later  the  Germans  would  use  the  presence  of 
their  ships  and  the  large  number  of  German  officers  to  involve  us 
in  the  war,  and  that  the  only  way  to  preserve  our  neutrality  was  to 
get  the  German  crews  off  these  ships  and  send  them  back  to 
Germany  along  with  the  officers  of  the  Military  Mission.  If  we 
had  been  really  neutral,  of  course  no  other  course  would  have  been 
open  to  us.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  had  declared  our  neutrality 
solely  with  the  object  of  gaining  time,  and,  as  far  as  our  partici- 
pation in  the  war  was  ccuicerned,  we  were  simply  waiting  for  the 
completion  of  our  military  mobilisation. 

Meanwhile  at  our  regular  meetings  in  the  Grand  Vizier's  palace 
the  Ministers  had  decided  that  I  should  get  into  close  touch  with 


At  the  Admiralty  123 

the  English  Ambassador  (Sir  Louis  Mallet)  and  Djavid  Bey  with 
the  French  Ambassador,  and  that  we  should  devote  ourselves  to 
remove  any  suspicions  they  might  have  as  to  our  alliances. 

One  evening,  when  I  was  talking  with  Sir  Louis  Mallet  in  his 
house  in  Therapia,  he  said  to  me  : 

"  Djemal  Pasha,  what  concessions  would  the  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment require  to  preserve  a  real  and  strict  neutrality  to  the 
end?" 

I  replied  that  there  could  be  no  doubt  about  the  neutrality  of 
the  Ottoman  Government,  but  that  I  thought  it  my  duty  to  bring 
his  question  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Grand  Vizier. 

Thereupon  we  consulted  the  Grand  Vizier,  and  in  agreement 
with  him  drew  up  the  principal  conditions  on  which  we  might 
possibly  join  the  Entente.  These  conditions  were : 

The  complete  abolition  of  the  capitulations. 

The  restoration  of  the  islands  taken  from  us  by  the  Greeks. 

A  solution  of  'the  Egyptian  question. 

An  assurance  that  for  the  future  Russia  would  refrain  from 
interfering  in  our  domestic  affairs. 

Effective  English  and  French  protection  in  case  of  a  Russian 
attack;  and  a  few  other  points. 

After  we  entered  the  war  I  saw  from  a  number  of  telegrams 
published  in  an  English  Blue  Book  that  these  conditions  had  been 
communicated  to  London  by  Sir  Louis  Mallet. 

Three  or  four  days  later  Sir  Louis  Mallet  replied  to  each  of 
these  points  in  detail: 

For  the  moment  there  could  be  no  question  of  abolishing  the 
juridical  capitulations.  The  utmost  that  England  could  concede, 
with  the  approval  of  her  allies,  was  the  abolition  of  some  of  the 
financial  capitulations. 

It  would  be  advisable  to  postpone  our  dispute  with  the  Greeks 
over  the  question  of  the  islands. 

It  would  be  better  to  let  the  Egyptian  question  rest  until  after 
the  war,  as  it  could  not  be  settled  at  the  moment  without  conjuring 
up  various  perils. 

The  Russians  had  no  idea  whatever  of  attacking  Turkey,  and 
besides  France  and  England  were  among  the  signatories  to  the 
treaty  guaranteeing  the  integrity  of  Turkey,  so  that  we  could  feel 
quite  at  our  ease  on  that  score,  particularly  as  if  we  wished  it 


124  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

they  were  prepared  to  give  us  a  fresh  guarantee  embodied  in  a 
diplomatic  record. 

As  compensation  for  all  these  concessions,  we  were  required 
not  to  close  the  Straits  against  Russian  ships  on  any  ground 
whatever,  and  we  must  undertake  to  give  the  Russians  the 
necessary  assurances  on  this  most  important  point.  They  did  not 
desire  to  see  us  taking  part  in  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Entente 
for  in  their  opinion  that  was  contrary  to  their  interests.  What 
they  desired  of  us  was  strict  neutrality,  that  the  German  crews  and 
the  Military  Mission  should  be  sent  back  to  Germany  at  once, 
and  that  the  Dardanelles  should  be  opened  to  shipping  and  not 
closed  again  in  future.  In  return,  France,  England,  and  Russia 
would  give  the  Sublime  Porte  a  diplomatic  record  guaranteeing 
our  territorial  integrity  and  sanctioning  certain  modifications  in 
the  matter  of  the  financial  capitulations. 

In  my  opinion  the  answer  was  perfectly  clear.  The  Entente 
Powers  did  not  desire  our  participation  in  the  war  on  their  side. 
What  could  be  the  reason  for  that  ? 

If  we  came  into  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Entente,  Russia 
would  see  her  last  chance  vanish  of  laying  hands  on  Constantinople, 
the  goal  of  her  future  hopes.  That  she  could  never  admit,  and 
therefore  neither  could  France  nor  England. 

Their  object  was  patently  as  follows :  "  For  the  moment  let  us 
prevent  Turkey  from  doing  anything  to  our  disadvantage.  During 
the  war  we  will  preserve  our  association  with  Russia  and  thereby 
bring  it  to  a  victorious  conclusion.  Then  we  can  satisfy  Russia's 
ambition  by  giving  her  Constantinople,  and  on  the  pretext  of 
reforms  grant  the  Arabian  provinces  autonomy  so  that  they  will 
easily  fall  under  our  protection  and  control/7 

It  is  thus  quite  easy  to  understand  that  my  second  pro- 
posal, made  to  England,  was  rejected  in  the  same  way  and  for 
the  same  reasons  as  that  first  offer  of  an  alliance  I  had  made 
in  Paris. 

It  may  be  said  that  it  would  have  been  better  for  us  if  we 
had  maintained  our  neutrality !  On  condition,  I  think,  that  we 
did  not  prevent  shipping  passing  through  the  Straits  ?  But  in 
that  case  Russia  would  have  emerged  from  the  World  War  so 
strong  that  she  would  certainly  not  have  waited  to  seize 
Constantinople  and  the  eastern  provinces  of  Asia  Minor. 


At  the  Admiralty  125 

It  may  be  said  that  we  could  have  closed  the  Straits  and  still 
preserved  our  neutrality.  The  agreement  did  not  allow  that,  nor 
would  the  English  and  Russians  have  allowed  it  either.  There 
would  immediately  have  been  pressure  on  all  sides  and  suggestions 
of  this  kind:  "  Let  us  occupy  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  until 
the  end  of  the  war  and  then  we  will  give  them  back  to  you !  " 

Nor  would  they  have  lost  any  time  in  translating  words  into 
deeds ! 

In  short,  we  had  only  two  safe  courses  open  to  us.  We  could 
either  ally  ourselves  with  the  English  and  French,  declare  war  on 
the  Central  Powers,  and  in  that  way  secure  ourselves  against 
further  attack  by  Russia,  or  we  could  join  the  Central  Powers 
and  assist  in  the  destruction  of  Russia.  After  declining  our 
alliance,  France  and  England  had  required  us  to  remain  neutral 
and  keep  the  Straits  open  for  the  benefit  of  our  worst  enemy. 
The  Central  Powers,  on  the  other  hand,  allowed  us  to  come  in 
with  them,  though  they  felt  themselves  strong  enough  to  destroy 
Russia,  but  they  bound  us  to  put  every  possible  obstruction  in 
her  way.  Thanks  to  that  attitude  we  could  hope  to  see  our  foe 
overthrown.  There  was,  of  course,  a  possibility  that  the  Central 
Powers  might  be  beaten,  and  in  that  case  a  catastrophe  for  us  was 
a  certainty.  But  it  is  also  an  undeniable  fact  that  if  we  had 
remained  neutral  and  left  the  Straits  open  the  inevitable  victory  of 
our  enemy  would  have  sealed  our  fate  with  equal  certainty. 

Men  may  say  what  they  like,  looking  back  on  events,  but  in 
my  view,  rather  than  fall  miserably  under  the  yoke  of  the  Russians, 
English,  and  French,  after  the  Russians  had  won,  it  was  infinitely 
better  to  defend  ourselves  to  the  last  drop  of  blood  in  the  hope 
of  freeing  ourselves  for  ever — the  only  alternative  worthy  of  a 
brave  and  great  nation — or  at  any  rate  to  be  able  to  say  "  Tout 
est  perdu  hors  I'honneurf  "  and  thus  bring  to  a  splendid  close  a 
national  history  which  was  established  on  honour  and  courage,  and 
rich  in  fame  and  glory. 

Not  I  alone,  but  the  great  majority  of  the  Turkish  nation 
cherish  the  opinion  that  our  four  years  of  war  produced  amazing 
episodes  worthy  of  the  finest  pages  in  the  history  of  the  greatest 
nations — the  defence  of  the  Dardanelles,  the  Selman  Pak,  the 
siege  of  Kut-el-Amara,  the  battles  of  Gaza,  and  the  defence  of 
Medina. 


Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Of  course,  my  observations  are  addressed  only  to  those  who 
are  ready  to  give  their  lives  to  defend  their  honour.  The  miserable 
creatures  who  are  ready  to  endure  anything  if  only  they  can 
prolong  their  wretched  lives  for  a  few  days  will  certainly  not 
appreciate  my  words.  Making  an  excuse  of  the  tragic  situation 
to  which  Fate  has  brought  us  to-day,  they  like  to  assume  the 
mantle  of  wisdom  in  saying:  "We  told  you  so.  If  we  had 
remained  neutral  we  should  not  have  lost  so  many  men,  nor  should 
we  now  be  in  such  a  horrible  state/' 

To  such  as  these  we  can  only  reply  :  "  It  is  quite  impossible  for 
us  to  agree  with  men  who  cannot  understand  that  to  go  down 
fighting  is  one  thing,  and  to  go  down  submitting  another. " 

Our  private  relations  with  the  Ambassadors  of  France  and 
England  occasionally  led  to  some  highly  amusing  conversations. 
I  was  chatting  with  Sir  Louis  Mallet  one  day  when  he  told  me  he 
was  quite  convinced  that  Enver  Pasha  had  been  won  over  by  the 
Germans,  and  that  they  probably  wanted  to  use  the  German 
officers,  particularly  the  officers  of  the  Goeben  and  Breslau,  to 
bring  about  some  incident  which  would  make  a  declaration  of  war 
inevitable.  I  told  him — more  or  less — that  the  neutrality  idea 
prevailed  in  the  Cabinet,  so  that  there  was  no  danger. 

"  No,  Djemal  Pasha!  "  he  interrupted,  "  you're  wrong !  I'm 
positive  that  the  Germans  wouldn't  stop  even  at  a  coup  d'etat  to 
gain  their  ends.  They  might  shut  you  up  in  gaol,  for  instance, 
and  who  knows  what  else !  ' 

By  way  of  a  less  naive  reply  to  these  naive  words,  I  answered 
with  a  smile  :  "I've  been  thinking  for  a  long  time  what  I  should  do 
if  I  had  any  suspicions  of  that  kind.  In  virtue  of  my  position  as 
Naval  Minister  I  should  open  the  Dardanelles  to  the  English  Fleet 
and  leave  to  you  the  suppression  of  the  revolt  in  the  fleet !  ' 

It  is  certainly  astounding  that  this  very  perspicacious  English 
diplomat  actually  believed  my  words,  so  much  so  that  he 
communicated  this  crazy  proposal  to  the  Foreign  Secretary,  as  I 
read  in  a  Blue  Book. 

In  Document  No.  40  of  the  Russian  Red  Book  it  is  said  that  I 
had  given  Baron  von  Giers  my  "  word  of  honour  that  I  should  have 
withdrawn  the  German  crews  of  the  Goeben  and  Breslau  a 
fortnight  after  our  conversation."  I  assume  that  if  Baron  von 
Giers  did  not  actually  desire  to  say  what  was  untrue,  he  must  have 


At  the  Admiralty  127 

used  those  words  to  please  his  superiors,  for  I  was  under  no  sort 
of  obligation  to  give  him  any  personal  assurance,  and  it  is  not  my 
custom  to  speak  unless  circumstances  make  it  necessary. 


WE    INTERVENE    IN    THE    WAR. 

Meanwhile  a  number  of  very  serious  measures  were  in 
progress.  The  Council  of  Ministers,  which  met  every  evening, 
came  to  various  decisions  supplementary  to  the  Turco-German 
alliance,  and  asked  the  Germans  to  signify  their  consent. 

What  we  most  desired  was  to  secure  the  intervention  of  the 
Bulgarians  in  the  war.  We  received  the  following  communication 
from  our  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  His  Excellency  Mahmud  Mukhtar 
Pasha :  "  When  the  Turco-German  alliance,  bearing  the  signature 
of  His  Majesty  the  Sultan,  was  laid  before  the  German  Emperor 
he  laid  emphasis  on  the  advantages  it  would  bring  to  both  nations, 
and  said,  with  a  happy  smile,  '  Now  let  me  give  you  another  piece 
of  good  news.  Since  this  morning  I've  had  in  my  pocket  a  letter 
from  the  King  of  Bulgaria,  in  which  he  writes  that  he  wants  to 
make  an  alliance  with  me/  ' 

This  news  gave  us  the  very  greatest  pleasure,  for  the  Bulgarians 
had  not  said  a  word  for  five  or  six  months  about  our  negotiations 
for  an  alliance  with  them,  and  we  had  not  the  slightest  doubt 
that  if  they  came  into  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Entente  it  might 
prove  a  perfect  catastrophe  for  us.  But  as  a  month  or  two  had 
passed  since  the  outbreak  of  war  and  no  action  had  been  taken  by 
the  Bulgarians,  we  thought  they  must  be  tricking  the  Germans 
just  as  they  had  tricked  us. 

The  Bulgarian  Envoy,  Toscheff,  with  whom  we  had  close  and 
constant  relations,  advocated  the  view  that  it  would  be  unwise  of 
Bulgaria  to  intervene  in  the  war  before  she  could  see  how  it  was 
going  to  end.  He  was  adamant  to  any  other  argument. 

As  I  have  said,  the  Germans  had  agreed  that  we  should  remain 
neutral  until  the  mobilisation  of  our  army  was  quite  complete, 
and  that  we  should  enter  the  war  as  late  as  possible.  But  when 
their  troops  had  to  retreat  somewhat  after  the  Marne  defeat,  and 
pass  from  the  offensive  to  the  defensive,  while  the  Russian  Armies 
were  engaged  in  their  successful  and  destructive  advance  in  East 
Prussia  and  also  overrunning  Galicia,  their  situation  was  so  utterly 


ia8  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

changed  that  they  began  to  urge  us  to  intervene  at  once  with  a  view 
to  tying  down  large  Russian  forces  in  the  Caucasus  and  a 
substantial  English  force  in  Egypt. 

The  representations  of  their  Ambassador,  who  based  them  both 
to  the  Grand  Vizier  and  ourselves  on  the  terms  of  the  alliance, 
became  more  and  more  imperious.  In  any  case  our  mobilisation 
was  completed  about  this  time,  and  all  our  army  corps  were 
ready  to  take  the  field  on  the  first  order  of  the  Commander-in-Chief . 
The  various  units  were  drilled  and  exercised  continuously,  and 
almost  every  day  we  had  divisional  and  corps  manoeuvres  round 
Constantinople  and  Skutari. 

It  was  seen  at  once  how  right  Enver  Pasha  had  been  in 
insisting  that  the  reorganisation  of  the  army  should  begin  with  the 
reconstruction  of  the  cadres.  The  result  was  observable  in  the 
mobility  of  the  larger  units,  the  command  of  which  had  been 
entrusted  to  young  officers  well  trained  in  strategy  and  tactics. 
When  the  Germans  realised  these  results  they  considered  that  as 
we  possessed  so  well  organised  an  army  we  could  not  remain  a 
mere  spectator  of  the  calamities  overtaking  the  Austrians  and 
Germans. 

I  must  here  ask  indulgence  for  a  slight  digression.  About  this 
time  there  was  a  rumour  in  Constantinople  that  Enver  Pasha  was 
insisting  on  an  alliance  with  the  Germans  and  a  declaration  of  war 
on  Russia,  while  I  was  determined  to  prevent  any  departure  from 
our  neutrality  in  any  case.  It  was  said  that  the  dispute  had  reached 
such  a  pitch  that  before  the  assembled  Ministers  Enver  had 
threatened  me  with  a  revolver,  but  that  I  had  anticipated  him  and 
injured  his  foot.  The  really  peculiar  thing  is  that  this  legend  has 
found  a  place  in  Mr.  Morgenthau's  book.  I  should  like  to  know 
whether  the  honest  Ambassador  who  bases  his  personal 
observations  on  such  idle  chatter  will  blush  if  he  takes  the  trouble 
to  re-read  his  book  after  reading  what  I  have  written. 

I  owe  it  to  him  to  let  him  know  that  it  would  never  have 
occurred  to  Enver  Pasha,  Talaat  Bey,  and  all  my  colleagues  even 
to  use  a  bitter  word  to  each  other — much  less  resort  to  weapons — 
either  at  the  time  when  we  were  working  as  revolutionaries  for 
the  overthrow  of  the  despotic  rule  of  Sultan  Hamid,  or  during  the 
period  when  we  were  together  in  the  Ministry.  We  have  not  come 


At  the  Admiralty  129 

from  low  and  obscure  origins,  as  Mr.  Morgenthau  believes  and 
desires  others  to  believe.  Some  among  us  finished  their  studies  at 
the  Military  Academy ;  several  have  been  to  Turkish  and  European 
Universities;  and  Talaat  Bey  (who  was  never  a  postman  as  the 
Ambassador  alleges)  was  at  a  law  college  in  Salonica  after  leaving 
school.  It  is  thus  ridiculous  to  suggest  that  we  behaved  like 
Apaches. 

We  had  no  longer  the  excuse  for  postponing  our  participation 
in  the  war  that  the  mobilisation  of  our  army  was  not  yet  complete. 
The  question  of  money  was  now  raised.  We  had  derived  no  direct 
advantage  from  the  fact  that  the  capitulations  had  been  abolished 
by  a  provisional  law,  as  the  customs  revenue  had  dropped  to  almost 
a  quarter  of  what  it  was  in  normal  times. 

The  first  instalment  of  the  loan  raised  in  France  barely  covered 
the  current  expenses  of  the  Government  up  to  the  end  of  the  year. 
We  therefore  asked  the  Germans  to  settle  the  financial  problem. 

On  October  nth  I  received  from  von  Wangenheim  an 
invitation  to  an  intimate  lunch  in  the  Embassy  at  Therapia.  When 
1  arrived  I  found  the  Grand  Vizier  present,  with  Talaat  Bey,  Halil 
Bey,  and  Enver  Pasha.  Von  Kuhlmann,  recently  appointed 
Councillor  of  Embassy,  was  also  there.  After  lunch  we  all  went 
to  the  Ambassador's  private  room.  Wangenheim,  with  a  very 
doleful  face,  told  us  that  Germany  had  accepted  all  our  financial 
conditions,  and  looked  at  us  as  much  as  to  say :  "  Now  don't  start 
thinking  of  any  more  objections !  " 

The  legend  that  we  signed  an  alliance,  and  so  forth,  at  the 
Embassy  that  day  is  wholly  untrue.  As  I  have  said  above,  the 
compact  had  been  signed  at  the  very  outbreak  of  war,  so  that  there 
was  nothing  to  sign  that  day. 

The  general  situation  was  examined"  and  discussed  at  a  meeting 
of  the  inner  Cabinet  (Endjumen  Wiikela)  which  took  place  the 
following  day.  At  the  outset  there  were  two  alternatives  before 
us : 

1.  Immediate  intervention  in  the  World  War. 

2.  To  send  Halil  Bey,  accompanied  by  Hakki  Bey  and 

the  Deputy  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  to  convince 
the  Germans  of  the  necessity  of  maintaining  neutrality 
for  another  six  months. 

I 


130  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

The  second  alternative  was  advocated  by  Djavid  Bey,  but  the 
other  Ministers  stood  by  the  first.  For  the  first  time  the  Grand 
Vizier  showed  himself  undecided. 

At  that  moment  Enver  Pasha  told  us  that  in  consequence  of  the 
numerous  and  very  justified  protests  of  the  Admiral,  on  military 
grounds  he  could  no  longer  oppose  the  cruise  of  the  Goeben  and 
Breslau  into  the  Black  Sea.  Yet  the  excursion  of  these  two 
warships,  accompanied  by  other  Ottoman  vessels,  would  inevitably 
involve  our  participation  in  the  war.  In  the  first  place,  the  Entente 
Governments  did  not  regard  the  Goeben  and  Breslau  as  Turkish 
ships,  and  had  made  a  formal  declaration  that  if  they  passed 
through  the  Straits,  even  without  showing  a  flag  and  with  Turkish 
crews,  they  would  be  treated  as  hostile  vessels.  Thus  it  was 
certain  that  the  Russian  Fleet  would  immediately  attack  the  Goeben 
and  Breslau  if  they  could  be  taken  at  a  disadvantage.  And  even 
if  the  Russian  Fleet  for  any  reason  refrained  from  attacking  these 
two  ships,  Admiral  Souchon,  who  was  extremely  anxious  that  we 
should  participate  in  hostilities,  could  bring  us  into  the  war 
by  attacking  the  Russian  Fleet  or  Russian  ports  on  his  own 
initiative. 

After  a  short  discussion  we  decided  to  send  Halil  Bey  and  Hafiz 
Hakki  Bey  to  Berlin  to  give  full  authority  to  the  Deputy 
Commander-in-Chief  to  deal  with  the  fleet  question,  while  avoiding 
everything  which  might  involve  us  in  the  war. 

As  the  result  of  a  report  from  Admiral  Souchon,  we  were 
compelled  to  recognise  the  fact  that  a  well-planned  attack  of  the 
Russian  Fleet  had  forced  him  into  an  action  against  it,  whereupon 
Russia — and  consequently  France — declared  war  on  the  Ottoman 
Government. 


When  the  news  reached  Constantinople  that  following  on  the 
attack  by  the  Russian  Fleet  in  the  Black  Sea  on  the  Ottoman  Fleet 
the  latter  had  in  <turn  bombardedOdessa,  Sebastopol,Theodosia  and 
certain  other  parts  of  the  coast,  we  found  the  Grand  Vizier,  Said 
Halim  Pasha,  in  a  vefy  peculiar  frame  of  mind.  As  he  was  utterly 
opposed  to  our  participation  in  the  war,  he  was  strongly  averse 
to  sharing  the  responsibility  for  a  war  in  which  the  attack  of  our 
squadron  on  the  Russian  Fleet  and  the  Russian  ports  was  bound  to 


At  the  Admiralty  131 

involve  the  Government.  The  Beiram  festival  was  on  at  this  time, 
so  we  met  every  day  at  the  Grand  Vizier's  Palace.  Said  Halim 
Pasha  declared  that  he  would  at  once  resign  if  this  attack  meant 
war.  We  quickly  pointed  out  that  after  he  had  himself  signed  the 
alliance  with  Germany,  and  associated  himself  only  a  few  days 
before  with  the  decisions  which  recognised  all  Turkish  obligations 
under  it,  he  could  not  for  a  moment  resign  on  a  pretext  of  an  event 
which  was  nothing  more  than  the  natural  consequence.  Faced 
with  such  incontrovertible  logic,  to  which  he  could  find  no  valid 
answer,  the  Grand  Vizier  accepted  the  situation  and  abandoned 
his  idea  of  resigning. 

The  day  Russia,  France,  and  England  announced  to  the 
Ottoman  Government  the  opening  of  hostilities,  the  Council  of 
Ministers  met  at  the  Sublime  Porte  for  an  extraordinary  session. 

Referring  to  the  facts  as  set  forth  in  Admiral  Souchon's  report 
Said  Halim  Pasha  related  how,  as  a  result  of  the  attack  by  the 
Russian  Fleet  on  our  warships  in  the  Black  Sea,  our  fleet  had 
taken  up  the  challenge  and  used  their  weapons  against  the  Russian 
war  and  merchant  vessels  in  Odessa,  Sebastopol,  and  other  ports. 
Thereupon  first  Russia,  and  then  France  and  England,  had  declared 
war  on  the  Ottoman  Government.  With  a  view  to  maintaining 
peaceful  relations  and  avoiding  hostilities  the  Turkish  Government 
had  proposed  a  joint  enquiry  to  ascertain  which  fleet  had  attacked 
first,  so  that  the  commander  of  that  fleet  could  be  made  personally 
responsible,  but  the  Russian  Government  had  rejected  that 
proposal.  In  view  of  their  refusal  the  Turkish  Government 
found  itself  compelled  to  consider  itself  in  a  state  of  war  with  the 
Russian,  French,  and  English  Governments,  and  accordingly  to 
bring  the  decree  to  the  knowledge  of  His  Imperial  Majesty.  The 
Grand  Vizier  added  that  he  wanted  the  Ministers  to  speak  their 
minds  without  fear  or  favour. 

The  first  to  speak  was  Oskan  Effendi,  the  Minister  of  Posts 
and  Telegraphs,  who  said  that  as  an  invincible  opponent  of  war 
he  could  not  sign  a  decree  approving  of  the  participation  of  the 
Ottoman  Government  in  the  war,  and  must  therefore  resign.  If, 
however,  the  Ministry  of  Posts  and  Telegraphs  was  reformed  as  a 
department  only,  he  would  continue  to  carry  on  his  duties  as  a 
Director-General. 

12 


132  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Then  Suleiman  Effendi  El  Bustani,  the  Minister  of  Agriculture 
and  Commerce,  said  that  as  a  member  of  the  "  Society  for 
International  Peace  "  he  need  hardly  say  he  opposed  all  wars  and 
was  therefore  compelled  to  resign. 

Churuk  Sulon  Mahmoud  Pasha,  after  dropping  a  few  remarks 
about  the  suspicion  with  which  he  was  regarded  in  the  Cabinet, 
asked  that  his  resignation  also  should  be  accepted. 

Djavid  Bey  was  not  present  at  the  Council  on  this  day,  but 
Talaat  Bey  informed  us  that  he  had  decided  to  resign. 

The  resigning  ministers  left  the  Council  Chamber.  The 
others,  Said  Halim  Pasha  the  Grand  Vizier,  Hairi  Effendi  the 
Sheik  ul  Islam,  ^Emir  Pasha  the  War  Minister,  Talaat  Bey  the 
Minister  of  the  Interior,  Ibrahim  Bey  the  Minister  of  Justice, 
Halil  Bey  the  President  of  the  Council  of  State,  Shukri  Bey,  the 
Minister  for  Education,  and  I  drew  up  the  decree  setting  out 
the  necessity  for  our  intervention  in  the  war  and  laid  it  before  His 
Majesty. 

As  the  Chamber  and  the  Senate  approved  the  war  by  huge 
majorities  and  expressed  their  confidence  in  the  Cabinet,  it  was 
obvious  that  the  whole  nation  agreed  with  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
Government. 

The  same  day  that  we  drew  up  the  decree,  and  thereby 
recognised  a  state  of  war  with  the  Entente  Powers,  I  held  corps 
manoeuvres  near  Skutari,  between  Idjadieh,  Tchamlidja,  and 
Erenkoi.  The  units  concerned  were  the  3rd  Division,  under  the 
command  of  the  German  Colonel  Nicolai  Bey,  and  the  5th  Corps 
under  Colonel  Mahmud  Kiamil  Bey.  Never  shall  I  forget  the 
display  of  patriotic  feeling  and  warlike  enthusiasm  given  by  all  the 
officers  of  the  four  divisions  when  I  gave  them  the  news  of  the 
outbreak  of  war.  As  G.O.C.  the  Corps  I  had  sent  for  them  to 
come  to  the  top  of  Ischamlidja  Hill  to  criticise  these  manoeuvres, 
which  lasted  a  day  and  a  night  and  ended  at  daybreak  with  the 
attack  on  the  hill,  which  was  defended  by  the  3rd  Division. 

The  officers  and  men  of  these  four  divisions  were  also  members 
of  the  Ottoman  nation.  Those  who  did  not  witness  the  rejoicing 
and  high  spirit  of  the  troops,  and  now  have  the  audacity  to 
maintain  that  the  Turkish  people  did  not  wish  to  join  in  the  war, 
are  either  inspired  by  base  motives  or  else  by  pure  cowardice  or 
shortsightedness. 


At  the  Admiralty  133 

The  only  change  in  the  composition  of  the  Cabinet  was  that 
Prince  Abbas  Halim  Pasha  took  over  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works 
and  Achmed  Nessiorri  Bey  that  of  Agriculture.  Talaat  Bay,  who 
was  already  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  took  over  the  Finance 
Ministry  for  the  interim,  and  Shukri  Bey  the  Ministry  of  Posts  and 
Telegraphs. 


IN  COMMAND   OF  THE   FOURTH  ARMY 


CHAPTER  IV. 
IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  FOURTH  ARMY. 

ABOUT  ten  days  after  our  entry  into  the  war  Enver  Pasha  invited 
me  to  his  house.  He  was  suffering  from  an  abscess  on  the  foot 
and  had  to  keep  his  bed.  After  a  few  remarks  about  the  general 
situation  he  said  to  me : 

"  Djemal  Pasha,  I  want  to  start  an  offensive  against  the  Suez 
Canal  to  keep  the  English  tied  up  in  Egypt,  and  thus  not  only 
compel  them  to  leave  there  a  large  number  of  Indian  divisions 
which  they  are  now  sending  to  the  Western  Front,  but  prevent 
them  from  concentrating  a  force  to  land  at  the  Dardanelles. 

"  With  that  end  in  view  I've  been  making  preparations  in  Syria 
for  a  month  of  two.  I've  ear-marked  the  8th  Army  Corps,  under 
the  command  of  Mersinli  Djimal  Bey,  for  this  business.  As  the 
Germans  attach  the  greatest  importance  to  the  execution  of  this 
operation,  I've  appointed  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Kress  Bey 
Chief  of  Staff,  and  sent  him  to  Damascus  as  attache  of  the  German 
Military  Mission.  I  told  him  his  principal  task  was  to  undertake 
the  preparations  for  the  expedition  against  the  Canal.  I  have 
also  sent  my  aide-de-camp,  Major  Merintas  Bey,  Senator  Abdin 
Rahman  Bey,  Sheik  Essad  Shukair,  and  various  other  Arab 
notables  to  Syria  with  orders  to  form  a  Beduin  Auxiliary  Corps. 
Zikki  Pasha,  of  the  1st  Division,  and  now  commanding  the  4th 
Army,  has  orders  to  look  after  the  defence  of  Syria  and  Palestine 
only,  while  Djimal  Bey,  as  Commander  of  the  8th  Corps,  is  to 
complete  the  mobilisation  of  his  Army  Corps  and  prepare  the 
operation  against  the  Canal.  Now  His  Excellency  Zikki  Pasha 
is  not  only  unwilling  to  undertake  this  expedition,  but  is  actually 

137 


138  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

demanding  larger  forces  in  order  to  protect  Syria  against  a  hostile 
landing.  The  news  from  Syria  points  to  general  disturbance  in 
the  country  and  great  activity  on  the  part  of  the  revolutionary 
Arabs.  In  these  circumstances  I  have  wondered  whether  Your 
Excellency  would  not  give  a  further  proof  of  your  patriotism  by 
taking  over  the  command  of  the  4th  Army.  In  doing  so  you 
would  have  to  prepare  (and  carry  through)  the  attack  on  the 
Canal,  and  also  maintain  peace  and  internal  order  in  Syria.  I 
don't  know  if  I  may  venture  to  make  this  proposal  to  you  ?  ' 

I  immediately  replied : 

"  I  consider  it  a  sacred  duty  to  go  wherever  you  think  my 
capabilities  may  be  of  the  most  service  to  the  country,  so  I  gladly 
accept  the  command  of  the  4th  Army  which  you  have  offered 
me,  and  will  leave  for  my  new  sphere  in  a  day  or  two." 

Enver  Pasha  was  very  delighted  at  my  answer.  In  the 
subsequent  conversation  I  obtained  the  full  freedom  of  action 
which  the  law  confers  upon  an  army  commander.  I  retained  my 
former  title  of  Naval  Minister,  but  Enver  Pasha  took  over  my 
portfolio  on  the  terms  that  he  should  consult  me  and  obtain  my 
consent  to  all  reforms  and  improvements  in  that  department. 

I  immediately  went  to  the  Military  School,  the  headquarters 
of  the  4th  Army,  and  as  Deputy  Commander-in-Chief  appointed 
the  Chief  of  Staff,  the  heads  of  the  ist,  2nd,  and  3rd  Sections,  and 
a  few  other  officers.  I  told  them  of  my  appointment  to  command 
the  4th  Army,  and  gave  Colonel  von  Frankenburg,  the  Chief 
of  Staff,  orders  to  make  preparations  for  our  departure  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment.  When  everything  was  ready,  four  or 
five  days  later,  I  left  Haidar  Pasha  Station  for  Syria  on 
November  2ist. 

One  of  the  gentlemen  who  came  to  the  station  to  see  me  off 
made  a  very  impressive  speech,  in  which  he  said  that  the  nation 
expected  from  me  great  exploits  and  speedy  news  of  victory.  Of 
course  there  had  to  be  a  reply  to  this  speech.  I  said  that  I  was 
fully  conscious  of  the  greatness  as  of  the  immense  difficulties  of 
the  task  before  me.  If  our  enterprise  failed,  and  my  corpse  and 
those  of  the  brave  men.  going  with  me  were  left  at  the  Canal,  the 
friends  of  our  country  who  would  then  have  to  take  up  our  work 
must  sweep  over  us  and  rescue  Egypt,  the  rightful  property  of 
Islam,  from  the  hands  of  the  English  usurpers. 


In  Command  of  the  Fourth  Army  139 

Since  then  I  have  heard  that  quite  a  number  of  my  enemies 
have  made  use  of  my  words  on  this  occasion  to  perpetrate  the 
following  sophism :  "  How  could  Djemal  Pasha  have  the  audacity 
to  come  back  from  Egypt  ?  Wasn't  it  his  business  to  drive  out 
the  English  or  die  ?  Why  did  he  not  die  ?  " 

What  I  have  to  say  in  my  book  will  enable  them  easily  to 
realise  that,  so  far  as  this  expedition  is  concerned,  it  is  no  fault  of 
mine  that  I  am  still  alive.  But  no  one  can  kill  a  man  whose  death 
God  has  not  yet  decreed.  Who  knows  whether  I  have  not  been 
called  on  to  remain  alive  to  suffer  still  more  sorrow  and  slander  in 
the  conflicts  into  which  I  am  still  prepared  to  enter,  for  the  good 
of  my  country ! 

But  what  do  all  these  critics  really  want?  Ought  I  to  have 
turned  to  the  crowd  and  said :  "  My  friends  !  I  am  going  to  Syria 
with  a  commission  to  drive  the  English  out  of  Egypt,  but  the 
resources  at  our  disposal  are  inadequate  to  make  the  execution  of 
this  project  possible.  I  will  therefore  return  to  Constantinople, 
grieved  and  humbled,  without  having  effected  anything  at  all. 
Please  shed  tears  now  in  anticipation  of  that  sad  day..  Why,  it's 
simply  a  decree  of  fate  ! 

No,  indeed !  If  perhaps  I  did  not  succeed  in  really  driving  the 
English  out  of  Egypt,  had  it  not  been  for  the  secret  betrayal  of 
Sherif  Hussein  (who  thereby  committed  an  unforgivable  sin 
against  the  Mussulman  world)  I  should,  at  any  rate,  as  I  shall  show 
hereafter,  have  prevented  the  usurpers  from  attempting  anything 
against  Palestine  and  Syria,  and  in  so  doing  have  held  the  hundreds 
of  men  composing  the  English  Army  inactive  in  Egypt. 

It  was  the  treachery  of  Sherif  Hussein  which  made  that  desir- 
able object  unattainable  for  us.  It  divided  the  two  (Mussulman) 
brother  nations,  Arabs  and  Turks;  he  made  the  former  the  slaves 
of  the  English  and  French  and  forced  the  latter  to  fight  a  hopeless 
fight  against  the  most  pitiless  foe. 

Later  on  I  will  give  full  documentary  proof  of  this  statement. 

Thirty-six  hours  after  my  departure  from  Constantinople  I 
reached  Konia,  where  the  Governor-General,  Azmi  Bey,  and  the 
population  gave  me  a  warm  reception.  I  seized  the  opportunity  of 
visiting  the  sacred  tomb  of  Merlana  Djelal-ed-dine  Rumi  and  made 
the  acquaintance  of  His  Excellency  Weled  Tchelebi  Effendi.  As 
we  were  separating  I  asked  him  if  he  would  not  join  the  Egyptian 


140  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Expedition  with  a  volunteer  corps.  Sure  enough,  some  time  after 
I  left  Weled  Tchelebi  came  to  Syria  with  an  armed  force  he  had 
gathered  together  under  the  name  of  a  "  Battalion  of  Mevlevi 
Volunteers."  I  cannot  say  enough  in  praise  of  his  patriotism. 
Although  he  himself  was  in  very  poor  health,  and  had  just  suffered 
the  sad  loss  of  his  wife,  with  whom  he  had  lived  many  years,  he 
never  even  thought  of  disappointing  me,  and  the  young  men  who 
formed  his  battalion  rendered  the  army  a  magnificent  service. 

Achmed  Rassin  Bey,  whom  I  regard  as  one  of  the  finest  of 
Turkish  journalists,  left  Constantinople  with  me,  and  during  the 
Canal  Expedition  came  to  Beersheba  with  the  second  echelon  of 
Headquarters.  Then  he  resided  at  Headquarters  in  Jerusalem  and 
wrote  very  important  articles  about  my  policy  in  Syria  under  the 
heading  "  The  Army's  Policy. "  I  cannot  omit  to  mention  the 
name  of  this  gentleman,  whose  company  was  always  fruitful  and 
valuable  to  me. 

Two  other  gentlemen  came  to  Headquarters  as  volunteers 
One  was  Fuad  Selim  Bey  Eff endi,  who  displayed  a  model  patriotism 
and  zeal  in  taking  on  the  post  of  Consul-General  at  Salonica  after 
the   Balkan  War,   and  the  other  was   Dr.   Fuad   Bey,   another 
Egyptian,  who  was  an  official  in  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior. 

Fuad  Selim  Bey  did  his  duty  in  the  Egyptian  section  with  great 
devotion  and  soldierly  loyalty,  and  the  army  derived  the  utmost 
advantage  from  his  presence.  It  was  a  matter  of  the  deepest  regret 
to  me  when  important  family  affairs  called  him  away  and  he  had 
to  leave  Headquarters. 

I  shall  always  think  with  feelings  of  gratitude  of  Fuad  Selim 
Bey,  who  was  subsequently  appointed  to  represent  the  Ottoman 
Empire  in  Switzerland  (and  with  great  success),  and  of  Dr.  Fuad, 
who  rendered  the  army  the  greatest  service. 

After  leaving  Konia  we  came  to  Bozanti,  and  from  there  with- 
out stopping  continued  our  journey  by  car  to  Tarsus,  from  which 
we  travelled  to  Adana  by  rail.  I  was  received  with  the  greatest 
enthusiasm  by  the  people  of  this  provincial  capital,  of  which  I  had 
been  Governor-General  four  or  five  years  before.  We  spent  the 
night  there.  The  rainstorms,  which  had  not  stopped  for  a  week, 
had  converted  the  Plain  of  Adana  into  a  sea  of  mud. 


In  Command  of  the  Fourth  Army  141 

At  that  time  the  Adana-Aleppo  railway  was  only  working-  to 
the  station  of  Taprak  Kaleh.  Although  the  Taprak  Kaleh- 
Alexandretta  sector  had  been  finished,  the  line  had  been  washed 
away  at  various  points  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Dort  Yol  owing  to 
the  rains,  and  communication  with  Alexandretta  was  interrupted. 
I  therefore  decided  to  go  by  train  to  Taprak  Kaleh  or  even 
Mustafa  Bey,  and  if  possible  to  continue  my  journey  from  there  by 
car  or  horse  to  Alexandretta  and  Aleppo.  Accordingly  I  left  Adana 
very  early  next  morning.  As  I  had  ascertained  that  the  Bozanti- 
Tarsus  sector,  the  only  route  which  offered  secure  communication 
with  the  army  in  Anatolia,  was  in  very  bad  communication  in 
various  places,  I  asked  Ismail  Hakki  Bey,  the  Governor-General  of 
the  province,  to  have  the  repair  work  put  in  hand  as  soon  as 
possible. 

An  hour  or  so  after  leaving  Adana  we  reached  Mustafa  Bey, 
where  the  horses  and  cars  were  detrained.  We  had  barely  got  a 
yard  or  two  in  our  cars  before  they  sank  in  the  mud.  As  we 
realised  that  we  should  get  no  further  that  way,  we  mounted  our 
horses  and  I  started  off,  after  instructing  my  aide-de-camp,  Captain 
Selaheddin  Effendi,  to  have  the  cars  towed  to  Alexandria,  whence 
he  was  to  follow  us. 

Three  or  four  hours  later  we  came  to  Dort  Yol.  This  is  a  large 
and  important  village  on  the  shores  of  the  Gulf  of  Alexandretta, 
and  lies  almost  equi-distant  from  five  or  six  other  villages,  which 
are  inhabited  almost  exclusively  by  Armenians,  and  celebrated  for 
their  orange  trees. 

During  the  time  I  was  Governor-General  of  Adana  I  had  had  a 
plan  drawn  out  by  German  engineers  for  another  colony,  to  be 
built  on  the  extensive  plot  of  gr.ound  between  Dort  Yol  and  the 
five  other  villages.  But  as  I  had  to  leave  the  vilayet  this  scheme, 
like  so  many  others,  had  not  been  carried  out. 

In  the  years  1910  and  1911  I  had  often  visited  Dort  Yol,  and  the 
villagers,  whom  I  had  often  helped,  now  came  down  in  crowds  to 
meet  me. 

As  I  had  heard  that  I  could  get  from  Dort  Yol  station  to  Alexan- 
dretta by  an  ordinary  trolley  in  two  hours,  while  it  would  take  me 
six  hours  to  ride  there,  I  preferred  to  use  this  method  of  locomotion 
and  started  off  with  my  Chief  of  Staff. 

Never  shall  I  forget  this  journey  by  trolley  on  the  slippery 


142  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

track.  More  than  once  we  went  in  danger  of  our  lives  as  in  pouring 
rain  we  passed  along  the  coast,  which  was  watched  by  enemy 
ships.  After  a  violent  storm,  the  moon  emerged  from  the  clouds 
and  then  disappeared  again,  after  lighting  up  the  sea  in  a  wonderful 
way,  so  that  in  the  distance  we  could  see  the  enemy's  ships — a 
sight  which  intensified  the  bitterness  in  my  heart. 

I  did  not  conceal  from  myself  that  our  foes  were  strong  and  stub- 
born. But  as  there  was  no  other  way  of  preserving  our  existence, 
we  were  compelled  to  resort  to  arms  for  weal  or  woe.  I  had  sworn 
to  leave  no  stone  unturned  to  break  the  power  of  our  adversaries. 

I  remembered  my  oath,  and  seeing  the  difficulties  which  stood 
in  my  path,  I  realised  the  terrible  weight  of  the  burden  which  rested 
upon  my  shoulders.  We  reached  Alexandretta  after  a  journey 
during  which  the  trolley  passed  over  rails  which,  in  some  places, 
hung  suspended  over  a  void  for  fifteen  to  twenty  metres,  and  in 
others  were  under  water.  It  was  four  or  five  hours  before  the 
other  General  Staff  officers  turned  up.  We  spent  this  night  at 
Alexandretta. 

According  to  the  information  we  received,  the  road  between 
Alexandretta  and  Aleppo  was  not  passable  for  cars.  The  road 
which  had  thus  been  allowed  to  become  unusable  for  motor  traffic 
was  the  only  road  connecting  Aleppo  and  the  district  around,  or, 
to  speak  more  accurately,  the  whole  of  Northern  Syria,  including 
the  regions  of  Urfa,  Diarbekir  and  Mosul,  writh  so  important  a 
Mediterranean  depot  as  Alexandretta.  When  I  returned  from 
Bagdad  some  years  before  and  passed  this  road  in  a  car,  I  had 
ascertained  that  repair  work  had  been  taken  in  hand  at  many 
different  points.  It  had  been  undertaken  by  the  General  Road 
Construction  Company,  and  since  August,  1912— two  years  back — 
it  would  have  been  perfectly  possible  to  finish  it.  Thanks  to  the 
difficulties  innumerable  which  the  Roads  Department  had  met  with 
— a  department  totally  incapable  of  doing  anything  on  its  own 
initiative — the  restoration  of  the  road  had  been  neglected.  Until 
we  make  up  our  minds  to  free  our  administration  from  the  shackles 
of  bureaucracy,  neither  a  Constitutional  Government  nor  the  help 
of  God  will  enable  us  to  carry  anything  through  to  a  successful 
conclusion.  The  most  extraordinary  thing  of  all  was  that,  on  the 
excuse  of  the  repair  work,  those  parts  of  the  road  which  had 
previously  been  in  good  condition  had  been  allowed  to  get  into 


In  Command  of  the  Fourth  Army  143 

a  wretched  state.  All  the  stones  had  been  taken  from  the  crown 
of  the  highway,  and  they  were  piled  up  in  two  long  heaps  on  each 
side.  The  holes  between  these  heaps  had  filled  with  rainwater, 
and  the  result  was  a  perfect  canal.  Such  was  the  condition  of  the 
Alexandretta-Aleppo  road  in  November,  1914. 

We  were  compelled  to  stop  one  night  in  Bilan  whether  we  liked 
it  or  not.  On  the  following  morning  we  continued  our  journey 
on  horseback,  after  arranging  that  three  strong  cars  should  be 
sent  from  Aleppo  to  the  nearest  village.  From  here  we  reached 
Katma  Station  by  car.  This  station  is  the  second  from  Aleppo  on 
the  Bagdad  line.  As  it  is  also  the  point  of  junction  of  the  Aleppo- 
Alexandretta  road  and  the  Bagdad  railway  a  lines-of-communi- 
cation  depot  had  been  established  there. 

The  zeal  and  industry  of  those  concerned  may  be  well  imagined 
from  the  fact  that,  when  we  were  about  fifty  metres  from  the 
station,  it  was  impossible  to  get  the  cars  any  further,  and  we  had 
to  be  carried  in  by  soldiers  in  the  inky  darkness. 

At  that  moment  I  remembered  the  Kirk  Kilisse-Adrianople 
road  and  the  Kirk  Kilisse-Bunarhissar- Wiza-Serai  road  during  the 
Balkan  War.  Here  again  the  roads  had  a  pile  of  stones  on  each 
side,  and  as  the  rain  had  filled  up  the  centre  they  looked  exactly 
like  ditches. 

What  a  dismal  prospect  it  was  for  the  march  of  the  army  I  had 
been  appointed  to  command !  Once  more  I  had  before  my  eyes 
the  unforgettable  picture  of  wretched  misery  presented  by  our 
batteries,  ammunition  wagons  and  limbers  failing  to  make  any 
further  progress  along  the  roads  and  being  compelled  to  strike 
across  the  fields  until  they  stuck  in  the  mud.  "  And  here  is  the 
only  road  which  keeps  my  army  in  touch  with  the  home  country  !  " 
I  thought. 

Aleppo  was  the  point  of  concentration  of  the  I3th  Army 
Corps,  which  had  completed  its  mobilisation  in  Mosul  and  neigh- 
bourhood. Colonel  Fahri  Bey,  of  the  General  Staff,  was  in  com- 
mand. The  bulk  of  this  corps  consisted  of  Kurds,  and  the  balance 
of  trained  Arabs.  One  division  was  at  Aleppo,  the  other  at  Hama. 
I  stayed  two  or  three  days  at  Aleppo  and  inspected  the  troops.  In 
spite  of  Fahri  Bey's  extraordinarily  hard  work,  the  divisions  and 
the  formations  independent  of  the  corps  were  not  in  a  very  satis- 
factory condition.  The  material  required  for  a  mobilised  army 


144  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

corps  had  not  been  completed,  and  indeed,  we  could  not  hope 
to  complete  it,  for  there  was  no  chance  of  getting  the  necessary 
equipment  in  and  around  Mosul,  which  was  the  mobilisation  zone 
of  this  corps. 

I  asked  the  Vali  of  Aleppo  to  take  in  hand  the  repair  of  the 
Aleppo-Alexandretta  road,  and  also  to  construct  a  new  road  from 
Islahic  to  Katma  Station  via  Radjo.  Then  I  went  to  Hama  to 
inspect  the  division  in  garrison  there.  It  was  in  exactly  the  same 
condition  as  the  division  at  Aleppo. 

It  was  my  intention,  before  going  to  Damascus,  to  visit 
Northern  Syria,  to  see  for  myself  the  condition  of  that  region. 

First  I  went  through  Horns  to  Tripolis,  returning  the  same 
day  to  Horns,  where  I  spent  the  night.  Next  morning  I  continued 
my  journey  and  went  to  Damascus  through  Rayak.  In  all  the 
towns  through  which  I  passed,  the  people  displayed  the  greatest 
patriotism  and  devotion  to  the  Turkish  cause.  It  gave  me  enormous 
pleasure  to  see  and  feel  that  the  majority  of  the  Arabs  would  not 
hesitate  to  make  any  sacrifice  in  this  great  war  for  the  liberation 
of  the  Mussulman  Khalifate.  It  was  my  duty  to  make  the  best  use 
of  that  frame  of  mind  and  to  preserve  this  region,  a  region  in- 
flammable as  powder,  from  the  enticements  of  traitors  who  had 
sold  themselves  to  the  enemy. 

With  a  view  to  making  it  easier  to  follow  the  sucessive  events 
of  the  three  years  (December,  1914,  to  December,  1917)  which  I 
spent  in  Syria,  events  concerning  the  army,  the  administration, 
domestic  policy  in  Syria  and  Arabia,  the  suppression  of  revolts,  the 
question  of  food  supplies,  and  those  other  questions  of  material 
progress,  and  so  forth,  with  which  I  had  to  deal,  I  have  thought 
it  wiser  to  devote  a  special  chapter  to  each  of  these  topics,  instead 
of  discussing  these  matters  in  the  form  of  a  chronological  diary. 


OUR  PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE 
EXPEDITION  AGAINST  THE  SUEZ  CANAL 


CHAPTER  V. 

OUR  PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  EXPEDITION  AGAINST 
THE  SUEZ  CANAL. 

As  it  is  not  my  intention  to  write  a  history  of  the  war,  I  shall  avoid 
entering  into  unnecessary  details  of  the  movements  and  operations 
of  the  army  and  confine  myself  to  describing  the  essential  facts 
in  broad  outline.  Some  day  I  shall  ask  Colonel  Fuad  Bey,  my 
invaluable  Chief  of  Staff,  to  compile  a  special  history  of  the 
campaigns  based  on  the  "  War  Diary  of  the  4th  Army,"  handed 
over  to  the  Great  General  Staff,  and  which  was  drawn  up  and 
edited  with  the  greatest  care  at  Headquarters. 

On  the  day  of  my  arrival  at  Damascus,  Mersinli  Djemal  Pasha, 
the  G.O.C.  8th  Corps,  came  to  meet  me  at  Rayak  and  handed  me 
a  bundle  of  documents.  These  contained  the  detailed  plan  for  the 
operations  of  his  corps,  which  had  been  selected  for  the  attack 
on  the  Suez  Canal,  and  a  copy  of  all  the  orders,  statistics  and  plans 
concerning  the  work  which  was  to  be  done,  as  well  as  that  which 
had  been  done  already.  His  Chief  of  Staff,  von  Kress,  gave 
Colonel  von  Frankenberg,  my  Chief  of  Staff,  a  German  copy  of 
the  same  document.  My  first  act  on  reaching  Damascus,  where 
I  had  made  my  headquarters  in  the  "  Damascus  Palace  Hotel/' 
was  to  study  these  documents  in  the  most  thorough  fashion. 

In  a  few  words,  the  plan  of  operations  proposed  by  the  8th 
Army  Corps  was  as  follows:  "For  the  operation  against  the 
Canal  the  25th  Division  shall  be  used,  in  addition  to  a  regiment 
composed  of  officers  and  men  selected  from  the  two  other  divisions 
forming  the  Army  Corps. 

'  The  rest  of  the  8th  Corps  is  to  be  distributed  on  the  lines  of 
communication  for  protective  duties  and  to  watch  the  Lebanon 
and  the  coast  region. 

*47  K2 


148  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

'  The  8th  and  loth  Divisions,  which  are  to  be  expressly  sent 
from  Constantinople  for  the  Egyptian  campaign,  will  be  employed 
as  the  Army  Commander  thinks  fit,  partly  for  the  Suez  Canal 
expedition  and  partly  for  guard  duties  in  the  interior. 

'  In  any  case,  no  large  force  is  to  be  engaged  in  this  operation. " 

In  view  of  the  physical  conformation  of  the  Sinai  Desert,  where 
the  operation  was  to  be  carried  out,  the  basis  of  this  plan  was 
entirely  sound. 

When  I  arrived  in  Syria  the  general  situation  was  as  follows  : 

The  detachment  of  Beduin  volunteers  under  the  command  of 
Major  Muntaz  Bey  had  seized  El-Arish  and  fortified  itself  there. 

A  detachment  of  volunteers  under  the  command  of  Ismirli 
Escref  Bey  and  belonging  to  the  "  teasckilat  Mahsussa"  (Special 
Organisation)  had  occupied  the  Kalaat-ul-Nahl  in  the  centre  of  the 
Sinai  Desert. 

An  infantry  detachment  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Mussa 
Kiasim  Bey  was  in  Akaba,  while  a  regiment  of  the  27'ch  Division 
quartered  at  Beersheba  served  as  support  to  all  the  forces  in  the 
desert. 

The  whole  of  the  25th  Division,  under  the  command  of  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Ali  Fuad  Bey,  of  the  General  Staff,  was  at 
Damascus  and  training  most  diligently. 

In  view  of  the  conformation  of  the  Sinai  Desert,  the  8th  Corps 
had  very  properly  realised  that  it  was  necessary  to  institute  a 
lines-of-communication  organisation,  proceeding  from  the  rear  to 
the  front,  before  marching  orders  were  given  to  the  army,  or 
rather  the  Expeditionary  Force.  Behdjet  Bey,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
in  the  General  Staff  and  Commander  of  the  23rd  Division,  was 
placed  in  charge  of  the  organisation,  which  took  the  name  of  the 
"  Desert  L.  of  C.  Inspectorate/' 

I  shall  always  think  with  affectionate  respect  of  Behdjet  Bey, 
who  displayed  invaluable  industry  in  the  great  desert  both  during 
the  first  Suez  Canal  campaign  and  in  the  preparations  for  the 
second. 

It  was  the  business  of  his  inspector  to  decide  on  the  L.  of  C. 
depots  (to  be  not  more 'than  twenty-five  to  thirty  kilometres  apart) 
on  a  line  connecting  Beersheba  with  Ismaila,  on  the  Canal.  He 
had  to  provide  these  points  with  water,  to  send  forward  in  accord- 
ance with  orders  the  supplies  which  were  previously  to  be  stored 


Expedition  against  the  Suez  Canal  149 

at  Beersheba,  to  fix  up  a  hospital  at  every  depot — in  short,  to 
undertake  everything  in  the  way  of  preparation  which  the  establish- 
ment of  a  L.  of  C.  organisation  on  that  line  required.  Kalaat-ul- 
Nahl  and  El-Arish  were  to  serve  as  the  two  headquarters  of  the  L. 
of  C.  Inspectorate.  From  these  two  points  food  and  all  other 
things  required  were  to  be  supplied  to  the  forces,  which  were  to 
concentrate  there  and  proceed  against  the  Canal. 

The  8th  Corps  proposed  to  concentrate  the  bulk  of  the  Expedi- 
tionary Force  at  Beersheba  and  advance  on  Ismaila  by  the  line    J 
Wadi  el  Arish-Ibin-Djefdjafe,  i.e.,  as  far  from  the  coast  as  possible. 
The  flanks  were  to  be  covered  by  smaller  bodies  from  El-Arish  and/ 
Kalaat-ul-Nahl. 

This  scheme  was  very  sound.  Our  main  line  of  communication 
must  be  so  far  from  the  sea  that  the  English  could  not  harass  it 
with  their  naval  guns  or  destroy  it  altogether  by  small-scale 
landings,  of  no  importance  in  themselves,  to  which  they  might  find 
themselves  occasionally  compelled. 

Accordingly  von  Kress  personally  selected  as  L.  of  C.  depots 
Beersheba,  El  Halassa,  El-Hafir,  Wadi -el-Arish,  Ibin,  Birindji-el- 
Hubra,  Djefdjafe,  and  Ikindji-el-Hubra.  At  each  of  these  places 
he  had  artesian  wells  sunk,  dykes  constructed,  in  view  of  the  rain- 
storms to  be  expected  in  December  and  January,  and  all  other 
arrangements  made  for  the  necessities  of  a  line  of  communication 

The  8th  Corps  reported  that  as  the  supply  of  food  for  officers 
and  men  right  through  the  desert  to  the  Canal  was  impossible,  we 
must  adopt  a  new  system  and  call  it  the  "desert  ration/*  It  was 
based  on  a  list  of  comestibles,  the  weight  of  which  was  not  to 
exceed  one  kilogram  per  man,  and  comprised  biscuits,  dates,  and 
olives.  As  regards  water,  no  man  must  carry  more  than  contents 
of  a  gourd. 

As  a  result  of  careful  calculation  on  the  basis  of  these  allow- 
ances, we  came  to  the  conclusion  that  if  we  wanted  to  send  the 
loth  Division  and  25th  Division  and  a  few  volunteer  detachments 
we  should  require  11,000  camels  to  carry  the  food  and  water,  in 
addition  to  the  light  and  heavy  transport  of  the  troops.  But  even 
with  the  help  of  this  organisation,  on  crossing  the  Canal  it  would 
be  necessary  for  the  Expeditionary  Force  within  four  days  either 
to  drive  the  English  troops  from  the  far  bank  and  securely  dig  itself 
in,  or  else  to  retreat,  as  the  fresh  water  collected  at  Ikindji-el- 


150  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Hubra — fifty  kilometres  from  the  Canal — would  last  scarcely  ten 
days,  and  after  it  had  been  used  up  the  force  would  be  doomed  to 
distress  worse  than  that  of  the  children  of  Israel. 

Nor  was  there  any  chance  of  concentrating  the  Expeditionary 
Force  at  Beersheba  and  sending  it  to  the  Canal  in  one  solid  body, 
for  it  was  quite  out  of  the  question  to  convey  water  and  food  for 
so  many  men  by  -means!  of  the  camels  forming  the  transport 
columns. 

Thus  the  battalions  and  batteries  would  have  to  march  through 
the  desert  at  one-day  intervals,  and  the  corps  had  to  concentrate 
ultimately  at  a  point  twenty  to  thirty  kilometres  from  the  Canal, 
and  from  there  direct  their  attack  on  the  point  selected. 

The  8th  Corps  proposed  that  the  Expeditionary  Force  should  be 
composed  of  the  following  formations,  distributed  in  two  echelons  : 

FIRST  ECHELON. — The  25th  Infantry  Division,  a  regiment  con- 
sisting of  men  from  the  23rd  and  27th  Divisions,  five  field 
gun  batteries,  two  mountain  gun  batteries,  a  15  cm.  field 
howitzer  battery,  one  cavalry  regiment,  four  squadrons  of 
the  Camel  Corps,  a  contingent  of  1,500  mounted  Arab 
volunteers,  enough  pontoons  to  allow  three  battalions  to 
cross  simultaneously,  six  engineer  companies,  a  telegraph 
section,  field  hospitals,  medical  units,  &c.,  a  total  of  12,642 
men,  968  horses,  12,000  camels,  328  oxen. 

SECOND  ECHELON. — The  loth  Infantry  Division  with  its  artillery, 
cavalry  squadron,  and  other  auxiliary  units. 

When  I  arrived  in  Damascus  I  received  from  the  Deputy  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  a  telegram,  in  which  he  placed  the  Hedjaz 
Division  at  the  disposal  of  the  Commander  of  the  Fourth  Army,  to 
be  assigned  to  the  Canal  Expedition  or  employed  locally,  as  I 
thought  fit.  I  therefore  wrote  to  Colonel  Wehib  Bey,  Military 
Governor  and  Vali  of  the  Hedjaz,  asking  him  to  come  to  Maan 
with  detachments  of  regulars  and  volunteers.  These  troops,  under 
Wehib  Bey,  were  then  to  be  attached  to  the  second  echelon. 

As  the  11,000  camels  mentioned  above  were  assigned  exclusively 
to  the  25th  and  loth  Divisions  and  the  various  formations  attached 
to  that  force,  the  camels  for  the  Hedjaz  Division  coming  to  join  the 
Expeditionary  Force  had  to  be  brought  from  the  Hedjaz  by  that 
division  itself. 


Expedition  against  the  Suez  Canal  151 

Although  in  their  official  reports  the  English  have  estimated  the 
strength  of  the  force  engaged  in  the  first  Canal  expedition  at 
40,000  men,  the  fact  is  that  this  force,  including  the  contingent 
from  the  Hedjaz  and  the  loth  Division,  never  exceeded  a  strength 
of  25,000. 

The  first  echelon  was  to  be  under  the  command  of  Djemal 
Pasha,  the  Commander  of  the  8th  Corps,  while  the  second  echelon 
was  attached  to  Army  Headquarters. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  the  armies  in  the  desert,  Palestine, 
and  the  interior  of  Syria  at  the  time  of  my  arrival  in  Damascus,  and 
so  far  had  the  preparations  of  the  Commander  of  the  8th  Corps  for 
the  expedition  against  the  Canal  progressed.  In  view  of  the  diffi- 
culties which  the  L.  of  C.  Inspectorate  organised  in  Damascus  had 
met  with  in  looking  after  so  long  a  line  of  communications,  the 
8th  Corps  had  also  proposed,  inter  alia,  that  an  independent  L.  of  C. 
Inspectorate  should  be  established  in  Jerusalem,  primarily  to  collect 
supplies  in  Palestine  and  forward  them  to  the  army. 

With  certain  quite  slight  modifications,  I  adopted  all  these 
suggestions. 

The  Commander  of  the  8th  Corps  now  came  to  me  in  great 
distress  to  tell  me  that  he  had  not  yet  succeeded  in  procuring  the 
camels  required  for  the  campaign,  and  did  not  see  any  chance  of 
doing  so.  He  drew  the  special  attention  of  the  Army  Commander 
to  this  point. 

True  enough,  this  Corps  had  found  itself  beset  with  difficulties 
innumerable  on  all  sides,  and  in  three  months  it  had  been  able  to 
secure  only  two  thousand  of  the  eleven  thousand  camels  required. 
It  must  certainly  come  as  a  shock  to  very  many  people  that  in 
regions  such  as  Syria  and  the  Hedjaz  ten  to  fifteen  thousand  camels 
could  not  be  obtained,  seeing  that  hundreds  of  thousands,  or  rather 
millions,  of  these  animals  are  to  be  found  there.  But  not  all  camels 
can  carry  burdens. 

I  do  not  wish  to  say  anything  more  than  is  absolutely  necessary 
on  a  matter  which  will  be  discussed  in  detail  when  the  history  of  the 
4th  Army  comes  to  be  written.  I  will  merely  remark  that  I  alone 
knew  the  greatness  of  the  difficulties  I  had  to  overcome  to  procure 
within  a  month  fourteen  thousand  camels,  including  reserves.  Yet 
I  ultimately  succeeded,  and  the  number  of  camels  provided  for  in 
the  8th  Corps'  plan  of  campaign  was  reached  by  the  appointed  date. 


152  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

The  troubles  I  had  to  face  will  be  realised  when  I  say  that  at 
this  time  Ibn  Sunud  brought  me  camels  from  the  far  depths  of 
the  Nedjed. 

The  great  problem,  on  which  everything  hangs  in  these 
difficult  military  operations  in  the  Desert  of  Sinai,  is  the  question 
of  water. 

In  any  other  than  the  rainy  season  it  would  be  impossible  to 
attempt  to  cross  this  waste  with  an  expeditionary  force  of  approxi- 
mately 25,000  men.  Even  a  force  of  only  10,000  men  could  not  be 
brought  through.  As  the  rainy  season  in  this  desert  comprises  the 
months  of  December  and  January  only,  it  was  necessary  to 
conclude  the  operation  in  these  two  months  or  postpone  it  to  the 
same  season  in  the  next  year. 

General  Headquarters  was  very  insistent  that  the  expedition 
should  be  carried  through  this  year,  and  I  therefore  decided,  after 
hearing  the  verbal  reports  of  the  Commander  of  the  8th  Corps  and 
the  Chief  of  Staff,  to  press  on  the  preparations  and  put  the  scheme 
into  execution.  At  the  end  of  December  I  began  to  concentrate 
the  first  echelon  of  the  Expeditionary  Force  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Beersheba. 

Meanwhile,  the  loth  Division  had  completed  its  concentration 
in  the  town  of  Zahle  in  the  Lebanon.  I  inspected  it  there,  and 
after  issuing  to  its  Commander,  who  was  under  the  direct  orders 
of  Army  Headquarters,  his  instructions  for  its  march  to  Jerusalem 
and  Beersheba,  I  transferred  my  headquarters  to  Jerusalem. 

At  this  time  I  had  begun  to  correspond  with  the  Sherif  of 
Mecca,  Emir  Hussein  Pasha,  and  I  asked  him  to  send  the 
Commander  of  the  Hedjaz  Division  an  auxiliary  force  under  the 
command  of  one  of  his  sons,  or  to  take  command  in  person 
and  join  the  Army. 

The  Sherif  replied  very  courteously  to  my  first  communication 
and  informed  me  that  he  would  send  his  son  AH  Bey  to  accompany 
the  Vali  of  the  Hedjaz,  Wehib  Bey.  Ali  Bey  did,  in  fact,  leave 
Mecca  with  Wehib  Bey's  troops,  but  when  he  reached  Medina  he 
declared  that  in  accordance  with  his  father's  orders  he  could 
accompany  Wehib  Bey  no  further.  He  remained  in  Medina  and 
began  to  interfere  with  the  functions  of  the  Commandant,  Basri 
Pasha. 

In  conformity  with  the  plan  of  campaign,  the  first  echelon  of  the 


Expedition  against  the  Suez  Canal  153 

Expeditionary  Force  began  its  march  to  the  Canal  on  January 
I4th.  Army  Headquarters  left  Beersheba  on  January  I5th  and 
pressed  on  behind  the  main  body. 

About  the  close  of  the  twentieth  day  after  the  advance  guard 
had  left  Beersheba  the  centre  column  of  the  first  echelon  had 
reached  in  full  strength  a  point  about  eleven  kilometers  from  the 
Canal.  The  right  wing  column,  which  had  marched  from  El-Arish 
in  the  direction  of  Katia,  arrived  before  Kantara,  and  the  left  wing, 
which  had  come  from  Akaba  through  Kalat-ul-Nahl,  was  before 
Suez. 

The  leading  units  of  the  loth  Division,  which  formed  the  second 
echelon,  reached  the  L.  of  C.  depot  at  Ikindji-el-Hulbra,  and  the 
Hedjaz  force,  under  the  command  of  Wehib  Bey,  had  arrived  at 
Kalat-ul-Nahl  after  marching  from  Mecca  to  Medina  and  travelling 
thence  by  rail  to  Maan. 

The  efforts  and  heroism  of  the  Ottoman  troops,  both  officers 
and  men,  who  took  part  in  the  first  Canal  Expedition  were 
wonderful  and  above  all  praise.  I  can  have  no  greater  duty  than 
to  offer  a  respectful  tribute  to  these  heroes  who  accomplished  their 
march,  though  subject  to  privations  innumerable,  and  dragged 
their  guns  and,  above  all,  their  pontoons  (all  that  was  available 
for  crossing  the  canal)  through  a  sea  of  sand.  In  this  force, 
composed  of  men  of  Arab  and  Turkish  stock,  a  fine  feeling  of 
brotherly  affection  prevailed,  and  not  a  man  hesitated  to  sacrifice 
himself  for  his  comrades.  This  first  campaign  against  the  Canal 
was  a  brilliant  revelation  of  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the 
Arabs  stood  by  the  Khalifate  with  heart  and  soul. 

The  Arabs  who  composed  the  entire  25th  Division  and  the  whole 
of  the  L.  of  C.  organisation  did  their  duty  with  the  greatest  zeal 
and  devotion.  For  that  reason  nothing  can  assuage  my  feelings 
of  bitterness  and  resentment  against  Sherif  Hussein,  who  subse- 
quently sowed  the  seeds  of  discord  in  that  unity  of  thought  and 
sentiment.  During  this  campaign,  while  we  marched  at  night  and 
only  by  moonlight,  my  heart  was  filled  with  a  deep  melancholy, 
mingled  with  a  great  hope  of  success,  at  the  sound  of  the  song, 
11  The  Red  Flag  Flies  over  Cairo/'  to  the  accompaniment  of  which 
the  advancing  battalions  forged  ahead  over  the  endless  waste  of 
desert,  feebly  illuminated  by  the  pale  gleam  of  the  waxing  moon. 

It  may  well  be  believed  that  this  army,  in  which  no  one  from  the 


154  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Commander-in-Chief  down  to  the  humblest  private  was  allowed 
more  than  650  grammes  of  biscuit  and  a  few  dates  and  olives,  and 
every  man  had  to  keep  his  consumption  of  water  down  to  bare 
necessity,  was  borne  along  by  glowing  hopes  as  it  approached  its 
goal.  Everyone  was  absolutely  convinced  that  the  Canal  would 
certainly  be  crossed,  that  we  should  dig  ourselves  in  securely  on 
the  further  bank,  and  that  the  Egyptian  patriots  would  then  rise 
and  attack  the  English  in  the  rear. 

Although  I,  personally,  was  not  so  sure  of  the  ultimate  success 
of  this  campaign,  for  I  knew  to  what  a  pitch  of  perfection  the 
English  had  brought  their  Canal  defences,  I  used  to  talk  to  the 
troops  every  night  about  the  victory  in  store,  and  what  a  glorious 
victory  it  would  be.  I  wanted  to  keep  the  sacred  flame  alive  in 
the  whole  force. 

After  the  force  had  completed  its  concentration — both  as  regards 
the  main  body  and  the  two  detachments  forming  the  right  and  left 
wings — in  the  region  above-mentioned,  I  decided  in  the  night  of 
January  20th/2ist  (February  2nd/3rd)  upon  a  surprise  attack  on 
Ismaila  with  the  centre  column.  The  right  column  would 
simultaneously  make  a  demonstration  against  Kantara,  while  the 
left  column  was  to  march  on  Suez. 

It  was  hardly  dark  before  the  troops  to  be  employed  in  the 
attack  began  to  approach  the  point  from  which  they  were  to  cross 
the  Canal,  and  shortly  after  sunrise  the  crossing  itself  commenced. 
I  had  staked  everything  upon  surprising  the  English  and  being 
able  to  hold  the  stretch  of  the  Canal  south  of  Ismaila  with  five  or 
six  thousand  men  at  the  first  rush,  so  that  I  could  bring  up  the 
loth  Division  and  have  a  force  of  twelve  thousand  rifles  securely 
dug  in  on  the  far  bank.  Then  Ismaila  was  to  be  taken,  if  possible, 
and  held  for  four  or  five  days  from  defensive  positions  facing  west, 
north,  and  south. 

Meanwhile,  the  march  of  the  8th  Division  was  to  be  accelerated, 
and  within  ten  days  the  number  of  men  in  Ismaila  was  to  be 
increased  to  20,000. 

During  this  time  I  hoped  that  the  Egyptian  patriots,  encouraged 
by  the  capture  of  Ismaila  by  the  Turkish  army,  would  rise 
en  masse,  and  Egypt  would  be  freed  in  an  unexpectedly  short  time 
by  the  employment  of  quite  a  small  force  and  insignificant  technical 
resources. 


Expedition  against  the  Suez  Canal  155 

According  to  the  information  in  the  possession  of  Army  Head- 
quarters the  enemy  had  a  force  of  about  35,000  men  along  the 
Canal,  and  another  150,000  and  more  distributed  in  Egypt.  But  as 
the  English  could  not  have  these  troops  available  at  all  the  points 
of  the  Canal — a  line  more  than  two  hundred  kilometres  in  length — 
it  was  possible  to  gain  a  success,  always  providing  that  we  could 
cross  the  Canal  by  surprise  at  some  point  where  the  enemy  was  not 
expecting  it. 

In  any  case,  I  contemplated  this  attack  solely  as  a  demonstra- 
tion, partly  in  order  to  make  the  English  realise  that  we  had  no 
idea  of  sitting  down  quietly  on  the  Canal,  and  partly  in  accordance 
with  our  design  of  tying  down  considerable  forces  in  Egypt. 
Otherwise  I  should  never  have  seriously  pretended  to  myself  that 
with  resources  which  did  not  permit  of  our  remaining  more  than 
four  days  on  the  Canal,  i.e.,  fourteen  thousand  rifles,  a  few 
mountain  gun  batteries,  a  single  howitzer  battery,  and  nothing  but 
ten  pontoons  with  which  to  cross  the  obstacle — we  could  have 
crossed  a  canal  at  least  a  hundred  metres  wide  defended  by  an  army 
so  mobile  and  brave  as  the  English  and  provided  with  every 
conceivable  means  of  defence  from  the  largest  warships  to 
armoured  trains.  Yet  notwithstanding  my  misgivings  I  managed 
to  inspire  my  staff  and  my  troops  with  such  confidence  that  no  one 
knew  that  this  first  attack  on  the  Canal  was  nothing  but  a 
demonstration,  and  not  a  man  hesitated  for  a  moment  to  make  any 
sacrifice  in  the  cause. 

If,  by  some  unanticipated  stroke  of  good  fortune,  this  enter- 
prise, which  to  me  was  nothing  but  a  demonstration  in  force,  had 
brought  us  success,  we  should  naturally  have  regarded  it  as  a  good 
o.ien  for  the  final  liberation  of  Islam  and  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

Unfortunately  there  was  some  slight  delay  in  the  approach  of 
the  attacking  force  to  the  Canal.  Morning  broke,  as  the  pontoons 
were  being  put  into  the  water  and  the  crossing  began,  so  that 
the  operation  took  place  under  the  eyes  of  the  English.  The 
defensive  measures  they  immediately  adopted  at  the  crossing  points 
destroyed  all  our  pontoons  except  three.  As  it  was  impossible  to 
send  reinforcements  to  the  six  hundred  heroes  we  had  succeeded 
in  getting  on  to  the  opposite  bank  at  the  very  outset,  they  were  all 
captured  by  the  English.  There  now  began  a  lively  duel  between 
the  English  armoured  vessels,  auxiliary  cruisers  and  armoured 


156  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

trains,  and  the  light  artillery  of  the  Expeditionary  Force.  By 
mid-day  we  had  destroyed  an  English  auxiliary  cruiser  by  the  fire 
of  our  howitzer  battery.  Meanwhile  both  regiments  of  the  loth 
Division  had  arrived  on  the  battlefield,  and  I  put  them  under  the 
orders  of  the  G.O.C.  8th  Corps. 

At  last  I  was  quite  clear  about  the  situation.  The  Expeditionary 
Force  had  carried  out  its  purpose  of  effecting  a  demonstration,  and 
I  was  convinced  that  there  was  no  chance  of  crossing  the  Canal 
and  seizing  Ismaila.  My  headquarters  was  on  a  hill  three  and  a 
half  kilometres  east  of  the  Canal,  and  the  battle  took  place  under 
my  eyes.  The  enemy,  whose  aircraft  had  enabled  him  to  discover 
the  whereabouts  of  Headquarters,  greeted  it  with  a  number  of 
9-2-inch  shells  from  his  warships. 

About  three  o'clock  I  sent  for  Djemal  Pasha,  the  Commander 
of  the  8th  Corps,  and  his  Chief  of  Staff,  von  Kress,  who  were 
seven  or  eight  hundred  metres  from  the  firing  line — i.e.,  the  eastern 
bank  of  the  Canal.  My  Chief  of  Staff  and  the  Director  of  the 
Operations  Section  at  Headquarters,  Major  AH  Fuad  Bey,  were 
with  me.  A  short  time  before  I  had  received  a  report  from  the 
G.O.C.  8th  Corps  informing  me  that  if  he  could  get  the  upper 
hand  with  his  artillery  fire  by  the  evening  he  would  make  an 
attempt  to  force  a  crossing  at  dawn  next  morning. 

Referring  to  this  report,  I  asked  von  Kress,  in  his  capacity  as 
Chief  of  Staff  to  the  Army  Corps,  to  give  me  his  opinion  on  the 
situation. 

After  explaining  the  general  position  to  me,  he  repeated  the 
proposal  put  forward  in  the  report  received  from  the  Corps 
Commander.  Djemal  Pasha  agreed  with  him.  I  said  to 
them : 

'  The  attempt  to  cross  the  Canal  a  second  time  is  dependent 
upon  the  resources  at  our  disposal,  and  according  to  the  reports 
you  have  sent  in  we  have  not  more  than  three  pontoons  left.  The 
proposal  to  swim  across  the  Canal  is  perfectly  hopeless.  How, 
then,  do  you  propose  to  carry  out  your  scheme  ?  ' 

Both  Djemal  Pasha  and  von  Kress  admitted  the  justice 
of  my  conclusion,  but  had  not  the  courage  to  issue  an  order  to 
the  force  to  retire.  It  was  easy  to  see  that  von  Kress,  who  had 
been  working  ceaselessly  on  the  preparations  for  the  expedition 
for  two  and  a  half  months  without  taking  a  day's  rest  and  regarded 


Expedition  against  the  Suez  Canal  157 

this  campaign  as  his  life's  purpose,  was  in  utter  despair  at  the 
apparent  failure,  and  considered  death  the  only  remedy. 

"  Your  Excellency!  "  he  replied,  "  in  my  view  it  is  now  the 
duty  of  the  Expeditionary  Force  to  die  to  a  man  on  the  Canal !  " 

I  answered  him  very  quietly : 

"  I  didn't  call  you  here  to  hold  a  council  of  war  and  share  the 
responsibility  for  my  decisions  with  you.  I  shall  never  allow 
anyone  but  myself  to  shoulder  the  responsibility  for  the  orders  I 
give  in  my  capacity  as  Commander-in-Chief ! 

"  My  object  in  summoning  you  was  to  get  information  as  to 
the  general  condition  of  the  troops  in  the  front  line  and  the  state 
of  the  technical  resources  at  our  disposal.  I  gather  from  what 
you  say  that  there  is  nothing  more  to  be  done.  If  we  stay  another 
day  by  the  Canal  the  Expeditionary  Force  will  be  entirely 
destroyed.  This  force  represents  all  that  is  available  to  the 
Ottoman  Empire  in  an  emergency  for  the  defence  of  Syria  and 
Palestine.  I  have  no  higher  duty  than  to  preserve  this  force  from 
danger,  and  put  it  to  the  best  uses  until  the  end  of  the  war.  So 
I  think  it  is  preferable  to  hold  our  positions  until  evening,  keeping 
up  the  artillery  duel  with  the  enemy,  and  then  utilise  the  darkness 
to  withdraw  the  troops  to  the  lines  they  left  yesterday  evening. 
From  there  we  can  march  slowly  back  to  Beersheba.  I  want 
von  Frankenberg  Bey  to  draw  up  the  daily  Army  Orders  on  that 
footing!  " 

Djemal  Pasha,  von  Kress,  and  von  Frankenberg  were 
entirely  convinced  that  my  decision  was  the  only  logical  one  and 
such  as  the  general  situation  required.  Just  at  this  moment,  as 
if  the  enemy  had  suspected  that  we  were  engaged  in  an  important 
discussion,  he  began  to  rain  shells  right  and  left  of  our  little 
group,  compelling  us  to  change  our  position.  But  ultimately  I 
signed  the  Army  Order  AH  Fuad  Bey  had  drawn  up.  Djemal 
Pasha  and  von  Kress  returned  to  the  front  line,  and  we  remained 
at  Headquarters  until  the  evening. 

It  was  necessary  to  take  appropriate  steps  to  prevent  this 
failure  from  having  a  bad  effect  on  the  troops.  I  therefore 
issued  an  Order  of  the  Day,  in  which  I  announced  that 
all  the  troops  had  done  their  duty  worthily  and  patriotically. 
The  object  of  our  enterprise  had  been  to  carry  out  an  9ffensive 
reconnaissance  against  the  Canal  with  a  view  to  finding  out  the 


158  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

resources  at  the  enemy's  disposal,  and  also  the  resources  we 
ourselves  should  require  to  effect  a  crossing  of  the  Canal.  As 
our  purpose  had  been  completely  attained,  it  was  now  advisable 
to  retire  in  order  to  procure  better  material  resources  rather  than 
expose  ourselves  to  unnecessary  losses.  Honour  required  that  the 
same  spirit  of  self-sacrifice  and  devotion  which  had  marked  the 
advance  should  be  displayed  in  the  retreat,  so  that  we  should  not 
suffer  any  loss  whatever  in  materiel. 

Army  Headquarters,  which  had  left  Beersheba  on  January  i5th, 
I9I5)  was  back  there  again  exactly  a  month  later,  February  i5th. 

As  the  telegraph  could  not  be  carried  beyond  the  L.  of  C. 
depot  at  Ibin  (halfway  between  the  Canal  and  Beersheba)  General 
Headquarters  had  had  no  news  at  all  from  me  for  a  week,  and 
was  in  a  state  of  great  agitation.  I  learned  subsequently  that 
the  Director  of  Army  Telegraphs  (engaged  in  erecting  the  lines 
in  the  desert),  to  whom  some  idiot  had  reported  the  mendacious 
news  of  the  capture  of  Ismaila,  had  hurried  on  his  job  and  sent 
the  report  on  to  Constantinople.  The  result  was  that  when  the 
truth  came  through  it  produced  the  worst  possible  effect.  Happily 
the  statements  published  broadcast  by  Headquarters  to  the  effect 
that  the  main  purpose  had  been  merely  an  offensive  reconnaissance 
succeeded  more  or  less  in  effacing  that  impression. 

To  tell  the  truth,  when  we  contemplated  this  first  expedition, 
not  a  man  knew  how  the  Canal  was  to  be  crossed.  It  was  really 
necessary  to  carry  out  some  such  reconnaissance.  What  material 
resources  would  be  required  to  effect  the  crossing  of  the  Canal, 
which  was  safe  in  every  respect  against  attack  ?  Was  it  possible 
to  attempt  the  crossing  under  observation  from  the  enemy's 
warships  ?  Was  it  not  possible  to  destroy  the  Canal  ?  And  even 
if  the  crossing  itself  failed,  and  it  should  prove  impossible  to 
secure  a  hold  on  the  Canal,  could  we  not  perhaps  entrench 
ourselves  firmly  on  the  eastern  bank,  and  from  there  harass  the 
passage  of  warships  and  merchant  vessels  with  long  range 
guns?  Might  not  that  be  our  best  plan?  These  were  real 
problems,  the  answer  to  which  necessitated  a  reconnaissance  in 
force. 

Thanks  to  our  reconnaissance,  we  obtained  full  knowledge  of 
the  situation,  and  it  was  in  expectation  of  the  sequel  to  our  attempt 
that  the  English  postponed  their  attack  on  the  Dardanelles,  and 


Expedition  against  the  Suez  Canal  159 

found  themselves  compelled  to  retain  not  less  than  two  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  men  permanently  in  Egypt. 

It  is  obvious  from  these  remarks  that  the  efforts  which  the 
first  expedition  against  the  Canal  had  cost  had  not  been  in  vain, 
because  we  had  attained  the  object  we  had  in  view. 

During  our  retreat  from  the  Canal  I  had  given  Major  AH  Fuad 
Bey  as  a  basis  for  his  report  the  number  of  men  and  the  nature 
of  the  artillery  and  other  materiel  we  should  require  to  carry 
through  a  successful  expedition  against  the  Canal.  I  told  him  to 
draw  up  a  detailed  report  on  that  foundation. 

During  the  four  or  five  days  I  spent  at  Ibin  in  witnessing  the 
march  past  of  the  troops  Ali  Fuad  Bey  finished  his  report  and 
gave  it  to  me  after  revising  it  with  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  obtaining 
his  concurrence.  I  much  regret  that  I  do  not  now  possess  this 
report,  which  I  approved  after  making  a  few  small  changes.  I 
should  like  to  make  it  known.  Could  I  do  so  the  English  General 
Staff  would  see  what  useful  knowledge  this  offensive  reconnaissance 
brought  us  and  it  would  be  overcome  by  a  feeling  of  shame 
to  think  that  our  heroes  in  English  captivity  should  have  been 
dragged  through  the  streets  of  Cairo,  and  that  the  English 
newspapers  spoke  of  our  army  in  anything  but  good  taste. 

But  when  I  get  back  to  Constantinople,  if  God  wills,  I  will 
make  it  my  business  to  fill  up  these  gaps  in  my  work. 

I  give  our  casualty  list  in  the  first  Canal  Expedition  : 

Dead,    Wounded.  Missing. 

Officers      14  15  15 

Men        178  366  712 

In  their  official  reports  the  English  gave  our  losses  as  follows : 

1,000  Dead.      2,000  Wounded.      650  Prisoners. 
Comparing  our  real  losses  with  the  inaccurate  figures  given  by 
the  English,  it  is  easy  to  realise  the  exaggeration  in  their  reports. 


THE  DESERT  FORCE 


CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  DESERT  FORCE. 

ON  my  return  from  the  Canal  I  had  carefully  decided  upon 
everything  that  was  to  be  done  in  the  desert,  and  had  also 
considered  how  my  plans  were  to  be  carried  out.  The  work  which 
a  decisive  campaign  involved  was  simply  and  solely  the  organisation 
of  the  lines  of  communication.  However  well  planned  the  lines  of 
communication  organisation  might  be,  if  its  depots  were  not  linked 
together  by  a  safe  road  there  would  be  no  possibility  of  keeping 
it  in  being  for  long  or  leading  a  considerable  army  to  the  Canal. 
One  of  the  first  questions  which  I  took  up  was  the  construction  of 
a  road  connecting  Beersheba  and  all  the  L.  of  C.  bases  in  the 
direction  of  Ismaila,  and  thus  permitting  the  transport  of  all  kinds 
of  wagons  and  cars.  I  also  considered  the  construction  of 
a  railway  to  run  parallel  with  this  road. 

It  was  also  necessary  to  sink  wells  at  each  L.  of  C.  base,  and 
erect  all  kinds  of  buildings,  such  as  hospitals,  depots,  and  so  forth. 
To  be  able  to  start  on  the  construction  of  these  buildings  it  was 
essential  to  have  forty  to  fifty  thousand  labour  men  at  work  in  the 
desert.  But  if  we  left  these  working  posts  unguarded  they  would 
unquestionably  be  harassed  the  whole  time  by  the  bold  and  highly 
mobile  cavalry  and  camelry  of  the  English.  Thus  it  was  necessary 
effectively  to  fortify  the  desert. 

I  therefore  decided  to  create  a  "  Desert  Force  Headquarters  " 
which  was  to  be  directly  responsible  to  Army  Headquarters,  and 
have  under  its  orders  all  troops  which  were  garrisoning  the  various 
desert  bases.  I  proposed  von  Kress  Bey  for  this  post. 

Von  Kress,  who  regarded  the  Canal  Expedition  as  the  object  of 

163  L2 


164  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

his  life,  and  the  tussle  with  the  difficulties  of  the  desert  as 
compensation,  accepted  my  proposal  without  hesitation.  In  this 
way  two  quite  independent  organisations  came  into  being  in  the 
desert.  One,  the  "  Desert  L.  of  C.  Inspectorate,"  had  to  arrange 
for  the  establishment  of  bases  and  connecting  roads;  the  other, 
the  "  G.H.Q.  Desert  Force/'  had  to  protect  these  works  from 
attack  by  the  enemy,  and  keep  au  courant  of  his  activities  by  making 
reconnaissances  to  the  Canal  from  time  to  time. 

The  headquarters  of  the  Desert  Force  were,  for  the  time  being, 
to  be  at  Ibin,  and  its  main  detachments  at  Ibin,  El-Arish  and 
Kalaat-ul-Nahl.  Beersheba  was  decided  upon  as  headquarters 
for  the  Desert  L.  of  C.  Inspectorate.  After  issuing  the  necessary 
instructions  for  the  establishment  of  these  institutions,  I  returned 
to  Beersheba  and  from  there  to  Jerusalem. 

Two  or  three  days  later,  when  the  iSth  and  loth  Divisions  had 
assembled  at  Beersheba,  I  invited  a  number  of  distinguished  people 
from  Jerusalem,  including  the  Consuls  of  neutral  and  allied  Powers, 
to  come  and  see  that  my  troops  had  been  able  to  cross  the  desert 
and  reach  the  Canal  without  the  slightest  accident,  fight  a  battle 
there,  and  return  in  fine  fettle  to  Beersheba,  where  I  held  a  review. 
The  Italian  Consul  was  among  the  guests,  as  at  that  time  Italy 
was  not  yet  in  the  ranks  of  the  combatants. 

I  can  say  with  pride  that  the  troops  returning  from  this  first 
two  months'  expedition  against  the  Canal  had  not  left  a  single 
straggler  behind  in  the  desert.  Not  a  man  was  missing  save  those 
who  had  fallen  in  battle  at  the  Canal,  or  into  the  hands  of  the 
English  on  the  far  bank.  Not  a  man  showed  any  signs  of  having 
suffered  from  hunger  or  thirst.  The  supply  columns  did  their 
duty  so  conscientiously  that  not  a  column  had  reached  its  destina- 
tion at  other  than  scheduled  time.  But  the  most  important  point 
of  all  was  that  among  the  Arabs  from  Syria  and  Palestine,  of  which 
the  supply  columns  were  exclusively  composed,  not  a  single  case 
of  desertion  or  treachery  had  been  observed. 

After  I  had  organised  the  Desert  Force  and  L.  of  C.,  I  dis- 
tributed the  command  within  the  extensive  army  zone  as  follows : 

I  called  Palestine,  comprising  the  Sanjak  of  Jerusalem  and  the 
Sanjak  of  Akka,  the  "  Jerusalem  zone/'  and  entrusted  the  com- 
mand to  Djemal  Pasha,  G.O.C.  8th  Corps. 


The  Desert  Force  165 

The  Kazas  (regions)  of  Beersheba  and  Gaza  were  not  part  of 
that  zone,  and  were  to  be  in  the  sphere  of  command  of  the  Desert 
L.  of  C. 

To  Fahri  Pasha,  G.O.C.  I3th  Corps,  I  gave  the  command  of 
the  zone  composed  of  the  central  and  northern  part  of  the  vilayet 
of  Beirut  and  the  vilayets  of  Syria,  Aleppo  and  Adana.  He  received 
the  title  of  "  G.O.C.  (interim)  4th  Army."  Then  I  transferred 
my  headquarters  to  Jerusalem  and  decided  to  occupy  myself  solely 
with  the  preparations  for  the  second  campaign  against  the  Canal. 

The  8th  and  loth  Divisions  were  incorporated  direct  in  the  army. 
Such  was  the  general  situation  of  the  4th  Army  at  the  end  of 
February,  1915. 

I  gave  Von  Frankenberg,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army,  a  careful 
plan  I  had  drawn  up,  dealing  with  the  troops — striking  force  and 
reserves,  the  materiel,  the  quantity  and  natures  of  the  ammunitioa 
required  for  the  second  Canal  Expedition,  and  sent  him  to  Con- 
stantinople. The  Turkish  General  Staff  accepted  my  plan  in  its 
entirety,  but  when  I  demanded  for  this  important  campaign  a 
number  of  artillery  formations  and  German  specialist  troops,  they 
sent  it  on  by  Frankenberg  to  the  German  General  Staff  with  a  view 
to  obtaining  the  sanction  of  the  latter.  The  then  German  General 
Staff  did  not  attach  to  this  matter  the  importance  that  it  deserved 
and  procrastinated  unnecessarily. 

After  I  transferred  my  headquarters  to  Jerusalem,  I  made  it  my 
special  business  to  compel  the  Arab  leaders,  such  as  Sherif  Hussein 
Pasha,  the  Emir  of  Mecca,  Ibn-el-Reschid  and  Ibn-el-Sunud,  to 
render  the  armies  of  the  Khalifate  some  real  service.  I  got  into 
communication  with  each  of  them.  When  I  publish  the  answers 
I  received  from  Sherif  Hussein  in  the  course  of  this  correspond- 
ence, the  whole  world  of  Islam  will  see  well  enough  what  a  double- 
faced  role  that  gentleman  played. 

The  Emir  Ibn-el-Sunud  could  not  give  us  any  direct  assistance 
as  he  was  too  near  the  English,  who  could  do  him  enormous  harm. 
But  he  made  himself  very  useful  to  us  by  sending  camels  to  the 
army  and  permitting  the  export  of  merchandise  from  his  country 
to  Syria.  As  for  the  Emir  Ibn-el-Reschid,  right  to  the  end  of  the 
war  he  proved  that  he  was  a  true  Mohammedan  and  intensely 
devoted  to  the  Khalifate.  I  shall  deal  with  the  plots  of  Sherif 
Hussein  later  on. 


1 66  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

It  was  about  this  time  that  I  sent  Nuri  Bey,  Enver  Pasha'o 
brother  who  had  come  from  Constantinople,  to  Tripolis  on  a 
smuggler's  boat  from  Beirut. 

I  should  add  here  that  I  had  sent  the  force  which  I  had  fetched 
from  Mecca,  under  the  command  of  Dehib  Bey,  to  a  point  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  Suez.  When  I  decided  on  the  retreat,  I  had 
withdrawn  these  troops  to  Maan,  and  as  Dehib  Bey  had  just  been 
appointed  Commander  of  the  2nd  Army  and  had  left  for  Con- 
stantinople, I  sent  his  force  back  to  Mecca  under  the  command 
of  Nedjib  Bey. 

If  I  give  all  these  details,  it  is  only  because  I  want  to  reply 
to  the  fools  who  would  like  to  ascribe  Sherif  Hussein's  re- 
bellion to  the  fact  that  I  had  unnecessarily  denuded  Mecca  of  its 
garrison. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  the  Allied  fleets  had  been  driven 
off  with  loss  in  their  attempt  to  force  the  Dardanelles.  I  sent 
Enver  Pasha  a  letter  in  which  I  set  forth  the  reasons  why  I  con- 
sidered that  it  was  impossible  for  the  hostile  fleet  to  pass  through 
the  Straits.  I  think  Talaat  Bey  also  shared  my  view.  My  object 
in  sending  my  friends  this  communication  was  to  confirm  them  in 
their  opinion  and  give  them  moral  support.  I  am  certain  that  at 
that  time  everyone  in  Constantinople  was  expecting  to  see  the 
enemy's  fleet  off  the  Seraglio  one  fine  morning.  That  frame  of 
mind  might  have  had  its  effect  on  the  confidence  and  convictions 
of  my  colleagues,  and  as  the  mischief  to  be  anticipated  was  simply 
incalculable,  I  sent  my  friends  my  views  as  those  of  a  colleague 
who  can  see  and  judge  the  general  situation  from  afar.  Enver 
Pasha  told  me  afterwards  that  my  communication,  which  was 
entirely  in  agreement  with  his  own  views,  had  had  a  great  moral 
effect. 

As  it  was  possible  that  after  the  naval  attack  the  enemy  would 
venture  upon  a  great  landing  and  send  troops  to  the  Dardanelles, 
Enver  Pasha  realised  the  necessity  of  concentrating  sufficient 
infantry  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Constantinople,  and  asked  me 
to  send  him  the  8th  and  .loth  Divisions. 

I  fell  in  with  his  views  at  once.  When  the  enemy  had  landed 
on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula,  Enver  Pasha  asked  me  to  send  the 
25th  Division  as  well  to  Constantinople.  I  sent  it.  He  also  asked 
me  to  send  one  of  the  divisions  of  the  I3th  Corps  to  Bagdad  and 


The  Desert  Force  167 

the  other  to  Bitlis.  I  carried  out  these  instructions  and  also  the 
order  to  send  all  the  quick-firing  guns  and  machine-guns  from 
my  army  zone  to  the  Dardanelles.  Ultimately  I  found  myself  in 
such  a  state  that  the  troops  in  the  army  zone,  the  vilayets  of  Adana, 
Aleppo,  Syria,  Lebanon  and  Palestine,  and  including  those  in  the 
desert,  were  reduced  to  twelve  battalions,  and  in  the  whole  region 
not  a  single  quick-firing  battery  nor  a  single  machine-gun  company 
was  left. 

These  twelve  battalions  consisted  exclusively  of  Arabs  from 
Syria  and  Palestine.  There  were  no  Turkish  but  the  Dervish 
volunteer  battalions  and  an  infantry  company  of  volunteers  from 
the  Dobrudja,  which  I  had  formed  for  Army  Headquarters.  There 
can  be  no  better  proof  of  my  conviction  that  the  Arab  would 
not  revolt  and  turn  traitor. 

The  most  important  military  event  up  to  the  end  of  the  year 
1915  was  the  attempted  rising  of  the  Armenians  in  fbeitun  and 
Urfa,  which  was  put  down  by  the  regulars  we  sent  there.  In 
general  the  year  1915  could  be  described  as  the  year  of  preparation 
and  consolidation. 

As  I  shall  show  later,  numerous  roads  and  railways  were  con- 
structed both  in  the  desert  and  in  the  interior,  and  L.  of  C.  bases 
were  established  and  provided  with  everything  they  required. 

In  addition  to  all  this  fortification  work  was  carried  out  at 
Mersina,  Taprakkale,  Dort  Yol,  and  on  the  Alexandretta  coast, 
and  four  or  five  lines  of  defence  were  provided  against  a  hostile 
landing  at  Beirut,  Haifa,  Jaffa,  as  well  as  in  the  Lebanon,  Mount 
Carmel,  and  everywhere  in  the  interior  of  Palestine. 

Of  course  the  divisions  sent  to  Constantinople  had  to  be  re- 
placed by  new  divisions  raised  in  the  interior  of  Syria  and  Palestine, 
Aleppo,  and  Adana.  Their  training  was  one  of  the  army's  chief 
tasks. 

In  August,  1915,  when  the  course  of  the  military  expedition  in 
Mesopotamia  was  taking  an  unfavourable  turn  for  us,  Enver 
Pasha  asked  me  if  I  would  take  over  the  civil  and  military 
administration  of  that  region. 

I  replied  that  at  the  very  time  when  the  secret  intrigues  of  the 
Arab  revolutionaries  in  Syria  and  Palestine  had  shown  that  the 
situation  in  those  provinces  had  become  extremely  difficult  my 
absence  would  most  probably  have  far  worse  consequences,  but 


1 68  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

that  if  he  did  not  agree  with  me  I  was  prepared  to  go  to  Bagdad. 
Enver  Pasha  was  of  the  same  opinion,  however,  and  proposed 
Marshal  von  der  Golz  for  the  post  of  Commander-in-Chief  in  Irak. 
The  Marshal  accepted  and  was  duly  sent  there. 

As  I  have  said,  the  year  1915  passed  in  preparations  for  the 
second  campaign  against  the  Canal.  As  I  had  an  idea  that  the 
German  General  Staff  did  not  attribute  to  these  preparations  the 
importance  due  to  them,  I  travelled  to  Constantinople  in  November 
to  draw  Enver  Pasha's  serious  attention  to  the  fact.  I  stayed 
there  a  fortnight  and  then  returned  to  Damascus  without  having 
achieved  very  much. 

As  the  English  and  French  had  retired  after  the  evacuation  of 
the  Dardanelles,  I  invited  Enver  Pasha  to  come  to  Syria  to  see  for 
himself  the  result  of  the  preparations  I  had  been  making  in  the 
desert.  He  came  in  February,  1916,  and  after  making  an  extended 
tour  of  inspection  together  in  Syria,  Palestine,  and  the  Sinai 
Desert,  we  went  to  visit  Medina. 

Sherif  Faisal,  who  was  then  at  Headquarters,  accompanied  us 
on  this  visit. 

Enver  Pasha  was  highly  satisfied  with  the  organisation  of  the 
desert  L.  of  C.  We  both  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was 
certainly  impossible  to  cross  the  Canal  and  drive  the  English  out 
of  Egypt,  but  that  it  would  be  quite  feasible  to  fortify  ourselves 
securely  on  the  eastern  bank  and  prevent  the  passage  of  merchant 
ships  with  our  heavy  batteries. 

At  this  time  my  greatest  desire  was  to  do  anything  and  every- 
thing to  prevent  the  revolutionary  tendencies  displayed  by  Sherif 
Hussein  from  developing  and  to  persuade  him  to  send  an  auxiliary 
force  to  Palestine  under  the  command  of  one  of  his  sons.  With 
that  end  in  view  I  conferred  continuously  with  Sherif  Faisal  and 
conducted  a  very  intimate  correspondence  with  Sherif  Hussein. 
As  will  be  seen  later  in  the  chapter  devoted  to  the  Arab  revolt,  I 
had  no  success  in  spite  of  all  my  efforts,  and  at  length,  on 
January  2nd,  1916,  I  was  faced  with  the  fact  of  Sherif  Hussein's 
rebellion.  This  rising  was  a  serious  blow  to  the  campaign  against 
the  Canal. 

I  calculated  that  if  the  English  wished  to  try  an  attack  by  land 
on  Palestine  they  would  be  compelled  to  establish  a  line  of  com- 
munication between  the  Canal  and  Palestine  (as  we  had  had  to  do 


The  Desert  Force  169 

on  our  part)  and  to  connect  them  by  a  railway.  During  the  whole 
of  1915  not  a  single  English  detachment  had  set  foot  on  the 
eastern  bank  of  the  Canal.  From  time  to  time  a  few  Camel  Corps 
patrols  had  penetrated  to  points  fifty  or  sixty  kilometres  from  the 
Canal  and  returned  to  their  own  side  a  few  days  later. 

The  first  defence  works  of  the  English  which  we  discovered 
towards  the  end  of  January,  1916,  were  the  fortifications  of  the 
bridgeheads  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Canal  opposite  Kantara  and 
Ismaila.  The  date  of  this  work  coincides  with  that  of  Sherif 
Hussein's  last  letter  to  the  English,  in  which  he  assured  them  of 
his  desertion  of  our  cause.  It  seems  obvious  from  this  that 
it  was  not  until  the  English  were  perfectly  clear  on  this  point  .that 
they  decided  to  cross  to  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Canal  or,  to  speak 
more  accurately,  start  an  offensive  against  Palestine.  They  knew 
perfectly  well  that  Sherif  Hussein's  revolt  would  compel  us  to  take 
certain  steps  for  the  defence  of  the  Hedjaz  and  that  we  should  also 
have  to  withdraw  from  that  region  a  portion  of  the  forces  ear- 
marked for  Syria  and  Palestine.  Apart  from  this  they  were 
certain  that  the  Beduins,  to  whom  they  had  sent  money  through 
Sherif  Hussein,  would  rise  against  us,  and  that  a  Beduin  revolt 
would  weaken  us  enormously. 

On  April  ist,  1916,  the  German  Air  Force  Company  No.  300,  the 
first  real  help  to  reach  us,  arrived  at  Beersheba.     On  April  I2th 
and  I5th  two  Austro-Hungarian   15011.   field  howitzer  batteries  \ 
arrived. 

The  Aeroplane  section  was  of  great  use  to  us  for  re- 
connoitring all  the  details  of  the  bridgehead  defences,  railway 
and  other  works  on  which  the  English  were  engaged  east  of 
the  Canal. 

When  Sherif  Hussein's  revolt  broke  out  I  appointed  Fahri 
Pasha  commander  at  Medina  and  I  had  to  organise  a  force  there 
consisting  of  fifteen  or  sixteen  infantry  battalions  and  as  many 
mountain  batteries. 

I  had  the  greatest  respect  and  unbounded  admiration  for  Fahri 
Pasha,  who  was  assailed  by  hostile  forces  and  influences  on  all 
sides  and  yet  managed  to  perform  miracles  with  his  force.  From 
January,  1916,  to  December,  1918— that  is,  for  nearly  three  years- 
he  defended  the  Sacred  Tomb  against  the  troops  of  the  renegade 
Sherif  Hussein  and  the  rebellious  Beduins,  who  were  reinforced  by 


i  yo  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

English  and  French  artillery  and  all  kinds  of  auxiliary  formations. 
Even  when  this  small  garrison,  which  had  been  reduced  to  five  or 
six  battalions  by  October  or  November,  1918,  was  completely  cut 
off  from  the  interior  as  the  result  of  the  capture  of  Maan  bv 
Sherif  Faisal  in  January,  1918,  it  persevered  in  its  resistance 
and  succeeded  in  holding  Medina  until  three  months  after  the 
Armistice. 

Beyond  all  praise  was  the  courage  and  persistence  of  the  force, 
consisting  of  four  or  five  Turkish  battalions,  to  which  was  com- 
mitted the  protection  of  the  railway  from  Medina  to  Maan 
and  which  maintained  communication  between  Medina  and  the 
army. 

The  men  whom  I  consider  the  soul  of  the  defence  of  this 
thousand  kilometre  line  of  railway  between  Medina  and  Maan 
were  Fahri  Pasha  and  brave  officers  such  as  the  Governor  of 
Medina,  Basri  Pasha,  General  Djemal  Pasha,  who  had  distin- 
guished himself  in  the  defence  of  the  Albanian  fortress  of  Skutari 
(and  whom  the  Arabs  called  "  Djemal  Pasha  Salis,"  i.e.,  Djemal 
Pasha  III.),  Colonel  Nedjih  Bey,  and  later  Lieutenant  Kemal  Bey 
and  some  others. 

The  courage  and  fearlessness  of  this  handful  of  soldiers  frus- 
trated all  the  efforts  of  Sherif  Hussein's  sons  and  drove  them  off 
with  bloody  losses.  The  proof  of  their  success  is  that  though  the 
Beduin  revolt  spread  from  Medina  to  Maan  and  the  coast  was  held 
by  the  Sheriffs  troops,  which  :were  reinforced  by  English  and 
French  troops,  communication  between  Syria  and  Medina  was 
maintained  from  June,  1916,  to  December,  1917,  and  traffic  was 
more  or  less  regular.  But  the  sacrifices  necessarily  involved  in 
feeding  the  garrison  in  Medina  and  supplying  the  troops 
echelonned  between  Medina  and  Maan  with  food  and  ammunition 
compelled  us  to  halve  the  supplies  provided  for  Palestine  and  Sinai 
and  prevented  us  from  reinforcing  our  Sinai  front  when  and  how 
we  liked. 

On  April  23rd,  1916,  von  Kress  Bey,  at  the  head  of  two  infantry 
battalions,  a  mountain. battery,  and  a  volunteer  camel  regiment, 
succeeded  in  a  surprise  attack  which  resulted  in  the  capture  of  an 
English  cavalry  regiment  with  its  commander  and  all  its  officers. 
This  occurrence  raised  the  confidence  of  our  troops  to  a  remark- 
able degree.  About  this  time  the  3rd  Infantry  Division,  some 


The  Desert  Force  171 

German  machine-gun  sections,  and  two  Austro-Hungarian  moun- 
tain howitzer  batteries  had  joined  the  Sinai  front  from  Constanti- 
nople. 

Meanwhile  the  English  had  materially  strengthened  their 
bridgehead  defences  opposite  Kantara,  and,  resting  their  left  wing 
on  the  sea,  had  sent  out  a  force  of  combined  arms  to  Katia  and 
the  wells  of  Romani. 

Here  they  immediately  began  to  construct  defences. 

Von  Kress,  who  had  resumed  command  of  the  Expeditionary 
Force,^reported  that  the  troops  were  tired  of  the  long  waiting,  and 
proposed  an  offensive  against  Romani. 

I  informed  him  in  turn  that  I  would  give  my  consent  to  such 
an  operation  on  condition  that  the  existence  of  the  Expeditionary 
Force — the  only  force  on  which  we  could  depend  for  the  defence 
of  Palestine — was  not  endangered. 

I  will  now  give  the  composition  of  the  troops  com- 
prising the  force  engaged  in  the  second  expedition  against  the 
Canal. 

The  3rd  Infantry  Division  (three  regiments  of  three  battalions, 
a  cavalry  squadron,  two  mountain  batteries,  a  battalion  of 
engineers). 

One  machine-gun  battalion  (eight  companies). 

Two  Austro-Hungarian  mountain  howitzer  batteries/ 

One  German  locm.  battery. 

One  German  I5cm.  battery. 

Two  anti-aircraft  gun  sections. 

A  total  of  10,000  men. 

This  enterprise,  which  opened  in  the  beginning  of  July,  1916, 
closed  with  the  failure  of  the  Expeditionary  Force  at  Katia  and 
Romani.  The  English  followed  up  this  force  step  for  step  with 
large  bodies  of  cavalry  and  camelry,  and  compelled  it  to  withdraw 
to  El  Arish.  Ultimately  the  force  had  to  evacuate  El  Arish  itself 
on  December  i6th  and  retire  to  the  Hans  Yonus-El  Hafir  line  on 
the  old  Palestine-Sinai  frontier. 

The  English  constructed  their  railway  with  incredible  speed, 
and  laid  two  kilometres  of  line  almost  every  day.  After  conferring 
with  Enver  Pasha,  who  had  come  to  inspect  the  Palestine  front, 
and  von  Kress,  we  decided  in  the  middle  of  February  to  make  the 
Gaza-Tel  el  Sheria-Beersheba  line  our  defensive  position,  and 


172  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

instructed  von  Kress   to  defend   this   position  with  the   troops 
available. 

The  difficulty  of  the  general  situation  due  to  the  revolt  in  th^ 
Hedjaz  and  the  necessity  of  keeping  a  watchful  eye  on  the  Druses 
and  the  various  Beduin  troops  compelled  me  to  leave  Army 
Headquarters  at  Damascus. 


THE   BATTLES  OF  GAZA 


CHAPTER  VII. 
THE  BATTLES  OF  GAZA. 

THE  Turkish  troops  which  had  withdrawn  to  the  Gaza-Tel  el 
Sheria-Beersheba  line  after  March  I5'th,  1917,  consisted  of  the 
following  units : 

IN  GAZA: 

The  79th  Infantry  Regiment  of  the  27th  Division  and  the 

I25th  Regiment  of  the  i6th  Division. 
Two  Austro-Hungarian  mountain  howitzer  batteries. 
Two  Turkish  field  gun  batteries. 
One  German  locm.  field  gun  battery. 
One  Turkish  15011.  howitzer  battery. 
Two  German  machine-gun  companies  and  five  or  six 

Turkish  machine-gun  companies. 
A  total  of  3500  rifles. 

IN  DJENMACH  : 

The  3rd  Infantry  Division  (nine  battalions;  six  field  gun 
batteries,  four  machine-gun  companies,  one  I5cm.  field 
howitzer  battery). 
A  total  of  5000  rifles. 
IN  TEL  EL  SHERIA  : 

Corps  Headquarters  of  22nd  Corps,  with  two  infantry 
regiments  of  the  i6th  Division  and  the  divisional 
artillery. 

A  total  of  5000  rifles. 
IN  BEERS HEBA  : 

The  3rd  Cavalry  Division  (three  regiments), 
A  total  of  1500  sabres. 


176  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

In  addition  to  these  formations  two  regiments  of  the  53rd 
Division  had  reached  Ramleh. 

In  the  official  report  published  by  General  Murray  in  November, 
1917,  he  gives  the  Turkish  force  employed  in  the  first  Battle  of 
Gaza  as  follows : 

IN  GAZA  : 

The  3rd  Division  and  the  2nd  Infantry  Regiment. 

Twenty-four  machine-guns. 

Two  heavy  German  isomm.  batteries. 

Three  Austro-Hungarian  io5mm.  field  howitzer  batteries. 

Five  field  gun  batteries. 

A  total  of  10,000  rifles. 

IN  TEL  EL  SHERIA  : 

The  i6th  Infantry  Division  (6000  rifles,  sixteen  machine- 
guns,  four  field  batteries). 

The  3rd  Cavalry  Division  (four  light  guns,  four 
howitzers,  four  machine  guns). 

IN  RAMLEH  : 

The  53rd  Infantry  Division. 

IN  JERUSALEM  : 

The  54th  and  67th  Infantry  Divisions. 

IN  HAIFA: 

The  27th  Infantry  Division. 

I  can  give  a  most  categorical  assurance  that  the  English  saw 
that  force  solely  in  their  imagination.  If  all  the  figures  for  the 
Turkish  forces  given  by  the  English  General  were  of  that  kind  he 
must  have  been  badly  served  by  his  Intelligence.  As  I  have  said 
before,  the  Turkish  force  which  drove  off  the  first  English  attack 
on  Gaza  so  victoriously  consisted  of  18,000  men  at  most. 

According  to  General  Murray's  report  the  English  Army  was 
composed  of  the  following  troops : 

In  first  line  (under  the  command  of  General  Sir  Philip 
Chetwode) : 

The  Anzac  Mounted  Division 

The  Imperial  Mounted  Division,  consisting  mainly  of 
yeomanry. 


The  Battles  of  Gaza  177 

The  53rd  Infantry  Division,  several  machine-gun 
sections. 

The  troops  of  the  second  line  comprised : 

The  Camel  Corps  Division,  the  52nd  and  $4th  Infantry 
Divisions,  heavy  artillery,  and  machine-gun  com- 
panies, with  automatic  rifle  sections. 

According  to  these  figures,  in  this  first  Battle  of  Gaza  the 
English  had : 

Three  infantry  divisions. 
Three  cavalry  divisions. 

A  division  of  the  Camel  Corps  and  the  naval  units 
participating  in  the  action. 

With  these  troops,  commanded  by  General  Sir  Charles  Dobell, 
General  Murray,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  English  Mediter- 
ranean Force,  decided  to  attack  the  Beersheba-Gaza  defences. 

The  53rd  Division,  twelve  thousand  rifles  strong,  was  to  make 
a  direc!  attack  on  Gaza,  while  the  Anzac  Mounted  Division,  the 
yeomanry,  and  another  cavalry  division  were  to  hem  it  in  from 
the  east,  and  thrusting  through  between  Gaza  and  Djemameh 
finally  isolate  it  altogether  by  closing  the  northern  exits. 

The  troops  which  were  to  open  the  attack  took  up  their 
positions  in  the  night  of  March  25-26.  At  8  a.m.  in  the  morning 
of  March  26th  the  cavalry  completely  surrounded  Gaza,  and 
communication  with  the  town  was  interrupted  everywhere. 

At  10  a.m.  a  brigade  of  the  54th  Division  and  several  regiments 
of  the  53rd  Division  were  sent  against  Gaza.  Thus  one  and  a  half 
divisions,  with  more  than  two  cavalry  divisions,  were  opposed  to 
the  small  Turkish  force  of  3500  rifles  garrisoning  Gaza.  Thanks 
to  the  heroism  of  its  Turkish  and  Arab  defenders,  Gaza  held  out 
against  the  attacks  of  the  enemy  for  twenty-four  hours.  These 
heroes  disputed  every  inch  of  the  ground  with  the  foe,  and  every 
hill  was  lost  and  regained  two  or  three  times. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  the  3rd  Division  from  Djem- 
mameh  pressed  forward  against  the  English  advance  guard  and, 
next  day,  as  soon  as  the  English  began  to  feel  the  effect  of  this 
movement,  they  retired  in  great  disorder.  The  i6th  Division 
which  came  from  Tel  el  Sheria  and  the  3rd  Cavalry  Division  from 
Beersheba  increased  that  disorder. 

M 


178  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

I  have  no  desire  to  enter  into  superfluous  detail  here,  but  1 
cannot  omit  to  state  that,  contrary  to  the  statements  of  the  English 
General  in  his  official  dispatch  (to  the  effect  that  reinforcements 
arrived  in  the  night  of  March  26-27),  not  a  man  reached  the  town 
before  the  morning  of  the  27th,  on  which  day  the  English  began 
to  retire. 

The  first  Battle  of  Gaza  will  have  a  high  place  in  Turkish  mili- 
tary annals.  Thanks  to  the  resistance  offered  that  day  by  a  handful 
of  heroes,  the  English  were  compelled  to  remain  in  that  line  from 
March  27th  to  October,  1917 — a  period  of  eight  months — and  send 
nine  infantry  divisions,  a  number  of  cavalry  divisions,  and  two 
divisions  of  the  Camel  Corps  to  this  front. 

The  bravest  of  the  defenders  of  Gaza  was  unquestionably 
Major  Hairi  Effendi,  the  commander  of  the  I25th  Infantry  Regi- 
ment. This  splendid  officer,  who  preserved  his  unruffled  calm  and  t 
kept  his  head  in  the  most  difficult  circumstances,  placed  himself  at 
the  head  of  each  battalion  of  his  regiment  in  turn,  twice  recovered 
the  famous  "  Ali  Mumtar  "  hill  from  the  English,  and  kept  it  the 
third  time.  In  this  attack  the  German  Lieutenant  Cordier,  com- 
mander of  a  machine-gun  section,  displayed  the  greatest  courage, 
and,  like  Captain  Kitter  von  Trushkowsky,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
battery  commander,  met  a  hero's  death  by  his  guns. 

In  his  official  report  the  English  General  estimated  our  losses 
at  8000  killed  and  wounded.  Including  cooks,  stretcher-bearers, 
&c.,  who  are  not  fighting  troops,  our  whole  force  in  Gaza 
never  exceeded  that  figure,  and  I  cannot  conceive  how 
General  Murray  arrived  at  it.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  our  losses 
were : 

Officers,  ten  killed,  twelve  wounded,  fourteen  missing. 

Men,  276  killed,  744  wounded,  571  missing. 

As  the  losses  of  the  English  were  admitted  to  be  4000,  it  is  to 
be  concluded  that  each  of  the  defenders  of  Gaza  had  killed  an 
English  soldier. 

I  left  Damascus  in  the  evening  of  March  27th,  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  28th  reached  Tel  el  Sheria  and  then  Gaza.  After 
decorating  the  officers  and  men  I  returned  to  Jerusalem.  Two 
hours  later  some  portions  of  the  i6th  Division  arrived  at  the  front. 
Von  Kress,  who  attributed  the  disorderly  retreat  of  the  English  to 
demoralisation,  proposed  an  attack  on  their  flank  with  troops  of 


The  Battles  of  Gaza  179 

the  3rd  and  i6th  Divisions.  If  this  attack  succeeded  it  would 
certainly  have  been  most  advantageous  to  us,  but  if  it  failed  we 
should  have  been  left  with  nothing  whatever  for  the  future  defence 
of  Palestine  and  Syria,  and  the  whole  affair  would  have  been 
settled  once  and  for  all.  As  equally  bold  experiments  on  the  other 
fronts  had  resulted  in  very  unhappy  experiences,  I  was  personally 
strongly  averse  to  having  such  experiences  on  my  own  front. 
Hitherto  it  had  been  my  object  to  keep  the  Expeditionary  Force 
in  the  desert  out  of  harm's  way,  but  after  I  had  withdrawn  to  the 
Gaza-Beersheba  lines,  which  were  the  natural  frontier  between 
the  desert  and  the  inhabited  regions,  I  decided  to  hold  that  front 
and  prevent  the  English  from  breaking  through  at  any  cost  by 
concentrating  all  the  Turkish  forces  there. 

The  greatest  advantage  of  this  position  was  that  it  could  not 
be  turned,  as  the  right  flank  rested  on  the  sea  and  the  left  on  the 
desert. 

Moreover,  as  long  as  we  were  holding  these  defences  the 
English  were  compelled  to  remain  in  the  desert,  while  we  were 
in  a  region  which  could  be  described  as  cultivated.  In  short,  so 
long  as  we  held  the  Gaza-Beersheba  lines  the  English  front  could 
not  join  up  with  the  Arab  front. 

In  consequence  our  best  policy  was  to  avoid  any  kind  of  action 
which  might  imperil  that  front,  and  in  view  of  these  considera- 
tions I  rejected  the  proposal  for  an  offensive  put  forward  by  von 
Kress. 

There  was  no  doubt  that  the  English  would  renew  their  attack 
in  a  fortnight  or  three  weeks,  and  so  it  was  necessary  for  us  to 
reinforce  our  front  from  the  interior  in  order  to  be  able  to  beat  off 
this  second  attack.  With  the  troops  which  had  recently  come  up 
we  had  a  continuous  fortified  line  (with  the  exception  of  a  few 
unimportant  gaps)  from  Gaza  to  Beersheba. 

The  English  proposed  to  begin  the  second  attack  on  Gaza  with 
a  ruse  de  guerre.  On  April  I4th  our  wireless  station  at  Tel  el 
Sheria  picked  up  an  English  message,  which  was  deciphered  by 
our  telegraph  officer,  Lieutenant  Stiller. 

This  message  contained  instructions  from  the  commander  of 
the  English  Armies  of  the  East  to  the  commander  of  the  Palestine 
Army,  informing  him  that  Gaza  was  to  be  attacked  on  April  I7th, 
but  while  the  main  attack  was  to  be  made  on  land,  an  infantry 


180  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

division  landed  at  Askalon  during  the  night  of  the  I7th  was 
to  fall  upon  Gaza  from  the  rear,  and  thus  support  the  frontal 
attack. 

We  considered  that  this  message,  the  genuineness  of  which  we 
at  first  had  no  doubt  about,  had  possibly  been  sent  out  solely  with 
a  view  to  compelling  us  to  regroup  our  reserves.  I  therefore 
refused  to  make  any  change  in  the  general  distribution  of  the  front, 
and  contented  myself  with  sending  toward  Askalon  a  small  force 
which  I  had  left  behind  Jaffa. 

During  the  twenty-four  days  which  elapsed  between  the  first 
and  second  Battles  of  Gaza  we  had  reinforced  our  troops  with  two 
regiments  of  the  53rd  Division — barely  2000  rifles. 

The  English  also  were  reinforced  on  this  front  by  the  74th 
Division.  They  brought  up  to  strength  the  divisions  which  had 
taken  part  in  the  first  Battle  of  Gaza,  so  that  they  had  quite  an 
imposing  force  of  four  infantry  and  four  cavalry  divisions. 

The  violent  English  onslaught  which  began  on  the  morning  of 
April  I7th  was  again  directed  against  Gaza  and  the  53rd  Division 
which  formed  the  left  wing. 

The  English  employed  eight  tanks  in  the  attacks,  in  which  they 
engaged  a  force  six  or  seven  times  larger  than  that  with  which 
we  held  this  part  of  the  line.  Their  fleet  intervened  in  the  action 
and  treated  Gaza  to  a  rain  of  steel  and  fire. 

The  battle  raged  with  the  utmost  violence  during  April  I7th, 
i8th,  and  igth,  and  the  English  left  no  stone  unturned  to  break 
our  front. 

But  once  more  it  was  seen  that  the  courage  of  the  Turkish 
soldier  prevailed  against  the  determination  of  the  English,  and  in 
the  night  of  April  iQth  the  latter  found  themselves  compelled  to 
return  to  their  old  lines,  leaving  their  dead  and  wounded  in 
numbers  (more  than  7000)  which  almost  equalled  the  total  Turkish 
force  engaged  in  that  sector. 

Three  of  the  eight  English  tanks  which  participated  in  the 
attack  were  left  before  our  lines,  or,  rather,  in  our  trenches.  It  is 
impossible  to  tell  in  a  few  lines  the  story  of  that  glorious  three 
days'  defence,  which  redounds  to  the  highest  credit  of  Ottoman 
courage.  I  will  postpone  the  details  of  this  chapter  to  another 
occasion  and  confine  myself  here  to  the  results  of  this  second 
Battle  of  Gaza. 


The  Battles  of  Gaza  181 

The  great  blow — the  last  thing  on  earth  the  English  expected — 
had,  so  to  speak,  utterly  disconcerted  them. 

They  always  prided  themselves  on  issuing  communiques  that 
were  absolutely  accurate,  but  this  time  they  found  themselves 
compelled  to  publish  a  short  and  vague  report  which  was  in  no 
way  consistent  with  the  truth. 

But,  as  the  English  said,  and  said  rightly,  that  a  failure  in 
Palestine  coming  on  the  top  of  the  Dardanelles  failure  would 
mean  the  end  of  English  prestige  in  the  East,  they  decided  to 
employ  the  spring  and  summer  in  completing  their  preparations 
for  one  last,  victorious  offensive  in  the  autumn  and  winter  of  1917, 
General  Murray  had  been  twice  beaten  at  Gaza  and  they  replaced 
him  by  General  Allenby,  who  had  gained  a  reputation  on  the 
Western  Front  for  alertness,  discretion,  and  brains. 

When  General  Allenby  took  up  this  new  post  he  declared  that 
he  would  undertake  no  attack  until  he  had  under  his  command  at 
least  four  men  to  every  Turk.  I  did  not  doubt  for  a  moment  that 
English  pride  and  obstinacy  would  make  that  proportion  possible, 
and  I  adopted  every  conceivable  means  of  reinforcing  and 
strengthening  the  Palestine  Front  to  the  uttermost.  I  sent  the 
General  Staff  a  very  lengthy  report  dealing  with  the  strength  of 
the  force  to  be  employed  on  the  Palestine  Front,  the  number  of 
divisions  required  to  relieve  the  front  line  troops  (and  where  these 
were  to  be  distributed  in  the  interior),  and  also  the  troops  which 
must  be  concentrated  in  Aleppo  or  Syria  to  meet  emergencies. 

About  the  end  of  May  I  received  a  telegram  from  the  Deputy 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  in  which  he  said : 

•  "  I  have  asked  General  von  Falkenhayn  to  undertake  a  tour 
of  inspection  via  Aleppo  to  the  Euphrates  Valley  and  Mosul  in 
order  to  ascertain  whether  it  is  possible  to  send  enough  troops 
there  to  recover  Bagdad.  I  have  advised  him  to  go  to  Jerusalem 
and  pay  you  a  visit  with  the  idea  of  concealing  the  object  of  his 
journey.  Please  give  him  a  good  reception  and  make  things  as 
easy  for  him  as  possible." 

The  general  situation  on  the  Turkish  fronts  at  the  end  of  May, 
1917,  was  as  follows : 

The  Caucasus  Front : 

The  Russian  Revolution  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  1917  had 
ruined  the  discipline  of  the  Russian  armies  which  had  occupied 


1 82  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Erzindjan  and  Trebizond  and  overrun  our  eastern  vilayets  as  far 
as  Bitlis.  Mustafa  Kemal  Pasha,  the  commander  of  the  2nd 
Army,  had  succeeded  in  recovering  from  them  the  province  of 
Bitlis  and  Mush.  It  would  therefore  have  been  possible  to  take  a 
few  divisions  from  the  2nd  and  3rd  Armies  and  send  them  to  more 
important  fronts. 

The  Irak  Front  (Mesopotamia) : 

After  our  armies  had  been  beaten  on  the  Kut  el  Amara  front 
and  Bagdad  had  been  finally  lost  they  were  compelled  to  fall  back 
on  Kerkuk  and  Hit  respectively.  There  was  no  chance  of  these 
armies  recovering  and  driving  the  English  out  of  Mesopotamia, 
still  less  of  their  striking  a  really  serious  blow  north  or  north-west 
of  Bagdad. 

The  Constantinople  and  Smyrna  regions : 

A  landing  of  Entente  troops  at  the  Dardanelles  or  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Smyrna,  which  would  have  created  a  new  front,  was 
equally  improbable  seeing  that  the  position  in  Europe  was  serious, 
as  the  Rumanians  had  been  utterly  defeated,  the  English  had 
suffered  two  reverses  at  Gaza,  and  the  Russian  armies  were  in  the 
throes  of  a  terrible  revolution. 

Thus  there  was  a  possibility  of  employing  the  troops  at 
Constantinople  and  Smyrna  on  the  other  important  fronts. 

Further,  it  was  high  time  to  withdraw  our  divisions  from 
Galicia,  Rumania,  and  Bulgaria. 

I  drew  attention  to  these  matters  and  asked  that  all  available 
troops  should  be  sent  to  Palestine  and  Northern  and  Central  Syria, 
so  that  this  front  might  be  reinforced  so  heavily  as  to  be  impreg- 
nable. It  was  the  weakest  and  yet  the  most  important  point  in 
the  Ottoman  Empire.  As  our  resources  in  the  East  were  inade- 
quate to  guarantee  the  supplies  of  so  large  a  force,  I  asked  that  we 
should  be  helped  by  the  northern  vilayets. 

Enver  Pasha  visited  the  front  in  the  month  of  June.  He  was 
more  than  satisfied  with  the  defensive  measures  we  had  taken,  but 
was  still  of  opinion  that  the  right  flank  of  the  English  Army  should 
be  attacked  in  the  rear.  At  last  he  said  to  me : 

"  I  have  asked  several  army  commanders  to  come  to  Aleppo 
to  discuss  with  me  the  following  plan.  I  am  contemplating  an 


The  Battles  of  Gaza  183 

offensive  with  a  view  to  the  recovery  of  Bagdad.  I  intend  to  form 
a  /th  Army  under  the  command  of  Mustafa  Kemal  Pasha,  the 
G.O.C.  2nd  Army,  and  by  combining  this  army  with  Halil  Pasha's 
6th  army  to  form  an  army  group  called  the  "  Yildirim  Group," 
which  is  to  march  against  Bagdad  under  an  army  group  com- 
mander. I  have  already  decided  on  the  divisions  which  will  have 
to  be  taken  for  this  enterprise  from  the  various  fronts.  Germany 
is  giving  us  General  Falkenhayn  as  the  army  group  commander. 
I  believe  he  will  carry  through  this  plan  to  a  successful 
conclusion." 

I  offered  no  objection  for  the  time  being,  but  kept  my  thoughts 
to  myself. 

When  we  returned  to  Aleppo  together  a  few  days  later  we 
found  Izzet  Pasha,  the  commander  of  the  Caucasus  Army  Group, 
and  Halil  Pasha,  G.O.C.  6th  Army,  already  there.  Mustafa 
Kemal  Pasha,  the  G.O.C.  2nd  Army,  who  was  already  quartered 
at  Damascus,  had  visited  the  Palestine  Front  with  us  and  we  had 
gone  to  Aleppo  together. 

The  meeting  of  four  army  commanders  with  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  to  preside  was  not  an  everyday  affair.  Of  course  I 
referred  to  the  importance  of  the  Palestine  Front  and  the  reasons 
which  should  move  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  reinforce  it  first 
and  foremost.  I  proposed  ihat  instead  of  embarking  on  the 
Bagdad  campaign  we  should  assemble  at  Aleppo  a  large  force 
which  could  be  directed  thence  wherever  its  presence  turned  out 
to  be  required.  I  added : 

"  If  we  concentrate  such  an  army  at  Aleppo  it  will  be  able  to 
resist  any  Russian  pressure  on  the  front  of  the  2nd  Army  or  oppose 
any  advance  of  the  English  up  the  Tigris  or  Euphrates.  Above 
all,  we  shall  be  able  to  force  the  Entente  Governments  to  give  up 
the  idea  of  a  landing  at  Adana,  an  eventuality  we  greatly  fear.  If 
the  English  knew  we  had  such  an  army,  ready  to  strike,  at  Aleppo, 
perhaps  they  would  be  compelled  to  abandon  their  attack,  although 
I  have  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  they  are  now  preparing  an 
offensive  against  the  Gaza  front  for  next  autumn.  In  short,  the 
Bagdad  scheme  strikes  me  as  dangerous/' 

The  Commander-in-Chief  replied  in  a  serious  tone : 

'  The  General  Staff  has  decided  upon  the  campaign  against 
Bagdad  and  provided  the  best  German  General  for  it.  We  have 


184  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

also  secured  the  assistance  of  a  German  division  consisting  of  six 
picked  battalions  of  light  infantry  with  a  large  number  of  machine- 
guns,  other  units  and  German  batteries.  It  is  not  feasible  to 
abandon  this  operation.  Please  don't  waste  time  in  trying  to  make 
me  change  my  mind." 

Izzet  Pasha  now  intervened  and  proposed  that  at  any  rate  a 
division  should  be  left  at  Aleppo  to  meet  any  emergency,  but  his 
advice  also  was  rejected.  It  was  only  after  Izzet  Pasha  and  I  had 
objected  how  disadvantageous  it  would  be — and  had  been — in  view 
of  the  advance  on  Bagdad  to  send  battalions  piecemeal  ifrom 
Aleppo  down  the  Euphrates  to  complete  their  concentration  on  a 
line  parallel  with  Ramadieh  that  our  proposal  was  accepted  to 
concentrate  the  troops  between  Djerablus  and  Aleppo  and  then 
send  them  forward. 

The  continuation  of  my  memoirs  of  the  military  operations  will 
show  how  General  von  Falkenhayn  entered  the  Turkish  service 
and  describe  the  military  events  that  followed.  Although  those 
events  were  of  the  greatest  personal  importance  to  me,  various 
political  considerations  compel  me  to  keep  silent  about  them  for 
the  moment.  At  present  I  deem  it  wise  not  to  publish  this  portion 
of  my  memoirs,  though  it  has  already  been  written. 

Never  shall  I  forget  that  Council  of  War  at  Aleppo,  and  never 
shall  I  forgive  myself  for  not  putting  my  views  with  greater  force 
and  persistency  that  day.  If  ever  there  was  a  time  in  my  career 
when  events  dictated  my  resignation,  it  was  that  conference  in 
Aleppo. 

I  will  not  say  that  the  idea  of  resignation  did  not  occur  to  me 
at  that  moment.  Izzet  Pasha  will  be  my  witness  on  that  point. 
We  exchanged  our  views  on  this  matter  in  a  long  conversation  I 
had  with  him  when  he  came  to  visit  the  Palestine  Front  after  the 
Commander-in-Chief's  departure.  In  view  of  the  extraordinarily 
great  importance  of  the  4th  Army  area,  both  in  a  military  and 
political  sense,  Izzet  Pasha  solemnly  urged  on  me  the  danger  in 
which  I  should  place  the  country  if  I  laid  down  my  command  at  a 
most  critical  moment.  He  strongly  advised  me  not  to  leave 
Syria. 

Yet  I  do  not  know  that  if  I  had  persisted  in  my  resignation  I 
should  have  been  able  to  make  General  Headquarters  change  their 
views,  and  whether  they  would  not  have  insisted  on  the  execution 


The  Battles  of  Gaza  185 

of  their  plan  and  interpreted  my  desire  to  give  up  my  command  as 
a  wish  to  evade  responsibility  for  events  to  come. 

I  think  my  request  would  undoubtedly  have  been  looked  upon 
in  that  light. 

From  that  time  onwards  preparations  were  pushed  forward 
along  the  Euphrates,  and  particularly  in  the  region  of  Djerablus. 
A  large  number  of  rafts  were  got  ready  and  a  line  of  communica- 
tions was  established  down  river  from  that  place.  All  these 
preparations,  of  course,  had  an  injurious  effect  on  the  Palestine 
Front,  and  reduced  the  forces  indispensable  to  its  maintenance. 

The  preparations  of  the  English,  the  progress  of  which  I  was 
following  from  day  to  day,  had  convinced  me  that  the  Palestine 
Front  was  in  imminent  danger.  When  I  saw  that  G.H.Q.  did 
not  attach  to  my  warnings  the  importance  they  deserved  I  hoped 
I  might  attain  my  end  by  applying  direct  to  the  Grand  Vizier  in 
one  or  two  telegrams  in  which  I  gave  my  reasons  in  detail. 
In  one  of  these  telegrams  I  said : 

"  At  the  very  moment  when  we  want  to  try  and  recover  Bagdad 
I  am  afraid  in  the  very  near  future  we  shall  find  ourselves  com- 
pelled to  fight  for  the  safety  of  Jerusalem,  perhaps  even 
Damascus." 

The  Grand  Vizier's  answer  came  in  the  following  telegram : 
"  The  decision  to  commence  an  important  operation  for  the 
recovery  of  Bagdad  was  taken  at  the  Council  of  Ministers.  On 
my  last  visit  to  Germany  I  asked  that  General  von  Falkenhayn's 
services  should  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
to  conduct  the  campaign.  It  is  now  impossible  for  me  to  take 
steps  to  have  this  campaign  postponed.  As  regards  the  troops 
you  feel  called  upon  to  demand  for  the  Palestine  Front,  this  seems 
to  me  a  fruitless  dispute  between  an  army  commander  and  the 
Commander-in-Chief.  I  do  not  think  my  intervention  can  do  any 
good  at  all." 

At  length,  in  the  middle  of  August,  I  went  to  Constantinople 
to  make  the  position  clearer  and  emphasise  for  the  last  time  the 
great  danger  with  which  the  Palestine  Front  was  faced.  Once 
more  I  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  concentrating  the  Yildirim 
Group  between  Damascus  and  Aleppo  and  even  sending  part  of  it 
to  Palestine.  In  a  word,  I  wanted  to  have  the  main  reserve  of  the 


1 86  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Sinai  Army  ready  to  meet  any  eventuality,  and  by  that  precaution 
prevent  the  breaking  of  the  Palestine  Front  in  case  of  an  English 
offensive  in  November  and  December.  On  the  other  hand,  I  was 
willing  to  admit  that  it  would  be  open  to  us  to  carry  through  a 
campaign  for  the  recovery  of  Bagdad  in  January  or  February  and 
that  until  then  the  line  of  communications  along  the  Euphrates 
must  be  fully  prepared. 

We  then  held  a  Council  of  War,  at  which  Enver  Pasha  presided. 
General  von  Falkenhayn  and  his  Chief  of  Staff,  my  Chief  of  Staff, 
and  Bronsart  Pasha,  the  Chief  of  Staff  at  G.H.Q.,  were  also 
present. 

First  of  all  Colonel  AH  Fuad  Bey,  my  Chief  of  Staff,  unfolded 
in  detail  the  preparations  made  by  the  English  and  the  condition  of 
the  troops  with  which  we  had  to  meet  them.  I  then  explained 
what  we  should  need  in  the  way  of  personnel  and  materiel,  and 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  in  the  interests  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  to  abandon  the  campaign  against  Bagdad.  Thereupon 
Enver  Pasha  and  von  Falkenhayn  began  a  discussion  in  German. 
Of  course  I  did  not  understand  a  word  of  what  they  said,  but, 
judging  by  their  conversation,  their  reference  to  the  map,  and  the 
fact  that  they  frequently  pointed  to  the  English  front,  as  well  as  by 
certain  French  military  expressions  they  used,  I  assumed  that  they 
had  returned  to  the  plan  for  an  offensive  which  they  had  contem- 
plated but  which  I  thought  had  .been  abandoned  in  view  of  my 
decided  opposition. 

At  this  moment  Enver  Pasha  seemed  to  be  the  strongest 
opponent  of  that  plan,  whereas  von  Falkenhayn  seemed  to  be 
insisting  on  the  highly  advantageous  results  such  a  plan  would 
have. 

But  afterwards,  when  Enver  Pa^ha  translated  the  conversation 
for  me,  I  realised  that  it  was  von  Falkenhayn  who  had  advocated 
the  view  that  it  was  impossible  to  carry  through  the  expedition 
against  Bagdad  while  the  English  were  on  the  Palestine  Front. 
He  maintained  that  it  was  the  first  task  of  the  Yildirim  Army  to 
make  a  surprise  attack  on  the  English  and  force  them  back  to  the 
Canal.  It  could  then  tfe  sent  against  Bagdad.  As  regards  the 
Palestine  Front,  it  was  merely  a  question  of  making  a  wheeling 
movement  and  thrusting  in  between  Hafir  and  the  sea  to  catth  the 
English  unawares.  Enver  Pasha  opposed  that  view  and  expressed 


The  Battles  of  Gaza  187 

his  opinion  that  the  troops  then  in  Palestine  were  adequate  for 
defensive  purposes.  He  saw  no  need  to  send  further  troops,  and 
declared  that  he  could  not  abandon  the  Bagdad  expedition. 

I  did  not  agree  with  either  of  them.  I  was  utterly  hostile  to 
the  Bagdad  scheme,  and  considered  that  it  was  extremely 
prejudicial  and  dangerous  to  lose  any  time  and  not  to  send  the 
divisions  concentrated  at  Aleppo  to  Palestine  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment.  In  the  second  place,  it  seemed  to  me  foolish  to 
start  an  offensive  from  the  Palestine  Front  against  the  English 
right  through  the  desert,  as  even  if  we  employed  the  whole 
Yildirim  Army  for  the  purpose  I  was  convinced  that  we  were 
scarcely  in  a  position  to  effect  anything  in  view  of  the  scale  on 
which  the  English  had  made  their  preparations. 

The  English  had  constructed  their  defences  so  excellently  that 
for  such  an  offensive  we  should  have  required  all  kinds  of  material 
which  we  had  not  the  faintest  chance  of  securing — tanks,  heavy 
long-range  guns,  high  explosives,  the  necessary  supply  of  poison 
gas,  &c. 

After  the  failure  of  this  offensive — and  it  was  twenty  to  one  it 
would  be  a  failure — the  English  would  have  made  their  counter- 
attack and  could  not  have  failed  to  capture  most  of  our  storm 
troops.  That  would  affect  the  moral  of  our  force  most  preju- 
dicially and  make  it  easy  for  the  enemy  to  assail  our  defences  and 
break  through  our  Palestine  Front  completely.  The  English  had 
concentrated  nine  infantry  divisions,  three  cavalry  divisions,  and 
a  large  force  of  special  arms  on  the  Palestine  Front,  and  it  was 
absolutely  certain  that  in  the  middle  of  August,  or,  at  the  latest, 
during  the  winter,  they  would  have  carried  out  their  last  decisive 
offensive  against  this  front.  Nor  would  they  confine  themselves 
to  a  single  onslaught.  They  would 'start  an  offensive  which  would 
continue  for  months,  an  offensive  like  those  of  which  we  have  seen 
examples  on  the  Western  Front.  The  result  of  all  this  was  that 
it  was  our  best  course  to  await  the  end  of  the  offensive,  which 
would  cause  the  English  immense  losses,  and  if  we  completely  suc- 
ceeded in  driving  them  off  we  ought  to  make  a  counter-attack  at 
short  range  on  the  defeated  English  divisions  with  fresh  forces 
held  ready  for  the  purpose. 

This  course  would  perhaps  not  bring  us  any  great  positive 
benefits,  but  it  was  the  best  and  most  promising  method  of  pro- 


1 88  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

tecting  the  Palestine  Front  and  averting  a  great  danger  from 
Syria. 

On  the  basis  of  my  proposal  the  following  plan  could  have 
been  adopted: 

Abandon  the  expedition  against  Bagdad  so  far  as  August 
or  the  coming  winter  was  concerned. 

Concentrate  all  the  Yildirim  divisions  in  Palestine,  Damascus, 
Hama,  and  Aleppo. 

Send  Yildirim  divisions  to  Palestine  as  and  when  the  English 
reinforced  their  front. 

Fix  the  number  of  divisions  to  be  employed  in  second  line 
so  that  all  the  divisions  in  the  front  line  could  be  relieved  every 
fortnight. 

Strengthen  our  third  line  with  a  substantial  main  reserve. 

Refrain  from  exposing  to  any  danger  the  army  awaiting  the 
English  offensive  in  these  positions — the  only  army  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Ottoman  Government. 

To  execute  these  movements  it  was  entirely  unnecessary  for 
the  Commander  of  the  Yildirim  Group  and  his  Headquarters  Staff 
to  come  to  Palestine.  Von  Kress  Pasha,  commanding  the 
Palestine  Front,  who  had  been  on  that  front  for  more  than  three 
years  and  conducted  the  two  defences  of  Gaza,  could  have  taken 
command  of  all  the  divisions  in  first  and  second  line,  while  the 
divisions  forming  the  main  reserve  would  be  under  my  direct 
orders. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Yildirim  Group  came  to  Palestine 
the  Headquarters  Staff  of  the  7th  Army  relieved  by  that  group 
would  have  to  follow  it,  and  it  would  then  become  necessary  to 
separate  the  Palestine  Front — essentially  a  single  front — into  two 
independent  sectors,  each  with  an  army. 

Yet  nothing  would  have  been  more  ridiculous  than  to  distribute 
eight  or  nine  and  perhaps  even  ten  army  corps  (and  I  do  not  know 
how  many  divisions)  in  two  armies,  seeing  that  the  whole  force 
from  start  to  finish  comprised  scarcely  fifty  thousand  bayonets. 

It  is  certain  that  it  would  have  been  far  better  to  employ  all 
the  efficient  young  officers  to  be  found  in  these  armies  and  army 
corps  to  fill  up  the  gaps  in  the  divisions. 


The  Battles  of  Gaza  189 

But  the  object  which  Marshal  von  Falkenhayn  Pasha  had  in 
mind  was  of  a  different  character.  After  he  realised  that  the 
expedition  against  Bagdad — which  he  had  at  first  considered  a  very 
simple  matter — was  impossible,  he  felt  that  his  position  was  very 
absurd,  and  desired  to  find  some  way  out  of  it.  To  save  his  own 
face  he  took  up  a  plan  which  Enver  Pasha  had  contemplated  three 
or  four  months  before,  the  plan  of  an  offensive  against  the  English 
in  Palestine.  Enver  Pasha  had  dropped  it  in  view  of  my  oppo- 
sition, but  von  Falkenhayn  now  said:  "  Djemal  Pasha  says  this 
operation  is  impossible,  but  I  consider  it  not  merely  possible,  but 
profitable/' 

Enver  Pasha,  however,  wished  neither  to  send  troops  to 
Palestine  nor  to  abandon  the  expedition  against  Bagdad,  so  he 
brought  the  Council  of  War  to  an  end  by  declaring  that  he 
remained  of  his  original  opinion. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  several  units  of  the  7th  Army  had  begun 
to  concentrate  at  Aleppo  a  month  before,  and  Mustafa  Kemal 
Pasha,  G.O.C.  the  7th  Army,  had  transferred  his  headquarters  to 
that  city. 

It  was  intolerable  to  me  to  see  these  troops  idling  in  Aleppo 
while,  in  my  opinion,  they  should  have  been  forming  an  indispen- 
sable part  of  our  force  on  the  Palestine  Front.  So  in  spite  of  the 
categorical  declarations  of  Enver  Pasha  and  the  announcement  of 
his  intentions  at  the  Council  of  War,  I  continued  to  make  repre- 
sentations— but  now  in  writing — that  these  troops  should  be  sent 
south  without  the  slightest  delay. 

At  this  moment  I  received  from  the  German  Emperor  an 
invitation  to  visit  the  Western  Front.  I  do  not  know  the  reasons. 

Count  Waldburg,  the  German  Councillor  of  Embassy,  who  was 
then  performing  the  functions  of  Charge  d'Affaires,  sent  the 
official  invitation  to  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  also 
communicated  it  to  me  personally  with  the  compliments  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor.  The  same  day  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador  informed  me  that  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
Austria  and  King  of  Hungary  invited  me  to  visit  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  front. 

After  obtaining  the  permission  of  His  Majesty  the  Sultan  I 
went  first  to  Germany. 

I  inspected  the  fleet  at  Wilhelmshaven  and  from  there  went  to 


i  go  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Cuxhaven  and  Kiel  on  board  the  Bayern.  At  Kiel  I  was  given  a 
very  kind  reception  by  Prince  Henry  and  visited  the  Arsenal  and 
the  Naval  Training  School  at  Hensburg.  In  Prince  Henry's 
company  I  was  present  at  several  naval  manoeuvres.  Travelling 
via  Hamburg  and  Essen,  where  I  visited  Krupp's  works,  I  then 
went  to  German  G.H.Q.  at  Kreuznach.  On  the  day  of  my  arrival 
the  news  of  the  capture  of  Riga  by  German  troops  had  just  come 
in,  and  the  rejoicing  was  great  and  general.  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  seemed  really  happy  and  light-hearted  that  day.  I  alone 
felt  depressed,  although  I  forced  myself  to  wear  the  mask  of 
cheerfulness. 

The  cause  of  my  sorrow  was  a  telegram  I  had  received  from 
Enver  Pasha  on  my  arrival  at  Kreuznach. 

In  this  telegram  Enver  Pasha  wrote : 

"  After  several  discussions  with  von  Falkenhayn  I  have  decided 
to  take  the  offensive  against  the  English  with  the  whole  of  the 
Yildirim  Group  and  to  send  von  Falkenhayn  there  to  take  the 
necessary  steps  to  carry  this  project  into  execution.  In  the  cir- 
cumstances it  is  inevitable  that  he  should  also  be  placed  in  command 
on  the  Palestine  Front.  Will  you  please  inform  von  Kress  Pasha 
that  it  will  be  necessary  for  him  to  carry  out  any  orders  issued  to 
him  by  von  Falkenhayn  ?  ' 

This  telegram  was  a  terrible  blow  to  me,  The  German  General 
had  got  his  own  way  and  ensured  the  adoption  of  a  fatal  scheme 
which  was  bound  to  involve  my  country  in  an  incalculable  disaster 

I  sent  Enver  Pasha  the  following  telegram : 

"  General  von  Falkenhayn  was  the  author  of  the  Verdun  affair, 
so  disastrous  for  Germany,  and  his  Palestine  offensive  will  mean 
an  equal  disaster  for  us." 

What  a  grief  it  was  to  me  to  realise  subsequently  that  I  had  so 
accurately  foretold  the  catastrophe  that  was  to  render  us 
defenceless ! 

The  very  same  day  I  tried  to  convince  Marshal  Hindenburg  and 
General  Ludendorff  of  all  the  disadvantages  of  the  operation  von 
Falkenhayn  desired.  Marshal  Hindenburg  replied  that  from  such 
a  distance  it  was  difficult  to  calculate  the  disadvantages  or  advan- 
tages of  such  a  plan,  but  he  thought  I  was  right.  General 
Ludendorff  said  exactly  the  same,  but  thought  that  by  attacking 
the  enemy  in  that  way  one  might  occasionally  compel  him  to  deliver 


The  Battles  of  Gaza  191 

his  own  attacks,  not  at  the  point  he  himself  intended,  but  where 
his  opponent  desired.  He  said  he  assumed  that  this  was  what 
General  von  Falkenhayn  had  in  mind  when  he  decided  on  his 
offensive.  He  added  further  that  any  intervention  by  him  could 
only  do  harm,  and  that  the  only  way  out  of  the  difficulty  was  for  me 
to  come  to  some  understanding-  with  Enver  Pasha  after  my  return 
to  Constantinople. 

After  leaving  Kreuznach  I  visited  Bruges,  Zeebriigge,  Ostend, 
and  then  the  front  of  the  German  4th  Army,  which  had  its 
headquarters  at  Cambrai.  I  returned  to  Constantinople. 

On  my  arrival  I  had  several  further  discussions  with  Enver 
Pasha,  but  was  compelled  to  recognise  that  I  should  not  succeed  in 
making  him  abandon  his  plan.  I  thereupon  made  up  my  mind  to 
resign.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Arab  revolt  had  already 
reached  the  neighbourhood  of  Maan  and  if  I  now  left  Syria  would 
soon  extend  to  Damascus  and  thereby  involve  the  country  in 
certain  disaster,  Enver  Pasha  begged  me  fervently  to  abandon  the 
notion.  The  objections  he  raised  were  certainly  valid  ones.  The 
Druses  and  Beduins  were  north  of  Maan.  The  refractory  Arabs, 
whose  influence  had  begun  to  make  itself  felt  in  Damascus,  but 
who  had  not  dared  to  kick  over  the  traces  (thanks  to  my  strong 
rule),  might  rise  at  any  moment,  cut  all  the  communications  of  the 
Palestine  Army,  loot  all  its  supply  depots,  and  bring  about  its 
utter  defeat. 

I  had  no  alternative  but  to  sacrifice  myself  once  more.  I  was 
compelled  to  put  up  with  a  compromise  which  severely  restricted 
my  powers  and  materially  affected  my  position  vis  &  vis  General 
von  Falkenhayn.  In  accordance  with  this  arrangement  the 
General,  who  had  the  title  of  Commander  of  the  Yildirim  Army 
Group,  was  assigned  the  task  of  carrying  through  an  offensive 
against  the  English  Palestine  Front  with  the  7th  Army  attached 
to  this  Army  Group.  While  this  operation  was  being  prepared 
and  carried  out  the  troops  on  this  front  under  the  command  of 
von  Kress  Pasha  (which  had  hitherto,  of  course,  been  under  my 
command)  were  put  under  the  command  of  the  G.O.C.  Yildirim 
Army  Group. 

I  was  instructed  to  see  to  the  supplies  of  the  armies  of  the 
Yildirim  Group  and  the  troops  of  the  Palestine  Front.  General 
von  Falkenhayn  was  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  civil  authorities 


192  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

of  Syria  and  Palestine.  I  alone  was  to  deal  with  the  civil 
administration. 

The  detachments  which  were  to  operate  east  of  the  Jordan  were 
to  be  under  my  command,  and  I  was  entrusted  with  the  defence  of 
the  entire  coast  north  of  Jaffa  and  the  military  protection  of  the 
country. 

On  these  terms  I  assumed  the  title  of  "  Commander  of  the 
Armies  in  Syria  and  Western  Arabia/'  with  the  privileges  of  an 
Army  Group  Commander. 

If  General  von  Falkenhayn  had  also  displayed  a  certain  spirit 
of  conciliation  this  arrangement  would  have  led  to  no  diffi- 
culties in  the  matter  of  spheres  of  command  or  the  administration 
of  Syria  and  Palestine,  and  everything  would  have  remained  as  it 
was.  Even  if  nothing  could  excuse  the  appalling  mistake  of 
allowing  divisions  to  idle  away  two  or  three  months  at  Aleppo  on 
the  excuse  of  an  expedition  against  Bagdad  so  that  they  arrived 
on  the  Palestine  Front  very  late,  at  any  rate  there  need  have  been 
no  transformation  of  the  internal  administration  of  Syria,  which 
had  lasted  three  years. 

When  I  returned  from  the  German  front  to  Constantinople  I 
had  heard  that  differences  of  opinion  had  arisen  between  Mustafa 
Kernel  Pasha,  the  Commander  of  the  7th  Army,  and  von  Falken- 
hayn. I  went  into  the  cause  of  the  dispute,  and  came  to  the  con- 
clusion that  Kemal  Pasha  was  entirely  in  the  right. 

Mustafa  Kemal  Pasha  respected  all  the  rights  of  the  Army 
Commander,  while  von  Falkenhayn  claimed  the  right  to  interfere 
in  the  affairs  of  the  7th  Army  in  a  way  which  was  inadmissible 
even  in  dealing  with  a  Corps  Commander. 

For  example,  when  von  Falkenhayn  wished  to  intervene 
directly  in  Arab  affairs  which  appertained  to  Mustafa  Kemal 
Pasha's  sphere,  the  latter  gave  him  to  understand  that  these  affairs 
concerned  his  army  alone  and  von  Falkenhayn  had  no  authority 
whatever  in  such  matters. 

Mustafa  Kemal  Pasha,  who  knew  only  too  well  how  much 
damage  might  be  done  by  certain  orders  of  von  Falkenhayn's 
which  were  incompatible  with  the  Beduin  constitution,  opposed 
these  encroachments  of  the  German  general  in  the  most  categorical 
fashion,  appealing  to  the  authority  given  him  by  his  position  as 
Army  Commander. 


The  Battles  of  Gaza  193 

Such  was  more  or  less  the  position  in  Syria  when  I  returned  to 
Aleppo  from  Constantinople  towards  the  middle  of  November. 

Mustafa  Kemal  Pasha  saw  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  be 
under  the  orders  of  General  von  Falkenhayn,  and  I  also  was  con- 
vinced that  as  long  as  the  German  general  was  in  Syria  the  influence 
I  had  been  able  to  exercise  for  three  years  would  be  undermined 
and  irreparable  harm  would  result  for  the  country. 

Ultimately,  after  a  long  and  bitter  correspondence,  Mustafa 
Kemal  Pasha  gave  up  his  army  command  and  returned  to 
Constantinople. 

I  had  told  him  that  I  was  thinking  of  following  his  example, 
but  that,  as  Enver  Pasha  had  told  me  he  was  coming  to  Syria  in  the 
immediate  future,  I  would  await  his  arrival. 

I  considered  my  decision  irrevocable. 

But  when  Enver  Pasha  came  to  Damascus  he  was  so  fervent 
in  his  entreaties  and  the  Governors-General  of  Beirut,  Syria  and 
Aleppo  pressed  me  so  strongly  that  for  the  time  being  I  considered 
myself  compelled  to  abandon  my  intention  of  leaving  Syria. 
Mustafa  Kemal  Pasha  disapproved  of  my  attitude,  but  subse- 
quently I  convinced  him  that  the  situation  at  the  moment  made 
this  last  sacrifice  inevitable. 

For  myself,  I  maintain  that  if  (i)  the  idea  of  recovering  Bagdad 
had  never  been  mooted  and  all  available  troops  had  been  concen- 
trated on  the  Palestine  front,  (2)  von  Falkenhayn  had  not  been 
put  in  command  of  the  army  in  Palestine,  we  could  have  held  the 
Gaza-Beersheba  line  for  years,  and  on  the  day  of  the  armistice 
Syria  and  Palestine  would  still  have  formed  part  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire. 


N 


THE  ARAB  REBELLION 


N2 


CHAPTER   VIII. 
THE  ARAB  REBELLION. 

ON  the  day  of  my  arrival  in  Damascus  Hulussi  Bey,  the  Governor- 
General  of  Syria,  told  me  he  wanted  to  confer  with  me  on  extremely 
important  matters.  We  met  the  same  night  at  Government 
House.  He  handed  me  some  very  important  documents  which 
had  been  seized  at  the  French  Consulate,  and  told  me  that  most  of 
the  documents  implicated  the  most  highly-placed  and  influential 
Mussulmans  of  Damascus,  Beirut  and  other  cities.  He  said  he 
had  not  cared  to  decide  whether  immediate  legal  action  against 
these  people  was  indicated  or  not,  and  had  therefore  awaited  my 
arrival. 

Judging  by  these  documents,  there  was  not  the  slightest  doubt 
that  the  Arab  revolutionaries  were  working  under  French  protec- 
tion and,  indeed,  under  the  guidance  and  for  the  benefit  of  the 
French  Government. 

Yet  to  take  immediate  legal  action  against  these  traitors  might 
well  endanger  the  success  of  the  Islam  unity  movement,  which 
was  the  goal  of  our  endeavour.  If  we  had  taken  such  action  at 
once,  Mohammedan  countries  such  as  Egypt,  India,  Algiers  and  j 
Morocco,  which  had  lost  contact  with  us,  would  have  thought  that 
the  Turks  were  yielding  to  feelings  of  vengeance  or  endeavouring 
to  secure  the  supremacy  of  the  Turanian  nation  by  taking  the  lives 
of  the  most  influential  Arabs.  In  the  mighty  struggle  upon  which 
we  had  entered  to  free  the  Mohammedan  world  from  a  foreign 
yoke  it  was  our  principal  task  to  preserve  unity  of  aim  and  effort 
in  the  lands  of  Islam.  For  that  reason  we  decided  not  to  breathe 
a  word  about  this  matter  for  the  time  being. 

197 


198  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Shortly  before  my  arrival  in  Syria  several  important  documents, 
implicating  Nahle  Mutran  Pasha  of  Baalbek,  were  handed  over 
to  a  court  martial.  As  the  inquiry  was  already  in  progress,  it  was 
necessary  to  let  justice  take  its  course.  The  court  martial  con- 
demned Nahle  Mutran  Pasha  to  penal  servitude  for  life. 

After  my  visit  to  Jerusalem  Hulussi  Bey  told  me  that  the 
presence  of  Nahle  Pasha  in  Damascus  was  open  to  objection,  and 
he  had  obtained  permission  from  Constantinople  to  send  him  under 
guard  to  Diarbekir.  During  the  journey  the  Pasha  had  attempted 
to  escape  one  night  when  they  were  near  Djerablus,  and  had  been 
found  dead  by  his  guards. 

The  documents  discovered  in  the  French  Consulate  at  Damascus 
contained  sufficiently  strong  evidence  to  implicate  beyond  hope 
Envir  AH  Pasha,  the  son  of  Envir  Abd-el-Kader,  Vice-President 
of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  his  brother  Envir  Olmer,  ex-Deputy 
for  Damascus,  Sheffik  el  Mueyyed  Bey,  Senator  Abdul  Hamid 
Lehravi  Effendi,  Yahya  el  Atrash,  Sheik  of  the  Druses,  Civil 
Inspector  Wehab  el  Inglisi,  Shukri  el  Asli,  Rushdi  Bey  el  Shema, 
formerly  Deputy  for  Damascus — i.e.,  many  of  the  most  influential 
and  well-known  Arabs. 

Yet  I  felt  sure  that  they  would  ultimately  realise  that  the  general 
war  was  a  life  and  death  matter  for  the  Mohammedan  world  and 
would  one  day  repent  of  their  criminal  activities.  On  that  assump- 
tion I  had  come  to  the  honest  conclusion  to  take  no  action  against 
them.  Being  not  averse  in  principle  to  the  use  of  the  Arab  tongue 
and  the  grant  of  certain  privileges  in  administrative  affairs,  I  sent 
for  the  leader  of  the  Arab  revolutionary  movement,  Abdul  Kerim 
el  Halil,  of  whom  I  spoke  in  the  opening  chapter  of  my  memoirs. 
I  overwhelmed  him  with  courtesies  and  benevolence. 

Through  his  agency  I  had  a  meeting  with  some  of  the  most 
influential  revolutionary  leaders,  including  one  of  their  greatest 
zealots,  Dr.  Abdul  Rahman  Shehbendir,  the  proprietor  of  the 
paper  El  Mufid,  Abdul  Gani  el  Arisi,  one  of  the  principal  organisers 
of  the  Arab  Congress  in  Paris,  and  the  proprietor  of  the  well- 
known  paper  El  Muktebes,  Mehoned  Kivid  AH.  I  explained  to 
them  the  views  of  the  Government,  and  insisted  that  it  would  be 
possible  to  liberate  the  Mohammedan  world  from  a  foreign  yoke 
if  the  great  war  ended  with  a  victory  for  us.  All  of  them — with- 
out exception — agreed  with  what  I  said,  and  swore  by  their  faith 


The  Arab  Rebellion  199 

and  honour  that  during  the  war  the  Arabs  of  Syria  and  Palestine 
would  remain  loyal  to  the  Government,  place  no  difficulties  in  its 
way,  and  translate  these  words  into  deeds.  In  the  same  breath 
these  so-called  revolutionaries,  starting  with  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil, 
began  a  doleful  tale  about  their  poor  financial  position  and  great 
need  of  money.  I  distributed  pretty  substantial  sums  between 
Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil,  Melumed  Kurd  Ali  and  Abdul  Gani  el  Arisi. 
From  that  time  onwards  these  gentlemen  were  my  most  humble 
servants,  and  assured  me  that  they  would  lose  no  time  in  doing 
everything  in  their  power  to  assist  me. 


• 


Immediately  on  my  arrival  in  Damascus  I  started  on  the  prepara- 
tions for  the  expedition  against  the  Canal,  and  also  endeavoured  |  \/ 
to  create  an  atmosphere  of  religious  and  patriotic  fervour  in  all  / 
the  Arab  countries. 

I  had  a  literary  festival  arranged  through  the  agency  of  leaders 
of  the  Arab  revolutionaries,  such  as  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil,  Dr. 
Abdul  Rahman  Shehbender  and  several  others  (who  were  known 
as  "  Reformers  ").  During  this  festival  the  best  speakers  among 
the  Reformers  gave  several  lectures  and  read  poems  which  sang 
the  praises  of  the  Arabs  and  glorified  the  passion  for  knowledge 
and  progress  which  animated  the  Arab  race.  Songs  were  sung 
in  which  the  hopes  of  Arab  unity  were  proclaimed.  The  "  Nahnu 
Djundullahu  Shubban  el  Bilad,"  an  Arab  patriotic  song,  nearly 
brought  down  the  roof  of  the  building  in  which  we  were. 

After  showing  by  my  conduct  that  I  was  quite  sympathetic  to 
all  this  and  desired  to  help  as  much  as  I  could,  I  mounted  the 
rostrum  and  made  a  long  speech.  I  emphasised  the  fact  that  we 
were  all  devoted  to  the  Arab  tongue,  the  language  of  our  religion, 
and  loved  and  respected  the  race,  with  which  we  were  associated 
by  a  common  faith.  I  said  they  could  be  assured  that  the  steps 
we  had  taken  in  the  previous  year  to  help  the  Arabs  in  their 
ambitions  would  be  repeated,  and  I  added : 

"  Gentlemen,  the  programme  for  the  welfare  of  the  Arabs 
which  our  party  means  to  carry  out  in  its  entirety  is  more  compre- 
hensive than  anything  you  can  imagine.  I  myself  am  not  one  of 
those  who  think  it  a  harmful  or  dangerous  thing  that  the  two  races, 
Arab  and  Turkish,  should  secure  their  unity  while  remaining 
separate  nations,  subject  to  the  same  Khalif. 


200  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

"  But  if  we  want  to  achieve  our  object,  much,  very  much, 
remains  to  be  done.  The  impostors  in  our  midst  who  betray  their 
country  and  faith  must  be  driven  away,  and  we  must  make  certain 
that  those  who  are  at  work  with  the  enemy's  gold  find  no  place 
among  us.  Above  all,  I  want  you  to  realise  that  the  pro-Turkish 
movement  which  you  have  noticed  in  Constantinople  and  other 
Mussulman  regions  inhabited  by  Turks  in  no  way  conflicts  with 
Arab  ambitions.  You  know  well  that  there  have  been  Bulgarian, 
Greek  and  Armenian  movements  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  There 
is  now  an  Arab  movement.  The  Turks  had  forgotten  their  own 
existence  so  completely  that  they  hardly  dared  to  mention  their 
own  race.  The  national  spirit  had  gone  to  sleep  and  ultimately 
the  race  might  have  completely  disappeared. 

'  Under  the  impression  of  the  menace  ahead  the  Young  Turks 
rose  with  a  zeal  beyond  praise.  They  took  to  arms  to  teach  the 
Turks  national  spirit  and  the  virtues  associated  with  it.  That  has 
been  the  object  of  all  their  endeavours  for  the  last  two  or  three 
years,  and  those  efforts  have  brought  about  the  revival  of  the 
Ottoman  Khalifate.  It  was  they  who  raised  the  army  you  see 
to-day,  and  they  have  not  hesitated  to  enter  into  an  alliance  with 
those  whom  fate  has  sent  to  us  and  to  declare  a  holy  war  upon  the 
fetreditary  enemy  of  our  faith. 

"  To-day  I  am  in  a  position  to  assure  you  that  the  Turkish  and 
Arab  ideals  do  not  conflict.  They  are  brothers  in  their  national 
strivings,  and  perhaps  their  efforts  are  complementary.  The  aims 
of  the  Young  Turks  are  to  awaken  national  feeling  in  the  Turkish 
nation,  train  their  countrymen  to  work,  free  them  from  the  Slav 
yoke,  give  them  health  and  national  expansion,  increase  the  wel- 
fare and  prosperity  of  Turkish  countries.  In  a  word,  they  want 
to  make  the  Turkish  race  respected  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  and 
secure  its  right  to  exist  side  by  side  with  the  other  nations  in  the 
twentieth  century. 

"  The  Young  Turks  have  resolved  to  work  tirelessly  to  achieve 
these  objects.  As  one  of  them,  I  appeal  to  you  in  your  own 
tongue  that,  as  the  representatives  of  Young  Arabia,  you,  too, 
should  work  for  the  success  of  this  cause.  Do  not  believe  the 
lies  of  the  hirelings  in  foreign  pay,  to  whom  fraud  and  cunning 
are  permissible  methods  of  securing  control  of  the  Arab  countries. 

"  I  turn  to  the  youth  of  Turkey  and  Arabia  and  say  these  two 


The  Arab  Rebellion  201 

nations  will  be  doomed  to  destruction  the  moment  they  separate. 
Discord  between  these  two  great  pillars  of  the  Islam  religion  will 
bring  with  it  the  downfall  of  the  Mussulman  power,  and  ultimately 
it  will  be  impossible  to  avert  slavery  under  the  Slavs. 

"  Most  regrettable  would  it  be,  gentlemen,  if  the  devilish  con- 
trivings  of  the  foes  of  our  faith  and  country  resulted  in  dissension 
among  us.  Turks  and  Arabs  must  love  and  respect  each  other, 
and  thus  harvest  the  fruits  of  their  joint  labours.  I  warn  you  that 
otherwise  you  are  doomed  to  slavery  and  destruction !  " 

This  speech  made  a  considerable  impression  upon  my  audience. 
The  next  day  many  distinguished  people  came  to  Headquarters  to 
thank  me.  The  reformers  were  very  satisfied.  During  the  days 
following  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  assembled  in  various  groups 
with  their  banners,  pledged  their  loyalty  to  the  Government  on 
the  Koran,  and  vowed  that  they  intended  to  do  everything  in  their 
power  to  help  in  the  defence  of  the  rights  of  Islam  against  the 
English  and  French. 

When  I  contrast  the  results  obtained  to-day  with  the  religious 
demonstrations  which  took  place  at  that  time  at  Damascus,  Aleppo, 
Kama,  Horns,  Beirut  and  even  in  the  Lebanon,  I  can  only  call  down 
the  curse  of  Heaven  on  Sherif  Hussein  and  his  sons,  who  are  wholly 
and  solely  responsible. 

As  I  have  already  said,  the  policy  I  desired  to  see  pursued  in 
Syria  was  a  policy  of  clemency  and  tolerance.  I  left  no  stone 
unturned  to  create  unity  of  views  and  sentiments  in  all  the  Arab 
countries. 

I  wrote,  for  example,  to  the  men  of  standing  in  Bagdad, 
Kerbela  and  the  Nedjef,  to  several  of  the  Sheiks  of  Irak,  with 
whom  I  had  been  on  friendly  terms  in  my  Bagdad  days,  and  to 
Ibu  Saoud  and  Ibu  Reschid  to  ask  them  to  help  Suleiman  Askeri 
Bey,  who  had  been  sent  with  one  or  two  divisions  and  the  "  Tech- 
kilat  Mahsusse  "  Osmandjik  battalion  against  the  English,  who 
were  in  occupation  of  Basra  and  district.  I  sent  a  special  letter 
to  the  Imam  Seid  Yahya  Hamid-ed-dine  pointing  out  the  necessity 
of  his  making  common  cause  with  our  detachments  in  the  Yemen. 

From  all  these  Arab  leaders  I  received  answers  in  which  they 
assured  me  of  their  devotion  and  loyalty  to  the  Khalifate  and  the 
religious  enthusiasm  which  inspired  them  in  common  with  all  the 


202  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Arab  countries  intent  on  participating-  in  the  Holy  War  against 
the  foes  of  our  faith. 

I  had  letters  to  the  same  effect,  though  expressd  somewhat 
vaguely,  from  Sherif  Hussein,  with  whom  I  had  been  in 
correspondence. 

As  I  knew  that  one  of  the  most  effective  ways  of  pleasing  the 
Arabs  was  to  avoid  requisitioning  anything  from  them  and  pay 
for  what  we  wanted  cash  down,  the  first  order  I  issued  on  my 
arrival  was  that  nothing  should  be  taken  by  way  of  requisition 
from  the  civil  population  of  Syria  and  Palestine  in  the  4th  Army 
area.  Prompt  cash  was  to  be  paid  for  everything  of  any  descrip- 
tion whatever — food,  equipment  or  clothing.  In  view  of  the 
injustice  and  inequality  in  insisting  that  everything  must  be  paid 
for  in  Syria  and  Palestine,  while  food  and  other  articles  were  simply 
requisitioned  in  other  parts  of  the  Empire,  I  recommended  the 
Government  at  home  to  adopt  the  same  course. 

I  displayed  great  confidence  in  the  "  Reform  "  party.  I  did 
not  hesitate  to  go  and  see  a  patriotic  demonstration  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Reis  Baalbek,  an  outlying  and  lonely  station,  although 
I  was  accompanied  only  by  my  aide-de-camp  and  Hulussi  Bey,  the 
Vali  of  Syria.  I  had  considered  it  necessary  to  take  part  in  this 
ceremony  and  thus  evince  the  highest  confidence  in  Abdul  Kerimel 
Halil  (who  had  organis'ed  this  affair),  in  order  to  strengthen  his 
position  in  the  eyes  of  the  Mitvalis  (Shiites).  In  fact,  whatever  I 
did  and  wherever  I  went  in  the  vilayets  of  Beirut  and  Syria,  I  was 
always  accompanied  by  Reformers,  until  I  went  to  the  Sinai 
Peninsula  to  conduct  the  operations  against  the  Canal. 

About  this  time  there  was  a  general  idea  throughout  Syria  and 
Beirut  that  the  Christians  of  the  Lebanon  would  rise  in  the  near 
future.  I  was  advised  on  all  sides  to  suspend  the  special  rights  of 
the  Lebanon  and  issue  a  proclamation  calling  upon  the  civil  popula- 
tion to  deliver  up  their  arms  to  the  Government.  It  was  said  that 
there  were  fifty  thousand  modern  rifles  in  the  Lebanon. 

I  did  not  credit  these  rumours  in  the  least,  and  such  action  on 
my  part  would  have  aroused  suspicion  among  the  Christian  inhabi- 
tants of  Syria  and  Palestine  and  provoked  them  to  rebellion,  even 
if  they  had  no  such  intention  hitherto.  I  was  certain  that,  whoever 
took  in  hand  the  business  of  disarming  them,  several  illegal  acts 
were  bound  to  occur  and  many  innocent  persons  would  be  unneces- 


The  Arab  Rebellion  203 

sarily  disturbed.  Under  the  pretext  of  house  searching  the  pro- 
pertied classes  among  the  inhabitants  of  the  Lebanon  were  bound 
to  suffer  immense  material  damage. 

For  these  reasons  I  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  civil  popula- 
tion of  the  Lebanon  assuring  them  that  their  old  privileges  would 
be  respected  and  no  one  would  do  them  any  harm.  Three  bishops 
sent  by  the  Maronite  Patriarch,  Monsignor  Peter  Hoyek,  visited 
me  and  told  me  that  my  proclamation  had  reassured  the  Maronites ; 
they  would  never  forget  this  kindness  of  mine,  and  I  need  never 
expect  anything  but  the  most  loyal  devotion  from  them  in  future. 
The  same  sentiments  were  expressed  in  a  letter  from  the  Patriarch 
himself. 

But  a  few  of  the  Maronites  and  Druses  of  the  Lebanon  were 
well  known  to  be  friendly  to  the  French  and  English  and  under 
strong  suspicion  of  secretly  fomenting  disorder,  and  as  a  matter 
of  precaution  I  invited  them  to  reside  in  Jerusalem  for  the  duration 
of  the  expedition  against  Egypt.  The  expenses  of  residence  there 
were  defrayed  from  army  funds,  and  they  were  free  to  reside 
exactly  where  they  liked. 

The  list  of  the  names  of  these  people  was  given  to  me  by  Govern- 
ment officials,  but  it  was  drawn  up  by  the  reformers  of  Syria  and 
Beirut  with  the  assistance  of  some  of  the  leading  men  of  the 
Lebanon. 

The  result  of  the  secret  inquiries  I  made  showed  that  these 
gentlemen  were  not  altogether  without  reproach,  and  I  can  see 
that  I  made  no  mistake  in  my  selection  when  I  read  their  names 
in  the  papers  to-day  and  realise  that  they  are  the  very  men  who 
are  now  doing  their  utmost  to  restore  the  French  protectorate — 
thus  dealing  a  fatal  blow  at  Arab  unity. 

The  American  Ambassador,  Mr.  Morgenthau,  in  his  well-known 
book  in  which  he  speaks  of  me  in  anything  but  complimentary 
terms,  has  not  hesitated  to  allege  that  I  was  guilty  of  many  illegal 
and  oppressive  acts  towards  the  Christian  population  of  Syria.  I 
could  answer  this  gentleman  with  a  simple  "  It  is  not  true,  sir !  ' 
but  it  seems  to  me  more  appropriate  to  give  a  few  facts  in  chrono- 
logical order. 

On  my  arrival  in  Jerusalem  on  the  3rd  or  4th  of  January,  1915, 
the  Consuls  of  Allied  and  neutral  States  drew  my  attention  to  a 
certain  book,  and  informed  me  that  its  contents  had  caused  the 


204  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

greatest  excitement  among  the  Mussulman  inhabitants,  and  that 
everyone  was  expecting  a  massacre  of  the  Christians  by  the 
Mohammedans  at  any  moment.  I  read  the  pamphlet  and  saw  that 
it  was  a  commentary  on  the  Jehad,  and  set  forth  that  it  was  the 
sacred  duty  of  the  Mohammedans  to  declare  a  holy  war  on  the 
Christians.  As  I  wanted  to  undo^the  evil  effect  of  this  pamphlet, 
I  issued  a  long  proclamation  to  the  civil  population  of  Syria.  Un- 
doubtedly the  pamphlet  used  language  which  might  easily  mislead 
the  ignorant.  My  proclamation,  which  was  distributed  even  in  the 
tiniest  hamlets  and  made  public  everywhere  by  posters,  ran  briefly 
as  follows : 

"  The  Holy  War  has  been  declared  by  the  Khalif  of  Islam  only 
against  the  English,  French  and  Russians,  who  are  the  enemies  of 
our  faith.  It  relates  to  those,  and  those  only,  who  take  up  arms 
against  us.  For  that  reason  all  who  cherish  any  evil  design  what- 
ever against  our  non-Mohammedan  countrymen,  associated  with 
us  by  the  bond  of  a  common  fatherland  and  common  interests,  will 
be  punished  by  me  with  the  greatest  severity/' 

The  Russian  diplomatist,  Mandelstamm,  refers  in  great  detail  to 
the  pamphlet  in  question  on  page  370  of  his  book,  "  The  Fate  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire/'  May  I  ask  this  gentleman  why  he  did  not 
take  the  trouble  to  translate  my  proclamation  also  ?  I  can  assure 
Messrs.  Morgenthau  and  Mandelstamm  that  had  I  at  any  time 
during  the  war  cherished  the  idea. of  provoking  a  massacre  of  the 
Syrian  Christians  by  the  Mohammedans,  nothing  could  have  been 
easier.  The  fact  that  throughout  the  war  the  Christians  and  Jews 
were  never  in  the  slightest  degree  troubled  by  the  Mohammedans 
and  Druses  is  to  be  ascribed  solely  to  my  efforts  and  precautions. 
Mandelstamm  may  say  in  his  notorious  book  that  the  Christians 
of  Syria  were  not  massacred  merely  owing  to  the  absence  of  the 
Kurds,  who  had  been  sent  against  the  Armenians,  but  I  am  quite 
sure  that,  in  his  heart  of  hearts,  he  does  not  believe  it  himself.  If 
I  had  once  let  the  Beduins  and  Syrians  know  that  there  was  a 
chance  of  their  robbing  the  Christians  of  the  Lebanon,  who  are 
very  rich,  I  need  have  taken  no  further  trouble. 

No,  gentlemen  !  Once  more  I  say  that  when  you  maintain 
in  your  books  that  I  intentionally  allowed  the  Christians  of  Syria 
to  die  you  are  stating  what  is  pure  fiction.  The  day  will  come 
when  honourable  men  in  America,  France,  and  England  will  tell 


The  Arab  Rebellion  205 

the  truth  and  authenticate  it  with  their  signatures.     Will  your 
cheeks  then  flame  with  shame  ?    I  doubt  it ! 

After  my  return  from  the  first  expedition  against  the  Canal 
nothing  happened  to  shake  my  confidence  in  the  reformers.  My 
policy  towards  them  was  so  straightforward  that  I  urged  Abdul 
Kerim  el  Halil  and  Dr.  Abdul  Rahman  el  Shehbender  to  visit  the 
Turko-Arab  troops  who  were  returning  from  the  Canal  Expedition 
and  satisfy  themselves  of  their  excellent  moral.  I  invited  them  to 
come  to  Jerusalem  and  after  giving  them  a  considerable  sum  to 
defray  the  expenses  of  their  journey,  I  sent  them  to  the  troops. 
Without  any  sort  of  supervision  they  spent  three  weeks  with  the 
army.  On  their  return  they  spoke  in  high  terms  of  the  discipline 
and  supply  arrangements  of  the  troops. 

During  May,  1915,  I  read  in  the  Egyptian  papers  such  violent 
attacks  on  the  Ottoman  Government  by  the  Ella  Merkezye  Com- 
mittee that  I  was  at  a  loss  to  account  for  this  degree  of  bitter 
vulgarity. 

One  day  I  asked  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil  if  he  could  explain  the 
contrast  between  the  loyalty  of  the  teformers  of  Syria  and  Beirut 
and  the  base  allegations  made  by  men  like  Refik  el  Azmet  and 
others  who  were  regarded  as  leaders.  In  some  confusion  he  tried 
to  give  me  an  answer,  but  it  was  perfectly  obvious  that  my  question 
had  greatly  frightened  him. 

A  few  days  later  he  called  on  me  and  told  me  that  if  I  wished 
he  would  go  to  Egypt  to  explain  the  policy  I  was  pursuing  in  Syria 
to  the  leaders  of  the  Ella  Merkezye.  He  assured  me  that  he  would 
use  every  endeavour  to  make  them  adopt  a  different  attitude. 

At  this  time  the  state  of  Syria  was  as  critical  and  deplorable  as 
could  be.  The  English  and  French  had  landed  at  the  Dardanelles 
and  were  renewing  their  violent  attacks  every  day.  At  the  wish  of 
G.H.Q.  I  had  sent  to  Constantinople  the  8th,  loth,  and  25th 
Divisions,  which  had  been  in  Syria.  They  were  subsequently 
followed  by  all  the  machine-gun  companies  and,  in  short,  every- 
thing in  the  way  of  men  and  material  required  for  the  defence  of 
the  Dardanelles.  In  an  area  stretching  from  the  Taurus  to  the 
Medina  I  had  to  maintain  internal  order  and  prevent  any  hostile 
landing,  but  there  was  nothing  at  my  disposal  but  one  or  two  Arab 
divisions  and  the  Dervish  Mevlevi  volunteer  battalion.  If  a  revolt 


206  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

had  broken  out  as  the  result  of  foreign  intrigues  there  would  have 
been  no  way  of  suppressing  it,  and  the  Government  would  have 
lost  all  its  Arab  territories.  If  the  English  and  French  had  secured 
the  assistance  of  the  natives  and  landed  two  divisions  at  any  point 
of  the  Syrian  coast — Beirut  or  Haifa,  for  example — we  should 
have  found  ourselves  in  a  perfectly  desperate  situation.  But  as  I 
felt  perfectly  sure  of  the  civil  population,  I  had  no  hesitation  what- 
ever in  committing  the  safety  of  the  country  to  the  Arab 
formations  and  leaving  the  coastal  districts  practically  without 
surveillance. 

I  am  certain  that  if  the  English  had  had  the  slightest  doubt 
about  the  loyalty  of  the  civil  population  of  Syria  and  Palestine 
they  would  certainly  have  attempted  a  landing.  But  at  this  time 
the  treasonable  activities  of  Sherif  Hussein  had  scarcely  begun, 
and  I  knew  nothing  about  them.  But  notwithstanding  all  the 
superficial  confidence  I  displayed  in  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil  I  was 
sure  that  he  could  be  easily  won  over  by  money,  and  his  proposal 
to  go  to  Egypt  aroused  my  suspicions.  Italy  also  had  declared 
war  on  us  at  this  time,  and  thus  all  communications  between  the 
Syrian  coast  and  the  outside  world  had  been  broken.  I  did  not 
understand  how  Abdul  Kerim  Halil  thought  he  could  get  to  Egypt. 
In  reply  to  my  question  he  answered,  "  I'll  find  some  way."  This 
answer  confirmed  my  suspicions,  but  I  did  not  betray  anything. 

About  the  end  of  June  Sheik  Essad  Shukair,  the  "  Army 
Mufti  "*  came  to  me  to  tell  me  of  the  beginnings  of  revolt  which 
were  perceptible  in  Syria.  He  said  that  Kiamil  el  Essad,  the 
deputy  for  Beirut,  who  lived  in  his  native  village  in  the  Kaza  of 
Sidon,  could  give  me  more  detailed  information.  I  immediately 
telegraphed  to  Kiamil  Essad  Bey,  and  he  came  to  Jerusalem  two 
days  later  with  another  gentleman.  What  he  said  was  this  : 

"  Effendim !  Your  Excellency  shows  great  confidence  in  the 
reformers  and  allows  them  absolute  freedom  in  the  country,  but 
I'm  afraid  that  they  are  abusing  your  confidence.  At  the  moment 
Riza  Beyel  Sulk,  the  former  deputy  for  Beirut,  and  Abdul  Kerim 
el  Halil  are  engaged  in  organising  a  rebellion  in  the  region  of 
Tyre  and  Sidon.  If  Your  Excellency  will  make  enquiries  you  will 
obtain  confirmation  of  all  I  tell  you." 

*  Corresponds  to  Chaplain  General  [Tr.]. 


The  Arab  Rebellion  207 

The  Arabs  have  one  great  weakness.  The  moment  one  of 
them  gets  more  attention  or  kindness  than  the  others,  all  the  rest 
are  smitten  with  jealousy  and  begin  to  agitate  against  him.  But 
I  could  not  assign  any  such  motive  to  the  revelations  of  Kiamil  el 
Essad.  I  had  never  treated  him  as  of  lower  rank  than  Abdul 
Kerim  el  Halil,  and  so  he  could  have  had  no  personal  interest  in 
intriguing  against  him.  Riza  Bey  el  Sulk,  on  the  other  hand,  I 
had  always  regarded  as  a  low  intriguer  and  refused  to  receive 
him. 

After  taking  Kiamil  el  Essad's  opinion  as  to  the  best  method 
of  conducting  the  enquiry  I  issued  the  necessary  instructions. 
The  enquiry  lasted  a  fortnight,  and  showed  that  Abdul  Kerim  el 
Halil  and  Riza  Bey  el  Sulk  were  in  fact  fomenting  a  revolt  in  the 
region  of  Tyre  and  Sidon.  I  immediately  ordered  their  arrest  and 
that  of  their  accomplices,  for  any  loss  of  time  might  be  dangerous. 
The  conspirators  had  chosen  their  locality  well,  for  the  district  of 
Tyre  and  Sidon  was  guarded  less  than  any  other  part  of  the  coast 
region.  There  was  only  one  company  there,  and  the  surveillance 
force  consisted  of  a  few  gendarmes. 

As  the  stretch  of  coast  between  Beirut  and  Syria  lies  on  no 
great  highway,  neither  officers  nor  administrative  officials  were  in 
the  habit  of  visiting  it.  I  myself  had  never  thought  of  making  a 
journey  to  that  region.  Thus  the  revolutionaries  could  work  there 
quite  undisturbed,  and  after  thoroughly  preparing  and  poisoning 
public  opinion,  they  could  have  been  assisted  by  a  hostile  force, 
landed  at  night,  and  have  occupied  the  mountainous  district  in  the 
interior  and  put  in  a  state  of  defence  against  attack  from  north 
east,  and  west. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  while  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil  and  Riza  Bey 
el  Sulk  were  fomenting  disorder  several  not  unimportant  attempts 
on  Tyre  and  Sidon  were  made  by  the  enemy's  vessels  employed  in 
watching  the  coast.  From  time  to  time  and  for  no  apparent 
reason  men  were  landed  from  these  ships  to  destroy  the  telegraph 
lines,  but  each  time  they  were  driven  back  to  their  ships  by  our 
gendarmes.  The  discovery  of  these  traitorous  activities  showed 
the  aim  and  purpose  of  the  enemy's  operations,  and  henceforth  I, 
of  course,  considered  it  would  be  simply  fatuous  on  my  part  to 
place  any  further  trust  in  the  reformers.  I  decided  to  take  ruthless 
action  against  the  traitors. 


208  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Just  about  this  time  the  Intelligence  Staff  at  my  Headquarters 
came  into  possession  of  an  extremely  important  document,  which 
I  reproduce  here : 

Circular  No.  403.  Cairo, 

27  Ramazan,  1322 

To  the  wise  and  venerable  Seyd  Effendi  Shukri. 
Honour  and  Greeting  ! 

At  this  moment,  when  the  World  War  rages  in  all 

its  fury,  the  Fatherland  expects  greater  sacrifices  from  its  children  than  ever 
before.  The  world  conflagration  may  shoot  sparks  into  the  East,  set  our  country 
on  fire,  an4,  consume  the  innocent  with  the  guilty,  the  Arabs  with  the  Turks. 
It  is  certain  that  if,  contrary  to  all  expectation,  the  Government  were  to  plunge 
into  the  struggle,  they  would  not  emerge  unscathed,  and  it  would  mean  their 
end.  If  the  war  ended  with  the  victory  of  the  Entente  that  end  would  be  all 
the  more  certain,  and  would  facilitate  the  solution  of  the  Eastern  question 
by  Russia.  The  Arab  territories  would  be  exposed  to  the  same  peril  as  the 
Turkish.  As  the  Turks  would,  in  any  case,  use  all  the  defensive  resources 
available  to  protect  their  own  Empire  and  possessions,  the  danger  threatening 
the  Arabs  would  be  all  the  greater.  That  is  what  will  certainly  happen. 

All  the  more  urgent  is  it  for  us  Arabs  to  take  steps  to  defend  our  threatened 
independence.  Our  society,  which  possesses  a  special  organisation,  and  whose 
members  are  known  for  their  patriotism  and  self-sacrifice,  considers  it  a  duty 
to  take  immediate  measures  to  secure  the  welfare  of  our  Fatherland  and  the 
lives  of  its  children.  For  that  reason  we  ask  an  immediate  answer  to  the 
following  questions  : 

1.  What  are  the  forces  at  your  disposal  with  which  to  start  a  general  rising 

if  the  necessity  arises  ? 

2.  Would  it  be  possible  to  give  us  pecuniary  help  or  raise  money,  which  you 

yourselves  could  use  if  necesjsary  ?    What  amount  could  be  raised  ? 

3.  Is  it  possible  to  find  a  safe  place  of  refuge  for  the  confidential  agents 

who  are  to  lead  the  rising,  and  will  be  supported  by  us  ? 

4.  Is  it  possible  to  send  us,  as  representative  of  your  community,  a  reliable 

man  who  can  go  to  some  fixed  place  and  receive  our  instructions? 

5.  If  you  can  find  no  reliable  man  to  send,  do  you  think  it  will  be  necessary 

for  us  to  send  someone  to  you  to  convey  our  instructions? 
Please  give  us  a  detailed  reply  on  these  points.     Every  minute  lost  may 
cost  an  Arab  his  life.     The  time  of  self-sacrifice  for  duty  and  the  Fatherland 

has  arrived. 

Greeting, 

A. 

p.S.— We  shall  sign  as  above  in  future  also,  but  in  your  answers  to  me 
please  be  careful  to  give  my  name  on  the  address.  The  envelope  must  he 
placed  in  another,  addressed  as  follows  : 

Cairo, 

Shari-ud-Devavine, 

Sheik  Hakky  Halef, 

Superintendent  of  the  Mosque  of  Shamli  Hanim 
(Opposite  the  Palace  of  the  late  Sherif  Pasha). 


The  Arab  Rebellion  209 

You  must  be  careful  to  give  the  letter  to  a  reliable  man,  who  must  give  it 
personally  to  a  foreign  post-office  on  the  coast.  If  that  is  impossible  it  will 
do  no  great  harm  if  you  send  the  letter  through  the  local  post. 

As  soon  as  I  read  this  letter  I  realised  the  situation  at  once. 
It  was  obvious  that  the  Arab  revolutionaries  had  in  no  way  aban- 
doned the  plan  of  a  rising  in  Syria  and  Palestine.  The  only  thing 
I  could  not  understand  was  why  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil  and  others 
had  shown  so  much  loyalty  to  the  Government  since  the  war 
began,  seeing  that  the  Ella  Merkezye  Committee  in  Egypt,  whose 
representatives  they  were,  had  taken  over  the  leadership  of  the 
revolt.  Neither  at  that  time,  nor  after  Sherif  Hussein's  rising,  or 
the  total  loss  of  Syria  and  Palestine,  after  the  defeat  of  our  glorious 
army,  did  I  succeed  in  penetrating  this  secret. 

A  few  months  after  I  began  to  write  my  memoirs  certain 
political  articles  in  the  Temps  opened  my  eyes  to  their  secret  aims 
and  objects. 

It  was  in  June,  1915,  that  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil  had  begun  his 
work  on  the  organisation  of  the  revolt,  and  the  correspondence 
between  the  English  and  Sherif  Hussein  with  reference  to  a  rising 
also  falls  into  this  time.  I  give  the  article  which  appeared  in  the 
Temps  on  September  i8th,  1919 : 

THE  ARABS  AND  THE  ENTENTE. 

To-day  we  are  in  a  position  to  say  something  fresh  about  the 
negotiations  during  the  war  between  the  British  authorities  and  the 
King  of  the  Hedjaz,  father  of  the  Emir  Faisal,  who  is  using  his 
influence  in  Syria  at  the  present  moment.  The  exchange  of  views 
between  the  British  Government  and  Sherif  Hussein  of  Mecca, 
now  King  of  the  Hedjaz,  on  the  subject  of  the  territorial  peace 
terms  in  the  Levant,  are  contained  in  eight  letters  between  July, 
1915,  and  January,  1916. 

i.  In  July,  1915,  the  Sherif  offered  the  British  Government 
military  assistance  in  return  for  the  promise  of  independence  for 
Arabia  in  an  area  including  Mersina  and  Adana  in  the  north  and 
stretching  from  the  37th  degree  of  latitude  to  the  Persian  frontier. 
The  eastern  limit  is  to  be  the  Persian  frontier  down  to  the  Gulf  of 
Basra,  the  southern  the  Indian  Ocean,  but  Aden  is  excluded.  In 
the  west  the  kingdom  is  to  be  bounded  by  the  Red  Sea  and  the 
Mediterranean  as  far  as  Mersina. 

o 


210  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

2.  On  August  30th,  1915,  Sir  Henry  MacMahon,  British  Resi- 
dent in  Cairo,  replied  evasively  with  the  remark  that  the  moment 
for  deciding  on  the  future  frontiers  had  not  yet  arrived. 

3.  In  a  letter  of  September  Qth,  forwarded  on  October  i8th,  Sir 
Henry  MacMahon  tells  the  Foreign  Office  that  the  Sherif  insists 
on  a  prompt  discussion  of  the  frontier  question.     At  the  same 
time  Sir  Henry  MacMahon  sends  on  the  declaration  handed  him  by 
the  Egyptian  representative  of  the  Sherif.    It  runs  as  follows : 

A  French  occupation  of  the  purely  Arab  districts  of  Aleppo,  Harna,  Horos, 
and  Damascus  would  meet  with  armed  resistance  from  the  Arabs.  But  with 
the  exception  of  these  regions,  and  a  few  rectifications  of  the  frontier  in  the 
north-west,  the  Arabs  accept  the  frontiers  proposed  by  the  Sherif  of  Mecca. 

4.  On  October  24th,  1915,  on  the  instructions  of  his  Govern- 
ment, Sir  Henry  MacMahon  sends  the  following  letter  to  the 
Sherif : 

The  districts  of  Mersina  and  Alexandretta  and  the  parts  of  Syria  lying  west 
of  Damascus,  Hones,  Harna,  and  Aleppo  cannot  be  regarded  as  purely  Arab, 
and  must  therefore  be  excluded  from  the  frontier  settlement  now  in  contempla- 
tion. With  this  exception,  and  without  insisting  on  the  agreements  we  have 
made  with  the  Arab  leaders,  we  accept  the  frontiers.  As  regards  those  areas 
in  which  Great  Britain  has  freedom  of  action  without  encroaching  upon  French 
interests,  I  am  authorised  by  the  British  Government  to  give  you  the  following 
assurances  : 

"  With  the  above  exceptions,  Great  Britain  is  prepared  to  recognise  and 
support  Arab  claims  to  independence  in  the  territories  within  the  frontiers 
proposed  by  the  Sherif  of  Mecca." 

5.  On  November  5th  the  Sherif  replied  that  he  was  willing  to 
agree  to  the  exclusion  of  Mersina  and  Adana,  but  must  insist  upon 
the  inclusion  of  the  other  regions,  especially  Beirut. 

6.  On  December  I3th  Sir  Henry  MacMahon  took  notice  of  the 
abandonment  of  Mersina  and  Adana  by  the  Sherif. 

7..  On  January  ist,  1916,  the  Sherif  explained  that,  with  a  view 
to  avoiding  any  prejudice  to  the  Anglo-French  alliance,  he  will  not 
insist  on  his  claims  to  the  Lebanon  for  the  duration  of  the  war,  but 
would  put  forward  these  claims  afresh  when  the  war  was  over. 

8.  On  January  30th  Sir  Henry  MacMahon  took  notice  of  the 
Sheriffs  intimation  that  he  would  avoid  anything  which  might 
complicate  Anglo-French  relations,  and  informed  him  that  the 
friendship  between  England  and  France  would  continue  after  the 
war. 

Thereupon  the  correspondence,   discussion,  and  negotiations 


The  Arab  Rebellion  an 

•  wf '     ~ '' ' 

between  the  Sherif  and  Great  Britain  on  the  territorial  conditions 
of  peace  came  to  an  end. 

These  documents  reveal  the  facts  that : 

1.  In  the  letter  of  October  24th,  1915,  which  constitutes  the  sole 
binding  agreement  between   Great   Britain  and  the  Shenf,  the 
English  Government  entered  into  no  obligation  which  conflicted 
with  the  Franco-British  agreement  of  May,  1916. 

2.  After  the  opening  of  the  negotiations  for  the  agreement  of 
May,  1916,  which  Monsieur  Georges  Picot  was  commissioned  to 
conduct  in  London,  Great  Britain  entered  into  no  fresh  commit- 
ment with  the  Sherif.    The  first  meeting  of  the  negotiators  took 
place  on  November  23rd,  1915,  and  the  two  last  letters  of  January, 
1916,  added  nothing  to  the  obligations  undertaken  tpwards  King 
Hussein  on  October  24th. 

This  article  shows  clearly  enough  that  as  early  as  the  first 
months  of  1915  Sherif  Hussein  had  decided  upon  a  revolt,  and  laid 
before  the  British  Government  a  proposal  for  the  establishment  of 
an  independent  Arab  State,  bounded  on  the  north  by  a  line  drawn 
from  Mersina-Adana  to  Mosul.  If  England  accepted  this  proposal 
the  Sherif  pledged  himself  to  rise  against  his  illustrious  sovereign, 
the  Khalif  of  Islam. 

When  these  facts  (which  I  have  ascertained  subsequently)  are 
viewed  in  conjunction  with  the  attempts  at  revolt  which  I  dis- 
covered at  the  end  of  June,  1915,  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  Abdul 
Kerim  el  Halil  and  his  confederates  had  then  received  appropriate 
instructions  from  the  Sherif  of  Mecca,  and  already  taken  the  first 
steps  towards  the  organisation  of  the  revolt. 

Although  I  had  never  believed  in  the  honesty  of  the  Sherif 
of  Mecca,  I  could  never  have  conceived  that  in  a  war,  upon 
which  the  fate  of  the  Khalifate  depended,  he  would  ally  himself 
with  the  States  which  desired  to  thrust  the  Slav  yoke  upon  the 
whole  Mohammedan  world,  and,  indeed,  would  go  so  far  as  to 
sow  the  seeds  of  discord  in  the  whole  country  to  gratify  his 
personal  ambitions. 

The  correspondence,  couched  in  a  highly  respectful  tone,  which 
I  had  had  with  him  since  December,  1914,  continued,  and  he  pro- 
mised to  assist  the  second  Canal  Expedition,  which  was  due  for 
the  winter  of  1915,  with  a  corps  he  proposed  to  send  from  the 

02 


212  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Hedjaz.  Although  I  was  perfectly  certain  that  men  like  Refik  el 
Azem,  Sheik  Reshid  Riza,  and  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil  were  base 
enough  to  sell  themselves  to  the  English  and  French,  it  never 
struck  me  as  possible  that  a  man  of  Sherif  Hussein's  experience, 
a  greybeard,  with  one  foot  in  the  grave,  could  be  so  egoistical  and 
ambitious  as  to  embark  upon  an  enterprise  the  development  of 
which  inevitably  involved  thraldom  for  the  Arabs  and  the  whole 
Mohammedan  world. 

About  this  'time  the  crew  of  the  Emden  were  attacked  by 
Beduins  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Yeddah,  just  after  their  landing 
on  the  coast  of  the  Hedjaz,  near  Assyr.  (After  overcoming  diffi- 
culties innumerable,  they  were  ultimately  to  make  good  their 
return  to  Germany.)  It  was  obvious  to  me  that  this  attack  by  the 
Beduins  had  been  suggested  and  ordered  by  Sherif  Hussein;  but 
I  thought  that  his  action  had  been  prompted  by  a  desire  to  make 
himself  popular  with  the  English  and  to  make  it  appear  to  the 
Arabs  that  all  he  was  doing  was  preventing  infidels  from  entering 
the  Holy  Places. 

At  this  time  the  English  were  blockading  all  the  coasts  of  the 
Empire,  but  the  coast  of  the  Hedjaz  was  excepted  and  they  per- 
mitted the  Arabian  Zambuks  to  get  as  much  food  and  corn  as 
they  liked  from  Egyptian  ports.  I  took  no  exception  to  this, 
because  the  Beduins  of  the  Hedjaz,  the  local  fixed  population, 
and  the  inhabitants  of  the  Holy  Places  were  almost  starving.  In 
this  way  Syria,  which  could  hardly  feed  itself,  was  relieved  of  the 
necessity  of  sending  food  supplies  to  that  region. 

I  believed  that  the  English  took  that  course  in  order  to  win  the 
sympathies  of  the  Mohammedans  of  India  and  Africa,  and  that 
Sherif  Hussein  was  doing  everything  to  avoid  estranging  the 
English.  I  considered  that  the  main  object  of  the  attacks  on  the 
crew  of  the  Emden  was  solely  to  avert  English  ill-will.  I  can  see 
now  that  all  these  ideas  were  phantoms.  Sherif  Hussein  had 
betrayed  me,  the  Government  and  the  illustrious  Khalifate,  and, 
indeed,  in  a  manner  worthy  of  the  commonest  of  hypocrites.  He 
had  not  shrunk  from  allying  himself  with  the  foes  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  and  sowing  discord  and  weaving  plots  among  the 
Mohammedans. 

The  trials  of  Abdul  Kerim  el  Halil  and  his  accomplices  took 
place  in  the  months  of  June  and  July.  As  they  proceeded, 


The  Arab  Rebellion  213 

the    criminal    aims    of    the    revolutionaries    became    abundantly 
clear. 

The  wide  range  of  their  plottings  simply  astounded  me.  At  this 
time  the  only  troops  in  Syria  were  Arab  regiments,  and  if  these 
had  mutinied  I  should  have  had  nothing  with  which  to  quell  the 
revolt.  The  battle  at  the  Dardanelles  was  raging  in  all  its  fury, 
and  it  was  out  of  the  question  to  take  a  battalion,  let  alone  a 
division,  away  from  that  front. 

As  I  wished  to  give  a  warning  to  all  and  sundry  who  were 
fomenting  any  kind  of  disorder,  I  considered  it  necessary,  in  view 
of  the  situation  and  the  powers  conferred  upon  the  Army  Com- 
mander in  exceptional  circumstances,  to  confirm  the  sentence  of 
the  court  martial  and  allow  it  to  be  carried  out  at  once.  Imperial 
sanction  to  be  obtained  subsequently.  I  had  already  obtained  the 
sanction  of  the  War  Minister  and  the  Minister  of  the  Interior. 

After  reading  the  proceedings  of  the  court  martial  and  obtain- 
ing the  views  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General,  I  confirmed  the 
sentence  of  death,  and  it  was  carried  out  the  following  day  at 
Beirut.  This  was  the  end  of  August,  1915.  These  speedy 
executions  produced  no  small  panic  among  the  rebels. 

Meanwhile  Sherif  Hussein  was  not  merely  content  to  enter  into 
negotiations  with  the  English,  but  had  actually  had  the  effrontery 
to  send  his  son,  Sherif  Faisal,  to  me  to  keep  him  informed  of  every- 
thing which  was  happening  in  Syria. 

In  September,  1915,  Sherif  Faisal  came  to  Syria  and  then  went 
on  to  Constantinople.  When  he  was  received  in  audience  by  the 
Sultan  in  Stambul,  he  protested  his  loyalty  and  that  of  his  father 
and  family  in  words  of  such  humble  devotion  that  His  Majesty 
could  not  have  the  slightest  doubt  about  his  honesty.  Sherif  Faisal 
returned  to  Syria,  after  giving  all  the  Ministers  the  same  assur- 
ances, and  was  received  by  me  with  great  honour.  During  his 
short  visit  we  arranged  that  his  father  should  send  to  Palestine 
a  volunteer  corps  of  fifteen  hundred  camelry  to  take  part  under 
Faisal's  command.  Before  he  left  Jerusalem  the  Emir  Faisal  made 
a  long  speech  to  my  Headquarters  Staff,  in  which  he  swore  by 
the  glorious  soul  of  the  Prophet  to  return  at  an  early  date  at  the 
head  of  his  warriors  and  help  them  to  fight  the  foes  of  the  Faith 
to  the  death.  It  is  worth  noticing  that  at  the  very  moment  when 
Sherif  Faisal  was  taking  this  perjured  oath,  his  father  had  already 


214 


Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 


written  the  letters  of  September  9th  and  November  5th  to  the 
English  and  prepared  his  treacherous  blow  at  the  Khalifate.  At 
that  time  I  knew  nothing  whatever  about  his  infamies. 

The  trial  of  Abdul  Gani  el  Vreissi  disclosed  a  large  number 
of  important  facts,  and  I  thought  the  moment  had  come  to  make 
appropriate  use  of  the  documents  seized  at  the  French  Consulate 
at  Damascus  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  I  had  asked  the  War 
Minister  and  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  for  the  necessary 
authority.  After  a  somewhat  lengthy  correspondence  I  was  given 
permission.  The  hesitation  they  displayed  I  ascribed  to  the  fact 
that  the  persons  implicated  by  the  Documents  held  very  high 
positions.  In  my  opinion  the  punishment  of  a  man  who  betrays 
his  faith  and  his  country  should  be  in  proportion  to  the  social 
position  he  enjoys,  for  the  criminal  activities  of  such  a  man  are 
not  to  be  ascribed  to  ignorance  and  folly,  and  their  effects  may  be 
infinitely  more  disastrous.  His  treachery  is  the  result  of  malice 
aforethought. 

After  the  two  responsible  Ministers  had  communicated  their 
agreement  with  me  on  this  matter,  I  gave  the  court  martial  the 
evidence  with  which  to  convict  persons  who,  for  years,  had  been 
planning  all  sorts  of  revolutionary  enterprises  on  the  pretext  of 
claiming  reforms,  self-determination,  and  independence  for  the 
Arabs. 

While  the  second  group  of  Arabs  were  on  their  trial  for  high 
treason  I  continued  the  very  amicable  correspondence  with  Sherif 
Hussein.  In  January  Sherif  Faisal  at  length  appeared  at  Damas- 
cus with  fifty  horsemen  from  Mecca.  He  resided  at  my  head- 
quarters to  help  me  in  equipping  the  promised  1500  volunteers 
and  despatching  the  necessary  material  to  Mecca. 

The  court  martial  prepared  the  case  very  carefully.  In 
February  Enver  Pasha  came  to  Syria  to  visit  the  4th  Army  and 
inspect  the  L.  of  C.  organisation  in  Sinai.  I  suggested  that  he 
should  go  to  Medina  also,  and  we  went  there  accompanied  by 
Sherif  Faisal.  During  this  visit  we  received  various  presents  from 
Sherif  Hussein,  and  among  them  a  sword  of  honour,  a  distinction 
which  the  Arabs  regard  as  the  greatest  proof  of  friendship.  But 
all  the  time  he  was  thus  demonstrating  his  loyalty  in  this  way,  he 
was  making  definitive  proposals  for  the  organisation  of  a  rebellion 


The  Arab  Rebellion  215 

against  the  Khalifate  in  the  letter  of  January  ist,  1916,  to  which 
I  have  referred. 

If  I  give  all  these  details,  it  is  to  expose  Sherif  Hussein's  base- 
ness and  furnish  an  adequate  reply  to  certain  short-sighted 
people  who  have  attributed  the  Sheriffs  rebellion  to  my  bad 
administration. 

The  trial  continued  even  after  Enver  Pasha's  return  to 
Constantinople.  It  was  then  that  Sherif  Hussein  showed  his 
true  colours.  Just  after  Enver  Pasha  got  back  he  sent  me  a  tele- 
gram in  cipher  which  he  had  received  from  Sherif  Hussein. 
Omitting  certain  introductory  sophisms,  it  ran  more  or  less  as 
follows : 

"  If  you  want  me  to  remain  quiet,  you  must  recognise  my  in- 
dependence in  the  whole  of  the  Hedjaz — from  Tebbuk  to  Mecca — 
and  create  me  hereditary  prince  there.  You  must  also  drop  the 
prosecution  of  the  guilty  Arabs  and  proclaim  a  general  amnesty 
for  Syria  and  Irak." 

The  meaning  of  this  telegram  was  so  obscure  that  Enver  Pasha 
told  me  he  could  not  make  head  or  tail  of  it  and  considered  it  a 
puzzle. 

Simultaneously  Sherif  Faisal,  probably  on  instructions  from 
his  father,  begged  me  to  show  forbearance  and  generosity  to  the 
prisoners. 

On  receipt  of  Enver  Pasha's  telegram  I  sent  for  the  Sherif.  I 
asked  my  Chief  of  Staff,  Ali  Fuad  Bey,  to  come  as  witness  to 
our  interview.  After  a  few  introductory  words,  I  addressed  Sherif 
Faisal  as  follows : 

"  When  I  heard  on  my  return  from  Medina  that  your  brother 
Ali  Bey  was  interfering  with  the  authority  of  the  Governor  of 
Medina  and  assuming  powers  on  the  pretext  that  they  were  part 
of  his  authority  as  Imam,  I  attributed  his  action  to  his  youth  and 
inexperience.  I  told  the  Governor  to  ask  him  to  discontinue  such 
action  for  the  future.  I  asked  your  father  also  to  make  similar 
representations  to  him. 

"  In  our  many  previous  conversations  I  have  always  impressed 
upon  you  that  I  myself  would  leave  nothing  undone  to  safeguard 
the  rights  of  the  Imam,  and  if  any  of  your  rights  were  illegally 
encroached  upon,  I  would  give  you  every  help  in  my  power,  even 
if,  in  doing  so,  I  came  into  conflict  with  other  people,  however 


216  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

highly  placed.  I  have  told  your  father  so  by  letter  on  several 
occasions,  and  received  letters  of  thanks  from  him  in  return. 

"  At  the  same  time  I  think  you  yourself  will  admit  that 
your  father  has  many  enemies  in  his  own  family.  Some  of  those 
enemies  are  in  Constantinople  and  trying  every  day  to  rouse  the 
Government's  suspicions  against  your  father.  That  being  so, 
the  best  course  for  you  is  to  avoid  doing  or  saying  anything  which 
could  give  your  enemies  any  ground  for  calumniating  you.  If 
you  read  this  telegram  you  must  admit  that  your  father  is  on 
the  wrong  track  and  giving  his  political  enemies  a  weapon  to  use 
against  him." 

Sherif  Faisal  feverishly  read  the  telegram  and  turned  pale.  At 
length  he  said: 

"  Effendim !  You've  no  idea  what  a  grief  this  is  to  me.  This 
telegram  is  certainly  the  result  of  some  great  misunderstanding. 
I  can  positively  assure  you  that  my  father  means  nothing  wrong. 
You  know  he  does  not  understand  Turkish  very  well.  This  tele- 
gram must  have  been  written  out  by  some  Turkish  scribe  who  did 
not  understand  the  Arab  text  and  has  reproduced  it  in  this  in- 
accurate translation.  God  forbid  that  my  father  should  ever 
contemplate  such  a  notion !  ' 

Sherif  Faisal's  discomfort  waxed  patently.  He  immediately 
offered  to  write  to  his  father  to  ask  him  to  abandon  his  intention, 
and  took  refuge  in  every  possible  excuse. 

As  a  result  of  this  conversation  I  sent  Sherif  Hussein  the 
following  telegram : 

"  I  have  been  informed  of  your  telegram  to  Enver  Pasha. 
You  ask  that  the  Imaret  should  be  made  hereditary  in  your  family 
and  the  Imperial  pardon  granted  to  several  persons  who  have 
proved  themselves  traitors  to  the  nation  and  the  faith.  Your 
second  request  cannot  be  complied  with,  for  it  would  involve  highly 
injurious  action  in  a  matter  touching  the  common  weal.  A  Govern- 
ment which  pardoned  traitors  would  be  accused  of  weakness  by 
public  opinion.  It  would  be  itself  encouraging  a  large  number 
of  persons  to  play  the  part  of  traitor  and  dealing  a  severe  blow  at 
the  welfare  of  the  Empire  and  the  Faith.  If  you  were  acquainted 
with  the  contents  of  the  documents  in  these  trials  you  would  see 
to  what  depths  of  treason  the  accused  descended.  But  as  regards 
the  question  of  making  the  Imaret  hereditary  in  your  family,  my 


The  Arab  Rebellion  217 

view  is — and  you  will  forgive  me  for  the  suggestion — that  the 
moment  for  putting  this  demand  forward  does  not  seem  to  me 
well  chosen. 

"  At  a  time  when,  owing  to  the  war,  everyone's  mental  and 
physical  forces  are  exposed  to  the  most  extreme  strain,  you  must 
admit  that  the  expression  of  such  a  wish  by  one  occupying  the 
position  of  Imam  at  the  most  important  point  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire — and  a  point  more  exposed  to  danger  than  any  other — is 
bound  to  make  the  worst  possible  impression  on  the  public. 

"  In  my  opinion  you  ought  not  to  put  forward  such  a  claim, 
even  if  you  had  the  right  to  do  so.  The  entire  resources  of  the 
nation  should  be  concentrated  for  one  purpose  and  one  purpose 
alone  to-day — to  win  the  final  victory. 

"  I  should  also  draw  your  attention  to  the  following  aspect  of 
the  matter.  Let  us  assume  that  the  Government  complied  with 
your  demand  solely  because  they  wanted  to  keep  you  from  being 
troublesome  in  the  difficult  times  through  which  we  are  passing. 
If  the  war  came  to  a  victorious  conclusion,  who  could  prevent  the 
Government  from  dealing  with  you  with  the  greatest  severity 
when  it  is  over  ?  The  men  who  form  the  present  Government  and 
dared  to  rise  against  Sultan  Hamid,  whose  despotism  alarmed  you 
also,  would  never  forgive  anyone  who  had  the  audacity  to  hamper 
them  in  the  war  upon  which  they  have  entered  for  the  good  of  the 
Mohammedan  world.  On  the  other  hand  they  would  not  fail  to 
secure  His  Majesty  the  Khalif 's  gracious  favour  for  all  those  who 
have  contributed  for  love  of  God  towards  the  attainment  of  our 
sacred  purpose." 

While  these  communications  were  passing,  the  court  martial 
at  Aalye  passed  sentence.  Sherif  Faisal  moved  heaven  and  earth 
to  secure  a  pardon  for  the  condemned  men.  He  came  to  see  me 
every  day,  and  always  brought  the  conversation  round  to  the 
question  of  pardon.  As  I  heard  from  time  to  time,  he  blamed  the 
notables  who  visited  him,  reproached  them  with  having  done 
nothing  to  save  their  countrymen,  and  insisted  that  the  least  they 
could  do  was  to  approach  me  on  their  behalf. 

One  Friday  he  asked  me  to  lunch  with  him  at  the  farm  of  Kabun, 
an  hour's  distance  from  Damascus.  I  went  there  accompanied 
by  several  officers.  After  the  meal  we  got  round  to  the  same 
old  subject.  I  asked  him  whether  he  knew  how  great  the  guilt  of 


2i 8  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

the  prisoners  was.  He  said  he  had  no  idea.  I  replied  that  when 
he  heard  the  details  he  would  be  extremely  sorry  that  he  had  ever 
asked  for  them  to  be  pardoned. 

On  the  day  before  the  executions,  at  Sherif  Faisal's  request, 
Sheik  Bedreddin,  for  whom  I  had  a  profound  respect,  came  to  my 
headquarters  to  put  in  a  word  for  the  condemned  men.  Sheik 
Abdul  Kader  el  Halil,  preacher  of  the  Mosque  of  Ormajade, 
accompanied  him.  It  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  more  dishonest 
and  treacherous  individual,  not  merely  in  Damascus,  but  in  the 
whole  world.  The  treachery  of  the  Medina  people,  who  have  earned 
the  Prophet's  curse,  is  nothing  compared  with  his  low  cunning. 
I  thought  it  wiser  to  defer  his  punishment  to  some  later  time. 

I  asked  Sheik  Essad  Shukair,  the  Mufti  of  the  Army,  to  act 
as  interpreter. 

Sheik  Bedreddin  put  his  request  in  the  well-chosen  words 
peculiar  to  him.  Without  mentioning  the  court  martial  and  the 
prisoners,  he  made  general  and  pointed  observations  on  criminal 
intrigues  which  endangered  the  welfare  of  Islam.  After  referring 
to  various  books,  he  ended  up  as  follows : 

"  God  has  three  punishments  for  those  responsible  for  discord 
and  disorder  among  the  believers :  death,  the  loss  of  both  arms, 
and  banishment  for  life.  The  punishment  must  be  according  to 
the  evils  which  flow  from  the  crime.  We  are  living  at  a  time  when 
the  world  of  Islam  has  entered  upon  a  most  perilous  war.  Men 
who,  at  such  time,  are  capable  of  weakening  Islam  by  their 
intrigues  are  nothing  but  a  dangerous  pest.  The  Prophet  says : 
'  He  who  intervenes  with  a  judge  on  behalf  of  a  traitor  is  himself 
a  traitor,  for  consciously  or  unconsciously  he  is  promoting 
dissension.' 

When  Sheik  Kiamil  Bedreddin  had  finished  I  looked  hard  at 
Sheik  Essad  and  Abdul  Kader  el  Halil,  and  said  with  a  smile : 

"  You  brought  the  venerable  Sheik  to  me  to  put  a  word  in  for 
the  traitors  condemned  by  the  court  martial.  What  he  has  done  is 
simply  to  approve  the  sentence  of  the  court  martial  and  show  me 
by  reference  to  Holy  Writ  that  I  have  no  right  to  pardon  traitors. 
That  is  so,  isn't  it,  Bedreddin  Effendi  ?  " 

He  glanced  at  us  all  and  nodded.     "  Great  Heavens,  Sheik !  ' 
cried  Sheik  Essad  Shukair.     "  You've  done  for  us !     After  what 
you've  said,  how  is  it  possible  for  us  to  make  further  representa- 


The  Arab  Rebellion  219 

tions  to  the  Pasha.  Thanks  to  your  fetva  he'll  treat  us  as  traitors 
and  hang  us,  too,  without  hesitation/'  he  said  in  a  joking  tone  and 
with  that  the  interview  came  to  an  end. 

The  next  day  the  executions  took  place  at  Beirut  and  Damascus. 

Some  say  I  should  not  have  allowed  the  sentence  to  be  carried 
out  before  confirmation  by  the  Sultan. 

The  reply  is  (i)  that  I  had  legal  authority  to  do  so;  (2)  that  the 
speedy  execution  of  the  sentence  was  the  only  way  in  which  I  could 
keep  traitors  in  check.  In  Arabia  highly-placed  individuals  have 
such  influence  that  quite  frequently  the  presence  of  a  single 
individual  can  have  a  greater  effect  than  that  of  a  whole  army  corps. 
If  an  Army  Commander  with  such  small  resources  at  his  disposal 
as  I  had  is  to  preserve  the  authority  and  influence  of  the  Govern- 
ment in  a  country  which  has  been  poisoned  by  English  and  French 
propaganda  for  years,  it  is  absolutely  essential  that  the  civil  popu- 
lation should  be  convinced  of  his  power  to  reprimand  and  punish 
anyone  without  having  to  refer  to  Constantinople  for  permission 
first. 

I  am  certain  that  to  the  executions  in  April,  1916,  alone  do  we 
owe  the  fact  that  there  was  no  rising  in  Syria  during  the 
two-and-a-half  years  following  Sherif  Hussein's  declaration  of 
independence. 

But,  apart  from  that,  Enver  Pasha  and  Talaat  Pasha,  the  War 
Minister  and  Minister  of  the  Interior,  had  agreed  that  the  sentences 
should  be  carried  out  without  previous  references.  Subsequently 
I  sent  the  report  of  the  proceedings  to  Constantinople,  where  they 
were  revised  by  the  appeal  court  of  the  Ministry  of  War  and  sent 
to  the  Sultan  for  confirmation  on  a  decree  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  In  this  way  the  sentences  pronounced  and  carried  out 
by  the  army  received  Imperial  sanction,  and  the  proceedings  were 
definitely  closed. 

There  are  some  also  who  say  that  the  crimes  of  those  who  were 
condemned  and  executed  in  Syria  were  covered  by  the  general 
amnesty  of  1913,  so  that  their  subsequent  conviction  for  the  same 
offences  was  illegal. 

As  I  have  shown  in  the  Red  Book,  "  The  Truth  About  the 
Syrian  Question/'  these  people  used  the  general  amnesty  to  start 
their  criminal  activities  afresh,  and  their  conviction  related  solely 
to  their  crimes  after  that  time.  As  the  documents  relating  to  their 


220  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

guilt  before  the  amnesty  are  very  strong  evidence,  the  court  martial 
examined  and  published  them  to  show  up  how  shameless  their 
treason  was.  If  there  are  some  who,  even  after  the  publication 
of  the  Red  Book,  still  persist  in  these  allegations,  it  is  easy  to  see 
that  their  motive  is  to  prove  the  Government  wrong  in  any  case. 

On  the  day  the  sentences  were  carried  out  the  army  published 
a  proclamation,  embodying  some  of  the  documentary  evidence,  to 
expose  the  guilt  of  the  prisoners. 

Two  or  three  hours  later  Sherif  Faisal  called  upon  me.  "  I 
swear  by  the  memory  of  my  ancestors/'  he  said,  "  that,  had  I 
known  how  heinous  was  the  offence  of  those  criminals,  I  should 
not  merely  have  refused  to  intervene  for  them.  I  should  have 
asked  for  them  to  be  torn  limb  from  limb  to  prolong  their 
sufferings.  God's  curse  be  upon  them  !  " 

The  same  day  Azem  Lade  Mehmed  Pasha,  the  Deputy  for 
Damascus,  came  to  see  me.  "  I  feel  absolutely  ashamed/'  he 
said,  "  that  such  people  should  be  members  of  my  family.  You 
have  vindicated  God's  justice.  May  God  and  his  Prophet  take 
you  in  His  holy  care !  " 

A  month  after  these  events  I  received  from  Sherif  Hussein  a 
reply  to  my  telegram.  I  gathered  from  his  answer  that  my  com- 
munication had  made  a  most  unpleasant  impression  upon  him. 
He  first  recommended  a  general  amnesty  in  the  interests  of  the 
Government,  and  then  complained  bitterly  of  the  Governor  of 
Medina.  He  wrote  that  he  could  not  suffer  rights  to  be  illegally 
filched  from  him  which  had  been  conferred  upon  him  by  the 
Ottoman  Khalif. 

At  this  time  the  behaviour  of  Sherif  Ali  Bey  towards  Basri 
Pasha  at  Medina  was  simply  intolerable.  I  immediately  asked 
Sherif  Faisal  to  come  and  see  me,  showed  him  his  father's  reply, 
and  told  him  severely  that  if  his  brother  continued  to  interfere  as 
he  had  been  doing,  I  should  use  military  force  against  him.  I 
added : 

"  I  may  as  well  tell  you,  Faisal  Bey  Effendi,  that  I  understand 
neither  the  language  used  by  your  father  of  late  nor  the  behaviour 
of  your  brother  at  Medina.  Our  relations  with  you  here  have 
been  friendly.  How  is  Ali  Bey's  conduct  in  Medina  to  be 
explained?  On  the  one  hand  they  are  equipping  a  force  of  1,500 
volunteers  for  the  Canal  Expedition.  The  Government  is  helping 


The  Arab  Rebellion  221 

them  with  money  and  arms.  On  the  other  hand,  your  father  is 
beginning  to  show  separatist  inclinations,  while  your  brother,  Ali 
Bey,  is  pursuing  a  line  of  conduct  which  is  in  harmony  with  your 
father's  claims.  I  want  to  make  you  realise  that  if  you  want  to 
remain  good  friends  with  us  you  yourself  must  observe  the  laws 
of  friendship. 

"  But  if  you  have  other  intentions  you'd  better  take  up  arms 
and  start  your  rebellion  at  once.  We  should  at  any  rate  end  the 
present  comedy  and  be  open  enemies.  The  sequel  will  be  in  God's 
hands  !  But  if  rebellion  is  not  your  object,  write  to  your  brother, 
Ali  Bey,  to  tell  him  to  come  to  me  here  at  once  and  stop  encroach- 
ing upon  the  authority  of  the  Governor  for  the  future !  ' 

Sherif  Hussein's  last  letter  made  it  quite  clear  to  me  that  this 
man  was  only  seeking  some  pretext  for  a  revolt.  That  was  why 
I  used  such  unambiguous  and  peremptory  language  to  Sherif 
Faisal. 

Under  the  effect  of  my  words  Sherif  Faisal  turned  deadly  pale 
and  every  drop  of  blood  left  his  cheeks.  He  rose  and,  putting  his 
hand  on  his  heart,  said : 

"  Forgive  me,  Your  Excellency !  How  could  you  accuse  us 
of  such  things  ?  How  could  we  be  traitors,  members  of  a  family 
descended  from  the  Prophet,  a  family  whose  greatest  honour  it  is 
to  be  most  devoted  and  loyal  followers  of  the  Khalif  ?  My  father, 
my  brother  and  I  are  not  traitors  to  the  nation  and  the  Govern- 
ment. We  are  the  faithful  servants  of  the  illustrious  sovereign 
who  has  always  heaped  favours  upon  us.  You  may  be  certain  that 
I  will  settle  the  differences  between  my  brother  and  Governor 
Basri  Pasha,  I'll  see  that  he  comes  here  to  kiss  your  hand !  "  4XA1 

AH  Fuad  Bey,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army,  was  present  at  this 
interview.  Sheik  Essad  Shukai  told  me  subsequently  that  Sherif 
Faisal  had  gone  to  the  office  of  my  Chief  of  Staff  in  extreme  agita- 
tion, burst  into  tears,  and  told  him  that  as  I  had  been  in  such  a 
rage  he  feared  that  I  would  have  his  brother  arrested  and  executed 
at  Damascus. 

All  this  happened  at  the  beginning  of  April,  1916.  From  the 
article  published  in  the  Temps  to  which  I  have  referred  it  is  clear 
that  since  January  ist,  1916,  Sherif  Hussein  had  had  an  understand- 
ing with"  the  English  and  was  only  waiting  for  a  favourable 
opportunity  of  raising  the  standard  of  rebellion. 


222  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Had  I  known  this  at  the  time,  I  should  have  immediately 
arrested  Sherif  Faisal  in  Damascus  and  his  brother  in  Medina.  I 
should  have  sent  a  Turkish  division  in  hot  haste  to  Mecca,  seized 
Sherif  Hussein  and  his  sons,  and  nipped  this  fateful  rebellion  in 
the  bud.  But  in  the  circumstances  what  could  I  do  ?  At  that  time 
I  had  no  documentary  evidence  of  the  criminal  designs  of  these 
people. 

Sherif  Hussein  had  already  had  fifty  to  sixty  thousand  pounds  in 
gold  for  the  equipment  of  his  auxiliary  force  of  1500  volunteers 
for  the  Canal  Expedition.  The  necessary  rifles  were  sent  to 
Medina  at  the  end  of  April,  and  were  to  be  sent  on  from  there  to 
Mecca.  Sherif  Hussein's  changed  tone,  however,  made  caution 
necessary;  I  pleaded  difficulties  of  transport  and  wrote  that  I 
thought  it  better  to  send  his  volunteers  on  foot  and  without  arms 
to  Medina,  where  rifles  would  be  supplied. 

One  day  about  the  middle  of  May  Sherif  Faisal  appeared,  and 
told  me  that  his  brother  had  been  ordered  by  his  father  to  join  the 
Sinai  Army  at  the  front,  and  with  my  permission  he  himself  would 
like  to  go  to  Medina  to  accompany  his  brother  to  Jerusalem.  He 
added  that  this  would  make  an  excellent  impression  on  the 
Mujahids. 

I  at  once  realised  that  he  hoped  to  outwit  me  by  this  device, 
but  as  I  was  quite  accustomed  to  being  deceived  by  Sherif  Hussein 
and  his  sons  I  preferred  to  be  top  dog.  After  a  moment's 
consideration  I  replied : 

"  All  right !  I'll  give  you  permission.  Receive  the  volunteers 
at  Medina  in  my  name  and  bring  them  on  here.  I'll  give  the 
railway  authorities  concerned  the  necessary  movement  orders 
for  the  troops  and  give  you  a  few  ulemas  from  Damascus 
as  your  escort.  You  can  form  a  special  delegation  to  greet  the 
Mujahids/' 

At  these  words  Sherif  Faisal's  eyes  simply  sparkled  with 
defight,  and  at  that  moment  I  knew  the  truth  and  the  whole  truth. 
Indeed  I  said  to  Ali  Fuad  Bey,  my  Chief  of  Staff :  "  I'm  absolutely 
certain  we  shall  have  a  rising  in  the  Hedjaz  in  the  immediate  future. 
Sherif  Faisal  was  so  delighted  at  the  prospect  of  taking  me  in  that 
he  could  hardly  conceal  his  delight." 

Ali  Fuad  Bey  was  of  the  same  opinion,  and  approved  the  course 
I  had  taken,  seeing  the  impossibility  of  any  other. 


The  Arab  Rebellion  223 

At  that  time  a  force  of  two  or  three  thousand  men  which  had 
been  sent  to  supplement  the  cadres  of  the  corps  in  the  Yemen  had 
arrived  at  Medina  from  Constantinople.  The  Governor  had  been 
trying  for  the  last  fortnight  to  raise  the  camels  required  for  its 
transport.  Basri  Pasha  informed  me  that  there  was  a  rumour  that 
this  force,  which  was  not  very  well  trained  and  had  hardly  one 
reservist  officer  and  fifty  armed  men  per  company,  was  to  be  enticed 
into  a  trap  by  the  Beduins  between  Mecca  and  Medina  as  a  result 
of  inflammatory  speeches  made  by  Sherif  Hussein. 

I  answered  the  Governor,  giving  him  strict  instructions  to  keep 
this  detachment  back  in  Medina  until  further  orders,  have  the  men 
well  trained  by  all  officers  available,  and  arm  them  with  the  rifles 
originally  destined  for  the  Mecca  volunteers.  In  view  of  Sherif 
Ali's  suspicious  behaviour  he  must  also  be  prepared  for  an  attack 
on  Medina.  I  added  that  Sherif  Faisal  was  on  his  way  to  Medina. 

After  Sherif  Faisal  had  left  with  the  small  escort  I  had  given 
him  I  decided  as  a  matter  of  precaution  to  send  Fahri  Pasha  to 
Medina.  He  was  of  the  Divisional  Commanders  of  the  Army 
Corps  under  my  command,  and  well  known  for  his  reliability  and 
patriotism.  I  explained  to  him  the  situation  and  my  views  upon  it, 
and  told  him  my  suspicions  that  Sherif  Hussein  would  shortly 
revolt.  I  asked  him  to  go  to  Medina  on  the  pretext  of  visiting  the 
Prophet's  grave,  and  if  occasion  required  to  arrange  with  Basri 
Pasha  all  necessary  measures  of  defence.  Basri  Pashi,  the 
Governor  of  Medina,  was  unquestionably  a  courageous,  honest, 
and  patriotic  man  who  was  very  familiar  with  the  peculiar  psycho- 
logy of  the  Arab,  but  he  had  no  great  war  experience,  and  I  was 
afraid  he  would  not  act  with  the  necessary  strength  and  resolution 
in  a  difficult  situation. 

Basri  Pasha  and  Fahri  Pasha  were  given  the  same  secret 
instructions,  which  provided  that  on  the  first  sign  of  a  revolt  Fahri 
Pasha  was  to  take  over  the  commands  of  the  Sheriffs  sons,  while 
Basri  Pasha  was  to  undertake  the  civil  administration.  I  was  quite 
sure  that  at  such  a  time  there  would  be  no  differences  between 
those  two  fine  Turks,  who  placed  love  of  country  before  anything 
else.  TBteSiJ^xj^  7K^*  \^ 

In  order  to  be  armed  against  any  emergency  I  had  two  or  three 
battalions  and  one  or  two  mountain  batteries  at  Damascus  ready 
to  march  on  Medina  immediately.  These  troops  did  not  know 


224  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

their  destination,  but  were  always  ready  so  that  they  could  be 
entrained  within  half  an  hour  of  receiving  the  first  signal. 

After  Sherif  Faisal's  arrival  in  Medina  he  wrote  to  me  to  say 
how  glad  he  was  his  brother  AH  was  to  meet  me  before  long.  As 
Sherif  Hussein  had  asked  me  to  send  him  I  forget  how  many 
thousand  pounds  for  the  expenses  of  his  Mujahids,  who  were  ready 
to  march,  I  asked  the  Governor  of  Medina  to  give  Sherif  AH  the 
sum  required.  Sherif  Hussein,  who  had  been  allied  with  the 
English  since  January  ist,  1916,  did  not  shrink  from  obtaining 
money  by  false  pretences  from  the  Government  a  day  or  so  before 
his  defection  towards  the  end  of  May,  1916. 

On  June  2nd,  when  I  was  on  a  visit  to  Beirut,  I  was  called  up 
on  the  telephone  from  Medina  by  Fahri  Pasha.  I  had  an  unmis- 
takable foreboding  that  I  was  to  get  bad  news.  Fahri  Pasha 
reported  as  follows : 

Since  I  came  here  I've  been  on  the  best  of  terms  with  Sherif  Ali  and  Faisal 
Bey.  Only  two  days  ago  they  invited  me  to  Hezret  Hamza,  where  the  camp  of 
the  Mujahids  is.  We  lunched  together.  The  volunteers  were  indulging  in  all 
the  sports  beloved  of  the  Beduins  and  singing  songs  about  the  blows  they  were 
going  to  inflict  on  the  English.  Last  evening  I  was  asked  to  Ali  and  Faisal 
Bey's  house.  The  first  contingents  of  the  Mujahids  was  to  be  sent  to  Deraa  in 
two  days'  time. 

This  morning  I  find  myself  faced  with  a  situation  which  has  changed  in 
the  most  remarkable  way.  One  of  Sherif  Ali  Bey's  men  brought  me  some  letters. 
One  was  for  me,  the  second — from  Sherif  Hussein — for  you,  and  the  third — also 
from  Sherif  Hussein— was  addressed  to  the  Grand  Vizier.  As  the  two  last  were 
in  cipher  I  had  them  sent  on  at  once. 

In  the  letter  to  me  Ali  Bey  writes  :  "In  accordance  with  my  father's 
orders  the  transport  of  the  volunteers  to  Palestine  will  be  suspended.  I  have 
therefore  decided  to  return  with  the  Mujahids  to  Mecca  instead  of  wasting  my 
time  here.  I  regret  that  I  must  go  without  taking  leave  of  you.  Please  excuse 
me!  " 

Of  course  I  could  not  read  the  letters  in  cipher  from  Sherif  Hussein, 
immediately  sent  a  detachment  to  the  place  occupied  by  the  volunteers  yesterday. 
It  was  deserted.  Ali  Bey  had  written  that  he  was  returning  to  Mecca,  but 
according  to  the  information  given  me  by  loyal  Beduin  Sheiks,  he  had  divided 
his  force  into  three  detachments  and  sent  them  in  different  directions.  It  seems 
to  me  certain  that  the  railway  will  be  attacked  to-night  or  to-morrow  morning  at 
the  latest,  and  that  Ali  Bey  will  interrupt  our  communications  between  Medina 
and  Syria  and  attempt  a  surprise  attack  on  Medina  with  his  whole  force.  In 
accordance  with  your  instructions  I  have  assumed  command  of  all  the  troops  in 
Medina  and  taken  all  measures  of  defence  necessary  to  meet  emergencies. 
Please  don't  leave  us  without  reinforcements  ! 

I  told  Fahri  Pasha  that  I  would  immediately  give  orders  that  the 
troops  destined  for  Medina  should  proceed  there  at  once,  and 
asked  him  whether  he  required  any  further  reinforcements. 


The  Arab  Rebellion  225 

I  had  Sherif  Hussein's  letters  to  the  Grand  Vizier  and  myself 
deciphered.  In  the  telegram  to  me  Sherif  Hussein  wrote  that 
unfortunately  he  could  take  no  part  in  the  expedition  against  the 
Canal  until  the  conditions  he  had  laid  down  in  his  telegram  to  the 
Grand  Vizier  were  complied  with  and  our  attitude  towards  him 
ceased  to  be  equivocal. 

In  his  letter  to  the  Grand  Vizier  he  said  that  he  did  not  know 
whom  he  was  to  believe,  as  one  of  the  two  diplomatists  with  whom 
he  was  dealing  had  always  shown  him  the  most  distinguished 
courtesy,  while  the  other  had  used  the  most  insulting  language. 
He  considered  himself  compelled  to  break  off  relations  with  the 
Government  until  the  request  was  acceded  to  which  he  had  made  to 
Enver  Pasha  two  months  before. 

I  was  the  courteous  diplomat,  while  Enver  Pasha  was  the  man 
who  had  been  so  rude  to  him.  About  three  weeks  before  Enver 
Pasha  had  sent  Sherif  Hussein  a  telegram  pointing  out  the  neces- 
sity of  his  son  Ali's  acting  very  differently  towards  the  Governor 
of  Medina. 

It  must  be  supposed  that  Sherif  Hussein  had  discovered  no 
other  excuse  for  rebelling  and  wished  to  exploit  this  matter.  The 
letters  I  had  sent  him  were  couched  in  terms  which  offered  no 
pretext  whatever  for  disagreement.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there 
were  no  insulting  expressions  in  Enver  Pasha's  letter,  though  it 
was  not  overburdened  with  polite  formulae.  Thus,  the  form  of 
this  letter  was  the  reason  why  Sherif  Hussein  rebelled. 

When  Sherif  Faisal  went  to  Medina  I  provided  him  with  a 
cipher  key,  in  case  anything  unusual  occurred  of  which  he  might 
like  to  inform  me. 

I  duly  received  a  communication  from  him  in  cipher.  It  ran 
as  follows : 

My  father  has  given  orders  to  stop  the  transport  of  the  volunteers  to  Syria, 
for  reasons  I  hope  to  explain  personally  when  I  have  the  pleasure  of  seeing 
you  before  long.  The  situation  which  has  now  arisen  has  upset  me  very  much 
and,  as  it  would  be  painful  for  me  to  see  you  again  before  matters  have  been 
put  right,  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  Your  Excellency  that  I  am  going  to 
Medina  for  a  time. 

Two  or  three  days  later  the  outbreak  of  the  revolt,  which 
began  with  an  attack  on  the  railway  north  of  Medina,  confirmed  the 
criminal  designs  of  Sherif  Hussein. 

As  subsequent  events  relate  solely  to  the  fighting  between  the 

p 


226  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

rebels  and  the  troops,  I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  discuss  them 
in  my  memoirs.  On  my  return  to  my  country — in  God's  good 
time  ! — I  hope  to  be  able  to  publish  the  whole  of  the  correspondence 
(which  I  have  kept)  between  Sherif  Hussein  and  myself.  But  as 
I  have  read  in  Mandelstamm's  book  the  French  translation  of  the 
proclamations  Sherif  Hussein  felt  impelled  to  issue  to  justify  his 
revolt,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  object  of  my  book  makes  it  advisable 
to  examine  them  more  closely. 

The  causes  of  the  revolution,  which  are  enumerated  in  the  first 
proclamation  of  Sherif  Hussein  on  the  25  Chaban,  1334  (June  27th, 
1916),  may  be  summarised  as  follows.  In  its  original  text  the 
proclamation  furnishes  an  eloquent  example  of  the  literary 
hypocrisy  of  the  Arabs.  It  is  translated  at  p.  260  of  Mandel- 
stamm's  work : 

1.  Since  the  day  on  which  the  "  Committee  of  Unity  and  Progress  "  obtained 
power  (he  probably  means  since  July  23,  1908,  when  the  country  received  a  con- 
stitution) the  country  has  been  governed  so  badly  that  the  Empire  has  lost  a 
large  part  of  its  territory,  with  its  population,  and  also  its  prestige. 

2.  During  the  many  foreign  wars  resulting  from  this  bad  government  the 
people,  particularly  the  inhabitants  of  the  Hedjaz,  have  been  reduced  to  such  a 
state  of  misery  that  they  have  had  to  sell  even  the  roof  over  their  heads. 

3.  As  if  that  were  not  enough,  the  laws  of  the  Mohammedan  religion  have 
been  disregarded.       In  Constantinople,  for  instance,  and  under  the  eyes  of  the 
Government  and  the  Sheif  ul   Islam,  a  newspaper,   El-Ijitihadj  has  had  the 
audacity  to  use  language  about  the  Prophet  which  is  incompatible  with   the 
traditional  reverence  due  to  him. 

4.  This  journal  even  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  a  change  in  the  laws  of  the 
Mussulman  sherifats  relating  to  inheritance  in  favour  of  equal  rights  between 
men  and  women. 

5.  Using  the  state  of  war  as  a  pretext,  the  Government  has  issued  a  decree 
releasing  troops  stationed  in  cities  like  Damascus,  Medina  and  Mecca  from  the 
necessity  of  observing  the  fasts. 

6.  The  prerogative  granted  to  the  Khalif  by  the  laws  of  our  religion  (Sheriat* 
and  the  authority  of  the  Khalif  have  been  restricted  by  depriving  His  Majesty 
of  the  right  to  choose  his  own  Chief  of  the  Cabinet  or  the  Ministers  of  his  Civil 
List. 

7.  Lastly,  the  veil  has  fallen,  and  it  is  obvious  that  the  Empire  is  in  the 
hands  of  Enver  Pasha,  Djemal  Pasha  and  Talaat  Bey,  who  govern  it  just  as 
they  like. 

8.  The  most  striking  proof  of  this  is  the  order  recently  Issued  to  the  Kadi 
of  the  Tribunal  of  Mecca  instructing  him  to  base  his  judgments  solely  on  the 
evidence  taken  down  by  the  court  in  his  presence  and  to  ignore  the  evidence 
solely  recorded  by  Mohammedans  elsewhere.     This  is  a  breach  of  the  sura  (verse 
of  the  Koran)  "  Suret  el  Baquara." 

9  Another  proof  is  that  at  the  same  time  the  following  people  of  rank  have 
been  hung  :  Emir  Omar  of  Algiers,  Emir  Arif.  El  Shihabi,  Shefil  Bey  el  Maayyad, 
Shukri  Bey  el  Assali,  Abdul  Wahab  (I  cannot  see  why  Sherif  Hussein  does  not 
give  the  latter  the  nickname  of  "El  Inglisi  "  by  which  he  was  known),  Tefhk 


The  Arab  Rebellion  227 

Bey   el    Easet,   Abdul    Hamid   el    Zehravi,   Abdul    Gani   el    Ureissi   and   their 
followers. 

10.  Even  that  was  not  enough,  but  all  their  friends  and  relations  have  been 
banished  and  their  property  has  been  confiscated. 

11.  They  have  destroyed  the  tomb  of  the  illustrious  brother  of  the  Emir 
Abd-el-Kadr,  el  Djezari  el  Hassani. 

These  were  all  the  excuses  for  the  rebellion  which  Sherif 
Hussein  for  all  his  pains  could  produce  in  the  period  of  twenty-five 
days  between  the  2nd  of  June,  the  first  day  of  the  rebellion,  and 
the  27th  of  June,  the  date  of  his  proclamation. 

I  appeal  to  the  natural  justice  of  the  whole  Mohammedan  world. 
Is  there  in  the  first  eight  clauses  anything-  whatever,  however  small, 
to  justify  a  genuine  Mohammedan,  much  less  a  man  claiming  the 
honour  of  being  a  descendant  of  the  Prophet,  in  'rising  in  revolt 
against  the  Mohammedan  Khalif  ?  The  events  to  which  Sherif 
Hussein  refers  in  paragraphs  9,  10  and  n  took  place  after  July, 
1915,  when  he  had  already  entered  into  negotiations  with  the 
English,  and  it  was  in  consequence  of  the  suspected  defection  of 
Sherif  Hussein  that  the  Government  found  itself  compelled  to 
take  those  precautionary  measures  in  the  general  interests  of  the 
world  of  Islam.  Thus  the  Sherif  has  no  right  whatever  to  bring 
them  forward  as  reasons  for  his  revolt. 

In  one  of  the  1918  numbers  of  El  Kible,  a  paper  appearing  in 
the  sacred  city  of  Mecca,  I  have  read  a  letter  of  Sherif  Hussein's. 
Unfortunately,  I  cannot  give  the  whole  of  this  letter,  as  it  is  not 
in  my  possession  at  the  moment.  In  it  the  Sherif  wrote  as  follows 
to  some  Arab  gentleman,  whose  name  he  does  not  give  : 

Since  we  first  became  Emir  pur  aim  has  always  been  the  exalted  one  of 
freeing  the  Arabs.  We  have  left  nothing  undone  to  achieve  that  aim  and,  with 
that  end  in  view,  we  have  established  friendly  relations  with  the  highly-placed 
Arabs.  How  great  have  been  our  efforts  appears  from  the  fact  of  our  participa- 
tion in  the  Assyr  Expedition,  when  we  sent  an  armed  force,  under  the  command 
of  our  son  Abdullah,  to  frustrate  the  attack  which  Emir  Ibn  el  Restrid,  on 
Turkish  inspiration,  had  made  on  Emir  Ibn-el-Snud,  etc. 

That  is  what  may  be  called  an  involuntary  confession  ! 

The  fact  is  that,  as  the  Sherif  himself  admits  he  had  contem- 
plated rebelling  against  his  sovereign  from  the  day  on  which  he 
was  appointed  Imam,  all  the  valis  of  the  Hedjaz  had  known  of  his 
intentions  and  communicated  them  to  Constantinople.  Wehib 
Pasha  proved  himself  particularly  sound  and  reliable  on  this 
matter.  He  considered  it  necessary  to  send  at  least  two  divisions 

P2 


228  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

to  Mecca  to  depose  the  Sherif  and  set  up  a  successor,  but  the 
Government  refused  to  take  so  strong  a  step  which  might  result 
in  fresh  and  futile  scandal  and  provoke  disorder.  They  considered 
that,  in  view  of  their  domestic  policy,  it  would  be  better  to  come 
to  some  friendly  arrangement  with  the  Arabs  when  the  Balkan 
War  ended. 

When  I  have  an  opportunity  of  publishing  the  correspondence, 
which  covers  a  period  of  more  than  a  year,  the  public  will  be  able 
to  realise  the  efforts  I  made,  particularly  after  our  entry  into  the 
World  War,  to  give  the  Sherif  no  cause  and  deprive  him  of  any 
excuse  for  quarrelling  with  us. 

Sherif  Hussein  would  like  to  call  it  a  crime  in  us  to  have  pro- 
nounced sentence  of  death  upon  a  few  Arabian  notables  in  Syria. 
Although  I  have  previously  published  the  documents  in  a  Red 
Book,  entitled  The  Truth  About  the  Syrian  Question,  documents 
which  prove  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  it  seems  to  be  not  without 
value  to  reproduce  some  of  them  here. 

I. 

THE  FRENCH  CONSULATE  IN  DAMASCUS. 

January  15,  1913. 
Reference  the  Case  of  Nahle  Mutran  Pasha  of  Baalbek. 

The  Consul-General  to  His  Excellency  Monsieur  Bompard. 

I  have  the  honour  to  inform  You*  Excellency  that  in  recent  weeks  I  have 
had  two  visits  from  Nahle  Mutran  Pasha,  a  very  influential  man  in  Baalbek. 
Two  years  ago  this  gentleman  was  Secretary  of  the  Turkish  Embassy  in  Paris, 
and  he  knows  most  of  our  diplomatists.  He  is  a  member  of  the  Greek  Catholic 
Church  and  also  of  the  Unionist  Party,  though,  in  his  conversation  with  me,  he 
disavowed  the  latter  by  talking  about  the  "  collapse  of  the  Committee's  policy 
and  the  insolence  of  the  Young  Turks/' 

Nahle  Mutran  Pasha  took  advantage  of  a  journey  he  had  to  make  to 
Damascus  to  secure  the  revision  of  the  trial  of  one  of  his  friends  to  call  upon 
me  and  discuss  a  matter  which  was  bound,  so  he  said,  to  interest  the  natural 
protector  of  the  Lebanon  and  Syria.  He  said  that  the  leading  statesman  of 
France  had  expressed  himself  to  the  same  effect. 

The  present  situation  is  intolerable  (he  continued).  We  have  decided  to 
secure  the  incorporation  of  Baalbek  and  the  Plain  of  Bukaa  in  the  Lebanon,  with 
which  they  are  united  geographically.  We  need  the  help  and  protection  of  the 
French  Government.  Mohammedans  and  Christians  alike,  we  are  all  deter- 
mined to  succeed.  We  know  how  we  can  achieve  our  object  if  the  Ottoman 
Government  opposes  an  armed  resistance.  One  section  of  the  people  of  Baalbek 
belongs  to  our  party  and  the  town  enjoys  a  special  position.  It  is  the  key  to 
the  heart  of  Syria  and  the  roads  into  the  interior.  The  Chief  of  the  Mutevalis 
(Essad  Bey  Haydar),  the  most  influential  man  in  the  district,  Abdul  Gani  el 
Rufai,  the  leader  of  the  Mohammedans,  and  I  are  determined  that  our  region 
shall  form  part  of  the  Lebanon,  and  we  have  decided  to  go  to  Beirut  to  inform 


The  Arab  Rebellion  229 

Monsieur  Couget  of  our  plans.  He  has  always  taken  the  greatest  interest  in 
everything  connected  with  the  Lebanon.  But  as  Baalbek  is  in  the  area  of  your 
consulate,  it  is  my  duty  to  inform  you  of  these  matters  on  behalf  of  Essad  Bey, 
Abdul  Gani,  and  myself. 

I  could  only  accept  Nahle  Mutran  Pasha's  assurances  with  the  greatest 
reserve,  though  I  received  him  with  every  courtesy.  But  the  former  Embassy 
secretary  paid  me  a  second  visit,  in  which  he  renewed  the  assurances  of  his 
devotion  to  France  and  promised  to  render  me  any  service  in  his  power  in  his 
own  country. 

II. 

BEIRUT, 

March   12,   1913. 
To  Monsieur  F.  Couget, 

Consul-General  of  France  in  Syria. 

M.  Consul-General, — Remembering  that  France  is  the  protector  of  the 
Ottoman  Christians  and  the  adopted  fatherland  of  the  Christians  of  Syria,  we, 
the  undersigned  Christian  members  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  General 
Assembly,  elected  by  all  the  communal  councils  of  the  province  of  Beirut  to 
draw  up  a  scheme  of  reform  for  this  vilayet,  wish  to  lay  before  the  French 
Consul-General  in  Syria  the  following  observations  on  : 

(1)  The  position  of  the  Ottoman  Christians; 

(2)  The  reforms  proposed  by  the  Executive  Committee; 

(3)  The  hopes  and  desires  of  the  Syrian  Christians ; 

and  beg  Monsieur  the  Consul-General  to  submit  these  observations  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  French  Republic  and  support  them  with  his  authority. 

III. 

BEIRUT, 

March   18,   1913. 

M.  Birre,  the  editor  of  the  Arab  journal  El  Salad,  has  just  given  me  on 
behalf  of  the  signatories  a  manifesto  which  I  am  sending  Your  Excellency  here- 
with in  view  of  its  political  interest. 

This  manifesto  has  been  drawn  up  with  the  approval  of  the  leading  members 
of  the  Committee  which  is  secretly  engaged  in  carrying  through  reforms  in 
Syria,  as  I  have  frequently  reported  to  the  Department.  It  is  signed  by  the 
most  influential  of  these  gentlemen.  The  lawyer,  M.  Pierre  Tarrad,  and 
M.  Tueni,  interpreter  at  the  Consulate,  are  Greek  Catholics,  while  M.  J.  Hani 
is  a  Maronite,  and  Dr.  Sabit  is  a  Protestant. 

In  the  letter  which  they  send  me  in  the  name  of  their  co-religionists  they 
are  mostly  concerned  with  putting  forward  the  wishes  of  the  Christians  in 
Syria,  and  emphasising  their  friendship  for  France.  This  document  is  a  fresh 
proof  of  the  deep  attachment  to  us  felt  by  the  Christian  population  of  this 
region.  It  also  shows  what  a  great  impression  French  promises  have  made 
and  what  great  hopes  they  have  awakened. 

i.  The  Position  of  the  Ottoman  Christians. 

The  situation  of  the  Christians  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  has  always  been 
wretched— nay,  tragic.  As  the  result  of  the  Balkan  War  and  the  Turkish 
defeats  it  may  well  become  far  worse,  for  the  direct  consequences  of  those 
defeats  are  (i)  increase  of  taxation,  (2)  a  revival  of  Mohammedan  fanaticism, 
(3)  a  new  impulse  towards  emigration  on  the  part  of  the  Syrian  Christians. 

As  to  (i)  increase  of  taxation.  As  a  result  of  the  loss  of  their  European 
provinces,  the  Turkish  Government  will  try — and  are  now  trying — to  shift  the 


230  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

burden  which  rested  on  the  lost  provinces  on  to  the  shoulders  of  the  Asiatic 
provinces.  Those  who  are  familiar  with  the  trickery  and  injustice  displayed  by 
the  Turkish  administration  in  assessing  and  raising  taxes  cannot  doubt  for  a 
moment  that  the  new  burdens  will  fall  exclusively  on  the  Christian  population. 

As  to  (2)  the  revival  of  Mohammedan  fanaticism.  In  the  hands  of  Turkish 
politicians  Mohammedan  fanaticism  has  ever  been  a  valuable  and  infallible 
weapon.  They  did  not  hesitate  to  use  it  during  recent  events  in  the  Balkans. 
The  Balkan  War  was  regarded  by  the  Mohammedans  as  a  religious  war,  a 
crusade  of  the  Cross  against  the  Crescent,  united  Christendom  against  Islam. 
Hence  it  is  a  simple  step  further  for  the  Mohammedans  to  think  that  the 
presence  of  Christians  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  has  been  the  main  cause  of  their 
defeats  and  decay.  In  Mohammedan  eyes  the  Ottoman  Christians  are  the  true 
authors  of  all  the  evils  which  have  overtaken  the  Empire.  They  are  its  natural 
enemies.  They  will  be  made  the  object  of  all  kinds  of  insults  and  oppression — 
not,  of  course,  such  brazen  and  palpable  oppression  as  might  give  a  foreign 
Power  an  excuse  for  intervening  (the  Turk  is  too  cunning  and  cautious  for 
that),  but  that  secret  and  "  slow-torture  "  oppression  in  which  the  Turkish 
authorities  are  such  masters  and  have  the  elasticity  of  their  laws  to  help  them. 

As  to  (3),  a  new  impulse  towards  immigration  on  the  part  of  the  Syrian 
Christians.  Since  the  Balkan  War  began  a  considerable  number  of  Moham- 
medans have  emigrated  from  Macedonia  and  Thrace  into  Syria.  This 
movement  is  on  the  increase,  and  is  openly  favoured  by  the  authorities.  It 
means,  unfortunately,  that  the  numerical  balance  between  the  Christians  and 
Mohammedans  in  Syria  is  upset,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  Christians.  The 
Mohammedans  are  already  despotic  enough  through  their  religion,  and  they 
will  become  even  more  so  through  the  oppressive  weight  of  their  numbers. 

The  Christians  of  Syria  are  greatly  agitated  at  this  prospect,  and  in  conse- 
quence many  of  them  have  emigrated  to  America.  Thus  the  present  situation 
provides  an  extremely  strong  impulse  to  double  emigration — of  the  Mohamme- 
dans to  Syria  and  of  the  Syrian  Christians  to  America.  Even  if  it  continues  for 
quite  a  short  time  it  will  mean  the  destruction  of  the  Christian  element  in  Syria. 

Reform  Proposals. 

Immediately  after  the  speech  of  Minister-President  Poincare,  in  which  that 
influential  statesman  called  upon  Turkey  to  bring  in  reforms  in  her  Asiatic 
provinces,  the  Turkish  Government  announced  on  their  own  that  they  were 
prepared  to  concede  reforms  in  their  vilayets,  and  required  the  valis  to  draw 
up  schemes  of  reform  for  their  provinces.  Taught  by  experience,  the  Ottoman 
Christians  knew  what  they  had  to  expect  in  the  way  of  honest  intentions  from 
the  Government.  The  sole  object  of  these  reform  schemes  was  to  prevent  Europe 
from  intervening  to  demand  the  introduction  of  definite  reforms  by  Turkey. 
Turkey  was  proposing  to  use  these  reform  schemes — which  would  look  as  if 
they  were  the  work  of  the  inhabitants,  whereas  in  truth  they  would  be  drawn 
up  by  the  Government — as  a  pretext  for  refusing  the  reforms  demanded  by 
Europe.  They  would  allege  that  these  were  not  in  accordance  with  the  draft 
schemes  produced  by  the  parties  interested  themselves. 

Yet  in  spite  of  all  this  the  Christians  of  Beirut  declared  their  willingness  to 
work  together  with  the  Mohammedans  in  the  carrying  out  of  the  reforms,  and 
for  the  two  reasons  following  :  (i)  To  checkmate  the  design  of  the  Turkish 
Government  and  prevent  tfye  draft  being  drawn  up  as  it  desired;  (2)  to  intro- 
duce into  this  draft  the  principle  of  European  control  in  every  branch  of  the 
administration.  If  this  principle  were  once  accepted  by  all  the  members  of  the 
Committee,  both  Christian  and  Mohammedan,  it  would  prove  beyond  dispute 
that  the  whole  population  considers  that  without  help  from  Europe  reform  in 
Turkey  is  quite  impossible. 


The  Arab  Rebellion  231 

The  Wishes  of  the  Syrian  Christians. 

Assuming  that  reforms  could  be  obtained  with  the  assistance  of  Europe,  this 
would  not  satisfy  the  desires  of  the  Christians  in  Syria.  They  are  indissolubly 
allied  with  France,  and  can  never  forget  how  much  admiration  they  owe  her  for 
her  high  civilisation  and  how  much  gratitude  for  her  help  in  time  of  trouble. 

The  heart's  desire  of  the  Christians  in  Syria  is  the  occupation  of  Syria  by 
France. 

For  these  reasons  the  undersigned  members  of  the  Executive  Committee,  in 
the  name  of  the  Christians  of  Beirut,  and  in  order  of  rank,  have  put  forward 
the  following  suggestions,  the  only  suggestions  they  deem  adequate  to  meet  the 
political  situation  in  Syria  : 

1.  The  occupation  of  Syria  by  France. 

2.  The  complete  independence  of  the  vilayet  of  Beirut  under  the  protection 
and  supervision  of  France. 

3.  The  incorporation  of  the  vilayet  of  Beirut  in  the  Lebanon,  which  is  to  be 
under  the  actual  suzerainty  of  France. 

(Signed)  MICHEL  TUENI,  JOSEF  HANI,  PIERRE  TARRAD,  DOCTOR 

EYUB  SABIT,  RIZCULLAH  ARCASCH,  KHALIL  ZEINE. 

FRENCH  REPUBLIC. 

CAIRO, 

March  28,  1913. 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

Political  and  Trade  Department. 
Europe,  Africa,  and  the  East. 
No.  131. 

Syria.  The  Ottoman  Decentralisation  Committee. 

COPY. 

M.  Defrance,  Plenipotentiary  of  the  French  Republic 
in  Cairo,  to  M.  Pichon,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

At  the  moment  the  Syrians  in  Cairo  are  very  active,  or  at  any  rate  spurring 
each  other  on  to  great  activity.  On  the  22nd  of  this  month  I  informed  you  in 
my  telegram  No.  17  of  the  sitting  of  the  Decentralisation  Committee,  at  which 
M.  Michel  Tueni,  auxiliary  interpreter  at  our  consulate  in  Beirut,  was  present. 
From  the  supplementary  information  I  have  been  able  to  gather,  it  appears  that 
the  decisions  of  the  committee  were  neither  so  definite  nor  so  unanimous  as 
M.  Tueni  thought.  The  latter,  who  was  acting  solely  as  a  private  person,  a 
leading  man  in  Syria,  and  in  no  official  capacity  whatever,  is  displaying  an 
almost  exaggerated  zeal  in  the  Syrian  business  in  favour  of  an  immediate  and 
radical  decision. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  also  that  the  tendencies  revealed  by  the  Decentralisa- 
tion Committee  confirm  at  any  rate  in  one  point  the  information  I  was  given  a 
short  time  back  as  to  the  views  on  the  probable  future  of  their  country  held  by 
the  Syrian  Mohammedans.  I  sent  on  that  information  to  the  Department  in  my 
letter  of  March  23,  No.  123. 

It  appears  that  the  Syrians — both  Mohammedans  and  Christians — or  at  any 
rate  those  living  in  Egypt — have  adapted  their  demands  to  the  second  of  the 
proposals  referred  to  in  my  letter  of  the  23rd — i.e.,  the  plan  of  making  Syria 
an  autonomous  State  under  a  Mohammedan  prince.  I  heard  that  Kiamil  Pasha 
— now  in  Cairo — roused  the  hopes  of  the  members  of  the  Decentralisation 
Committee,  said  that  he  agreed  entirely  with  the  draft  reforms,  and  promised 
them  to  satisfy  all  their  desires  when  he  obtained  power.  But  just  as  all  those 
who  received  these  assurances  do  not  doubt  for  a  moment  that  the  aged 


232  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

statesman  would  not  hesitate  to  renew  these  promises  if  he  were  reappointed 
Grand  Vizier,  they  are  equally  certain  that  the  promises  will  not  be  kept,  and 
that  the  Syrians  will  once  more  be  put  off  with  fine  words.  That  is  the  reason 
why  the  first  plan  of  a  regime  with  decentralised  administration  (the  so-called 
administrative  decentralisation)  appears  to  be  unacceptable. 

As  regards  one  point — the  protection  of  a  foreign  Power  under  which  the 
Syrians  are  willing  to  place  their  future  principality  if  need  be — the  views 
referred  to  in  my  letter  No.  123  are,  judging  by  Tueni's  report,  in  conflict  with 
the  tendencies  displayed  in  the  Committee.  According  to  the  reports  I  have 
received  this  week,  the  Syrians  desired  English  protection,  to  the  exclusion  of 
all  other.  According  to  M.  Tueni,  the  Mohammedans  and  Christians  on  the 
Committee  are  at  one  in  aiming  at  a  French  protectorate  alone.  I  may  say  that 
my  own  informant  is  an  official  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian  Government,  while 
M.  Tueni  is  passionately  devoted  to  France.  The  truth  seems  to  me  to  lie 
between  these  two  extremes.  If  Syria  is  to  be  under  foreign  protection,  some  day 
the  Syrian  Christians  would  unanimously — or  almost  unanimously — desire  the 
protection  to  be  French.  Of  the  Mohammedans,  a  considerable  number  of  whom 
prefer  England,  some  would  accept  the  protection  of  France  because  they  are 
her  real  friends,  while  others  would  accept  an  English  or  French  protectorate 
quite  indifferently,  whichever  was  decided  for  them  by  outside  agencies. 

As  the  Committee  has  pronounced  in  favour  of  the  provincial  autonomy  of 
Syria,  it  must  naturally  set  about  finding  suitable  persons  to  govern  the  future 
principality.  So  far  as  I  know,  this  question  has  not  been  dealt  with  at  any  of 
the  sittings  of  the  Committee,  but  several  of  its  members  have  already  taken  it 
up.  In  my  previous  letter,  No.  123,  I  pointed  out  that  the  President  of  the 
Committee,  Refik  El-Asm,  thinks  that  the  future  ruler  of  Syria  could  be  none 
other  but  the  head  of  his  family,  Shefik-Bey  el  Mueyed  el  Asm.  Other  members 
of  the  Committee  are  of  opinion  that  the  Syrians  would  never  recognise  one 
of  themselves  as  their  soveriegn,  as  they  all  think  themselves  equal  to,  if  not 
above,  each  other.  They  want  to  elect  a  prince  from  the  family  of  the  Khedive. 
This  last  view  is  that  of  M.  Tueni,  who  came  to  give  me  his  views,  which  he 
said  are  shared  by  many  Syrians.  At  the  moment  the  scheme  is  to  advocate  the 
candidature  of  Prince  Yussuf  Kemal  Pasha,  the  Khedive's  cousin. 

This  prince  is  a  man  of  immense  wealth,  entirely  independent,  and  when 
he  was  asked  his  opinion  he  let  it  be  understood  that  he  would  accept  election, 
but  on  the  formal  condition  that  if  Syria  was  to  be  under  the  protection  of  a 
foreign  Power,  that  Power  should  be  France.  Any  other  protectorate,  particu- 
larly an  English  protectorate,  was  to  be  absolutely  excluded. 

The  above  explains  the  excitement  and  agitation  undoubtedly  prevailing 
among  the  Mohammedan  and  Christian  leaders.  But  from  suggestion  to  action 
is  a  great  step,  and  the  Syrians  in  Cairo  seem  to  me — at  any  rate  at  the  present 
time — incapable  of  taking  the  step  unless  they  are  urged  on  powerfully  from 
outside. 

Anyone  who  reads  through  these  documents  attentively  will 
easily  realise  that  the  French  Government  was  doing  its  utmost 
to  pave  the  way  for  the  annexation  of  Syria  on  the  pretext  of 
protecting  the  Arabs.  I  should  like  to  know,  too,  if  anyone  had 
any  doubts  about  England's  intentions  with  regard  to  Irak  and 
Palestine.  Those  who  pretend  they  knew  nothing  of  these  designs 
must  either  be  weak-minded  or  have  sold  their  conscience.  Let 
us  assume  that  at  the  time — July,  1915 — when  Sherif  Hussein  was 


The  Arab  Rebellion  233 

negotiating  with  the  English  he  knew  nothing  of  the  intentions 
of  France,  that  he  was  convinced  that  the  end  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  was  at  hand,  and  had  risen  to  render  the  Mohammedan 
world  a  glorious  service,  and  thereby  restore  the  Arab  State,  and 
that  he  was  establishing  a  great  Arab  Empire  in  the  Arabian  Penin- 
sula in  the  place  of  sinking  Turkey — an  empire  which,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  promises  he  had  received  from  England,  was  to 
comprise  all  territory  south  of  a  line  from  Mersina  to  Adana  and 
Mosul.  But  if  the  answer  given  him  through  Sir  Henry  Mac- 
Mahon  on  October  24,  1916,  did  not  rouse  his  suspicions,  did  not 
the  documents  I  published  in  Syria  after  the  executions  of  the 
conspirators — documents  each  of  which  was  unanswerable  proof 
of  France's  designs — open  his  eyes  more  effectively  than  every- 
thing I  have  said  here  ?  Were  they  not  sufficiently  cogent  argu- 
ments to  show  him  the  measure  of  the  crime  he  was  contem- 
plating ?  It  is  easy  to  see  what  Sir  Henry  MacMahon  had  in 
mind  when — even  at  that  time,  in  his  letter  of  October  24,  1916— 
he  explained  that  certain  parts  of  the  coasts  of  Syria  and  the 
Lebanon  could  not  be  called  purely  Arab.  England  had  no 
option  but  to  respect  French  claims  to  those  parts  of  Syria. 

A  man  must  be  smitten  with  pure  political  blindness  to  believe 
that  England  has  taken  Irak  from  the  Turks  solely  for  the  purpose 
of  presenting  it  to  the  Arabs. 

When  Sherif  Faisal  was  at  the  headquarters  of  the  army  in 
Syria  I  told  him  all  this,  and  brought  it  home  to  him  that  on  the 
day  when  the  Arabs  severed  their  connection  with  the  Turks  they 
would  fall  under  the  yoke  of  the  English  and  French,  and  thus 
be  wholly  deprived  of  the  protection  of  the  Khalif  of  Islam. 

Now  the  World  War  is  over,  and  the  English,  thanks  to  Sherif 
Hussein's  revolt,  have  destroyed  the  Turkish  army  in  Palestine 
and  completed  their  occupation  of  Syria  and  Palestine,  what  is 
the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  Mohammedan  territories?  The 
region  of  Palestine  with  Jerusalem — the  precious  gift  of  the  great 
Khalif  Omar  to  the  Mohammedan  world — is  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  the  English,  who  intend  to  establish  a  Jewish  State  there. 
They  have  assigned  to  the  French  a  region  they  call  "  Greater 
Lebanon/'  which  comprises  the  former  Lebanon,  Tripolis,  Beirut, 
the  cities  of  Tyre  and  Sidon,  and  the  region  of  Baalbek  and  the 
Plain  of  Bukaa.  The  English  have  taken  the  whole  of  Irak  under 


234  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

their  protection.  As  they  have  avoided  the  annexation  of  the 
Hedjaz,  which  is  recognised  as  an  independent  State,  they  wanted 
to  set  up  under  the  French  protectorate  an  Arab  State,  to  include 
the  towns  of  Damascus,  Kama,  Horns,  and  Aleppo.  But 
apparently  the  French  object  to  this  scheme. 

To  show  how  well  the  English  know  what  amazing  advantages 
they  derived  from  the  revolt  of  Sherif  Hussein,  I  give  in  full  the 
article  which  Shukri  Ganem,  the  President  of  the  Syrian  Central 
Committee,  who  was  honoured  with  titles  such  as  "  Grand  Emir," 
"  Defender  of  the  Arabs/'  and  so  on,  published  in  the  Figaro  on 
October  12,  1919: 

SYRIA  AND  THE  RIGHTS  OF  THE  HEDJAZ. 

Apparently  they  are  still  "  hesitating,"  and  refusing  the  Emir  Faisal  the 
rights  of  the  King  in  his  Kingdom  of  Syria. 

If  the  Emir's  statements  are  to  be  accepted,  these  rights  are  not  disputed  by 
the  majority  of  the  parties  concerned. 

Let  us  examine  them  ! 

They  are  based  on  the  English  promises  in  1915.  It  does,  indeed,  appear 
from  a  perusal  of  the  letters  between  Hussein,  the  Sherif  of  Mecca,  and  Sir 
Henry  MacMahon,  that  England  promised  the  Hedjaz,  if  not  the  whole  of 
Syria,  at  any  rate  its  most  famous  part,  Damascus,  Horns,  Kama,  and  Aleppo. 
On  this  basis,  therefore,  rest  the  rights  of  the  Sherif,  now  King,  and  his  son 
Faisal !  These  are  the  promises  (no  one  uses  the  word  "  obligations  ")  on  which 
the  Emir  takes  his  stand,  and  which,  he  thinks,  justify  him  in  having  his  say  in 
all  other  agreements  or  decisions,  and  even  at  the  Peace  Conference  itself. 

What  really  are  these  letters,  promises,  or  obligations  ?  In  the  twentieth 
century  is  it  permissible  for  two  private  individuals,  whoever  they  may  be — 
and  especially  if  they  are  foreigners — to  dispose  of  the  fate  and  fortunes  of  a 
whole  country  and  nation  ? 

Can  a  secret  correspondence,  with  supplementary  conferences,  furnish  a 
ground  for  any  legal  or  valid  claims  whatsoever  ?  Did  the  issue  of  a  bill  drawn 
in  this  way  for  so  large  a  sum,  and  in  the  name  of  third  parties  who  knew 
nothing  about  it  and  owed  nothing  at  all,  mean  that  we  could  become  their 
creditors  ? 

Then  why  is  this  claim  better  founded  than  other  claims  of  the  same  kind  ? 
The  agreements  of  1916  between  England,  France,  and  Russia,  however  little 
may  be  said  in  their  defence,  had  at  any  rate  considerable  force,  owing  to  the 
importance  of  the  contracting  parties.  Moreover,  the  Powers  who  were  dividing 
these  countries  among  themselves  could  excuse  themselves  on  the  ground  that 
they  intended  to  bring  them  peace  and  prosperity.  But  what  could  the  weak 
Hedjaz,  with  its  chronic  lack  of  culture,  bring  young  Syria  ? 

But  if  Faisal  loves  our  country  so  much,  and  wishes  to  preserve  its 
inviolability,  why  does  he  not  reject  all  voluntary  agreements  without  distinc- 
tion ?  Why  does  he  make  an  exception  where  they  are  in  his  favour  ?  On  the 
contrary,  he  says  to  Reuter's  Agency  :  "  We  do  not  recognise  the  agreement  of 
1916."  He  adds  :  "  I  do  not  care  what  this  or  that  Government  thinks." 

Is  he  quite  sure  ?  Is  he  quite  indifferent  to  the  views  of  the  Government  from 
which  he  received  those  letters  he  now  puts  forward  as  the  basis  of  his  claims  ? 
Yet  this  cautious  diplomat  of  the  Turkish  school — who  forty  days  before  the 
occupation  of  Syria  by  the  Allies  tried  to  make  his  peace  with  Turkey  because 


The  Arab  Rebellion 


235 


he  felt  the  insecurity  of  his  position — says  that  this  first  agreement  (of  1915)  was 
in  accordance  with  the  desires  of  the  people  of  Syria.  Even  then  !  What  did  he 
know  about  it,  or  the  archaeologist  Lawrence,  and  Sir  Henry  MacMahon  ?  They 
must  have  known  that  the  reverse  was  the  truth,  as  the  main  concern  of  the 
Emir  and  his  confidants  after  their  arrival  in  Syria  was  to  prevent  the  falsity 
of  their  assertions  from  being  shown  up.  A  shower  of  gold  and  promises,  a 
display  of  lavish  wealth  and  military  power,  propagandist  intrigue,  which  it  is 
well  known  was  directed  even  against  the  French  ally,  threats,  murders — 
nothing  was  left  untried.  Examples  were  made  :  the  murder  of  the  grandson  of 
Abd-el-Kader,  the  banishment  of  his  brother  Said  of  Damascus  and  his  subse- 
quent arrest,  which  preceded  the  arrest  of  Manjib  Bey,  Governor  of  Aleppo, 
whose  crime  was  that  he  and  the  eight  hundred  thousand  members  of  his  party 
had  given  their  votes  to  France.  (If  the  space  at  my  disposal  were  not  so  limited 
I  should  give  a  detailed  account  of  this  occurrence!)  The  arrest,  conviction, 
and  death  of  the  notables  of  Baalbek,  also  for  voting  for  France.  Even  in 
Damascus,  which  became  the  seat  of  the  autocratic  and  theocratic  sovereignty 
of  the  Hedjaz  after  the  armistice,  this  system  imposed  silence  upon  some  while 
heaping  gold  on  others  in  order  to  loosen  their  tongues.  The  son  of  the  Sherif, 
the  bearer  of  the  Holy  Standard,  who  is  the  sure  herald  of  a  religious  revival  in 
the  eyes  of  the  blind  and  ignorant  section  of  the  populace,  cannot  afford  to 
neglect  any  means  of  symbolising  the  sovereignty  which  Faisal  is  promising  to 
the  believers.  If  Syria  really  wants  him,  why  has  he  to  resort  to  illegalities  of 
all  kinds,  compromises,  corruption,  terror,  and  crime  ? 

What  remains,  then,  of  the  alleged  rights  of  the  son  of  that  Mohammedan 
Pope,  whose  son  was  apparently  rewarded  for  his  revolt  against  his  Turkish 
suzerain  with  the  title  of  King  and  the  grant  of  temporal  power  in  accordance 
with  the  materialist  spirit  of  the  age  ? 

What  is  plain  is  something  that  the  Emir  has  not  said,  and  which  can  only 
be  put  in  diplomatic  phraseology — that  the  truth,  as  befits  the  peculiarities  of 
this  country,  is  treated  as  a  Mohammedan  lady  who  must  not  be  seen  unveiled 
by  the  uninitiated.  Perhaps  in  France,  too,  there  is  a  desire  to  spare  the 
feelings  of  neighbours  and  allies,  who  are  terribly  shocked  when  they  hear  the 
commonest  things  called  by  their  true  names.  And  so  we  decorate  and  evade 
with  a  knowing  wink.  But  all  this  does  not  affect  the  fact  that  the  legal  claims 
of  that  Emir  rest  solely  upon  the  wishes  of  those  to  whom  I  have  referred.  He 
owes  everything  to  those  wishes  which  have  received  formal  expression  since 
1915,  inspired  the  agreements  of  1916,  revealed  themselves  in  the  undertaking 
of  September  30,  1918  (on  the  very  next  day  the  Abd-el-Kader's  grandson  was 
killed  and  his  brother  banished),  and  are  now  responsible  for  the  provisional 
agreement  of  September  19.  The  Emir  is  the  tool  of  a  policy  which  has  made 
him  what  he  is  and  brought  him  to  Syria;  this  policy  is  determined  to  keep  him 
here,  perhaps  in  order  to  have  him  at  its  disposal  when  the  time  arrives 

Of  course  eveiything  has  been  done  in  a  perfectly  correct  manner,  and  it 
would  be  wrong  to  reproach  England  or  her  agents  with  the  slightest  breach  of 
etiquette.  Superficially  nothing  has  been  outraged  by  this  series  of  enterprises 
by  which  the  Syrians  have  been  turned  into  Arabs  and  geography  and  history 
turned  upside  down.  This  absolute  rectitude  in  the  selection  and  employment  of 
means  is  the  speciality  of  skilled  diplomacy. 

Thus  Emir  Faisal,  who  was  once  simply  the  commander  of  a  detachment  of 
2000  men,  is  now  the  unchallenged  ruler  of  Syria.  We  should  hardly  have  the 
courage  to  complain  of  this  undeserved  misfortune  if  France — still  bleeding 
from  her  wounds — had  obtained  some  advantage  from  the  new  regime.  But  is 
it  possible  to  speak  of  "  advantage  "  when  she  is  robbed  of  a  land  which  has 
increased  her  prestige  in  the  East  and  the  whole  world  of  Islam,  quite  apart 
from  her  considerable  material  interests  ? 


236  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

No,  if  the  Hedjaz  bluff  succeeds — for  Faisal  is  only  a  figurehead — if  he  is 
left  in  Syria,  or  merely  with  Damascus,  Horns,  Kama,  and  Aleppo,  while 
England  rules  over  Haifa,  Akka,  Palestine,  Cyprus,  Egypt,  Mesopotamia 
Arabia,  and  Persia,  and  all  the. holy  places  of  Islam,  would  not  French  interests 
in  this  country,  the  French  tongue,  and  French  ambitions  be  seriously  menaced  ? 
Would  not  Syria,  a  land  she  had  begun  to  form  after  her  own  pattern,  be  for 
ever  changed  and  unrecognisable  ?  Who  could  have  thought  that  this  would  be 
the  fruit  of  the  victory  of  civilisation  over  barbarism  ?  It  is  inconceivable.  We 
must  defend  ourselves  against  such  a  result.  It  is  a  torturing  dream,  a  hallu- 
cination. The  truth  is  otherwise.  It  must  be  so. 

England  is  an  ally  who  is  not  only  correct  in  conduct,  but  judicially  minded, 
and  has  a  liberal  constitution.  She  is  wise  in  counsel,  prudent  in  policy,  humane 
to  the  highest  degree.  She  cannot  allow  herself  to  be  led  away  by  selfish  desires 
and  to  be  open  to  such  a  reproach,  as  she  would  be  if  Syria  was  dismembered 
through  her  fault  and  delivered  into  the  hands  of  the  Hed]az  or  a  man  of  the 
Hedjaz.  Syria  will  remain  Syria  unsullied,  a  Syria  within  unchanged  frontiers 
like  a  pretty  picture  in  its  frame. 

In  the  words  of  the  Minister-President  to  the  Central  Committee  in  Syria, 
upon  France  alone  will  fall  the  duty  of  securing  her  future  and  rendering  her 
brotherly  assistance  in  realising  her  high  national  ideals. 

SHUKRI  GANEM, 
President  of  the  Syrian  Central  Committee. 


From  this  article  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  none  of  the  claims 
of  the  King  of  the  Hedjaz,  Sherif  Hussein,  to  the  cities  of 
Damascus,  Hama,  Horns,  and  Aleppo  are  regarded  with  any 
favour.  He  and  his  son  Faisal  have  been  treated  as  catspaws. 
The  grandson  of  Emir  Abd-el-Kader,  el  Djezairi  el  Hassan  (whom 
he  called  "my  honoured  brother "),  accuses  him  of  having 
treacherously  slain  the  Emir.  In  an  article  I  have  read  in  an 
English  newspaper  it  is  said  that  Sherif  Hussein  is  working  in 
Mecca  with  English  money.  Those  who  know  the  nature  of  the 
soil  and  the  climate  in  the  Hedjaz  can  have  no  doubt  that  this  will 
always  be  so.  The  result  is  that,  thanks  to  Sherif  Hussein's  revolt, 
the  "  Hadem  el  Haremein  el  Sherif ein  "  (Protector  of  the  two 
Holy  Cities)  is,  in  my  opinion,  none  other  than  His  Majesty  King 
George  V.  of  England. 

It  is  obvious  that  England  is  making  Sherif  Faisal  Emir  of  an 
Arab  state  to  be  formed  from  the  cities  of  Damascus,  Hama, 
Horns,  and  Aleppo,  and  in  this  way  attempting  to  lay  hands  on 
this  region,  comprising  all  the  important  towns  of  the  Islam  world. 

This  is  a  true  picture  of  the  disaster  which  has  overtaken  the 
Mohammedan  world  as  the  result  of  Sherif  Hussein's  rebellion. 
Compared  with  the  injury  done  to  the  Khalifate  by  Sherif  Hussein, 
the  blows  dealt  at  Mohammedan  power  by  the  Moorish  leaders 


The  Arab  Rebellion  237 

when  they  allied  themselves  with  Christian  states  are  simply 
insignificant. 

And  if—which  God  forbid — Constantinople,  described  by  the 
sacred  Hadiss  as  "  Lefe  tachtahane  Kostantinieti,"  the  natural 
centre  of  the  Mohammedan  Khalifate,  is  governed  by  the  League 
of  Nations  (as  the  Europeans  intend),  Sherif  Hussein's  treacherous 
work  will  have  been  completed.  To  those  who  say  to  us:  "If 
you  had  not  entered  the  World  War  things  would  not  have  come 
to  such  a  pass,"  our  reply  is  that  if  we  had  not  entered  the  World 
War  the  result  would  have  been  just  the  same,  as  the  French, 
English,  and  Russian  lust  of  conquest  is  not  a  thing  of  yesterday, 
but  has  existed  for  centuries.  After  emerging  victorious  from  the 
war  these  three  nations  would  inevitably  have  carved  up  our 
country.  The  property  of  the  weak  and  helpless  usually  is  divided 
up.  We  should  then  have  had  to  bear  the  shame  and  humiliation 
of  seeing  ourselves  deprived  without  a  struggle  of  what  God  had 
entrusted  to  our  care. 

If  God  pleases,  the  Turks  will  succeed  in  saving  proud  Stamboul 
and  beautiful  Smyrna  for  their  country,  thanks  to  the  recent 
national  rising  under  the  leadership  of  Mustafa  Kemal  Pasha,  and 
if  they  take  proper  measures  they  will  assure  the  welfare  of  their 
nation  and  the  prosperity  of  their  country  within  its  natural 
frontiers. 


THE  ARMENIAN    QUESTION 


CHAPTER  IX. 
THE  ARMENIAN  QUESTION. 

AN    HISTORICAL    INTRODUCTION. 

WE  Young  Turks  unquestionably  prefer  the  Armenians,  and  par- 
ticularly the  Armenian  revolutionaries,  to  the  Greeks  and  Bul- 
garians. They  are  a  finer  and  braver  race  than  the  two  other 
nations,  open  and  candid,  constant  in  their  friendships,  constant  in 
their  hatreds.  We  are  absolutely  convinced  that  the  policy  of 
Russia  was  alone  responsible  for  the  enmity  between  Turkish  and 
Armenian  elements.  Sixty  years  ago,  or,  to  speak  more 
accurately,  until  ten  years  before  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877-8, 
there  was  no  question  whatever  of  any  religious  conflict  between 
the  two  races,  i.e.,  religious  differences  between  Mohammedans 
and  Christians.  In  Anatolia,  Rumelia,  Constantinople,  indeed 
throughout  the  Turkish  Empire,  the  Armenians  and  Turks  lived 
together  in  such  harmony  that  Ottoman  histories  of  that  period  do 
not  even  mention  such  a  thing  as  an  Armenian  question.  In  family 
affairs  there  was  no  limit  to  Turco-Armenian  friendship.  When  a 
Turk  left  his  village  in  Asia  Minor  for  some  business  journey  he 
left  his  Armenian  neighbours  in  full  charge  of  his  family,  honours 
and  rights,  and  the  Armenians  on  their  side  showed  equal 
confidence  in  their  Turkish  neighbours. 

In  the  whole  of  Anatolia  and  Rumelia,  and  even  in  Constanti- 
J  nople  there  was  not  an  Armenian  who  could  speak  Armenian. 
Turkish— in  Armenian  characters— was  taught  in  all  the  schools, 
and  in  the  churches  Mass  was  said  in  Turkish.  The  highest  offices 
of  State  were  open  to  the  Armenians,  and  they  were  regarded  as 
the  most  loyal  subjects  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 


241 


242  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

When  the  Beys  of  Kurdistan  were  overthrown  by  the  Turks  the 
Armenians  who  lived  under  their  sway  did  not  form  an  independent 
State.  Under  Kurdish  domination  they  had  suffered  terrible 
oppression.  Mr.  Ambassador  Morgenthau  may  say  what  he  likes 
and  take  endless  pains,  as  he  does,  to  suppress  the  historical 
evidence.  The  fact  is  that  just  as  justice  and  tolerance  alone  can 
explain  the  formation  of  the  Turkish  Empire  and  the  rapid  exten- 
sion of  Turkish  dominion,  so  the  magnanimity  and  friend- 
ship shown  the  Armenians  won  their  gratitude.  The  result 
was  that  for  five  hundred  years  there  was  no  sort  of  conflict 
between  the  two  peoples  and  there  was  not  a  single  Armenian 
who  had  not  made  the  Turkish  tongue  and  national  customs 
his  own. 

When  Sultan  Fatih  Mehmed  Han  allowed  the  Orthodox 
patriarchate  to  remain  in  existence  after  the  capture  of  Constanti- 
nople and  granted  the  Greeks  (not  as  a  result  of  any  external 
pressure,  but  purely  out  of  generosity  and  nobility  of  mind)  a 
number  of  rights  known  as  "  religious  privileges,'*  he  also  founded 
an  Armenian  Patriarchate  in  the  capital  of  his  Empire,  so  that  the 
rights  of  the  Armenian  nation,  who  were  a  national  minority 
among  the  Mohammedans  of  Anatolia,  should  be  the  more 
worthily  upheld.  He  also  gave  the  Armenians  the  same  rights 
and  privileges  he  had  granted  to  the  Greeks. 

On  page  190  of  his  work  Mandelstamm  relies  on  the  observa- 
tions of  a  historian  who,  notwithstanding  incontrovertible 
historical  facts,  is  shameless  enough  to  ascribe  the  tolerant 
generosity  of  the  Turks  solely  to  their  contempt  for  all  things 
Christian,  which,  in  their  eyes,  wrere  from  the  religious  point  of 
view  impure ! 

In  the  year  1462  of  the  Christian  era,  at  a  time  when  throughout 
Europe  ithe  notion  of  the  "  rights  of  minorities  "  was  utterly 
undeveloped,  a  Mohammedan  Sultan  at  the  height  of  his  power 
allowed  the  Greek  Patriarchate  to  continue  in  Constantinople.  He 
granted  the  Greeks  as  "  religious  privileges  "  a  whole  series  of 
special  rights  as  to  marriage,  inheritance,  and  education.  In  his 
own  capital  he  founded  another  Patriarchate  for  another  nation 
which  had  lived  under  the  yoke  of  Kurdish  tyranny,  and  granted  it 
the  same  rights  and  privileges.  Yet  shameless  individuals  of 
Mandelstamm's  kidney  do  not  shrink  from  ascribing  this 


The  Armenian  Question  243 

generosity  to  a  feeling  of  contempt  for  everything  Christian ! 
What  an  injustice ! 

Were  not  these  rights  granted  by  a  great  Turkish  Sultan  in  the 
fifteenth  century  the  highest  application  of  those  principles  of 
the  "  Rights  of  Minorities  "  which  President  Wilson  has 
endeavoured  to  get  recognised  by  the  civilised  world  ? 

Has  this  principle  received  the  same  recognition  and  extension 
in  the  recent  peace  treaty  with  Austria  at  Saint  Germain  (which 
the  Jugo-Slav  and  Rumanian  Governments  refused  to  accept)  as 
it  did  in  those  rights  granted  by  the  Conqueror  to  the  Christian 
nationalities  ? 

The  Armenians  know  well  enough  that  to  these  privileges  alone 
they  owe  the  fact  that  they  have  preserved  their  religion  and 
nationality.  Instead  of  the  oppression  they  endured  under  the 
thraldom  of  the  Kurds  they  have  been  able  to  live  on  the  best  of 
terms  with  the  Turks,  and  especially  with  the  Turkish  Government. 
Why  does  Herr  Mandelstamm,  who  gets  his  information  from  the 
works  of  men  like  Zarzeski  and  others,  turn  for  proof  to  the 
sufferings  and  wrongs  to  which  the  Armenians  were  exposed  before 
the  nineteenth  century  under  the  feudal  tyranny  of  the  Kurdish 
Beys  ?  Why  does  he  not  think  of  the  feudal  tyranny  in  which  the 
French  nation  lived  before  the  Great  Revolution  ?  It  is  not  even 
necessary  to  go  as  far  afield  as  that.  Was  the  existence  of  the 
Russian  mujiks  more  tolerable  than  that  of  the  Armenians  in 
Turkey  ? 

Herr  Mandelstamm  does  not  shrink  from  confessing  himself 
an  enthusiastic  partisan  of  the  Russian  Revolution.  Does  he  not 
know  that  we,  too,  know  something  about  the  Russian  revolu- 
tionary writings  and  something  about  the  oppression  of  the 
Russian  peasants  by  their  landlords,  and  not  so  long  ago  ?  If 
Herr  Mandelstamm  has  the  audacity  to  maintain  that  those 
writings  exaggerated  we  can  assure  him  without  hesitation  that 
he  is  not  speaking  the  truth. 

I  repeat  once  again  that  until  after  the  Crimean  War  of  1856 
the  Turks  and  Armenians  lived  together  on  the  best  of  terms  and 
the  former  were  never  guilty  of  any  wrongs  against  their 
Armenian  neighbours. 

When  the  Russians  turned  greedy  eyes  on  the  Ottoman  Empire 
they  began  to  think  it  would  be  politically  effective  if  they 

Q2 


244  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

could  make  the  Christian  elements  in  Rumelia  tools  in  then- 
designs. 

It  produces  a  remarkable  impression  to  find  Herr  Mandel- 
stamm,  after  saying  on  page  300  of  his  book  that  the  Russian 
Revolutionary  Government  thoroughly  approved  of  the  steps 
taken  by  Czarist  Russia  to  support  the  Christian  nations  against 
Turkish  oppression,  and  adding  that  "  the  mujik,  who  himself  is 
a  victim  of  the  greatest  oppression,  has  always  gone  to  war  to 
save  the  Greeks,  Bulgars,  and  Serbs/' 

All  this  was  the  result  of  that  famous  policy  which  aroused 
fear  and  aversion  throughout  the  world.  For  the  sake  of  man- 
kind we  cannot  but  hope  it  will  be  doomed  to  eternal  extinction 
along  with  Czarism. 

It  must,  of  course,  be  admitted  that  the  nationalist  tendencies 
which  began  to  develop  and  spread  about  the  middle  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  was  the  direct  explanation  of  the  fact  that  the  young 
Armenians  who  had  gone  to  Europe  and  America  to  gain  know- 
ledge or  a  living  absorbed  that  mental  atmosphere  which  drove 
them  to  strive  for  an  easier  private  life  for  their  people  and  more 
independent  political  activities.  This  development  wras  regarded 
by  the  Russian  diplomats  as  a  gift  from  God,  and  from  that  moment 
they  left  no  stone  unturned  to  excite  the  Armenians  against  their 
Government. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  Sultan  Mahmud  IT. 
had  taken  extreme  steps  to  restore  order  in  his  Empire  and 
suppress  the  administrative  and  military  anarchy  which  had  been 
the  result  of  two  hundred  years  of  misgovernment.  He  abolished 
the  janissaries,  restricted  the  powers  of  the  Beys  of  Anatolia  and 
Rumelia  until  they  had  hardly  any  authority  left,  and  also  curbed 
the  power  of  the  Beys  of  Kurdistan. 

But  while  this  unfortunate  sovereign  was  endeavouring  to 
,  restore  order  in  his  country  he  found  himself  faced  with  difficulties 
Y  innumerable.  The  Greeks  were  egged  on  through  the  intrigues 
of  the  "  Ethniki  Heteria,"  an  organisation  founded  by  Russian 
capital,  and  he  had  all  the  trouble  in  the  world  to  pacify  them.  He 
saw  himself  attacked  by  the  French,  English  and  Russians,  lost 
his  entire  fleet  at  Navarino,  and  was  at  length  compelled  to  recog- 
nise the  independence  of  Greece.  Mehmed  AH  Pasha,  the 
Governor-General  of  Egypt,  rose  against  him  as  the  result  of 


itu-  \ 

nti- 

r\r\t*   *' 


The  Armenian  Question  245 

French  inspiration.  He  wanted  to  secure  the  Turkish  crown  for 
himself,  and  succeeded  in  taking  the  whole  country  as  far  as 
Kutahia. 

Who  can  reproach  a  Government  faced  with  such  enormous 
internal  and  external  difficulties  with  not  having  taken  all  the  steps 
possible  to  promote  the  welfare  not  merely  of  its  Armenian 
subjects,  but  of  all  its  subjects  ? 

The  Government  of  Sultan  Abdul  Medjid  granted  the 
Armenians  such  extensive  privileges  that  even  Mandelstamm  men- 
tions the  fact  with  admiration.  On  page  90  of  his  book  he  writes  : 

In  the  year  1863  the  Armenians  received  a  real  constitution.     That  constitu- 
tion gave  them  the  right  to  elect  a  Supreme  Council,  with  its  seat  at  Constant! 
nople.     The  Supreme  Council  consisted  of  four  hundred  members,  of  which  one 
hundred  and  twenty  were  elected  by  the  people  themselves. 

Could  President  Wilson  think  of  any  better  method  of  safe- 
guarding the  rights  of  national  minorities  ? 

The  Ottoman  Government  granted  the  Armenians  this  consti- 
tution without  any  pressure  from  outside.  The  loyalty  they  had 
displayed  hitherto  had  gained  the  sympathies  of  the  Government 
to  such  an  extent  that  the  latter  did  not  hesitate  for  a  moment  to 
give  the  "  faithful  Armenian  nation  "  a  constitution.  It  was  to 
be  the  beginning  of  a  new  and  happy  era.  The  Russians,  however, 
used  this  constitution  to  interfere  in  Armenian  affairs. 

Even  as  early  as  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1856  a  few  Armenian  , 
rebels  had  given  assistance  to  the  Russians.       Thereafter  the  , 
Russians  maintained  relations  with  Armenia,  and  lost  no  oppor-  j 
tunity  of  encouraging  the  Armenian  revolutionaries.    The  effect 
made  itself  felt  so  quickly  that  within  four  years  of  the  grant  of 
the  constitution  (1867)  the  first  Armenian  revolt  broke  out  at 
Zeitun. 

This  first  armed  revolt  on  the  part  of  the  Armenians  naturally 
made  a  considerable  impression  on  the  Government.  The  Russian 
and  Anatolian  Armenians  made  things  extremely  difficult  for  the 
Turkish  armies  during  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877-8. 

Nercess  Effendi,  the  Armenian  Patriarch,  who  at  that  time  went 
to  San  Stefano  to  secure  the  Czar's  support  for  the  cause  of 
Armenian  independence,  was  thereby  largely  responsible  for  the 
fact  that  the  Armenians  had  entirely  lost  their  old  name  of  the 
"  loyal  nation  "  (millet-i-Sadika). 


246  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

The  Russian  politicians  realised  well  enough  that  after  the 
declaration  of  Bulgarian  independence  any  chance  of  interfering 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  Empire  had  gone.  But  the  Imperial 
Russian  Government  desired  to  preserve  that  right,  and  therefore 
secured  the  insertion  in  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  of  a  special 
article  for  the  benefit  of  the  Armenians.  This  article  was  repro- 
duced in  another  form  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin. 

In  this  way  relations  between  the  Armenians,  Kurds  and  Turks 
had  become  very  strained.  Throughout  the  Ottoman  Empire,  in 
large  towns  as  in  the  smaller  villages,  the  Armenian  Revolutionary 
Committee  had  established  secret  associations,  very  well  organised. 
These  secret  associations  worked  tirelessly  to  rouse  the  Armenians 
against  the  Kurds  and  Turks,  and  demanded  nothing  less  than  the 
establishment  of  a  privileged  Armenian  province  consisting  of  six 
vilayets  in  eastern  Anatolia.  The  Government  and  the  Turk 
and  Kurdish  population  were,  of  course,  well  aware  of  these 
intrigues. 

As  the  Armenians  were  bent  on  founding  an  independent  State 
in  which  they  could  impose  their  will  on  the  Kurds  and  Turks,  who 
greatly  outnumbered  them,  the  latter  naturally  tried  to  frustrate 
this  plan.  To  speak  more  plainly,  the  Kurds  and  Turks  realised 
only  too  well  that  the  whole  scheme  was  only  a  pretext  on  the  part 
of  Russia  for  snatching  a  very  large  part  of  Anatolia,  which  was 
inhabited  exclusively  by  Turks  and  Kurds.  They  naturally 
regarded  Armenia,  so  to  speak,  as  a  snake  let  loose  by  Russia 
against  them. 

In  January,  1880,  as  a  result  of  continuous  pressure  by  Russia, 
and  in  view  of  the  various  Armenian  revolts,  the  States  of  Europe 
issued  a  Note  on  the  subject  of  Armenian  Reforms  to  the  Sublime 
Porte.  It  was  just  then  that  the  Bulgarians  were  trying  to  annex 
Eastern  Rumelia.  Every  time  the  Government  had  to  settle  some 
very  important  domestic  or  foreign  problem  the  Russians  brought 
up  the  Armenian  question  again.  Abdul  Hamid  II.  settled  the 
matter  by  giving  way  on  certain  points. 

The  Armenian  troubles  reached  their  height  in  the  years  1894- 
1896,  and  there  were  risings,  more  or  less,  everywhere.  The 
Armenian  disorders  now  resulted  in  such  intense  hatreds  between 
the  three  nations,  which  had  lived  peacefully  side  by  side  for  five 
to  six  hundred  years,  that  they  were  ready  to  fall  upon  one  another 


The  Armenian  Question  247 

and  stain  the  soil  of  Anatolia,  and  even  Constantinople  itself,  with 
their  blood. 

Even  men  like  Mandelstamm  who  thoroughly  detest  the  Turks 
cannot  deny  that  during  the  events  of  those  years  the  Turks  felt 
no  sort  of  hatred  towards  the  Armenians.  Many  Turks  vied  with 
one  another  in  protecting  the  Armenians,  and  in  Constantinople 
a  number  of  Turkish  families  showed  the  greatest  friendliness  to 
their  Armenian  neighbours  by  hiding  them  in  their  houses  to  save 
them  from  death.  Many  dignitaries  of  the  Empire  were  horror- 
struck,  and  condemned  the  Armenian  massacres  in  Constantinople, 
which  were  started  by  the  porters  at  the  Custom  House.  They 
did  everything  in  their  power  to  stop  them. 

The  whole  world  knows  what  strong  steps  Marshal  Fuad  Pasha 
took  to  protect  the  Armenians  at  Kadikoi.  Mandelstamm  says 
that  it  was  just  because  of  Fuad  Pasha's  friendship  for  the 
Armenians  that  he  afterwards  fell  into  disfavour,  but  there  is  not 
a  human  being  in  Constantinople  who  does  not  know  that  the 
statement  is  untrue. 

During  the  two  or  three  years  in  which  these  massacres  were  in 
progress  a  very  large  number  of  Kurds  and  Turks  were  killed 
by  the  Armenians,  and  the  two  sides  vied  with  each  other  in 
thinking  out  every  possible  form  of  torture.  But  as  the  Armenians 
were,  of  course,  in  a  minority,  the  Turks  and  Kurds  had  the 
upper  hand.  If  the  Armenians  had  had  a  numerical  majority  the 
number  of  murdered  Turks  and  Kurds  would  have  exceeded  that 
of  the  Armenians.  The  best  proof  is  the  number  of  Turks 
massacred  by  the  Greeks  in  the  Morea.  But  as  those  poor  unfor- 
tunates were  only  Turks  and  Mohammedans  there  was  no  poet 
like  Lord  Byron  or  Chateaubriand  to  sing  their  hard  lot,  and  those 
bloody  events  left  no  memories  behind  them  but  a  record  in  the 
annals  of  Ottoman  history. 

Consistently  with  my  views  on  political  administration  I  have 
an  absolute  horror  of  such  methods.  I  condemn  the  practice  of 
using  the  masses  to  suppress  revolutionary  movements  and 
organise  massacres.  Such  practices  do  a  nation  the  utmost  harm 
and  cast  a  stain  on  their  history. 

This  view  is  shared  by  all  the  patriots  who  banded  together  as 
the  "  Young  Turk  "  revolutionaries.  They  condemned  the  hap- 
penings of  1894-1896  in  Armenia  as  a  grave  political  blunder  of 


248  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  II.,  who  hoped  to  maintain  his  own  despotic 
authority  in  that  cruel  way.  It  was  thus  that  Ahmed  Riza  Bey  and 
his  companions  who  were  in  Europe  at  the  time  gave  the  revolting 
Armenians  effective  assistance.  The  other  revolutionaries  who, 
like  myself,  were  at  home  and  shared  the  same  views,  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  condemn  Abdul  Hamid  because  of  the  injury  done  to  the 
Turkish,  and  more  especially  the  Ottoman,  cause  by  the 
Armenian  massacres. 

Some  of  the  most  high-minded  of  the  Armenian  revolutionaries 
then  began  to  see  the  situation  in  a  true  light.  They  saw  that 
while  on  the  one  hand  the  Russians  were  stopping  at  nothing  to 
secure  independence  for  the  Armenians  of  Turkey,  the  Armenians 
of  the  Caucasus  were  suffering  under  the  greatest  despotism.  In 
return  for  the  promise  that  no  railways  would  be  constructed  in 
Eastern  Anatolia  the  Czar  actually  promised  the  Sultan  Abdul 
Hamid  II.  to  forbid  the  return  to  Turkey  of  the  Armenians  who 
had  fled  into  the  Caucasus  after  the  revolution  of  1896. 

There  could  not  be  clearer  proof  of  Russia's  intentions  towards 
Turkey  and  the  Armenians.  It  is  incontestable  that  culture  and 
material  well-being  are  the  most  essential  elements  in  the  pro- 
sperity of  a  nation.  But  well-being  begins  with  the  establishment 
of  suitable  communications  such  as  railways  and  roads.  The 
Russians  were  demanding  reforms  for  the  welfare  and  security  of 
the  vilayets  inhabited  by  Armenians  and  simultaneously  insisting 
that  we  should  refrain  from  the  construction  of  railways,  which 
would  have  promoted  those  objects. 

What  is  Herr  Mandelstamm's  explanation  of  these  facts  ?  He 
confines  himself  simply  to  reviling  a  European  writer  who  drew 
attention  to  this  matter.  But  insults  are  not  proof. 

The  double  game  played  by  Russian  politicians  made  the 
honourable  Armenians  reflect.  They  could  not  help  putting  to 
themselves  the  following  question :  If  Armenia  gained  autonomy 
would  she  not  fall  under  the  Russian  yoke,  which  was  a  thousand 
times  worse  than  the  Turkish  ?  The  Turkish  revolutionary  com- 
mittees therefore  made  great  efforts  to  get  the  "  Dachnakzutiun 
Committee,"  the  most-  reasonable  and  best  conducted  of  the 
Armenian  committees,  to  recognise  the  reforms  for  the  benefit  of 
all  the  nationalities  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  for  which  they  were 
working. 


The  Armenian  Question  249 

Herr  Mandelstamm  cannot  say  that  my  statements  are  invented 
because  the  "  Dachnakzutiun,"  which  participated  in  the  general 
congress  of  the  Committee  of  Unity  and  Progress  in  Paris  in  1907 
and  their  published  programme,  closely  approached  the  reforms 
at  which  we  aimed.  They  also  promised  to  work  in  co-operation 
with  the  Committee  of  Unity  and  Progress.  Malumian  Effendi 
(Agnoni),  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  "  Dachnakzutiun  Committee/' 
whom  I  met  in  Constantinople  in  1908,  frequently  spoke  to  me  of 
the  Russian  danger  which  was  hanging  over  the  Armenians'  heads. 

But  among  the  Armenian  revolutionary  committees  were  some 
like  the  "  Hinjakists  "  and  "  Reformed  Hinjakists,"  most  of  whose 
leaders  had  been  bought  by  the  Russians,  who  sought  no 
rapprochement  with  the  Turkish  committees  and  were  aiming  at 
an  Armenian  State  under  Russian  protection. 

Thanks  to  the  representatives  of  these  Russian  committees  and 
the  Russian  money  distributed  by  all  the  Russian  Consulates  which 
took  an  active  part  in  the  revolutionary  organisations,  even  the 
ecclesiastical  party  began  to  say  that  the  protection  of  the  Russian 
Czar  was  preferable  to  that  of  the  Mohammedan  Khalif . 

Such  was  the  position  of  the  Armenian  and  Turkish  revolu- 
tionaries when  the  revolution  of  1908  began.  The  secret  "  Com- 
mittee of  Unity  and  Progress  "  which  was  formed  at  Salonica  had 
accepted  as  its  'domestic  programme  the  establishment  pf  the 
"  Midhat  Pasha  "  constitution.  The  basis  of  this  constitution  was 
the  recognition  of  Ottomanism  and  simultaneous  decentralisation 
of  administration.  On  the  other  hand,  the  system  of  "  political 
decentralisation  "  without  recognition  of  Ottomanism  was  the 
goal  aimed  at  by  the  Macedonian  Bulgarian  Committees,  the 
Macedonian  Greek  Committees  under  the  leadership  of  the 
Ethniki  Heteria,  the  Macedonian  National  War  Committee,  and 
the  revolutionary  Albanian,  Armenian,  and  Arab  Committees. 

:t  Decentralisation  of  the  Administration  "  meant  administra- 
tive local  autonomy  in  a  single  "  Ottoman  Empire  "  for  the 
various  parts  inhabited  by  the  different  national  elements.  If  the 
Committee  of  Unity  and  Progress  had  held  the  same  views  as  our 
external  enemies,  who  desired  nothing  so  much  as  the  dismember- 
ment of  the  Empire  and  left  nothing  undone  in  the  way  of  plots 
and  intrigues,  it  would  not  have  hesitated  for  a  moment  to  accept 
that  principle  of  "  political  or  legal  autonomy/*  the  greatest  cham- 


250  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

pion  of  which  was  Prince  Sabaheddin.  But  France  coveted  Syria, 
the  English  hoped  to  make  themselves  masters  of  Mesopotamia  and 
the  whole  Arabian  Peninsula,  the  Russians  were  only  waiting  for 
a  favourable  opportunity  to  seize  the  eastern  provinces  of  Anatolia, 
the  Bulgarians  and  Serbs  wanted  to  carve  up  Macedonia,  the 
Italians  and  Austrians  wished  to  lay  hands  on  Albania,  and  the 
Greeks  hoped  to  incorporate  the  islands  of  the  Archipelago  in  their 
kingdom.  If  all  these  regions  had  been  created  provinces  on  the 
principle  of  "  political  decentralisation/'  would  those  nations  have 
had  the  slightest  difficulty  in  swallowing  them  up  one  after  the 
other  ?  Would  our  decentralisation  principle  have  stood  the  test 
of  time  any  better  than  the  decentralisation  principle  of  Austria  ? 
Did  it  make  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  Croats,  and  Slovenes  lose  hope 
of  breaking  away  altogether  from  Austria  ?  Would  the  authority 
and  power  of  our  central  Government  have  proved  more  effective 
than  those  of  the  Austrian  Government  to  protect  the  independent 
provinces  against  the  intrigues  of  our  even  more  numerous  and 
covetous  enemies  ?  No  region  enjoyed  a  larger  measure  of 
administrative  autonomy  than  the  island  of  Crete.  But  did  we 
succeed  in  compelling  the  Cretans  to  abandon  their  hope  of  uniting 
with  Greece  ?  The  Island  of  Cyprus  had  a  privileged  position 
before  the  English  occupation,  but  did  we  not  hear  the  same  story 
every  year — the  age-old  desire  for  incorporation  with  Greece  ? 

Were  we  able  to  prevent  the  Bulgarians  from  taking  Eastern 
Rumelia,  though  Rumelia  enjoyed  a  generous  administrative 
autonomy  ?  Did  England  have  any  difficulty  in  occupying  Egypt, 
which  was  among  the  most  highly  privileged  of  our  provinces  ? 
Have  the  English  hesitated  to  lay  hands  on  Kuiveit,  a  dependency 
of  the  Ottoman  Khalifate  for  centuries,  after  announcing  that  the 
Sheik  Mubarek  el  Sabah  had  accepted  English  protection  ?  Did 
the  English  find  any  difficulty  in  treating  Mesopotamia  as  their 
sphere  of  influence  on  the  pretext  that  the  local  population  were 
longing  for  English  protection  ?  Could  not  the  same  be  said  of 
the  French  with  regard  to  Syria  ?  And  can  we  regard  Macedonia 
or  Albania  in  a  different  light  to  Eastern  Rumelia  and  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina  ? 

I  do  not  think  the  advocates  of  "  political  decentralisation  " 
can  give  a  logical  and  satisfactory  answer  to  all  these  problems. 
To  those  who  reproach  us  with  having  pursued  a  "  purely  Turkish 


The  Armenian  Question  251 

policy/'  I  reply  emphatically  that  our  policy  was  not  a  "  Turkish  " 
policy,  but  the  policy  of  Ottoman  unity.  If  we  had  accepted  the 
decentralisation  principle,  the  Committee  would,  indeed,  have  had 
to  pursue  a  "  Turkish  "  policy,  for  we  should  have  had  to  demand 
the  same  local  autonomy  for  vilayets  inhabited  solely  by  Turks 
as  for  the  other  provinces.  So  those  who  confess  themselves 
"  Turks  "  only  are  really  advocates  of  "  decentralisation,"  for  in 
effect  they  are  simply  following  a  purely  Turkish  policy.  We,  on 
the  other  hand,  whose  policy  was  Ottoman  unity,  had  accepted 
as  a  fundamental  principle  that  the  influence  of  the  Central  Govern- 
ment on  the  vilayets  should  not  be  diminished,  though  the  local 
administration  should  be  granted  the  most  extensive  powers, 
always  provided  that  the  unity  of  army  organisation  should  not  be 
prejudiced. 

Young  Turkey  realised  that  among  the  various  Ottoman 
elements  which  were  struggling  for  the  advancement  of  their 
respective  nationalities  the  Turks  alone  were  isolated  and  without 
leaders,  and  so  they,  too,  began  to  work  for  a  great  national 
revival  in  knowledge,  education  and  virtue.  The  Committee  of 
Unity  and  Progress  had  no  right  to  put  any  obstacles  in  their  way, 
and  I  cannot  imagine  that  the  advocates  of  decentralisation  would 
have  wished  to  oppose  their  endeavours. 

Can  it  be  said  that  the  "  Turkification  "  of  the  nations  was 
involved  in  the  demand  that  the  Turkish  language  should  be  the 
official  tongue  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  ?  Were  we  engaged  in  the 
"  Turkification  "  of  the  other  nations  when  we  said  that  public 
education  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  must  be  under  the  supervision 
of  the  Government  and  well  conducted  ? 

Just  after  the  inauguration  of  the  constitution  a  number  of 
national  committees  were  established  in  Constantinople,  com- 
mittees such  as  the  "  Arab  Union/'  the  "  Cherkess  Mutual  Help 
Society/'  the  "  Kurdish  Club/'  the  "  Albanian  Club,"  and  many 
others.  Then  why  is  it  said  that  the  foundation  of  the  "  Ottoman 
Home  "  proves  that  the  Unionist  Government  had  "  Turkifica- 
tion "  designs? 

Speaking  for  myself,  I  am  primarily  an  Ottoman,  but  I  do  not 
forget  that  I  am  a  Turk,  and  nothing  can  shake  my  belief  that  the 
Turkish  race  is  the  foundation-stone  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The 
educational  and  civilising  influence  of  the  Turks  cements  Ottoman 


252  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

unity  and  strengthens  the  Empire,  for  in  its  origins  the  Ottoman 
Empire  is  a  Turkish  creation. 

If  any  evidence  is  required,  look  at  the  tragic  situation  in  which 
we  find  ourselves  to-day.  Look  at  the  Arabs,  who  rose  against 
us  in  the  hope  of  gaining  their  independence.  Where  are  they 
to-day?  I  have  referred  to  this  point  before. 

Immediately  after  Egypt  deserted  the  Ottoman  Union  it  fell 
under  English  domination.  The  moment  Young  Egypt  protested 
against  that  domination  England's  heavy  fist  descended  upon  them. 
The  coast  region  of  Syria  and  Lebanon  are  not  enough  for  France. 
She  wants  to  occupy  the  interior  as  well. 

Does  anyone  in  those  countries  ever  speak  of  Ottomanism  ? 
On  the  contrary,  the  cry,  "  By  the  grace  of  God  we  are  freed  from 
Ottomanism/'  is  ever  on  the  lips  of  a  crowd  of  traitors  who  have 
lived  on  the  favour  of  the  Government.  But  the  voice  raised  in 
Anatolia — that  sacred  land  to  the  Turks — proclaims  that  the 
"  Ottoman  Empire  "  still  exists,  and  her  noble  sons  who  dwell  in 
Western  Thrace — that  little  Turkish  corner — have  never  ceased  to 
strive  for  their  union  with  the  Empire.  In  short,  all  Turks — 
wherever  they  are — endeavour  to  assert  themselves  and  seek  refuge 
in  the  glorious  Ottoman  name.  We  appeal  to  all  who  wish  to 
preserve  the  cause  of  Ottoman  unity  to  realise  their  holy  duty  of 
encouraging  the  Turks,  increasing  their  number,  and  giving  them 
their  place  in  the  sun. 

I  hope  my  little  diversion,  for  the  purpose  of  making  my 
personal  views  widely  known,  may  not  be  regarded  as  superfluous. 

In  accordance  with  the  Act  of  the  Constitution,  the  Central 
Committee  of  "  Unity  and  Progress  "  expressed  a  desire  to  form 
the  various  revolutionary  political  committees  in  the  country  into 
one  "  Political  Committee  of  Ottoman  Unity/'  With  that  end  in 
view  it  first  of  all  got  into  touch  with  the  various  Bulgarian  revolu- 
tionary committees.  We  opened  negotiations  with  the  celebrated 
Sandansky,  Chernopexiff,  and  their  friends.  But,  whereas  we 
regarded  the  principle  of  Ottomanism  as  the  basis  of  the  negotia- 
tions, they  refused  to  make  the  slightest  concession,  and  demanded 
the  autonomy  of  Macedonia.  God  alone  knows  what  we  had  to 
put  up  with  at  those  conferences  in  which  Talaat  Bey  and  I  partici- 
pated as  delegates.  I  shall  never  forget  the  painful  day  I  spent 


The  Armenian  Question  253 

with  Sandansky  in  the  Bulgarian  villages  of  Menlik,  Petric,  and 
Osmanje  Djuma-i-Bala  at  the  time  of  the  first  elections.  Yet  we 
got  on  better  with  them  than  with  any  of  the  other  revolutionary 
committees,  for  the  Macedonian  Bulgarian  Committee  absolutely 
refused  to  abandon  its  own  programme. 

A  Greek,  who  had  come  to  Salonika  to  negotiate  in  the  name 
of  the  Ethniki  Heteria,  proposed  that  Crete  and  Samos  should  be 
annexed  by  Greece,  that  the  other  islands  should  be  granted 
administrative  autonomy,  and  so-called  Greek  Macedonia  the  most 
far-reaching  privileges.  As  compensation  there  was  to  be  an 
alliance  between  Greece  and  Turkey.  We  rejected  these  proposals 
as,  of  course,  what  we  wanted  was  not  a  Turco-Greek  alliance,  but 
that  the  Greeks  of  Turkey  should  join  our  Committee  of  Unity 
and  Progress  so  that  Ottoman  unity  could  become  a  reality. 

In  August,  1908,  the  Central  Committee  was  provisionally 
transferred  to  Constantinople,  where  we  opened  negotiations  on 
the  same  principles  with  Prince  Sabaheddin  and  the  Armenian 
Committee.  Our  party  was  represented  by  Talaat  Bey,  Behaeddin 
Shakir  Bey  and  myself.  Dr.  Reschad  Nihad  represented  Prince 
Sabaheddin,  while  Malumian  and  Shahirikian  Effendi  acted  on 
behalf  of  the  Armenians.  We  demonstrated  to  them  in  turn  all 
the  drawbacks  the  principle  of  decentralisation  involved  for  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  Prince  Sabaheddin's  views  were  more  or  less 
those  of  the  Dachnakzutiun  Committee.  They  both  replied  to  us 
in  the  same  sense. 

It  was  curious  that  Dr.  Reschad  Nihad  asked  us  to  grant  privi- 
leges even  more  extensive  than  those  claimed  by  the  Armenian 
Revolutionary  Committee  and  refused  to  consider  the  disadvan- 
tages those  privileges  involved.  At  length  Malumian  Effendi, 
speaking  in  the  name  of  the  Dachnakzutiun  Committee,  made  the 
following  proposal : 

The  Dachnakzutiun  Committee  will  work  hand  in  hand  with  the  Committee  \ 
of  Unity  and  Progress  to  safeguard  the  constitution  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  but     \< 
otherwise  each  Committee  retains  full  freedom  of  action  both  as  to  the  realisa- 
tion of  its  main  programme  and  the  choice  of  means.     This  means  that  the    / 
Dachnakzutiun  Committee  will  maintain  its  revolutionary  organisation  in  the 
country  with  the  single  difference  that  the  organisation,  which  has  hitherto  been,, 
secret,  will  now  come  forward  openly  as  a  political  committee  and  its  member/ 
will  work  in  public. 

Of  course  we  had  no  alternative  but  to  accept  this  proposal. 
To  put  it  shortly,  after  all  our  sacrifices  and  three  or  four  months 


254  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

of  unceasing  labour,  we  had  not  succeeded  in  incorporating  the 
revolutionary  committees  of  the  other  nationalities  in  our  "  Unity 
and  Progress  "  Association  because  our  aims  and  theirs  diverged 
too  greatly.  They  wanted  to  carry  on  in  public  their  propaganda 
in  favour  of  autonomy  and  independence,  propaganda  which  had 
hitherto  been  secret  and  exposed  to  great  perils.  They  hoped  in 
that  way  to  reach  their  goal  all  the  sooner.  We,  on  the  other 
hand,  wanted  to  give  the  Committee  of  Unity  and  Progress  the 
prestige  of  a  joint  association  of  all  revolutionary  committees  of 
the  Ottoman  nationalities,  just  as  the  Empire  itself  had  come  into 
being  by  the  joint  association  of  all  those  nationalities.  We 
wanted  the  necessity  of  Ottoman  unity  to  be  realised  and  recog- 
nised by  all  the  elements  so  that  the  constitution  should  be  safe 
from  any  danger. 

Just  as  all  Republicans  in  France  at  once  unite  against  the 
aggressor  the  moment  they  consider  the  Republic  in  danger,  the 
"  Unity  and  Progress  "  Association,  composed  of  all  the  old  revo- 
lutionary committees,  was  to  call  upon  its  members  to  rise  as  one 
against  the  slightest  attack  on  the  constitution.  Just  as  the  Repub- 
licans in  France  comprise  men  of  the  most  varying  political  views 
and  adherents  of  different  parties,  our  "  Unity  and  Progress  n 
Association  was  to  comprise  men  of  different  political  views  and 
parties,  without  prejudice  to  their  national  and  religious 
convictions. 

None  of  the  political  parties  whose  aims  were  exclusively 
nationalist  were  willing  to  accept  this  super-national  programme, 
for  in  reality  they  were  receiving  their  directions  from  abroad,  and 
as  far  as  we  were  concerned  they  were  simply  puppets. 

Thus  the  Dachnakzutiun  Committee,  which  was  the  most 
favourably  inclined  to  us  and  had  a  very  real  fear  of  seeing 
Armenia  fall  under  the  Russian  yoke,  maintained  its  own  organisa- 
tion, and  publicly  announced  its  intention  of  continuing  its  work 
for  the  realisation  of  its  political  aims.  The  Armenian  Hinjakists 
and  Reformed  Hinjakists  absolutely  refused  to  enter  into  negotia- 
tions with  us  and  their  leaders  in  Constantinople  or  entered  into 
open  relations  with  tfce  Russian  Embassy. 

In  1909,  at  the  instigation  of  the  Committee  of  Unity  and  Pro- 
gress, Hussein  Hilmi  Pasha's  Cabinet  decided  to  send  a  commission 
of  enquiry  to  the  eastern  vilayets  to  settle  the  agrarian  disputes 


The  Armenian  Question  255 

which  had  broken  out  in  those  vilayets  between  the  Armenians, 
Turks,  and  Kurds.  Ghalib  Bey,  Member  of  the  Senate  and 
Supreme  Administrative  Court,  was  appointed  chairman  of  the 
commission,  which,  in  addition  to  him,  was  composed  of  two 
Turkish  and  two  Armenian  members.  One  of  the  Turkish  mem- 
bers was  Major  Zeki  Bey,  of  the  General  Staff,  who  had  been  on  the 
best  of  terms  with  the  Dachnakzutiun  Committee  when  he  was  in 
Europe.  I  was  the  other  member.  Once  more  it  was  the  leaders 
of  the  Dachnakzutiun  who  asked  that  I  should  be  a  member  of  this 
committee.  In  the  previous  negotiations  they  had  realised  that 
my  views  were  just  and  impartial,  and  they  assumed  that  as  I  was 
a  member  of  the  Central  Committee,  my  decisions  would  be  less 
exposed  to  attack  by  the  committee. 

Glad  to  fall  in  with  the  suggestion,  I  left  Salonica  for  Con- 
stantinople. Yet  this  proposal  of  the  Government  was  most 
violently  attacked  in  the  Chamber  by  the  deputies  for  the  eastern 
vilayets,  who  maintained  that  to  send  a  commission  of  enquiry  was 
to  encroach  upon  the  constitutional  authority  of  the  Governor- 
General. 

As  Ferid  Pasha,  then  Minister  of  the  Interior,  proved  incom- 
petent to  defend  the  Government's  views  to  the  Chamber,  I  had 
to  wait  idly  in  Constantinople  until  the  events  of  March  3ist 
(April  i3th),  1909. 

After  those  events  the  scheme  was  entirely  dropped,  and  at  the 
end  of  May,  1909,  I  was  appointed  Governor  of  Skutari  . 


THE  ADANA  AFFAIR  AND  AFTER. 

Just  at  the  time  when  the  revolt  of  March  3ist  began  with  the 
avowed  object  of  finishing  with  the  leaders  of  the  Committee  of 
Unity  and  Progress  and  their  followers  there  was  a  Turco- 
Armenian  massacre  in  Adana. 

As  I  was  appointed  Governor  of  Adana  about  the  middle  of 
August,  1909,  four  months  after  this  occurrence,  I  may  maintain 
that  no  one  was  better  qualified  than  I  to  enquire  into  the  psycho- 
logical causes  of  this  massacre,  one  of  the  most  painful  events 
in  the  history  of  our  constitution. 

After  the  constitution  was  proclaimed  the  civil  population  in 
every  part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  had  become  so  unruly  that  no 


256  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

one,  from  the  lowest  gendarme  to  the  mighty  Governor-General, 
had  any  influence  with  them.  The  word  "  freedom  "  was  inter- 
preted both  by  Press  and  public  in  a  very  erroneous  sense,  and 
every  man  thought  he  could  do  exactly  what  he  liked  without 
penalty.  Several  valis  and  many  civil  police  and  legal  officials 
who  had  oppressed  the  people  during  the  Absolutist  regime  were 
now  subjected  to  very  ugly  and  illegal  attacks.  Men  who  had 
never  even  heard  the  name  of  "  Unity  and  Progress  "  before  the 
promulgation  of  the  constitution  often  paraded  as  "  heroes  of 
liberation/'  and  went  so  far  as  to  interfere  with  Government 
officials  in  the  execution  of  their  duty.  My  memories  of  the  early 
days  of  the  constitution,  when  I  was  a  member  of  the  Central 
Committee,  are  full  of  occurences  of  that  kind. 

The  Central  Committee  did  everything  in  its  power  to  check 
such  excesses  and  to  protect  everyone,  whether  guilty  or  innocent, 
against  illegal  attacks.  With  a  view  to  imbuing  the  public  with 
the  essential  principles  of  the  committee's  programme  special 
deputies  were  sent  out  with  the  task  of  founding  sections  in  all 
places  where  the  committee  had  not  yet  established  local  organisa- 
tions. Unfortunately,  generally  speaking,  these  deputies  were  not 
well  chosen.  Some  of  them  allowed  themselves  to  be  carried  away 
by  the  spirit  of  indiscipline  prevailing  among  the  people,  and  forgot 
that  the  main  purpose  of  our  regulations  was  to  maintain  the 
prestige  of  the  Government  in  the  country. 

Later  on  several  politicians  who  came  forward  as  opponents  of 
'  Unity  and  Progress  "  used  the  harmful  and  peculiar  interpreta- 
tion put  upon  the  word  "  freedom  "  in  the  Press  to  make  attacks 
upon  the  committee  and  plunge  the  country  into  a  perfectly  hope- 
less anarchy.  As  the.  Government  was  deprived  of  all  prestige  and 
power  in  the  capital  of  the  Empire,  it  is  easy  to  imagine  the  state 
of  affairs  in  the  provinces.  Many  men  who  failed  to  secure  impor- 
tant positions  in  the  local  Unity  and  Progress  Committees  which 
we  established  founded  branches  of  the  various  political  commit- 
tees which  were  gradually  formed  in  Constantinople  and  took 
their  revenge  that  way. 

The  Mohammedan  and  Turkish  population  was  thus  at 
sixes  and  sevens,  while  the  Christian  population  through  their 
own  committees  worked  hard  for  the  realisation  of  their  pro- 
gramme. 


The  Armenian  Question  257 

In  the  vilayet  of  Adana  the  Turkish  population  is  in  a  majority. 
After  it  come  the  Armenians,  then  the  Arabs  (known  by  the  name 
of  "  Arab  Uschagi  "),  and  finally  the  Greeks.  The  vilayet  has  a 
population  of  five  hundred  and  fifty  thousand.  There  are  about 
sixty  thousand  Armenians,  between  twenty  and  twenty-five 
thousand  Arab  Uschagi,  and  ten  to  fifteen  thousand  Greeks.  All 
the  rest  are  Turks.  For  centuries  these  people,  who  are  mostly 
engaged  in  agriculture,  have  lived  together  in  the  greatest  peace 
and  harmony. 

It  is  an  incontestable  fact  that  long  before  the  Ottomans  came 
the  vilayet  of  Adana  was  Turkish,  for  the  Ottomans  seized  it 
from  a  Turkish  ruling  family  known  under  the  name  of  "  Ramazun 
Oghullari."  Although  history  tells  us  that  at  the  time  of  the 
Crusades  there  was  an  Armenian  kingdom  called  Cicilia  in  this 
region,  it  is  equally  true  that  a  large  number  had  settled  in  the 
country  at  that  time,  and  the  Turkish  feudal  Beys  did  not  like  that 
kingdom. 

The  majority  of  the  Armenians  now  dwelling  in  the  vilayet  of 
Adana  had  their  original  home  in  Diabekir,  Sivas  and  Mamuret- 
ul-Asis.  They  migrated  during  the  nineteenth  century  in  the 
hope  of  seeking  their  fortune.  The  real  Adana-born  Armenians 
are  to  be  found  in  the  town  of  Hadjin,  on  the  northern  border  of 
the  vilayet,  in  a  few  villages  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Sis,  chief 
town  of  the  Sandjak  of  Kozan,  and  in  Dort  Yol,  on  the  shores  of 
the  Gulf  of  Alexandretta,  and  some  villages  in  its  vicinity. 

The  Arab-Uschagi  are  part  of  the  population  which  was  trans- 
planted from  the  Sandjak  of  Lazkie,  under  the  government  of 
Sultan  Abdul  Aziz,  in  order  to  cultivate  the  plain  of  Adana,  which 
was  very  fertile,  but  at  that  time  sparsely  populated. 

As  I  have  already  said,  the  Turks  and  Armenians,  as,  indeed,  the 
rest  of  the  population,  had  previously  lived  together  on  the  very 
best  of  terms,  and  there  was  no  reason  to  anticipate  any  sort  of 
strife  between  them.  At  the  time  of  the  disorders  and  massacres 
of  1894-1896  nothing  at  all  had  happened  in  the  vilayet  of  Adana, 
and  Turks  and  Armenians  had  worked  together  to  prevent  the 
spread  of  disorder  into  their  district.  Their  efforts  had  not  been 
without  success. 

After  the  promulgation  of  the  constitution  the  Armenians  of 

Adana  founded  local  branches  of  the  Dachnakzutiun,  Hinjakists 

R 


258  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

and  Reformed  Hinjakists  in  opposition  to  the  Turkish  political 
committees  which  were  being-  formed,  or  rather — to  speak  more 
accurately — they  continued  openly  those  activities  of  their 
organisation  which  they  had  hitherto  carried  on  in  secret. 

At  this  time  the  Armenian  vicar  in  Adana  was  a  young-  and 
ambitious  priest  named  Muscheg  Effendi,  who  was  also  leader 
of  the  Reformed  Hinjakists.  The  Armenians  could  not  say 
enough  about  the  licentiousness  of  this  man.  If  all  the  stories 
told  about  him  by  the  Armenians  are  true,  it  may  be  stated 
without  exaggeration  that  he  was  the  incarnation  of  all  the  evil 
instincts. 

After  the  promulgation  of  the  constitution  Monsignor  Muscheg 
regarded  himself  as  the  religious  and  political  head  of  Adana.  I 
was  told  that  this  priest,  shamelessly  taking  advantage  of  the  weak- 
ness of  the  Government,  adopted  a  most  insulting  attitude  towards 
the  Governor-General  at  a  meeting  of  the  Administrative  Council, 
and  left  the  assembly  in  a  furious  rage  after  threatening  to  box  the 
ears  of  the  Colonel  of  Gendarmerie  for  the  vilayet.  I  was  also 
told  by  Armenians  that  at  this  time  a  considerable  number  of  young 
Armenians — acolytes  of  Monsignor  Muscheg — carried  their 
effrontery  so  far  as  to  proclaim  publicly  at  various  meetings  that 
it  would  not  be  long  before  the  Armenians  were  liberated  from  the 
Turkish  yoke. 

To  be  fair,  I  should  add  that  the  delegate  of  the  Dachnak- 
zutiun  had  no  part  in  Monsignor  Muscheg's  excesses,  and  did  not 
fail  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Dachnakzutiun  deputies  in  Con- 
stantinople to  the  very  evil  results  of  his  conduct. 

But  Monsignor  Muscheg  was  not  content  with  all  this.  He  sent 
to  Europe  for  rifles  and  revolvers  with  which  to  arm  the  Armenians. 
At  this  time  the  Government  was  permitting  everything,  even 
traffic  in  arms  and  their  importation.  Monsignor  Muscheg  let  it 
be  known  publicly  in  all  quarters  that,  "  as  the  Armenians  are 
armed  at  last,  they  no  longer  fear  a  repetition  of  the  massacres  of 
1894,  and  that  if  anything  happened  to  any  Armenians  ten  Turks 
would  pay  for  it  with  their  lives. "  These  declarations  and 
Monsignor  Muscheg's  acts  compelled  the  Turks  of  Adana  to  take 
similar  steps. 

It  is  at  this  point  that  the  heavy  responsibility  of  the  then 
Government  of  Adana  begins,  for  an  admission  of  weakness  can 


The  Armenian  Question  259 

never  be  a  permissible  excuse  for  the  authorities.  When 
Monsignor  Muscheg's  unruly  agitation  began  to  have  its  evil 
influence  on  the  local  population  the  safest  course  would  have  been 
at  once  to  arrest  him  and  his  adherents,  and  also  any  Turks  who 
seemed  likely  to  promote  disorder,  hold  a  legal  investigation  with- 
out delay,  and,  if  necessary,  threaten  the  vilayet  with  martial  law. 
But  at  that  time  the  Grand  Vizier  himself,  Hussein  Hilmi  Pasha, 
did  not  dare  to  adopt  energetic  measures  in  Constantinople.  It 
was  he  who  had  been  insulted  by  members  of  the  Mohammedie 
Committee  in  the  avenue  leading  to  the  Sublime  Porte  on  the  occa- 
sion of  the  funeral  of  the  journalist,  Hassan  Felimi  Bey.  The  first 
duty  of  a  Government  is  to  make  it  clear  to  the  nation  that  freedom 
and  anarchy  are  not  the  same  thing.  Unhappily,  we  had  no  such 
Government  in  the  Turkish  Empire  at  the  end  of  1908  and  the 
beginning  of  1909. 

At  this  period  the  Governor-General  of  Adana  was  Djevad  Bey. 
He  may  certainly  be  regarded  as  a  model  of  uprightness, 
but,  unfortunately,  he  was  also  a  model  of  administrative 
incapacity.  He  was  in  no  way  equal  to  the  demands  made  upon 
a  vali  of  Adana.  An  old  soldier,  General  Mustafa  Renizi  Pasha, 
commanded  the  division.  In  his  youth  he  had  come  to  the  front 
through  his  great  energy,  and  he  always  maintained  the  traditions 
of  honourable  patriotism.  But  it  cannot  be  said  that  this 
officer,  who  was  both  old  and  without  any  police  powers,  pos- 
sessed the  qualifications  required  by  the  military  commander  of 
Adana. 

In  the  Sandjak  of  Bjebel  Bereket  the  mutessarif  was  Assaf 
Bey,  who  was  so  timid  that  he  was  afraid  of  his  own  shadow.  I 
have  never  been- able  to  understand  how  such  an  individual  came 
to  be  appointed  Vice-Governor. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1909  a  rumour  was  going  round 
that  the  Armenians  would  rise  and  destroy  the  Turks  in  the  imrrre- 
diate  future.  They  would  use  the  opportunity  to  let  the  vilayet 
be  occupied  by  contingents  from  the  fleets  of  European  Powers, 
and  then  proceed  to  form  an  Armenian  State.  The  Turks  were 
so  convinced  of  the  truth  of  these  rumours  that  many  reputable 
people  took  their  families  to  a  place  of  safety. 

I  was  told  that  certain  members  of  the  Mohammedie  Committee 
had  been  sent  from  Constantinople  to  Adana  to  warn  the  people 

R2 


260  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

of  the  Armenian  rising,  but  I  have  never  succeeded  in  ascertaining 

the  truth  of  that  rumour. 

At  the  beginning  of  April,  1909,  the  situation  on  both  sides  was 

so  strained  that  every  day  it  was  expected  that  the  two  parties 

among  the  local  population  would  fall  upon  each  other. 

At  length,  on  April  I4th,  the  "  Adana  affair  "  began,  on  Mon- 

signor  Muscheg's  orders,  with  attacks  started  by  the  Armenians. 
At  Adana,  Tarsus,  Hamidie,  Mismis,  Erzine,  Dort  Yol  and  Azirli, 

in  fact,  in  all  places  inhabited  by  Armenians,  a  massacre  began, 

the  details  of  which  are  too  loathsome  to  describe.     The  Govern- 
ment showed  itself  utterly  powerless  even  in  the  chief  town  of  the 

vilayet,  and  in  its  utter  bewilderment  went  so  far  as  to  order  a 

rising  en  'masse  in  these  districts  to  prevent  the  Armenian  attacks 

on  the  Turks. 

On  hearing  the  news  that  the  Armenians  of  Dort  Yol  were 
approaching  Erzine,  the  chief  town  of  the  Sandjak  of  Djebel 
Bereket,  in  arms,  the  mutessarif  Assaf  Bey  did  not  dare  even  to 
leave  his  room.  He  scattered  all  over  the  villages  of  the  Liwa 
telegrams  in  which  he  wrote  : 

The  Mohammedans  here  are  in  danger  of  being  wiped  out,  and  it  is  the  duty 
of  every  man  who  loves  his  country  and  nation  to  fly  to  arms  and  hurry  to  the 
Sandjak  of  Djebel  Bereket. 

It  was  certainly  true  that  the  Armenians  of  Dort  Yol  were 
approaching  Erzine  with  the  intention  of  massacring  the  Turks  in 
the  Sandjak  of  Djebel  Bereket.  But  it  is  an  utterly  unpardonable 
error  for  a  mutessarif  to  shut  himself  up  in  his  room  and  tell  the 
inhabitants  to  do  what  they  liked,  for  people  who  find  themselves  in 
danger  will  not  only  attack  aggressors,  but  even  the  unarmed  and 
helpless,  such  as  women,  old  men,  and  children,  and  end  by  looting 
and  burning  towns,  villages,  and  country  houses.  And  all  this  is 
exactly  what  happened. 

Such  were  the  causes  of  the  first  events  in  Adana.  The  subse- 
quent occurrences,  which  were  confined  to  the  town  of  Adana, 
followed  ten  days  later  in  consequence  of  shots  fired  by  young 
Armenians  into  the  camp  of  the  troops.  The  Adana  massacre 
became  even  worse  after  that. 

My  personal  opinion  is  that  Monsignor  Muscheg  is  the  real 
culprit,  the  real  author  of  the  Sicilian  Vespers,  but  his  responsi- 
bility is  almost  shared  by  the  Governor,  who  must  have  realised 


The  Armenian  Question  261 

what  a  danger  this  man  represented  and  yet  did  not  take  the 
necessary  steps  to  avert  it.  It  was  quite  unpardonable  of  him  to 
let  the  reins  of  authority  slip  from  his  grasp  at  such  a  time  and  to 
be  guilty  of  such  deplorably  feeble  conduct  when  dealing  with  a 
looting  and  murderous  rabble. 

What  is  absolutely  certain  is  that  two  or  three  months  before 
these  events  the  Turks  and  Mohammedans  of  all  public  and  official 
circles  in  the  vilayet  of  Adana  were  firmly  convinced  that  the 
Armenians  were  procuring  fresh  arms  every  day  for  the  purposes 
of  a  general  massacre,  and  that  they  were  really  in  great  danger. 
The  unbridled  and  provocative  language  of  Monsignor  Muscheg 
only  confirmed  that  opinion. 

The  psychological  causes  I  have  discussed  are  not  merely  my 
own  opinion.  The  English  Major  Doughty  Wyllie,  who  was  then 
English  Consul  at  Adana,  also  shared  my  view.  I  much  regret 
that  this  honourable  gentleman,  who  showed  high  courage  in 
the  Dardanelles  actions  and  gave  his  life  for  his  country,  is  no 
longer  alive  to  confirm  what  I  say. 

The  American  missionary,  Mr.  Chambers,  and  the  Director  of 
the  American  College  at  Tarsus,  Mr.  Christine,  told  me  of  the 
horrible  cruelties  perpetrated  by  the  Turks  and  Arab  Uschaks 
during  the  massacres,  but  also  assured  me  that  Monsignor 
Muscheg  was  the  prime  instigator  of  the  massacre. 

Seventeen  thousand  Armenians  and  one  thousand  eight  hun- 
dred and  fifty  Turks  were  killed  in  Adana  in  this  massacre.  The 
figures  show  that  if  the  Armenians  had  been  in  a  majority  the 
reverse  would  have  been  the  case  and  the  Turks  would  have  been 
massacred  by  the  Armenians.  There  was  nothing  to  choose 
between  the  two  sides  as  regards  cruelties.  The  Armenians  never 
stopped  attacking  Turkish  women  and  children,  the  Turks  did  the 
same,  and  the  two  infuriated  races  proved  that  there  was  no 
difference  between  them. 

When  I  was  appointed  Governor-General  of  Adana  the  Govern- 
ment placed  a  credit  of  £200,000  (Turkish)  at  my  disposal.     One  ^  f 
hundred  thousand  were  for  rebuilding  the  Armenian  and  Turkish 
houses  in  the  towns  and  villages  which  had  been  burnt ;  the  other 
half  was  to  be  lent  to  the  Armenian  traders,  artisans,  and  farmers 
to  enable  them  to  resume  business.    The  loans  were  not  to  be  paid   f! 
back  for  ten  years. 


262  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

I  established  a  building  committee  in  Adana  and  took  the 
chairmanship  myself.  The  committee  consisted  of  several 
foreigners,  such  as  the  American  missionary,  Mr.  Chambers,  and 
a  large  number  of  natives,  the  majority  being  Armenians. 

Thanks  to  the  steps  I  took,  four  months  after  my  arrival  all 
the  Armenian  houses  in  the  vilayet  had  been  rebuilt  and  in  the 
provisional  capital  there  was  not  a  single  small  family  house  which 
had  not  been  finished.  In  brief,  within  five  or  six  months  the 
Armenians  had  freely  resumed  their  trade,  agriculture,  and 
industry,  and  between  Turks  and  Armenians  there  was  no  trace, 
at  any  rate  superficially,  of  the  previous  hatreds. 

When  Herr  Mandelstamm,  on  the  authority  of  the  work  of  a 
Greek  named  Adossides,  says  on  page  205  of  his  book  that  of  the 
guilty  Mohammedans  only  nine  of  the  most  insignificant  were 
killed,  he  does  not  speak  the  truth.  Nor  does  Adossides,  who  is 
well  known  for  his  spiteful  writings  against  the  Turks. 

Four  months  after  my  arrival  at  Adana  I  had  not  less  than 
thirty  Mohammedans  executed  who  had  been  convicted  by  court 
martial.  Two  days  later  1  had  seventeen  executed  at  Erzine. 
Among  them  were  members  of  the  oldest  and  highest  families  in 
Adana,  such  as  the  Mufti  of  the  Kaza  of  Bagjce,  who  was 
extremely  popular  with  the  Turks  of  his  district. 

Monsignor  Muscheg  succeeded  in  escaping  to  Alexandretta  on 
board  a  foreign  steamer  two  days  after  these  events,  and  I  greatly 
regret  that  he  did  not  fall  into*  my  hands.  He  was  very  properly 
condemned  to  death  in  contumaciam.  If  I  had  caught  him  I  should 
have  had  him  hanged  opposite  the  Mufti  of  Bagjce. 

The  Armenians  themselves  have  fully  recognised  all  the  efforts 
I  made  in  their  behalf,  and  the  restoration  of  their  property  while 
I  was  Governor-General  of  Adana.  Many  foreigners — French, 
English,  Americans,  and  Russians — who  came  to  Adana  were  wit- 
nesses of  my  work,  and  congratulated  me  upon  it.  The  great 
orphanage  I  had  built  for  the  reception  and  bringing  up  of  the 
children  orphaned  in  the  Adana  affair  is  still  in  existence. 


THE  REFORMS. 

In  August,   1912,  when  I  left  the  administration  of  Bagdad 
(where  I  was  sent  on  from  Adana)  and  returned  to  Constantinople, 


The  Armenian  Question  263 

the  Ottoman  Empire  was  passing  through  one  of  the  most  danger- 
ous crises  of  its  existence,  (i)  We  were  in  the  throes  of  war  with 
Italy.  (2)  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  Montenegro,  and  Greece  had  formed 
an  alliance  and  were  searching  for  some  excuse  for  making  war  on 
us.  (3)  The  Albanians  were  in  revolt.  (4)  The  whole  Syrian 
Press  was  vomiting  flames  against  the  Government  and  demanding 
reforms  for  the  Arabian  provinces.  (5)  The  Armenian  Patriarch 
was  addressing  note  after  note  to  the  Sublime  Porte  and  insisting 
upon  reforms  in  Armenia.  (6)  Perhaps  the  greatest  danger  of  all 
— a  number  of  officers  had  banded  together  under  the  name  of  the 
"  Officer  Liberators  Group  "  (Halaskiaran)  and  were  promoting 
deadly  anarchy  in  the  army.  It  could  be  said  with  perfect  truth 
that  the  troops  at  the  Dardanelles  and  in  Smyrna  and  Albania  were 
completely  out  of  hand. 

At  the  head  of  the  Government  was  Ghazi  Muhtar  Pasha's 
Cabinet. 

During  all  these  troubles  the  Balkan  War  began.  The 
politicians  of  Russia  and  France  took  advantage  of  our  various 
military  failures  to  get  to  work.  The  French  egged  on  the  Arabs 
to  demand  reforms  in  SyriaK  and  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Con- 
stantinople, Baron  von  Giers,  raised  the  Armenian  question  once 
more  and  handed  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  the  following  note 
on  November  26th,  1912: 

Since  the  memorable  events  of  1894-1896,  when  Asia  Minor  and  Constanti- 
nople were  bleeding  from  the  barbarous  Armenian  massacres,  the  position  has 
in  no  way  improved.  Effect  has  not  been  given  to  the  reforms  decreed  by 
Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  on  October  2oth,  1895,  as  a  result  of  Russian,  French,  and 
English  pressure.  The  agrarian  question  is  becoming  more  and  more  acute 
from  day  to  day.  Most  of  the  landed  estates  have  been  or  are  being  seized  by 
the  Kurds,  and  instead  of  forbidding  this  illegal  confiscation,  the  authorities 
are  protecting  and  assisting  the  usurpers.  The  reports  of  all  our  consulates 
agree  as  to  the  acts  of  brigandage  perpetrated  by  the  Kurds,  the  unprecedented 
exactions,  the  murder  of  Armenians,  and  forced  conversion  of  Armenian  women. 
The  miscreants  are  hardly  ever  dealt  with  according  to  law.  The  memoir  pre- 
sented by  the  Armenian  Patriarch  in  Constantinople  to  the  Sublime  Porte  and 
the  Minister  of  the  Interior  gives  a  true  picture  of  the  miseries  and  persecution 
to  which  the  Armenian  subjects  of  the  Sultan  are  exposed. 

This  state  of  things  {continued  Baron  von  Giers)  sufficiently  accounts  for  the 
fact  that  the  Armenian  nation  is  looking  more  and  more  to  Russia.  The  Russian 
consulates  in  Armenia  all  bear  witness  to  the  state  of  public  feeling  there.  The 
Armenians  are  demanding  the  introduction  of  reforms  under  Russian  super- 
vision or  even  a  Russian  occupation.  The  Armenians  professing  the  Catholic 
faith  are  imploring  Russia,  the  "  ancient  protectress  of  the  Christians  of  the 
East,"  in  the  name  of  the  Almighty  to  take  the  wretched  Armenian  population 


264  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

in  Turkish  Armenia  under  her  protection.  The  Ambassador  is  of  opinion  that 
the  Armenian  question  is  of  the  highest  importance  to  Russia,  and  desires  the 
Government  will  do  what  is  necessary  to  remedy  matters.  He  regards  an 
occupation  as  premature  and  advocates  reforms.  But  in  doing  so  he  does  not 
forget  the  tragic  fate  of  the  decree  of  1895,  and  insists  upon  the  necessity  of  the 
reforms  being  effectively  supervised  by  Russian  or  European  officials.  In  view 
of  the  state  of  anarchy  in  which  Turkey  is  plunged  at  the  moment,  the  possibility 
must  be  reckoned  with  that  the  reforms  will  not  have  the  calming  effect  desired 
and  that  it  may  be  necessary  for  our  troops  to  enter  this  region. 

As  early  as  the  beginning  of  1912  the  Catholicos  of  Etschmiazin 
in  Russia  had  sent  the  Boghos  Nubar  Pasha,  to  the  Cabinets  of 
Europe  with  a  commission  to  demand  administrative  autonomy 
for  Turkish  Armenia.  This  proceeding  was  nothing  but  a  step  in 
Russian  policy. 

What  a  strong  resemblance  there  was  between  the  course  taken 
by  the  Russians  (which  was  designed  to  conceal  their  real  inten- 
tions with  regard  to  Armenia)  and  the  policy  pursued  by  France  in 
Syria ! 

A  Mohammedan  of  Beirut,  member  of  the  Arab  Congress  which 
met  in  Paris  at  the  beginning  of  1913,  said  to  Monsieur  Pichon,  the 
French  Foreign  Minister : 

Although  we  have  called  our  congress  in  Paris,  our  only  object  is  to  obtain 
reforms  for  the  Arab  provinces  from  the  Ottoman  Government.  We  want 
neither  a  French  occupation  of  Syria  nor  a  French  protectorate. 

To  prove  that  France  had  no  arriere  pensee  with  regard  to  Syria 
Herr  Pichon  reported  this  conversation  to  Herr  Bompard,  the 
French  Ambassador  in  Constantinople.  Almost  at  the  same 
moment,  on  March  I5th,  1913,  the  Russians  said  the  same  thing, 
possibly  in  the  same  words,  to  the  Boghos  Nubar  Pasha. 

What  I  say  is  confirmed  by  the  following  letter  of  February 
28th  (March  I3th)  from  M.  Isvolsky,  the  Russian  Minister  in  Paris, 
to  H.  Sasonov,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister. 

Boghos  Nubar  Pasha  (the  Ambassador  writes)  repeatedly  asserts  that  the 
Armenians  of  Turkey  in  no  way  desire  to  bring  up  the  question  of  independence 
or  constitutional  changes.  Their  sole  aim  is  to  secure  the  reforms  drawn  up 
by  Russia,  France  and  England  and  provided  for  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin, 
reforms  which  have  remained  a  dead  letter  hitherto. 

I  think  this  remarkable  coincidence  in  the  views  of  the  Arab 
and  Armenian  reformers  is  sufficient  proof  of  the  policy  pursued 
by  Russia  and  France  with  the  object  of  dismembering  Turkey. 

On  March  22nd,  1913,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  at  length 


The  Armenian  Question  265 

took  the  first  step  in  the  matter  of  the  Armenian  reforms.  In  a 
telegram  of  that  date  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  Berlin  M. 
Sassonoff  called  on  Germany  to  associate  herself  with  an  inter- 
national appeal  to  the  Sublime  Porte.  The  date  coincides  with 
the  time  when  the  Ottoman  Government,  utterly  helpless, 
saw  itself  compelled  to  sign  the  preliminary  peace  in  London 
and  recognise  the  Enos-Midia  line  as  the  Turco-Bulgarian 
frontier. 

At  this  time,  too,  the  national  demonstrations  of  the  Armenians 
in  Constantinople  began  to  take  unusual  forms.  They  organised 
great  celebrations  in  memory  of  the  anniversary  (I  do  not  know 
which  anniversary)  of  the  discovery  of  the  Armenian  alphabet. 
They  carried  their  audacity  to  the  point  of  throwing  confetti  in  the 
Armenian  national  colours  about  the  streets.  We  bore  all  this  with 
unshakable  patience,  and  took  the  necessary  steps  to  prevent  ugly 
incidents.  I  was  then  Military  Governor  of  Constantinople,  and 
on  an  invitation  from  the  Armenians  went  to  the  Tascion  Garden 
and  made  a  speech,  speaking  in  the  highest  terms  of  the  Armenian 
nation. 

The  course  taken  by  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  was  to  hand 
the  representatives  of  the  Great  Powers  in  Constantinople  a  new 
scheme  of  reforms  based  upon  the  draft  issued  by  the  Ottoman 
Government  in  1895.  England  and  France  at  once  fell  in  with 
their  proposal.  Germany  alone  suggested  that  plenipotentiaries 
of  the  Sublime  Porte  should  be  invited  to  join  the  committee  to  be 
formed  by  representatives  of  the  Ambassadors.  This  suggestion 
was  rejected  out  of  hand  by  Russia,  and  Germany's  consent  was 
ultimately  obtained  to  the  establishment  of  a  committee  consisting 
of  the  Dragomans  of  the  Embassies,  which  was  to  study  the 
Armenian  question.  The  only  Government  really  concerned  in 
the  matter  was  calmly  excluded. 

Before  the  committee  started  on  its  work  Russia  had  already 
had  a  scheme  of  reform  prepared  by  Mandelstamm,  the  First 
Dragoman  of  the  Embassy  in  Constantinople.  I  leave  it  to  the 
conscience  of  the  author  to  decide  whether,  under  the  pretext  of 
preserving  the  rights  of  a  national  minority  in  a  great  empire,  he 
can  reconcile  his  sense  of  shame  and  the  presentation  of  such  a 
scheme  of  reforms  to  an  independent  State.  In  view  of  its  great 
importance,  I  give  the  exact  text  of  the  Russian  scheme : 


266  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

THE  RUSSIAN  PROJECT  (Oiange  Book  No.  50). 

Constantinople,  June  8th,  1913. 

Scheme  for  the  reforms  for  Armenia,  drawn  up  by  M.  A.   Mandelstamm, 
First  Dragoman  of  the  Russian  Embassy  in  Constantinople. 
Based  on  the  following  : 

(1)  The  Memoir  in  Armenian  reforms  of  the  French,  Russian  and  English 
Ambassadors  in  Constantinople  (March  and  April,  1895) ; 

(2)  The  scheme  for  administrative  reforms  for  the  province  of  Armenia  drawn 
up  by  the  French,  Russian  and  English  Ambassadors  (March  and  April,  1895); 

(3)  The  Armenian  reform  decree  issued  by  His  Majesty  the  Sultan  on  October 
2oth,  1895; 

(4)  The  draft  for  a  vilayet  law  for  European  Turkey  of  August  nth  to  23rd, 
1880,  drawn  up  by  the  European  Commission; 

(5)  The  vilayet  law  of  1913; 

(6)  Orders  and  negotiations  with  regard  to  Syria. 

I. 

§i.  One  province  to  be  formed  from  the  following  six  vilayets  :  Erzerum, 
Van,  Bitlis,  Diarbekir,  Kharput  and  Sivas,  excepting  certain  frontier  districts, 
i.e.,  Hekkiari,  the  southern  part  of  Surts,  Bicheriks,  Malatias  and  the  districts 
north-east  of  Sivas. 

§2.  The  administrative  division  of  the  province  is  to  be  as  follows  :  i,  Sand- 
jak  (district);  2,  Kaza  (department);  3,  Nahie  (commune). 

§3.  The  parishes  are  to  be  arranged  in  such  a  way  that,  from  the  ethno- 
graphical point  of  view,  homogenous  national  groups  are  to  be  formed. 

Compare  Point  I.  of  the  Three  Ambassadors7  Memorandum  of  1895  and  Art.  7 
of  the  Ambassadors'  scheme  of  1895. 

II. 

The  Governor-General  (Vali  Umumi)  of  the  Armenian  province  is  to  be  a 
Christian  Ottoman  subject,  or,  better  still,  a  European  appointed  by  His  Imperial 
Majesty  the  Sultan  for  five  years  and  approved  by  the  Powers. 

(Cf.  Art.  17  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin;  Art.  I.  of  the  Cretan  Regulations  of 
1896;  Orders  and  negotiations  with  regard  to  the  Lebanon;  Arts.  II.  and  VI.  of 
the  Three  Ambassadors'  Memorandum  of  1895;  Introduction  to  the  Reform 
Decree  in  Armenia  of  October  2oth,  1895,  Point  I.) 

III. 

The  Governor-General  is  the  head  of  the  executive  in  the  province.  He  has 
full  authority  to  appoint  and  replace  all  the  provincial  administrative  authorities. 
He  also  appoints  all  the  judges  of  the  province. 

2.  The  police  and  gendarmerie  are  to  be  under  the  orders  of  the  Governor- 
General. 

3.  If  the  Governor-General  so  desires,  the  military  forces  are  to  be  at  his 
disposal  to  maintain  order  in  the  province. 

(Cf.  Art.  I.  of  the  Lebanon  Orders,  1864;  Arts.  27,  32  and  44  of  the  Scheme 
of  the  European  Commission,  1884;  Arts.  20,  25  and  26  of  the  Vilayet  Administra- 
tion Decree  of  1913.) 

IV. 

The  Governor-General  of  the  province  is  to  be  assisted  by  an  Administrative 
Council  with  full  advisory  powers,  and  consisting  of  : 


The  Armenian  Question  267 

(a)  The  heads  of  the  different  administrative  parishes  of  the  province; 

(b)  The  spiritual  heads  of  the  religious  associations ; 

(c)  The  European  technical  advisers  in  the  service  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment appointed  to  assist  the  heads  of  the  administrative  parishes; 

(d)  Six  legal  advisers  (three  Mohammedans  and  three  Christians)  chosen  from 
the  members  of  the  Provincial  Assembly. 

(Cf.  Art.  49  of  the  Scheme  of  the  European  Commission  of  1880;  Art.  62  of 
the  Vilayet  Administration  Decree  of  1913;  Art.  6  of  the  Decree  of  October, 
1895.) 

V. 

1.  The  Provincial  Assembly  is  to  consist  of  Mohammedans  and  Christians 
in  equal  numbers. 

2.  The  members  of  the  Provincial  Assembly  are  to  be  elected  by  secret  ballot 
in  the  department  by  the  electoral  colleges  to  be  formed  tEere. 

3.  The  number  of  seats  to  be  assigned  to  the  Mohammedan  and  Christian 
nationalities  of  the  province  is  to  be  specially  fixed  for  each  department.     So  far 
as  is  compatible  with  the  principle  laid  down  in  the  first  paragraph  of  this 
article,  this  number  is  to  be  in  proportion  to  the  population  of  the  department. 

(Cf.  Art.  II.  of  the  Negotiations  and  Orders  with  reference  to  the  Reorganisa- 
tion of  the  Lebanon,  1861 ;  Art.  3,  §5,  of  the  Three  Ambassadors'  Scheme  of  1895; 
Art.  69  of  the  Scheme  of  the  European  Commission  of  1880;  Art.  103  of  the 
Decree  of  1913.) 

VI. 

1.  The  Provincial  Assembly  will  be  elected  for  five  years,  and  meet  once 
a  year  for  a  regular  sitting  of  two  months.     The  sitting  may  be  extended  by 
the  Governor-General. 

2.  The  Provincial  Assembly  may  be  summoned  for  an  extraordinary  sitting 
either  by  the  Governor-General  on  his  own  initiative  or  on  the  demand  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  members  of  the  Assembly. 

3.  The   Governor-General   may  dissolve  the  Assembly.       In  this   case  the 
elections  must  be  held  in  two  months,  and  the  new  Assembly  meet  within  four 
months  of  the  dissolution  decree. 

4.  The  decrees  summoning  or  dissolving  the  Assembly  must  be  issued  in  the 
name  of  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan. 

(Cf.  Arts.  73-75  of  the  Scheme  of  the  European  Commission  of  1880;  Arts. 
111-115  and  Art.  125  of  the  Provincial  Decree  of  1913.) 


VII. 

1  The    Provincial    Assembly    is    the    legislative    authority    for    provincial 
interests. 

2  The  powers  of  the  Provincial  Assembly  in  respect  of  legislation  and  finance 
are  to  be  at  least  co-extensive  with  those  provided  for  in  Arts.   82-93  of  the 
scheme  drawn  up  in  1880  by  the  European  Commission. 

3.  The  laws  passed  by  the  Provincial  Assembly  are  to  be  sent  up  for  the 
consent  of  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan.  That  consent  must  be  given  or 
refused  within  two  months  and  after  the  expiry  of  that  period  the  silence  of  (the 
Government  is  to  be  taken  as  consent. 

(Cf.  Arts.  82-93  of  the  Scheme  of  the  European  Commission  of  1880;  Arts. 
123,  124,  128-135  of  the  Vilayet  Administration  Decree  of  1913.) 


268  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

VIII. 

1.  The  Mutessarif  is  to  be  president  of  the  Administrative  Council  of  the 
Sandjak;  the  Administrative  Council  is  to  consist  of  the  administrative  heads  of 
the  Sandjak,  the  spiritual  heads  of  the  religious  societies,  and  six  members  (three 
Mohammedans    and    three    Christians)    to   be   chosen    from    the    administrative 
councils  of  the  Kazas. 

2.  The  Kaimakam  is  to  be  the  president  of  the  Administrative  Council  of 
the  Kaza;  the  Administrative  Council  is  to  consist  of  the  administrative  heads 
of  the  Kazcij  the  spiritual  heads  of  the  religious  societies,  and  four  members 

(two  Mohammedans  and  two  Christians)  to  be  elected  by  the  council  of  the 
commune. 

3.  The  powers  of  these  councils  will  be  fixed  in  accordance  with  Arts.  115  and 
116,  139,  and  140  of  the  Scheme  of  the  European  Commission  of  1880. 

(Cf.  Arts.  114,  115,  116,  138,  139,  140  of  the  Scheme  of  the  European  Com- 
mission of  1880;  Art.  6  of  the  Decree  of  October  2Oth,  1895;  Arts.  62,  63,  64,  and 
65  of  the  Decree  of  1913.) 

IX. 

1.  The  boundaries  of  each  commune  (Nahie]  are  to  be  fixed  in  such  a  way 
that  as  far  as  possible  villages  inhabited  by  one  nationality  are  to  form  one 
commune. 

2.  Each  commune  is  to  be  administered  by  a  Mudir,  assisted  by  a  council  of 
not  less  than  four  and  not  more  than  eight  members  elected  by  the  people.     The 
council  is  to  elect  the  Mudir  and  his  assistant  as  members.     The  Mudir  is  to  be  a 
member   of   the   national    group   which   ethnologically   forms   a   majority,   his 
assistant  to  belong  to  the  other  group. 

3.  In  communes  where  the  population  is  mixed  the  minority  is  to  be  repre- 
sented according  to  its  numbers,  provided  that  it  comprises  not  less  than  twenty- 
five  houses. 

4.  The  powers  of  the  communes  are  to  be  fixed  in  accordance  with  Arts.  163- 
168  of  the  Scheme  drawn  up  by  the  European  Commission  of  1880. 

(Cf.  Arts.  167,  168  of  the  Scheme  of  the  European  Commission  of  1880;  Arts. 
7,  8,  and  9  of  the  Three  Ambassadors'  Reform  Scheme  of  1895;  Arts.  7,  8,  and  9 
of  the  Decree  of  October  2oth,  1895.) 


X. 

1.  In  every  commune  there  will  be  a  juge  de  $aix>  appointed  by  the  Governor- 
General  and  of  the  same  religion  as  the  majority  of  the  commune. 

2.  The  juge  de  $aix  will  decide  : 

(a)  in  criminal  cases  (without  appeal)  in  offences  punishable  by  simple 
police  penalties,  with  a  right  of  appeal  in  offences  punishable  by  fine 
not   exceeding    500   piastres   or   by   not   more   than   three   months' 
imprisonment. 

(b)  in  civil  actions   (without  appeal)  in  all  civil  and  commercial  cases 
where  the  claim  does  not  exceed  1000  piastres,  with  a  right  of  appeal 
in  similar  actions  where  the  claim  does  not  exceed  5000  piastres. 

3.  The  Court  of  the  juge  de  -paix  is  to  be  also  a  court  of  arbitration.     On 
demand  by  the  parties   it  may  appoint  arbitrators  who   shall   decide  even  in 
disputes   over    5000   piastres.     In   case   of   the   award   of   an   arbitrator   there 
shall  be  no  right  of  appeal. 

4.  The  Sandjak   Courts  are  to  have  only  one  civil   court,   consisting  of  a 
president  and  two  paid  judges   (one  Mohammedan  and  one  Christian),  to  be 


The  Armenian  Question  269 

appointed  by  the  Governor-General.  The  Sandjak  Courts  are  to  function  as 
(a)  a  court  of  first  instance  in  civil  and  commercial  matters  where  the  amount 
involved  exceeds  5000  piastres,  and  (b)  a  court  of  appeal  from  the  decisions  of 
the  juges  de  -paix  in  civil  and  commercial  actions. 

5.  The  criminal  section  of  the  Sandjak  Courts  is  to  be  replaced  by  mobile 
courts  of  assize.     These  are  to  consist  of  a  president  (to  be  selected  from  the 
members  of  the  next  higher  appeal  court  to  which  the  Sandjak  Court  is  attached) 
and  two  members  (one  a  Mohammedan  and  one  a  Christian)  selected  by  the  same 
Court  of  Appeal  from  among  the  juges  de  $aix  of  the  Sandjak. 

6.  The  assizes  will  be  held  in  succession  in  all  Kazas  where  the  presence  of 
these  courts  is  considered  necessary. 

7.  There  will  be  a  juge  d~ 'instruction  in  every  Kasa.     On  the  arrival  of  tihe 
president  of  the  Assize  Court  in  a  Kaza  the  juge  d}  instruction  will  put  before  him 
the  documents  relating  to  cases  prepared  by  the  juge  d' 'instruction  and  already 
ripe  for  action,  and  also  the  documents  relating  to  pending  cases  and  cases  not 
yet  complete.     If  the  latter  reveal  irregularities  or  unjustifiable  delay  he  must 
immediately  report  the  matter  to  the  President  of  the  Court  of  Appeal. 

8.  The  Assize  Court  is  to  decide,  subject  to  appeal,  upon  the  sentences  passed 
by  the  juges  de  -paix  in  criminal  causes.     As  a  court  of  first  and  last  instance  it 
is  to  decide  in  cases  of  crime  or  misdemeanour  punishable  by  fine  of  more  than 
500  piastres  or  imprisonment  for  more  than  three  months. 

9.  There  are  to  be  at  least  six  Courts  of  Appeal.     Each  Court  of  Appeal  is  to 
be  composed  of  a  president,  a  trained  lawyer  appointed  by  the  Governor-General, 
and  a  sufficient  number  of  members  to  deal  with  the  civil  business  brought  before 
it  and  provide  the  Courts  of  Assize  with  presidents.     The  Court  of  Appeal  is 
competent  to  decide  when  a  quorum  of  a  president  and  two  members  is  present. 

10.  Commercial  Courts  will  be  established  wherever  required.     Where  these 
are  functioning  the  civil  courts  shall  have  no  jurisdiction  in  commercial  actions. 

11.  The  powers  of  the  sheriat  courts  shall  be  strictly  defined,  and  it  shall  be 
the  business  of  the  Governor-General  to  see  that  the  functions  of  the  other 
judicial  authorities  of  the  province  are  not  encroached  upon.     The  judges  of 
the  sheriat  courts  may  not  simultaneously  be  presidents  of  the  other  provincial 
courts. 

(Cf.  Arts.  2Q-3Q  of  the  Three  Ambassadors'  Scheme  of  1895;  Arts.  125-263  of 
the  scheme  of  the  European  Commission  of  1880.) 


XI. 

1.  A  corps  of  police  and  a  corps  of  gendarmerie  will  be  formed  in  the 
province.     Half  of  these  corps  will  be  recruited  from  the  Mohammedan  and 
Christian  population  of  the  province. 

2.  The  organisation  and  command  of  these  forces  will  be  in  the  hands  of  the 
European  officers  in  the  Turkish  service. 

3.  A  constabulary  is  to  be  formed  in  the  communes.     The  constables  are  to 
be  appointed  by  the  Governor-General  and  be  under  the  orders  of  the  Mudir. 

(Cf.  Arts.  18-21  of  the  Three  Ambassadors'  Scheme  of  1895;  Art.  24  of  the 
Decree  of  October  2oth,  1895.) 

XII. 

Recruits  who  are  natives  of  the  province  shall  perform  their  military  service 
in  peace-time  in  the  province.  The  regiments  of  Kurdish  light  cavalry  (Ex- 
Hamidie)  will  be  disbanded. 

(Cf.  Art.  25  of  the  Three  Ambassadors'  Scheme  of  1895 ;  Art.  28  of  the  Decree 
of  October  2oth,  1895.) 


270  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

XIII. 

T.  The  administrative  officials  and  provincial  judges  are  to  be  selected  in 
equal  numbers  from  the  Mohammedan  and  Christian  population. 

2.  In  appointing  the  governors  of  the  Sandjaks  (Mutessarif)  and  the  Kasas 
(Kaimakam)  regard  is  to  be  had  to  the  national  populations  and  their  economic 
interests. 

(Cf.  Art.  5  of  of  the  Decree  of  October  2otK,  1895.) 

XIV. 

i.  Only  domiciled  inhabitants  are  to  have  the  electoral  franchise  and  to  be 
eligible  for  election. 

(Cf.  Art.  24  of  §8  of  the  Three  Ambassadors'  Scheme  of  1895;  Art.  27  of  the 
Decree  of  October  2oth,  1895.) 

XV. 

1.  All   laws,   orders,   regulations,  official   circulars   and   announcements  are 
to  be  published  in  the  three  languages  of  the  province  (Turkish,  Armenian,  and 
Kurdish). 

2.  All  petitions  and  requests,  and  all  documents  addressed  to  the  judicial 
or  administrative  authorities,  are  to  be  in  one  of  the  three   provincial   languages, 
according  to  the  unfettered  choice  of  the  parties. 

3.  Parties  may  defend  themselves  in  the  courts  in  their  own  language. 

4.  Judgment  is  to  be  given  in  Turkish,  and  will  be  drawn  up  with  a  translation 
in  the  language  of  the  party  concerned. 

(Cf.  Art.  40  of  the  Three  Ambassadors'  Scheme  of  1895;  Art.  22  of  the 
Scheme  of  the  European  Commission  of  1880;  Circular  from  the  Ministry  of 
the  Interior  to  the  vilayets,  re  Arabic,  of  April  6th,  1913.) 

XVI. 

1.  Each   nation   in   the   province   has   the   right   to   establish   and   maintain 
private  schools  of  all  kinds. 

2.  They  may  raise  taxes  for  the  benefit  of  these  schools  among  their  own 
nationals. 

3.  Teaching  in  these  schools  will  be  given  in  the  national  language. 

4.  The  supervision  of  these  schools  will  be  in  the  hands  of  the  Governor- 
General,  in  accordance  with  the  regulations  laid  down  in  the  provincial  laws. 

5.  Turkish  is  to  be  compulsory  in  all  private  schools. 

(Cf.  Clause  XIV.  of  the  Scheme  of  the  Commission  of  1880.) 

XVII. 

A  Special  Commission,  presided  over  by  the  Governor-General,  will  prescribe 
the  conditions  upon  which  Armenians  illegally  deprived  of  their  lands  will 
have  them  restored,  or  receive  compensation  in  the  shape  of  other  lands  or 
money. 

(Cf.  Art.  26  of  the  Ambassadors'  Scheme  of  1895;  Art.  29  of  the  Decree  of 
October  2oth.  1895.) 

XVIII. 

The  rights  and  privileges  of  the  Armenian  nation  derived  from  the 
Sahmanatrutiun  (Fundamental  Decree)  of  1868  and  the  berats  issued  by  the 
Sultan  are  expressly  recognised  as  inviolable. 

(Cf.  Point  XI.  of  the  Three  Ambassadors'  Scheme  of  1895.) 


The  Armenian  Question  271 

XIX. 

No  Mohadjvis  (Mohammedan  immigrants)  may  settle  within  the  boundaries 
of  the  province. 

XX. 

Special  regulations  in  the  spirit  of  the  above  principles  shall  be  issued  for 
the  benefit  of  Armenians  residing  outside  the  province,  particularly  in  Cilicia. 

(Cf.  Art.  12  of  the  Ambassadors'  Memorandum  of  1895;  Art.  4  of  the 
Introduction  to  the  Decree  of  October,  1895.) 

XXI. 

A  Special  Commission,  consisting  of  representatives  of  the  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment and  the  Great  Powers  will  draw  up  the  Organisation  Decree  of  the 
province  and  the  special  regulations  referred  to  in  Article  XX.  hereof. 

XXII. 

The  Great  Powers  will  see  that  all  the  regulations  are  carried  out. 
(Cf.  Art.  VIII.  of    the    Memorandum  of   1895;    Art.  32  of  the  Decree  of 
October  20th,  1895;  Art.  14  of  the  Cretan  Decrees  of  1896.) 

I  do  not  think  anyone  can  have  the  slightest  doubt  that  within 
a  year  of  the  acceptance  of  these  proposals  the  vilayets  of  Erzerum, 
Vovas,  Van,  Bitlis,  Diarbekir,  and  Mamuretel-Aziz  would  have 
become  a  Russian  protectorate  or,  at  any  rate,  have  been  occupied 
by  the  Russians. 

During  the  negotiations  the  German  delegate  had  always 
endeavoured  to  preserve  and  advance  the  rights  of  the  Ottoman 
Government,  while  the  Russian  representative  did  his  utmost  to 
undermine  them. 

The  delegates  of  England  and  France  supported  Russia,  while 
the  Austrian  and  Italian  representatives  appeared  to  take  the  same 
view  as  their  German  colleague. 

The  Commission,  which  first  met  on  July  3rd,  1913,  broke  up 
on  July  23rd.  In  spite  of  several  sittings  it  had  done  nothing,  as 
Russia's  object  was  to  carry  out  this  scheme  without  any  modifi- 
cations, while  Germany  wanted  to  protect  the  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment as  much  as  possible.  At  length,  in  September,  1913,  Baron 
von  Giers  succeeded  in  persuading  Baron  von  Wangenheim,  the 
German  Ambassador  at  Constantinople,  to  accept  a  basic  pro- 
gramme of  six  points.  Then  began  negotiations  between  Said 
Halim  Pasha,  Grand  Vizier  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
the  two  diplomatists. 

After  we  knew  of  the  six  fundamental  points,  we  saw  that  it 


272  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

would  be  possible  for  the  Ottoman  Government  to  give  effect  to 
them  itself  and  without  any  external  pressure.  We  thereupon 
worked  out  a  very  comprehensive  programme  for  the  whole 
Empire  and  communicated  it  to  the  great  Powers  through  our 
Ambassadors. 

In  accordance  with  this  programme  the  whole  Empire  was  to 
be  divided  into  six  General-Inspectorates,  two  of  which  were  to 
be  formed  of  the  vilayets  o(  eastern  Anatolia. 

With  a  view  to  foiling  Russian  intrigues,  we  wanted  to  let  the 
English  supervise  these  two  districts.  Tewfik  Pasha,  our  Ambas- 
sador in  London,  was  asked  to  enquire  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  whether 
two  English  officials  would  be  sent,  and  he  replied  that  the  English 
seemed  inclined  to  favour  this  plan.  The  Grand  Vizier  immediately 
put  forward  the  request  officially.  The  moment  England  accepted 
this  proposal  the  doom  of  Russia's  designs  would  be  sealed.  A 
fortnight  later,  when  the  news  came  through  that  England  could 
not  undertake  the  appointment  of  the  officials  for  eastern  Anatolia 
without  Russian  consent,  we  had  to  abandon  all  our  hopes  and 
realise  that  England  had  once  and  for  all  sacrificed  us  to  Russian 
ambition. 

We  were  compelled  to  continue  the  negotiations  between  the 
German  and  Russian  Ambassadors,  and  on  February  8th,  1914,  the 
resulting  agreement  was  signed  by  M.  Gulkievitch,  the  Charge 
d'Affaires  of  the  Russian  Embassy,  and  Said  Halim  Pasha. 

THE  TURCO-RUSSIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  JANUARY  26in  (FEBRUARY  STH),  1914. 
(Orange  Book,  No.   147.) 

His  Excellency  M.  Constantine  Gulkievitch,  Russian  Charge  <T Affaires,  and 
his  Highness  Prince  Said  Halim  Pasha,  Grand  Vizier  and  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  are  agreed  that,  simultaneously  with  the  appointment  of  the  two 
Inspectors  for  the  provinces  of  Eastern  Anatolia,  the  Sublime  Porte  will  issue 
the  following  Note  to  the  Great  Powers  : 

Two  foreign  Inspectors  will  be  put  in  charge  of  the  provinces  to  be 
formed  in  Eastern  Anatolia  :  Monsieur  A.  will  have  the  vilayets  of  Erzerum, 
Trebizond,  and  Sivas,  and  Monsieur  B.  the  vilayets  of  Van,  Bitlis,  Kharput, 
and  Diarbekir. 

The  Inspectors  will  supervise  the  civil  administration  and  the  administration 
of  justice,  the  police,  and  the  gendarmerie  of  the  two  districts.  If  the  police 
force  is  insufficient  to  maintain  order,  military  forces  will  be  at  the  disposal 
of  the  Inspector,  if  required  by  him,  to  enable  him  to  carry  out  the  duties  of 
his  office. 

If  necessary  the  Inspectors  may  dismiss  officials  who  prove  unsuitable 
through  inefficiency  or  bad  behaviour,  and  hand  over  to  justice  officials  who 
have  been  guilty  of  crimes.  They  have  the  right  to  propose  the  higher  officials 


The  Armenian  Question  273 

for  appointment  by  his  Majesty.  In  such  cases  of  dismissal  they  are  to  send 
an  immediate  telegraphic  report,  with  a  summary  of  their  reasons,  to  the 
Ministers  concerned,  and  a  more  detailed  report,  with  the  documents,  must 
be  forwarded  within  a  week.  In  important  cases  which  require  immediate 
action  the  Inspectors  have  the  right  to  suspend  judicial  officers,  who  cannot 
be  dismissed,  on  condition  that  they  immediately  refer  the  matter  to  the 
Department  of  Justice. 

Should  any  actions  for  which  the  Vali  has  made  himself  responsible  call 
for  energetic  measures,  the  Inspectors  will  inform  the  Minister  of  the  Interior 
by  telegram.  The  latter  will  immediately  bring  the  case  to  the  notice  of  the 
Cabinet,  which  will  come  to  a  decision  within  four  days  at  most  after  the 
receipt  of  the  telegram. 

Agricultural  disputes  will  be  decided  under  the  personal  supervision  of  the 
Inspector. 

After  the  appointment  of  the  Inspectors,  detailed  memoranda  will  be  drawn 
up,  with  their  co-operation,  on  the  subject  of  their  duties  and  rights. 

Should  the  post  of  Inspector  remain  vacant  during  a  period  of  ten  years,  the 
Sublime  Porte  will  avail  itself  of  the  benevolent  assistance  of  the  Great  Powers 
in  making  the  new  appointment.  Laws,  edicts,  and  public  proclamations  are  to 
be  in  the  language  of  each  district  respectively.  In  so  far  as  the  Inspector 
may  deem  it  possible,  each  party  has  the  right  to  use  its  own  language  before 
a  court  of  justice  or  an  administrative  authority.  Judgment  is  to  be  given  in 
the  Turkish  language,  accompanied,  when  possible,  by  a  translation  in  the 
language  of  the  party  concerned. 

The  contribution  to  the  schools  budget  of  the  vilayet  payable  by  the 
different  native  elements  will  be  fixed  in  accordance  with  the  rate  of  the  school 
tax  originally  in  force.  The  Imperial  Government  will  place  no  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  the  religious  orders  sharing  in  the  maintenance  of  their  schools. 

Every  Ottoman  must,  in  peace  time,  perform  his  military  service  within 
the  military  Inspectorate  in  which  his  home  is  situated.  The  Sublime  Porte 
will,  however,  until  further  notice,  detail  contingents  of  the  military  forces 
from  all  parts  of  the  Empire  for  service  in  the  outlying  regions  of  the  Yemen, 
Assir,  and  Nedjd  in  proportion  to  the  population  of  these  regions;  it  will, 
moreover,  relegate  to  the  Navy  recruits  from  all  parts  of  the  Empire. 

The  Hamidie  regiments  will  be  converted  into  Cavalry  Reserves.  Their 
arms  are  to  remain  in  the  military  dep6ts,  and  will  only  be  issued  in  case  of 
mobilisation  and  manoeuvres.  They  will  be  under  the  command  of  the  Corps 
Commander  in  whose  district  they  are.  In  peace  time,  regimental,  squadron, 
and  platoon  commanders  will  be  selected  from  officers  .on  the  active  list  of 
the  Imperial  Ottoman  Army.  The  men  of  these  regiments  will  perform  one 
year's  military  service.  They  must  bring  to  the  regiment  their  own  horses 
and  complete  saddlery  equipment.  Every  man,  without  distinction  of  race 
or  faith,  who  comes  within  this  recruiting  area  and  fulfils  the  required  condi- 
tions, may  be  drafted  into  the  aforesaid  regiments.  In  case  of  war  and  during 
manoeuvres  they  will  be  subject  to  the  same  disciplinary  regulations  as  the 
regular  troops. 

The  authority  of  the  Inspectors  of  the  vilayets  will  be  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  March  isth,  1320,  (1913). 

A  census  will  be  taken  under  the  direction  of  the  Inspectors  at  the  earliest 
opportunity — if  at  all  possible,  not  later  than  a  year  hence — in  order  to  ascertain 
the  exact  conditions  as  to  religion,  nationality,  and  language  in  the  two  districts. 
Until  then  the  elected  members  of  the  "  General  Council  "  (Medjlissi  Umumi) 
and  the  "  Vilayet  Committees  "  (Endjumen)  of  Van  and  Bitlis  will  consist  of 
equal  numbers  of  Mohammedans  and  non-Mohammedans.  In  the  vilayet  of 
Erzerum  the  members  of  the?  General  Council ?  in  the  event  of  the  final  census 


274  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

not  being  completed  within  the  year,  will  be  elected  on  the  same  basis  as  those 
of  the  other  two  vilayets.  In  the  vilayets  of  Sivas,  Kharput,  and  Diarbekir 
members  will  be  elected  immediately  in  proportion  to  the  population.  To 
facilitate  the  carrying  through  of  these  measures,  the  number  of  Mohammedan 
electors  will,  until  the  new  census  is  made,  be  fixed  according  to  the  old  lists, 
and  the  number  of  non-Mohammedans  according  to  the  parish  lists.  Meanwhile, 
should  material  difficulties  prevent  the  adoption  of  this  provisional  system 
of  election,  the  Inspectors  have  authority  to  propose  for  the  vilayets  of  Sivas, 
Kharput,  and  Diarbekir  a  division  of  the  electorate  for  the  General  Councils 
which  may  be  more  suitable  to  the  present  needs  and  conditions  of  the  vilayets 
in  question.  In  all  vilayets  in  which  the  General  Councils  are  elected  by 
proportional  suffrage,  the  minority  of  the  population  will  be  accorded 
representation  on  the  Committees  (Endjumen). 

The  members  of  the  Administrative  Council  will,  as  heretofore,  consist  of 
Mohammedans  and  non-Mohammedans  in  equal  numbers.  It  is  left  to  the 
discretion  of  the  Inspector  to  undertake  recruiting  for  the  police  and  gendarmerie 
in  the  districts  in  a  similar  ratio.  The  principle  of  proportion  will  also  be 
observed  as  far  as  possible  in  filling  the  other  official  posts. 

In  witness  of  which  we,  the  undersigned,  hereto  append  our  signatures  and 
affix  our  seals. 

(Signed)      GuLKiEViTCH.  (Signed)      SAID  HALIM. 

Dated,  Constantinople,  January  26th  (February  8th),  1914. 

The  Russians  had  acclaimed  this  agreement  as  a  substantial 
political  success.  To  appreciate  its  significance,  it  is  sufficient  to 
read  the  following  passages  from  Gulkievitch's  telegram  to 
Sassonoff,  the  Foreign  Minister: 

Thus  the  Act  of  January  22nd,  1914,  signifies  without  doubt  the  opening 
of  a  new  and  happier  era  in  the  history  of  the  Armenian  people.  In  political 
significance  it  is  comparable  with  the  Firman  of  1870,  in  which  the  Bulgarian 
Exarchate  was  founded  and  the  Bulgars  were  freed  from  Greek  guardianship. 
The  Armenians  must  feel  that  the' first  step  has  been  taken  towards  releasing 
them  from  the  Turkish  yoke. 

The  agreement  of  January  26th,  1914,  has,  at  the  same  time,  great  signi- 
ficance for  the  international  status  of  Russia.  It  has  been  signed  personally 
by  the  Grand  Vizier  and  Russia's  representative,  and  pledges  the  Turks  to 
hand  to  the  Powers  a  note,  the  contents  of  which  have  been  precisely  set  forth. 
The  outstanding  role  of  Russia  in  the  Armenian  question  is  thus  officially 
emphasised,  and  Art.  16  of  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  to  some  extent  ratified. 
This  circumstance  will  certainly  not  fail  to  exert  a  most  favourable  influence 
on  the  international  status  of  Russia,  and  to  place  a  halo  on  the  head  of  her 
sovereign  in  the  eyes  of  the  Christians  of  the  Near  East.  In  reaching  an 
agreement  with  the  Porte  on  the  Armenian  question  the  Imperial  Ambassador 
has  had  to  overcome  extraordinary  difficulties.  It  was  necessary  to  reckon,  on 
the  one  hand,  with  the  natural  desire  of  the  Armenians  to  introduce  the 
most  far-reaching  reforms  possible;  on  the  other,  with  the  stubborn  resistance 
of  the  Porte,  which  did  its  utmost  to  defeat  the  proposed  reforms,  and  opposed 
all  the  important  points,  of  the  scheme.  As  far  as  Germany  is  concerned,  the 
understanding  with  us  serves  a  double  purpose;  first,  by  convincing  the  Porte 
that  in  consenting  to  these  moderate  reforms,  fraught  with  little  danger  to  her, 
Germany  had  shielded  the  Turkish  Government  from  more  drastic  reforms; 
secondly,  by  winning  over  the  sympathy  of  the  Armenians,  which  is  of  great 


The  Armenian  Question  275 

importance  because  of  Cilicia,  which  they  regard  as  coming  within  their  sphere 
of  influence.  Germany's  conduct,  therefore,  was  lacking  in  candour;  her 
support  was  merely  bluff  as  far  as  the  Armenians  were  concerned.  In  reality 
the  German  diplomatists  were  the  loyal  advisers  of  the  Turk. 

(Signed)  GULKIEVITCH. 

The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  regards  the  Armenian  plan  for 
reform  merely  as  the  first  step  towards  the  Russian  occupation 
of  Armenia,  and  in  this  is  completely  justified.  I  cannot  avoid 
expressing  my  astonishment  that  these  lines,  which  so  openly 
reveal  Russia's  political  aim  with  regard  to  Armenia,  could  be 
published  in  the  Orange  Book;  I  can  justly  say:  "God  has 
brought  the  guilty  to  an  acknowledgment  of  their  guilt." 

Of  late  the  Russians  have  considerably  altered  their  policy  with 
regard  to  the  Armenians  of  the  Caucasus.  Seeing  that  the 
oppression  which  the  Armenians  there  have  had  to  suffer  at  their 
hands  had  awakened  the  mistrust  of  the  genuine  Armenian 
revolutionaries  against  Russia,  they  at  once  abandoned  their 
malevolent  policy,  they  returned  the  confiscated  property  to  the 
Monastery  of  Etchmiazin,  issued  a  general  pardon  for  all  Armenian 
political  criminals,  and  proclaimed  the  greatest  friendliness  towards 
the  Armenians.  This  new  policy  won  over  even  those  revolu- 
tionary Armenians  who  hitherto  had  detested  Russia. 

After  the  activity  which  Boghos  Nubar  Pasha  had  displayed 
in  Europe,  particularly  towards  the  middle  of  1913,  we  repeatedly 
suggested  to  the  leaders  of  the  Dachnakzutiun  that  they  should 
support  us  in  resisting  the  Russian  efforts  for  reform  in  Armenia ; 
as  the  Balkan  War  was  over,  it  would  now  have  been  easier  for  us 
to  subject  the  Kurds  to  more  stringent  discipline  and  secure  peace 
for  the  Armenians.  The  answer  we  received  was  somewhat  after 
this  fashion :  "As  the  Great  Powers  are  intervening  in  this  matter, 
we  can  no  longer  stand  aside." 

Painful  for  us  and  satisfactory  for  Russia  as  was  the  agreement 
of  the  8th  February,  1914,  the  Ottoman  Government  nevertheless 
intended  meticulously  to  enforce  all  the  conditions.  But  is 
Russian  policy  ever  at  a  loss  to  find  new  impediments  ?  Was  not 
her  real  aim  never  to  permit  peace  in  East  Anatolia?  For  this 
she  had  first  to  establish  a  protectorate  over  Armenia,  further  to 
awaken  the  sympathy  of  Europe  for  the  Armenians,  and  also  to 
stir  up  the  Kurdish  Beys  and,  more  important  still,  the  influential 
sheiks  to  resistance  against  the  Government  and  the  Armenians. 

82 


276  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

In  accordance  with  this  carefully  planned  scheme  the  Russian 
Government  at  home  supported  the  famous  Abdul  Rezak  Bey 
Bederhani,  furnished  him  with  lavish  supplies  of  money  on  the 
pretext  of  restoring  Kurdish  rule  in  Sinai,  and  on  the  other  hand, 
through  the  agency  of  the  Consul  at  Bitlis,  provoked  Sheik  N.  N. 
to  rise  against  the  Government. 

However  hard  M.  Mandelstamm  may  try  he  cannot  conceal  the 
truth. 

While  the  question  of  the  Armenian  reforms  was  developing  in 
this  way  the  Great  War  broke  out.  The  Ottoman  Government 
saw  that  sooner  or  later  they  would  be  drawn  into  the  War  by  the 
German  alliance.  As  they  foresaw  the  impossibility  of  occupying 
themselves  with  internal  reforms  during  the  long  trying  years  of 
war  they  considered  it  unnecessary  to  prolong  the  mandate  of  the 
two  foreign  Inspectors  whom  they  had  appointed  to  the  East 
Anatolian  Provinces. 

Of  course  it  was  our  one  hope  to  free  ourselves  through  the 
World  War  from  all  conventions,  which  meant  so  many  attacks  on 
our  independence,  and  to  be  able  to  live  in  future  as  an  independent 
and  free  nation,  which  in  its  own  territory,  of  its  own  initiative 
introduces  the  reforms  which  local  necessities  have  made  impera- 
tive. Just  as  it  was  our  chief  aim  to  annul  the  Capitulations  and 
the  Lebanon  statute,  so  in  the  matter  of  Armenian  reform  we 
desired  to  release  ourselves  from  the  Agreement  which  Russian 
pressure  had  imposed  upon  us. 

As  has  already  been  discussed  in  detail  in  a  special  chapter,  we 
entered  the  World  War  in  the  hope  of  being  able  in  future  to  lead  a 
free  and  independent  existence  as  a  self-respecting  Nation. 

This  was  our  intention,  and  so  the  treaty  dealing  with  the 
reforms  for  the  vilayets  inhabited  by  Armenians,  wrung  out  of 
us  by  our  hereditary  enemies  (the  Russians),  had  no  further 
significance.  That  is  not  to  say,  however,  that  we  had  not  the 
earnest  intention  of  introducing  reform  in  our  country.  On  the 
contrary,  we  had  determined  on  radical  reform,  as  we  were  inspired 
by  the  conviction  that  otherwise  we  could  not  continue  to  exist. 

But  we  approached  the  question  of  reform  from  the  standpoint 
that  Czardom,  which  for  two  centuries  had  hovered  over  our  heads 
like  a  scourge,  must  be  destroyed,  so  that  the  eternal  intrigue 
smouldering  within  our  country  might  be  finally  quenched.  And 


The  Armenian  Question  277 

this  aim  was  only  to  be  realised  by  throwing  into  the  World  War  the 
fullest  strength  of  our  military  resources.  And  so  we  decided  to 
defer  tackling  the  internal  reforms  until  the  end  of  the  War,  first 
devoting  all  the  forces  of  our  nation  to  the  War  itself.  We  have 
not  failed  to  communicate  this  point  of  view  to  the  leaders  of  the 
Dachnakzutiun. 

Finally  we  became  actively  involved  in  the  World  War.  A  few 
days  after  the  declaration  of  War  I  was  appointed  to  the  Command 
of  the  4th  Army  and  left  Constantinople  to  proceed  to  Syria. 
From  that  time  I  have  learnt  nothing  further  of  the  conditions 
in  the  vilayets  of  East  Anatolia,  nor  on  what  grounds  the  Govern- 
ment saw  itself  called  upon  to  deport  all  Armenians.  I  neither 
took  part  in  the  negotiations  at  Constantinople  nor  was  I  consulted. 
It  was  through  the  Government  Proclamation  to  the  vilayets  that 
I  first  learned  that  all  Armenians  were  provisionally  to  be  deported 
to  Mesopotamia,  where  they  were  to  remain  until  the  end  of  the 
War. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  at  home  also  informed  me  that  I  was 
to  take  the  necessary  measures  to  protect  the  Armenians  against 
any  attack  while  passing  through  my  command;  their  deportation 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  civil  authorities.  That  was  all  I  learned. 
At  that  time  I  was  busy  with  the  organisation  of  the  line  of 
communications  between  Bozanti  and  Aleppo;  it  was  the  only  route 
by  which  the  military  forces  which  were  to  be  sent  to  Syria  towards 
the  end  of  the  autumn  of  1915  to  take  part  in  the  second  Canal 
Expedition  could  pass;  I  was  to  provide  for  the  necessary  supplies. 

I  was  furious  when  I  learned  that  the  exiled  Armenians 
were  to  come  to  Bozanti  on  their  way  over  the  Taurus  and 
Adana  to  Aleppo;  for  any  interference  with  the  line  of  com- 
munications might  have  the  gravest  consequences  for  the  Canal 
Expedition. 

My  correspondence  with  the  Commander-in-Chief  is  preserved 
in  the  Army  records;  later,  when  these  records  are  published,  it 
will  be  possible  to  show  that  I  considered  it  more  expedient  to 
settle  the  Armenians  in  the  interior  of  the  provinces  of  Konia, 
Angora,  and  Kastamuni  than  to  send  them  to  Mesopotamia. 

But  as  I  could  not  oppose  a  Government  measure  based  on  an 
Act  of  Parliament,  and  had,  moreover,  received  a  specific  order  not 
to  hinder  the  progress  of  the  Armenian  emigrant  columns  which 


278  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

were  passing  Adana  and  Aleppo  on  their  way  to  Mesopotamia,  I 
saw  myself  compelled  to  yield. 

I  heard  from  time  to  time  of  deeds  of  violence  against  the 
emigrating  Armenians  in  the  vilayets  of  Mamuret-ul-Asis  and 
Diarbekir.  The  organisation  of  the  emigrants  was  exclusively 
the  concern  of  the  civil  authorities,  the  Army  had  nothing  to  do 
with  it.  As,  however,  I  could  not  allow  attacks  on  the 
emigrants  to  take  place  in  my  Army  zone,  as  had  occurred 
in  the  other  Army  zones,  I  thought  it  my  duty  to  issue 
stringent  orders  to  this  effect.  As  I  was  continually  hearing 
complaints  that  the  civil  authorities  in  the  sector  between 
Bozanti  and  Aleppo  were  unable  to  provide  the  emigrant  columns 
with  adequate  supplies,  and  that  the  people  in  consequence  were 
being  found  in  a  condition  of  the  greatest  distress  along  the 
route.  I  made  a  journey  from  Aleppo  to  Bozanti  to  view  the 
situation  personally,  issued  an  order  that  bread  was  to  be  pro- 
vided for  the  emigrants  from  the  Army  depots,  and  ordered 
the  doctors  on  the  lines  of  communication  to  look  after  the  sick 
Armenians. 

I  thus  did  everything  possible  during  the  whole  period  of  their 
deportation  to  give  help  to  the  Armenians,  as  has  been  confirmed 
by  the  Armenians  themselves  and  by  all  impartial  foreigners.  For 
the  moment  I  will  refer  only  to  some  orders  and  negotiations 
recorded  in  the  book  of  Lepsius,  which  contains  official  reports  of 
the  German  Foreign  Office  in  connection  with  the  Armenian 
question.  All  my  telegrams  which  I  sent  to  Constantinople,  to  the 
District  Commandants,  and  to  the  vilayets  are  collected  in  the 
Army  War  Records;  on  the  day  when  this  is  published  the  public 
will  know  more  of  the  humane  intentions  upon  which  my  measures 
were  based. 

When,  after  the  deportations  of  the  Armenians  of  Anatolia, 
the  civil  authorities  received  the  command  to  deport  all 
Armenians  from  Adana  and  Aleppo,  I  repeatedly  opposed  this 
measure.  I  wrote  a  detailed  report  on  this  subject  to  Constanti- 
nople, explaining  that  I  could  see  no  necessity  for  such  a  measure, 
and  that,  in  my  opinion,  such  action  was  bound  to  have  the  worst 
possible  influence  on  the  economic,  and  especially  on  the 
agricultural  situation  in  the  territory  of  the  4th  Army.  But  as  I 
was  told  that  it  was  not  my  business  to  meddle  with  the  concerns 


The  Armenian  Question  279 

of  the  civil  authorities,  but  merely  to  give  them  assistance,  I  was 
unable  to  prevent  these  orders  being  carried  out. 

However,  as  I  was  convinced  that  the  deportation  of  all 
Armenian  emigrants  to  Mesopotamia  was  bound  to  cause  them 
great  distress,  I  thought  it  better  to  bring  a  large  number  of  them 
into  the  Syrian  vilayets  of  Beirut  and  Aleppo;  I  succeeded  in 
obtaining  the  desired  permission  after  I  had  made  vigorous 
representations  to  Constantinople.  In  this  way  I  was  actually  able 
to  bring  nearly  150,000  Armenians  to  these  vilayets. 

I  have  a  fundamental  aversion  to  telling  of  the  help  I  rendered 
to  these  widows  and  orphans.  It  seems  to  me  as  though  in 
doing  so  I  am  reflecting  on  the  moral  value  of  these  actions  which 
were  prompted  only  by  feelings  of  humanity.  As,  however,  in  spite 
of  all  the  help  given,  our  foreign  enemies  point  to  me  as  morally 
responsible  for  these  occurrences,  and  that  caricature  of  a  Govern- 
ment which  has  been  set  up  at  Constantinople  since  the  Armistice 
even  went  so  far  as  to  condemn  me  to  death  on  an  accusation  of 
moral  guilt  for  these  banishments  and  butcheries,  I  regard  it  as  a 
just  means  of  self-defence  to  give  some  explanation  in  accord- 
ance with  the  truth.  Public  opinion  will  recognise  that  I  had 
nothing  to  do  with  the  deportations  and  Armenian  massacres. 
Just  as  I  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  aforementioned  negotiations 
about  the  deportation  of  the  Armenians,  I  am  equally  innocent  of 
ordering  any  massacres;  I  have  even  prevented  them  and  caused 
all  possible  help  to  be  given  lo  all  emigrants  at  the  time  of  the 
deportations. 

If  I  had  been  in  Constantinople  at  the  time  and  taken  part  in 
the  discussions,  knowing  what  was  happening  in  the  rear  of  the 
Army  in  East  Anatolia,  should  I  not  have  supported  the 
deportations  ?  This  question  I  cannot  now  answer.  But  I  assume 
that  my  friends,  in  reaching  such  a  drastic  decision  as  this  wholesale 
deportation  which  roused  the  indignation  of  the  whole  civilised 
world,  must  have  been  actuated  by  weighty  reasons.  I  have  no 
doubt  that  in  the  publications  which  are  shortly  to  appear  they 
will  satisfy  our  doubts  and  curiosity. 

I  am  certainly  firmly  convinced  that  the  Armenians  planned 
insurrections  which  endangered  the  rear  of  our  Army  in  the 
Caucasus  and  which  might  under  certain  circumstances  have 
completely  destroyed  it.  Consequently  my  friends  held  it  more 


280  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

expedient  to  transfer  the  whole  Armenian  nation  to  another  region 
where  they  could  do  no  harm,  than  to  expose  the  whole  Ottoman 
Empire  to  a  catastrophe  which  would  have  involved  Russian 
occupation  of  the  whole  of  Asia  Minor. 

As  to  the  occurrences  which  took  place  during  the  deportations 
these  must  be  ascribed  to  seventy  years  of  accumulated  hatred 
between  Turks,  Kurds,  and  Armenians.  The  responsibility  must 
lie  with  Muscovite  policy  which  made  mortal  enemies  of  three 
nations  who  for  centuries  had  lived  together  in  peace.  The 
crimes  perpetrated  during  the  deportations  of  1915  justly  roused 
the  deepest  horror,  but  those  committed  by  the  Armenians  during 
their  rising  against  the  Turks  and  Kurds  do  not  in  any  way  fall  short 
of  them  in  cruelty  and  treachery.  But  whatever  may  have  been 
the  causes  that  gave  rise  to  these  crimes,  they  ought  to  have  been 
prevented  by  every  possible  means.  The  Government  regarded 
deportation  as  the  most  effective  and  speedy  means  of  ensuring 
the  safety  of  the  Kurdish  and  Turkish  population,  the  Army  and 
the  whole  political  existence  of  the  Ottoman  States.  Yet,  on  the 
other  hand,  by  these  measures  they  opened  the  way  for  the  crimes 
perpetrated  by  the  Kurds  and  Turks.  Could  not  the  question 
have  been  solved  in  another  way  ?  Or,  would  it  not  have  been 
possible  to  protect  the  exiles  from  attacks  en  route  f  We  can  only 
deal  with  these  questions  after  seeing  the  explanation  of  those  who 
organised  the  deportations  and  those  who  carried  them  out.  In 
any  event,  I  am  able  to  prove  that  in  the  territory  occupied  by 
my  Army  no  outrages  on  the  emigrants  wrere  permitted,  and,  apart 
from  a  few  exceptional  cases,  none  occurred. 

As  to  the  bad  impression  created,  a  no  less  lamentable 
impression  was  given  by  the  spectacle  of  the  Turks  fleeing  from 
Diarbekir,  via  Aleppo  and  Adana,  to  Konia,  and  from  Erzerum 
and  Erzindjan  to  Sivas,  before  the  Russians,  and  the  horrors  and 
outrages  committed  by  Armenians.  But  these  unfortunate 
wretches  were  only  Mohammedans;  so  there  was  no  German  or 
American  missionary  available  to  send  reports  or  to  feel  called 
upon  to  devote  his  eloquence  to  describing  their  woes. 

Let  us  assume  that  the  Ottoman  Government  deported  a  million 
and  a  half  Armenians  from  the  East  Anatolian  Provinces,  and 
that  600,000  of  them  died,  some  murdered,  some  collapsing  on  the 
way  from  hunger  and  distress.  But  does  anyone  know  how  many 


The  Armenian  Question  281 

Kurdish  and  Turkish  inhabitants  of  the  vilayets  of  Trebizond, 
Erzerum,  Van,  and  Bitlis  were  done  to  death  in  circumstances  of 
the  greatest  cruelty  by  the  Armenians  when  the  Russians  marched 
into  these  provinces  ?  Then  let  it  be  stated  that  the  number  of 
Turks  and  Kurds  killed  on  this  occasion  far  exceeded  one  and  a 
half  millions.  If  the  Turks  are  to  be  made  responsible  for  the 
Armenian  massacres,  why  not  the  Armenians  for  the  massacres 
of  the  Turks  ?  Or  are  the  Turks  and  Kurds  of  no  more  value  in 
the  eyes  of  humanity,  or  of  such  politicians  as  Mandelstamm  and 
Morgenthau  and  their  like,  than  flies  ? 

I  ask  my  readers  to  examine  the  two  following  Russian  reports 
with  care,  for  they  give  an  idea  of  the  hatred  fostered  by  the 
Armenians  against  the  Turks,  and  the  excesses  in  which  they  have 
indulged : 

RUSSIAN  OFFICIAL  MEMORANDUM. 
The  Retreat  of  the  Russian  Army. 

Memorandum  of  Lt.-Col.  Twerdokhleboff  concerning  the  Armenian  attacks 
on  the  Turkish  population  of  Erzerum  and  its  neighbourhood,  from  the  beginning 
of  the  Russian  Revolution  to  the  reoccupation  of  the  town  by  the  Turkish  troops 
on  February  27th,  1918. 

INTRODUCTION. 

The  enmity  known  throughout  Europe  to  have  existed  for  a  long  time 
between  Turks  and  Armenians  has  revealed  itself  during  the  War  in  a  manner 
that  passes  all  description.  It  is  a  commonly  recognised  fact  that  the 
Armenians  cannot  stand  the  Turks;  in  spite  of  this  they  have  always  managed 
to  pose  as  martyrs,  and  to  convince  the  world  that  on  account  of  their  high 
state  of  civilisation  and  their  faith  they  have  been  the  object  of  the  most 
ghastly  cruelties. 

The  Russians,  who  of  all  Europeans  have  necessarily  been  in  closest  touch 
with  the  Armenians,  have  a  different  conception  of  the  manner  in  which  this 
nation  understands  civilisation  and  morality.  They  have  learnt  to  know  them 
as  miserly,  avaricious,  parasitical,  only  able  to  exist  by  preying  on  others.  The 
Russian  peasant  has  seen  into  this  nation's  soul.  I  have  often  heard  from 
Russian  soldiers  such  expressions  as  :  "  The  Turks  have  used  the  Armenians 
badly,  but  they  should  have  done  it  in  quite  a  different  way  and  left  not  one 
of  them  alive." 

From  a  military  point  of  view  the  Armenians  are  worthless.  The  Armenian 
soldiers  of  the  Russian  Army  play  a  very  insignificant  role;  they  always  prefer 
service  in  the  rear  of  the  Army,  however  menial,  to  the  firing  line.  The 
persistent  desertions  and  cases  of  self-wounding  confirm  the  opinion  which  has 
been  given  of  the  bravery  of  the  Armenians. 

But  the  course  of  events,  from  the  beginning  of  the  Russian  Revolution 
to  the  reoccupation  of  Erzerum  by  the  Turkish  troops,  surpasses  anything  that 
could  have  been  expected  from  this  nation.  I  have  witnessed  some  of  these 
occurrences  partly  with  my  own  eyes ;  others  I  have  heard  of  from  eye-witnesses. 

When,  in  1916,  Erzerum  was  taken  by  the  Russians,  not  a  single  Armenian 


282  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

was  allowed  to  enter  the  town  or  its  neighbourhood.  So  long  as  General  Kalikin 
was  at  the  head  of  the  ist  Army  Corps,  which  occupied  the  town  and  surround- 
ings of  Erzerum,  not  a  single  unit  which  contained  Armenian  elements  was 
sent  there.  After  the  Russian  Revolution  these  measures  were  discontinued, 
and  the  Armenians  took  advantage  of  this  to  attack  Erzerum  and  its  neighbour- 
hood, and  then  the  plundering  of  houses  and  villages  and  the  massacres 
began. 

During  the  Russian  occupation  the  Armenians  did  not  dare  to  indulge  openly 
in  deeds  of  violence;  the  looting  and  murder  was  committed  in  secret.  In 
1917  the  Armenian  Revolutionary  Committee,  which  consisted  chiefly  of 
soldiers,  instigated  general  house-searchings  on  the  pretext  of  disarming  the 
population.  But,  as  they  were  conducted  without  any  control,  they  soon 
developed  into  systematic  lootings  which  were  carried  on  by  the  soldiers  on 
an  even  more  extensive  scale.  The  worst  looters  among  the  Armenian  soldiers 
were  usually  those  who  had  shown  themselves  the  most  cowardly  in  face  of 
the  enemy. 

One  day,  as  I  was  riding  through  the  streets  of  the  town,  I  saw  a  group 
of  Russian  soldiers  who,  egged  on  by  an  Armenian  soldier,  were  dragging 
along  two  old  Turks  of  seventy.  The  Armenian  solclier  seemed  to  be  in  a  state 
of  frenzy  and  lashed  the  poor  devils  with  a  wire  whip.  I  tried,  without 
success,  to  induce  the  soldiers  to  treat  the  old  men  a  little  more  humanely. 
The  Armenian  stepped  up  to  me,  threatened  me  with  his  riding-whip,  and 
shouted  :  "  You  dare,  to  protect  our  murderers?  "  Other  Armenians  who  came 
up  took  his  part,  of  course,  and  my  position  with  regard  to  the  Russian  soldiers, 
who  would  seize  any  opportunity  to  beat  and,  if  possible,  kill  their  officers, 
began  to  look  critical.  The  appearance  of  an  officers'  patrol,  however,  changed 
the  situation  :  the  Armenians  vanished  into  thin  air  and  the  soldiers  led  off  the 
two  old  men  without  further  violence. 

With  the  return  home  of  the  Russian  front-line  troops,  the  danger  arose 
that  the  Armenians  remaining  at  the  front,  or  nocking  to  Erzerum,  would  take 
the  opportunity,  before  the  arrival  of  units  of  other  nationalities,  to  commit 
outrages  on  the  Turkish  population.  The  influential  Armenians,  of  course, 
gave  assurances  that  nothing  of  the  kind  would  happen;  they  asserted  their 
anxiety  to  bring  about  a  reconciliation  of  the  two  peoples,  and  their  conviction 
that  the  adoption  of  suitable  measures  would  ensure  success. 

At  first  events  seemed,  indeed,  to  justify  these  assertions.  The  mosques, 
which  had  been  converted  into  barracks,  were  cleared  and  cleaned  out  and  no 
longer  used  as  military  quarters.  Militia  units  were  formed,  comprising  Turks 
and  Armenians,  and  the  Armenians  even  clamoured  loudly  for  the  setting  up 
of  a  court  martial  to  deal  with  the  crimes  that  had  been  committed  against 
the  Turks. 

Not  until  later  did  it  become  known  that  all  these  manoeuvres  were  nothing 
but  bluff  and  cunningly  concealed  treachery.  The  Turks  who  joined  the  militia 
soon  had  enough  of  it  when  they  observed  that  the  majority  of  those  who  were 
told  off  for  night  patrol  did  not  return,  and  no  news  of  their  fate  could  be 
obtained.  The  Turks  who  were  taken  to  work  in  the  fields  disappeared  in  like 
manner  without  a  trace.  Also,  the  members  of  the  court  martial,  when  they 
finally  met,  dared  not  enforce  any  penalties  for  fear  of  their  own  lives. 
Murder  and  looting  multiplied;  between  January  and  February  Bekir  Hadji 
Effendi,  one  of  the  most  respected  notables  of  Erzerum,  was  murdered  in  his 
own  house.  General  Odichelidze  thereupon  issued  an  order  to  the  officers  in 
command  of  the  troops  that  the  murderer  must  be  found  within  three  days.  This 
order  produced  no  result. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  sent  severe  reprimands  to  the  headquarters  of  the 
Armenian  detachments  on  the  intolerable  lack  of  discipline  among  their  men. 


The  Armenian  Question  283 


He  also  appealed  to  the  Armenian  notables,  pointing  out  the  atrocities  that 
had  been  committed  by  the  troops— e.g.,  that  of  the  Turkish  land  workers  who 
had  been  ordered  to  the  fields  less  than  half  had  returned — and  explained  to 
them  that  if  the  Armenians  desired  to  obtain  control  of  the  occupied  territory 
they  would  have  to  prove  themselves  worthy  of  it.  He  added  that  these  crimes 
were  a  blot  on  the  fame  of  the  Armenian  nation.  The  war  is  not  yet  over, 
he  said,  and  the  Peace  Congress  has  not  yet  assigned  this  territory  to  the 
Armenians;  it  behoved  them,  therefore,  to  conduct  themselves  thenceforward 
as  a  nation  worthy  of  freedom. 

The  answer  of  the  Armenian  leaders  was  to  the  effect  that  the  honour  of 
a  whole  people  could  not  be  prejudiced  by  the  crimes  of  an  insignificant 
minority;  they  gave  assurance  that  the  reasonably-minded  Armenians  were 
doing  their  utmost  to  put  a  stop  to  these  acts  of  vengeance  for  the  Turkish 
tyranny  of  the  past;  they  observed,  further,  that  they  were  engaged  in  framing 
the  sternest  measures,  which  they  would  enforce  without  delay,  justly  and 
equitably.  Shortly  after  the  receipt  of  these  oft-repeated  assurances  we  learned 
of  the  massacre  of  Turks  at  Erzindjan.  The  following  details  I  heard  from 
the  mouth  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Odichelidze.  The  massacre  was  not 
instigated  by  bands,  but  by  the  doctor  of  the  town  and  the  army  contractor. 
As  I  do  not  know  the  exact  names  of  these  Armenians  I  cannot  give  them. 
The  report  runs  : 

"  More  than  800  unarmed,  defenceless  Turks  were  murdered.  The 
Armenians  had  dug  gigantic  trenches  into  which  the  poor  Turks  were  thrown 
after  being  slaughtered  like  a  herd  of  cattle.  An  Armenian  who  directed  the 
execution  counted  the  unhappy  victims.  '  That's  seventy,'  he  roared,  *  there's 
still  room  for  ten  more ;  hack  away  !  '  And  another  ten  wretches  were  slaughtered 
to  fill  up  the  gap,  which  was  then  filled  in  with  a  little  earth.  The  army 
contractor  wanted  to  provide  a  little  diversion  for  his  own  benefit.  He  locked 
into  a  house  eighty  wretched  victims,  and  then  had  them  let  out  one  after 
another  while  he  smashed  in  their  skulls  with  his  own  hand." 

After  the  massacre  at  Erzindjan  the  Armenians,  well  armed,  made  their  way 
to  Erzerum.  A  Russian  officer  who,  with  the  aid  of  a  few  guns,  was  protecting 
the  line  of  communication  of  the  retreating  force  from  the  attacks  of  the  Kurds, 
one  day  attempted  to  lead  an  Armenian  detachment  into  the  firing  line.  The 
men,  however,  had  no  stomach  for  real  fighting;  instead,  they  set  fire 
to  the  house  in  which  the  Russian  officers  were  and  tried  to  get  rid  of  them  in 
this  way.  The  officers  narrowly  escaped  death  and  lost  all  their  possessions. 

The  Armenian  bands,  swarming  from  Erzindjan  to  Erzerum,  destroyed  on 
their  way  all  Mohammedan  villages  and  annihilated  the  inhabitants. 

During  the  retreat  of  the  Russian  troops  to  Erzerum  Kurds  and  other  peace- 
able inhabitants  of  the  district  were  recruited  as  drivers  of  ammunition  trans- 
port. Not  a  man  of  these  possessed  a  weapon.  As  they  approached  Erzerum  the 
Armenians  seized  the  moment  when  the  Russian  officers  had  turned  in  to  rest 
to  kill  the  drivers.  The  Russian  officers,  brought  up  by  the  shrieks  of  the 
unhappy  wretches,  were  received  by  the  Armenians,  arms  in  their  hands,  and 
threatened  with  a  similar  fate  if  they  dared  to  interfere.  These  murders  were 
carried  out  with  the  direst  cruelty. 

In  the  Officers'  Club  at  Erzerum  a  Russian  artillery  officer,  Lieutenant 
Medivani,  publicly  stated  that  he  had  witnessed  the  following  scene  : 

"  One  of  the  Armenians  had  mortally  wounded  a  Kurdish  driver;  he  had 
fallen  on  his  back  in  a  dying  condition.  The  Armenian  then  tried  to  drive 
the  stick  he  held  in  his  hand  into  his  victim's  mouth,  but  the  poor  fellow's  teeth 
were  so  tightly  clenched  in  his  death  agony  that  the  murderer  could  not  carry 
out  his  horrible  design,  and  in  his  fury  he  despatched  the  dying  man  with  kicks 
in  the  stomach." 


284  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Odichelidze  has  himself  told  me  that  in  the  village  of  Ilidja  all  Turks  who 
wera  unable  to  escape  were  massacred;  he  saw  numbers  of  corpses  of  children 
whose  heads  had  been  hacked  off  with  blunt  axes. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Griaznoff,  who  returned  from  Ilidja  on  the  28th  February, 
three  weeks  after  the  slaughter,  related  to  me  what  he  had  seen. 

"  In  the  courtyard  of  the  mosque  the  corpses  lay  heaped  to  a  depth  of  two 
lance-lengths.  There  were  bodies  of  men,  women,  children,  old  people,  people 
of  every  age.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Griaznoff  told  a  couple  of  young  Armenian 
girls,  who  were  employed  with  the  Armenian  troops  to  serve  the  telephones,  to 
accompany  him  to  the  courtyard.  He  showed  them  the  atrocities  committed 
by  their  countrymen,  and  said  bitterly  they  had  something  to  be  proud  of. 
Griaznoff  was  both  astonished  and  enraged  at  being  forced  to  realise  that  the 
spectacle,  far  from  rousing  the  disgust  of  the  young  women,  merely  moved  them 
to  loud  laughter.  Overcome  by  his  anger,  he  began  to  abuse  them,  telling  them 
that  the  Armenians,  the  women  included,  were  the  most  cowardly  and  barbarous 
of  all  the  nations,  and  the  fact  that  educated,  well  brought-up  young  girls  could 
laugh  at  a  spectacle  that  even  made  the  hair  of  an  officer  stand  on  end  was  proof 
of  the  barbarity  of  the  race.  At  these  words  the  girls  thought  it  advisable  to 
appear  impressed,  and  said  that  their  laughter  was  hysterical;  but  the  witness 
was  not  deceived." 

An  Armenian  contractor  to  the  line-of -communication  forces  at  Aladja  told 
me  the  following  : 

"  On  the  27th  February  the  Armenians  crucified  a  Turkish  woman — still  alive 
— on  a  wall  after  tearing  out  her  heart;  she  was  hung  head  downwards." 

On  the  7th  February  the  great  massacre  at  Erzerum  began.  Armenian 
artillery  soldiers  had  captured  270  people  in  the  street  and,  after  stripping  them 
of  all  their  clothing,  shut  them  into  a  bath  to  sate  their  perverse  lusts  upon 
them.  After  superhuman  efforts  I  succeeded  in  saving  a  hundred  of  these 
unhappy  wretches  who  were  still  alive;  they  are  alleged  to  have  been  released 
by  the  soldiers.  The  ringleader  of  these  horrors  was  an  Armenian  non- 
commissioned infantry  officer  named  Karabedoff,  serving  with  the  artillery.  On 
the  same  evening  several  Turks  were  done  to  death  in  the  streets  of  the  town. 
On  the  i2th  February  the  Armenians  shot  ten  peaceful,  unarmed  peasants  at 
Erzerum  station;  the  officers,  who  tried  to  interfere,  were  threatened  with 
death. 

At  this  time  I  had  under  arrest  an  Armenian  who  had  killed  a  Turk  without 
any  plausible  pretext;  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  ordered  him  to  be  brought 
before  the  court  martial.  According  to  an  old-established  law  murderers  are 
executed.  An  Armenian  officer  informed  the  murderer  that  he  would  be  hanged 
for  his  crime.  "What!"  exclaimed  the  man,  amazed.  "Hanging  an 
Armenian  for  a  Turk  !  Who  ever  heard  of  such  a  thing  !  " 

In  Erzerum  the  Armenians  had  set  fire  to  the  Turkish  bazaar.  On  the  i7th 
February  I  heard  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  village  of  Tepe  Koj,  in  the  district 
of  the  artillery  regiment,  had  been  completely  exterminated — men,  women,  and 
children.  The  same  day  I  met  Andranik,  who  had  been  sent  to  Erzerum  by  the 
Caucasus  Government  to  restore  order.  I  informed  him  of  the  butchery,  and 
urged  him  to  find  out  who  was  responsible.  I  have  never  heard  the  result  of 
my  request.  In  the  casino  of  the  artillery  officers  Andranik  publicly  promised 
the  restoration  of  order,  but  in  spite  of  the  two  envoys  of  the  Caucasus  Govern- 
ment, Andranik  and  Dr.  Zawrieff,  this  promise  has  never  been  fulfilled. 

In  the  town  the  disturbances  have,  comparatively  speaking,  died  down;  in 
the  villages  where  all  the  inhabitants  had  been  slain  complete  quiet  reigned  of 
course.  The  imprisonment  of  Turkish  inhabitants  in  Erzerum  began  afresh 
when  the  military  movements  of  the  Turks  proclaimed  their  approach  from 
Ilidja;  these  arrests  were  particularly  numerous  on  the  26th  and  27th  February. 


The  Armenian  Question  285 

In  the  night  of  the  26th-27th  the  Armenians  eluded  the  vigilance  of  the  Russian 
officers  and  perpetrated  another  massacre,  but  at  once  took  to  their  heels  at 
the  first  approach  of  the  Turks.  This  massacre  was  no  impromptu  affair — it 
had  been  planned  beforehand;  all  captured  Turks  were  collected  and  put  to 
death  one  by  one.  The  Armenians  reported  with  pride  that  the  night's  toll 
reached  a  total  of  3,000. 

The  Armenians  who  had  to  defend  the  town  were  numerically  so  weak  that 
they  fled  before  a  Turkish  army  of  1,500  men  with  two  guns.  Nevertheless,  the 
number  of  murders  committed  by  them  on  the  night  of  the  massacre  was  very 
great. 

As  the  educated  classes  of  the  Armenian  population  could  very  well  have 
prevented  the  massacre,  it  is  to  be  concluded  that  these  classes  played  a  greater 
part  in  the  crime  than  the  bands,  and  that,  in  any  case,  the  chief  responsibility 
rests  with  them.  The  humble  people  are  very  sensitive  to  the  influence  of  the 
higher  classes.  My  regiment,  which  is  officered  exclusively  by  Russians,  con- 
sisted entirely  of  Armenian  soldiers;  although  we  had  no  means  at  hand  of 
using  force  against  them,  we  were  able  to  make  them  obey  all  our  orders;  they 
have  never  ventured  to  indulge  in  open  looting.  On  the  night  of  the  massacre 
not  one  of  the  Kurdish  grooms  was  murdered  in  the  barracks,  where  several 
detachments  of  the  regiment  were  quartered,  although  only  one  Russian  officer 
was  on  duty  and  forty  Kurdish  grooms  were  amongst  hundreds  of  Armenians. 

I  do  not,  of  course,  wish  to  maintain  that  the  Mite  of  the  Armenian  nation 
without  exception  had  a  hand  in  the  crimes.  I  have  met  Armenians  who  deeply 
deplore  these  crimes;  others  who  have  protested  not  only  in  words,  but  by 
action.  Yet  I  must  confess  that  these  are  a  very  small  minority  and  are  in 
ill-odour  with  their  compatriots;  they  are  accused  of  treason  against  the  national 
ideal.  Others,  again,  posed  as  enemies  of  these  bestialities,  but  condoned  them 
in  secret.  Some  Armenians  maintained  an  attitude  of  silence  in  face  of  all 
reproach,  but  the  majority  had  the  same  answer  ready  on  their  lips  :  "  You  are 
Russians.  You  cannot  understand  the  ideal  of  the  Armenian  nation."  Some- 
times they  tried  to  defend  themselves  in  such  speeches  as  :  "  Have  the  Turks 
behaved  otherwise  towards  the  Armenians?  What  we  are  doing  is  merely 
revenge."  These  incidents  prove  how  bloodthirsty  this  ideal  of  the  Armenian 
people  and  upper  classes  is. 

It  lay  in  no  man's  power  to  prevent  these  lamentable  happenings.  The 
Armenians  have  sown  the  wind  without  taking  thought  that  they  would  reap 
a  storm, 

ERZERUM,  i6th  April,  1918. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  TWERDOKHLEROFF,  Commandant  ad  interim  of  the 
garrison  of  Erzerum  and  Neveboyun,  O.C.  2nd  Engineer  and  Artillery  Regiment. 

OFFICIAL  DIARY  OF   THE   SECOND   RUSSIAN   GARRISON 
ARTILLERY  REGIMENT  IN  ERZERUM. 

The  Russian  Army  of  the  Caucasus  evacuated  the  stations  they  had  previously 
occupied  towards  the  middle  of  December,  1917,  and,  without  having  received 
orders  from  G.H.Q.  or  any  of  the  Army  Commanders,  began  their  withdrawal. 
The  Garrison  Artillery  Regiment  brought  up  the  rear  of  the  Army.  Of  the 
detachments  from  the  Deve-Boinu  fortresses  and  the  Artillery  Regiment  from 
Erzerum  only  40  officers  remained  behind.  Deserted  by  their  men,  they  remained 
by  the  guns  from  a  feeling  of  duty.  In  the  fortresses  were  more  than  400  guns, 
left  behind  for  lack  of  means  of  transport.  The  officers,  inspired  by  feelings 
of  honour  and  duty,  waited  permission  from  G.H.Q.  to  leave  the  guns  or  for 


286  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

reinforcements  to  carry  on  the  defence.  With  the  officers  of  the  first  Regiment 
the  cadre  of  the  second  Artillery  Regiment  was  formed. 

After  the  withdrawal  of  the  Russian  Army  an  Armenian  Revolutionary  Com- 
mittee was  set  up  in  Erzerum,  calling  itself  "  The  Armenian  Military  Union. " 
At  the  same  time  the  Army  Commander  sent  to  the  Second  Garrison  Artillery 
Regiment  400  untrained  Armenians,  of  whom  the  majority  deserted  and  the 
remainder  could  only  be  used  to  guard  the  batteries  of  the  fortresses. 

Shortly  before  the  withdrawal  of  the  Army,  when  touch  had  been  lost  between 
Russia  and  the  Trans-Caucasus,  a  provisional  Government  had  been  formed  in 
Tiflis,  which  was  called  "  The  Trans-Caucasian  Commission."  This  Commis- 
sion announced  that  there  was  no  intention  of  instituting  an  independent  Trans- 
Caucasian  Government,  as  before  Trans-Caucasia  belonged  absolutely  to  Russia, 
but  until  the  restoration  of  order  the  Commission  would  undertake  to  represent 
the  central  administration. 

On  the  i8th  December,  1917,  the  Commission  issued  a  proclamation  that  in 
place  of  the  scattered  Russian  Army,  a  new  Army  would  be  raised  on  a  national 
basis,  consisting  of  three  Army  Corps — one  Russian, one  Georgian, one  Mohamme- 
dan— and  some  detachments  of  smaller  nationalities,  such  as  Cherkesses,  Ossets, 
etc.  Only  the  artillery  in  the  fortresses  of  Erzerum  and  Deve-Boinu  retained 
their  old  character  (i.e.,  comprised  troops  of  various  nationalities)  until  a 
decision  should  be  arrived  at  as  to  the  nationality  of  this  unit,  consisting  of 
Russian  officers  and  Armenian  men.  It  was  clear  that  this  unit,  whose  cadres 
and  leading  were  in  Russian  hands,  could  not  be  claimed  as  Armenian.  More- 
over, we  had  received  no  orders  with  regard  to  the  Armenian  character  of  the 
formation,  which  was  still  regarded  as  Russian,  being  led  by  Russian  officers 
who  had  actually  served  in  the  Russian  Army  and  drew  their  pay  from  the 
Russian  Treasury.  The  fact  that  the  Army  possessed  no  Armenian,  but  only  a 
Russian  church,  conducted  by  Russian  priests,  was  a  further  proof  of  the  complete 
Muscovite  character  of  the  unit. 

Since  the  withdrawal  of  the  Army,  begun  some  two  months  before,  order 
could  not  be  re-established  among  the  soldiers,  who  deserted,  looted,  and 
threatened  their  officers,  and  were  in  a  state  of  complete  mutiny.  Colonel 
Torkum,  alleged  to  be  an  Armenian  Bulgar,  was  appointed  Commandant  of 
Erzerum. 

Towards  the  middle  of  January,  1918,  some  Armenians  of  the  infantry 
detachment  murdered  a  Turkish  notable  of  Erzerum  in  his  dwelling  and  looted 
the  house.  Commander-in-Chief  Odichelidze  mustered  all  detachment  com- 
manders and  summoned  them  to  discover  the  perpetrator  of  this  horrible  crime 
within  three  days  at  most.  He  then  turned  to  the  Armenian  officers  and  told 
them  that  the  honour  of  the  Armenian  nation  was  at  stake  in  this  matter;  it 
was  therefore  their  duty  to  leave  no  stone  unturned  to  discover  the  guilty 
person  if  they  were  to  clear  their  reputation  in  the  eyes  of  the  world. 

"  If  these  outrages  of  which  the  Armenians  are  guilty  do  not  cease,  I  shall 
find  myself  compelled  to  distribute  arms  to  the  Mohammedan  population  so 
that  they  can  defend  their  lives  and  property,"  he  added.  To  these  accusations 
Colonel  Torkum  retorted  in  an  injured  tone  that  it  was  unjust  to  lay  the  crimes 
of  a  few  individuals  at  the  door  of  a  whole  nation.  The  detachment  com- 
manders proposed  the  setting  up  of  a  court  martial,  which  by  military  law 
could  punish  murder  with  death.  Odichelidze  replied  that  he  had  already  taken 
the  necessary  measures. 

Colonel  Torkum,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  organised  on  25th  January  a 
review  of  the  troops  and  had  twenty-one  guns  fired  to  impress  the  population 
with  his  military  power.  On  this  occasion  he  made  a  speech  in  Armenian.  In 
this  speech,  which  is  directed  against  General  Odichelidze,  he  asserted  Armenian 
independence,  and  mentioned  that  he  was  taking  over  the  reins  of  authority  as 


The  Armenian  Question  287 

head  of  the  new  State.  After  hearing  this  grotesque  statement  the  General 
had  the  new  head  of  the  State,  Colonel  Torkum,  removed  from  Erzerum. 

This  measure  was  sufficient  to  show  that  the  Russian  Government  intended 
to  prevent  at  all  costs  the  founding  of  an  independent  Armenian  State.  I  have 
learnt  that  the  Russian  General  Staff  has  reminded  the  Armenians  repeatedly 
that  all  arms,  ammunition,  and  other  war  stores,  partly  from  the  depdts  at 
Erzerum,  partly  from  other  depots,  had  only  been  handed  over  to  them  provision- 
ally because  no  other  troops  were  available.  These  arms,  therefore,  were 
only  loaned  to  the  Armenians^  and  had  to  be  handed  back  at  any  time  on 
request. 

In  these  days  the  Armenians  were  perpetrating  indescribably  cruel  murders 
among  the  poor  Turkish  inhabitants  of  the  neighbourhood  of  Erzindjan;  the 
Turks  were  unarmed  and  without  any  means  of  self-defence.  On  hearing  that 
the  Turkish  troops  were  approaching,  the  Armenians,  committing  fresh  crimes, 
fled  in  the  direction  of  Erzerum. 

According  to  the  reports  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  confirmed  by  officers 
who  were  actually  present  at  the  scene  of  the  crime,  the  Armenians  slew  more 
than  800  Turks  in  Erzindjan,  and  so  avenged  one  of  their  miserable 
accomplices  who  had  been  killed  by  a  Turk  in  justified  self-defence.  Further- 
more, the  Armenians  massacred  the  unhappy  Mohammedan  population  of  Ilidja, 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Erzerum,  without  sparing  the  women  and  children. 

On  February  yth  the  following  incident  came  to  my  notice  :  I  ascertained 
that  the  Militia  and  the  Armenian  soldiers  of  the  town  were  carrying  off  some 
hundreds  of  Mohammedans  to  an  unknown  destination.  When  I  inquired  into 
the  reasons  for  this,  I  received  the  answer  that  these  men  were  being  recruited 
to  clear  the  railway  of  snow.  I  expressed  myself  satisfied  with  this  explanation. 
The  following  story  will  prove  how  unsatisfactory  it  was  : 

About  three  o'clock  2nd  Lieut.  Lipsky,  an  officer  of  my  regiment,  reported 
to  me  over  the  telephone  that  some  Armenian  soldiers  had  attacked  five  Turks 
in  the  streets;  they  had  driven  them  into  a  corner  of  the  barrack  yard,  beaten 
them  mercilessly,  and  would  certainly  kill  them.  The  intervention  of  the 
Russian  officer  in  favour  of  the  unfortunate  men  was  met  with  threats,  where- 
upon an  Armenian  officer,  who  was  also  present  at  the  scene,  took  the  part  of 
the  bandits  and  joined  in  preventing  Lipsky  from  intervening.  On  hearing 
this  I  hurried,  accompanied  by  three  officers,  to  the  scene  of  the  outrage.  On 
the  way  I  met  the  officer  who  had  telephoned  to  me  and  the  Mayor  of  Erzerum, 
Stawrosky,  looking  for  one  of  their  Turkish  friends  who  had  been  captured 
by  the  Armenians.  Lipsky  told  me  that  the  soldiers  were  holding  the  entrance 
to  the  barracks  by  force  of  arms.  I  went  on  my  way.  As  I  came  near  the 
barracks  I  saw  twelve  Turks  leaving ;  they  were  running  away,  obviously  panic- 
stricken.  I  stopped  one  of  them,  but,  as  I  did  not  understand  his  speech,  it 
was  impossible  to  know  what  he  said.  Finally,  with  great  difficulty,  I  entered 
the  barracks.  I  immediately  inquired  about  the  Turks  who  had  been  captured 
in  the  street.  The  soldiers  affirmed  that  there  was  no  civilian  of  the  town  in 
the  barracks.  I  began  a  personal  search  of  every  nook  and  corner  of  the 
barracks,  and  finally  discovered  in  the  bathroom  seventy  Mohammedans,  victims 
of  the  most  ghastly  horrors.  I  immediately  instituted  an  inquiry  and  had  six 
Armenians  who  were  responsible  for  this  crime  arrested.  I  also  learned  in  the 
course  of  the  inquiry  that  an  Armenian,  whose  identity  I  could  not  establish, 
had  shot  an  unfortunate  Mohammedan  who  had  shown  himself  on  the  roof  of 
a  house  near  the  barracks. 

Naturally  I  at  once  set  at  liberty  the  unfortunate  victim  of  this  horrible 
outrage.  The  minutes  of  this  inquiry,  together  with  my  own  records,  including 
the  list  of  the  Mohammedans  whom  I  had  succeeded  in  rescuing,  were  lost 
during  the  reoccupation  of  Erzerum  by  the  Ottoman  troops  on  February  27th. 


288  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

But  the  incident  can  be  confirmed  by  questioning  the  Turks,  who,  whenever  we 
meet,  are  profuse  in  their  gratitude.  In  addition,  Ali  Bey  Pepeoff,  the  Secretary 
of  Mayor  Stawrosky,  who  drew  up  the  list  and  the  protocol,  would  certainly 
recognise  the  parties  concerned. 

The  inquiry  revealed  that  Karaguedoff,  an  Armenian  cadet  of  the  artillery 
regiment,  was  the  instigator  of  the  outrage.  In  the  course  of  ruthless  house- 
searchings  in  Turkish  homes,  which  he  had  conducted  in  the  company  of 
Armenian  soldiers  accustomed  to  such  methods,  he  had  appropriated  furniture 
and  other  domestic  property.  Karaguedoff  was  arrested,  together  with  other 
Armenian  soldiers.  The  incidents  were  reported  the  same  evening  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief  in  the  presence  of  Government  Commissioner  Zetaloff  and 
his  assistant.  On  the  same  day  the  Armenians  murdered  other  Turks  and  set 
fire  to  the  Turkish  bazaar.  It  was  generally  known  that  during  these  days 
several  murders  were  committed  in  Erzerum  and  its  neighbourhood.  I  person- 
ally arrested  an  Armenian  who  had  killed  Turks  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Tafta 
and  handed  him  over  to  the  Commandant.  It  was  said  in  the  town  that  the 
Turks  who  had  been  told  off  to  work  in  the  fields  never  returned  from  their 
work,  and  that  nothing  could  be  learnt  as  to  their  whereabouts.  The  magistrates 
reported  the  disappearance  of  these  men  to  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

In  a  report  which  we  handed  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  on  the  occasion  of 
an  officers'  conference  we  requested  his  permission  to  leave  the  fortress  of 
Erzerum  in  view  of  our  complete  uselessness  and  the  impossibility  of  preventing 
the  Armenian  crimes.  We  were  afraid  of  besmirching  our  reputation. 
Odischelidze  told  us  of  the  arrival  of  a  wireless  message  which  he  had  received 
from  General  Wehib  Pasha,  in  command  of  the  Ottoman  troops.  The  General 
informed  him  that  his  troops  had  received  orders  to  garrison  Erzindjan  and 
to  advance  until  they  had  established  touch  with  the  Russian  troops.  Wehib 
Pasha  further  remarked  that  this  was  the  only  means  of  paving  the  way  for 
the  suppression  of  the  barbarous  cruelties  practised  by  the  Armenians  upon  the 
Turkish  population. 

After  this  the  Trans-Caucasian  Commission  made  offers  of  peace  to  the 
Ottoman  Government.  In  the  telegram  of  reply  the  Commandant  of  the 
Ottoman  troops  expressed  his  readiness  to  accept  the  proposal,  and  added  that 
he  had  communicated  the  proposal  of  the  Trans-Caucasian  Commission  to  his 
Government,  recommending  its  acceptance.  In  accordance  with  a  petition  from 
us,  General  Odichelidze  got  into  communication  with  Gueguetschkoni,  the 
President  of  the  Trans-Caucasian  Commission,  and  General  Lebedinsky,  the 
Commander-in-Chief. 

The  reply  contained  the  announcement  that  an  ultimatum  had  been 
despatched  to  the  Armenian  National  Assembly,  demanding  the  immediate  cessa- 
tion of  all  Armenian  atrocities  in  order  to  put  an  end  finally  to  these  lamentable 
occurrences,  and  that  Dr.  Zavrieff  and  Andranik  had  been  sent  as  delegates  to 
Erzerum.  As  to  the  request  of  the  officers,  the  advice  of  the  Commissaries  was 
that  they  should  remain  at  their  posts  until  the  expected  answer  to  the  peace 
overtures  had  been  received  from  the  Ottoman  Government.  The  Council 
expressed  their  thanks  to  the  officers  for  the  service  they  had  rendered,  and 
declared  that  if  Russia  were  faced  with  any  fresh  danger  they  were  sure  that  the 
officers  would  be  found  at  their  posts  to  the  last  minute. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  also  issued  an  order  of  the  day  in 
which  he  recommended  officers  not  to  leave  their  posts,  adding  that  to  shield 
their  honour  and  protect  their  lives  he  would  enforce  the  most  stringent 
measures  against  the  Armenian  criminals.  On  these  conditions  we  remained 
at  Erzerum  with  the  sole  object  of  safeguarding  the  interests  of  Russia,  and 
under  the  sole  command  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  We  learned  that  the 
Ottoman  Government  had  received  the  proposal  of  the  Trans-Caucasian  Commis- 


The  Armenian  Question  289 

sion  with  favour  and  replied  to  this  effect,  and  that  peace  negotiations  would 
be  opened  on  February  i;th  in  Trebizond. 

Our  Army  Commander  informed  all  officers  that  there  was  no  intention  of 
stirring  up  enmity  against  the  Ottoman  troops  in  Erzerum  and  the  neighbour- 
hood and  that  accordingly  they  were  to  remain  in  Erzerum  until  the  conclusion 
of  peace,  when  arms  and  other  war  material,  according  to  the  peace  conditions, 
would  cither  be  transported  to  Russia  or  handed  over  finally  to  the  Ottoman 
Government.  In  case  of  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Ottoman  troops  to  occupy 
Erzerum  before  the  signing  of  peace,  all  guns  were  to  be  put  out  of  action 
and  the  troops  and  officers  withdrawn  to  Russia,  definite  orders  for  which  would 
be  promulgated  at  least  seven  days  in  advance. 

The  necessity  for  defending  ourselves  against  the  attacks  of  the  Kurds  until 
the  final  decision  as  to  our  remaining  grew  more  and  more  obvious,  for  during 
the  Armistice  the  Ottoman  Government  had  declared  that  the  Kurds  were 
subject  to  no  orders  and  would  act  on  their  own  initiative.  The  Army  Com- 
mander had,  therefore,  decided  as  early  as  the  end  of  January  to  strengthen 
the  Erzerum-Erzindjan  line-of-communication  by  an  appropriate  number  of 
guns  to  keep  off  the  attacks  of  the  Kurds,  who  were  trying  to  loot  our  line-of- 
communication  depots.  An  officer  and  two  guns  were  ordered  to  each  strategic 
point.  On  the  withdrawal  of  the  Armenians  from  Erzindjan  and  Erzerum  the 
guns  were  withdrawn  with  them.  On  February  loth  two  guns  were  placed 
in  all  the  positions  from  Buyuk-Kiremidli  along  the  road  from  Trebizond  as 
far  as  Erep-Michan,  as  at  all  other  important  strategic  points  of  the  town,  with 
the  same  object  in  view.  In  view  of  the  probability  of  a  Kurdish  attack  from 
the  direction  of  Palan-Dongno,  guns  were  to  be  placed  also  between  the  Kars 
and  Charput  gates.  These  guns,  which  were  only  to  be  used  against  a  possible 
attack  by  the  Kurds,  and  were  scarcely  adequate  for  this  object,  would  have 
been  useless  against  a  regular  army  with  artillery  :  a  few  shots  would  suffice 
to  put  them  out  of  action.  Towards  the  middle  of  February  the  sights  of  the 
guns  in  the  outlying  positions  were  collected  and  delivered  to  the  central  dep6t ; 
the  same  measure  was  now  to  be  carried  out  also  in  the  case  of  the  guns  in  the 
nearer  positions.  This  order  was  also  given  for  the  guns  in  Palan-Dongno,  but 
was  never  carried  out.  Only  the  guns  which  remained  in  the  positions  to  be 
used  against  the  Kurds  retained  their  sights.  However,  no  immediate  offensive 
on  the  part  of  the  Ottoman  troops  was  expected,  as  the  Turks  were  regarded 
as  demoralised  and  not  in  a  position  to  undertake  any  movements  before  the 
summer.  On  February  i2th  some  Armenian  bandits,  armed  to  the  teeth,  had 
openly  shot  ten  or  twelve  Turks  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  station.  Two 
Russian  officers,  infuriated  by  these  impudent  outrages,  had  tried  to  interfere, 
but  had  been  compelled  to  give  way  before  armed  threats  and  to  leave  the 
victims  to  their  fate. 

On  February  i3th  the  Commander-in-Chief  proclaimed  a  state  of  siege  and 
convened  a  court  martial,  which  was  to  enforce  the  death  penalty  according 
to  the  old  regulations.  Colonel  Morel  was  appointed  Commandant  of  the 
fortress  of  Erzerum,  and  an  Armenian  as  president  of  the  court  martial.  On 
the  same  day  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  General  Gerassimoff  left  the  town  : 
they  wished  to  fix  a  rendezvous  in  case  the  artillery  had  to  withdraw.  I 
remained  in  Erzerum  in  command  of  the  Garrison  Artillery.  Colonel  Morel's 
staff  consisted  exclusively  of  Russian  officers,  and  the  Adjutant  of  the  regiment 
was  Staff-Captain  Schnauer. 

After  the  departure  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Colonel  Morel  at  once 
changed  his  attitude.  He  declared  that  Erzerum  was  to  be  defended  to  the 
last  moment,  and  forbade  all  officers  and  inhabitants  capable  of  bearing  arms 
to  leave  the  town.  When  I  submitted  to  the  court  martial  the  wishes  of  some 
of  the  officers  to  avail  themselves  of  this  permission,  one  member,  an  Armenian 

T 


290  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

named  Sokhonnyan,  replied  brutally  that  he  would  himself  cut  down  all  who 
showed  any  intention  of  quitting  the  town,  and  would  have  any  man  who  should 
dare  to  attempt  flight  seized  by  the  Armenian  forces  in  Kopri-Koj  and  Hassan- 
Kale,  and  taken  before  the  court  martial  unless  they  were  provided  with  permits. 
These  permits,  however,  were  issued  solely  by  him.  I  realised  that  we  were 
in  a  trap,  escape  from  which  would  be  extremely  difficult,  and  that  the  court 
martial  and  the  state  of  siege  were  directed  less  against  the  bandits  than  against 
the  Russian  officers. 

The  outrages  continued  in  the  town,  and  the  unhappy  Turkish  population, 
unarmed  and  defenceless,  were  continually  attacked  by  the  Armenians.  Their 
only  refuge  was  the  Russian  officers,  who,  however,  could  only  offer  them  verv 
limited  protection.  A  few  officers  under  my  command  had  been  obliged  to  use 
force  to  save  the  lives  of  a  couple  of  Turks  who  were  being  robbed  in  the 
street.  A  military  engineer,  Karaieff,  shot  down  with  his  rifle  an  Armenian 
who  was  taking  to  his  heels  after  robbing  a  Turk  in  the  street  in  the  middle 
of  the  day.  The  promise  to  punish  the  bandits  who  murdered  peaceful, 
unarmed  Mohammedans  remained,  as  usual,  a  dead  letter. 

From  fear  of  Armenian  revenge,  the  court  martial  did  not  dare  to  sentence 
one  single  Armenian,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  had  been  set  up  chiefly  at 
Armenian  request.  The  Turks,  moreover,  had  prophesied  that  a  court  martial 
of  Armenians  would  not  condemn  a  single  one  of  their  compatriots.  We 
could  now  see  the  truth  of  the  proverb  that  the  wolves  do  not  prey  on  one 
another.  All  fit  Armenians  immediately  escaped  with  their  wives  on  the  pretext 
of  being  obliged  to  protect  them. 

I  learned  that  a  non-commissioned  officer,  Karaguedoff,  had  been  freed  from 
prison  without  my  permission.  I  made  inquiries  of  Colonel  Morel  as  to  the 
reason  for  this,  and  was  told  in  reply  that  Karaguedoff' s  innocence  had  been 
established  at  a  new  inquiry.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  two  of  my  officers 
and  I  had  been  the  principal  witnesses  on  this  occasion,  neither  of  us  had  been 
summoned  to  this  very  extraordinary  inquiry.  I  expressed  my  dissatisfaction 
with  the  reply  received  from  Colonel  Morel,  reported  the  matter  again,  and 
handed  over  the  minutes  to  Colonel  Alexandroff.  The  murderer  I  had  captured 
in  Tafta  likewise  went  unpunished. 

Colonel  Morel  feared  a  mutiny  of  the  Turkish  troops  in  Erzerum.  On 
February  iyth  Andranik  arrived  in  Erzerum,  accompanied  by  Dr.  Zavrieff, 
Assistant  Commissioner  for  the  occupied  area.  As  we  had  not  been  instructed 
on  Armenian  questions,  we  did  not  know  that  Andranik  was  one  of  the  criminals 
condemned  to  death  by  the  Ottoman  Government.  I  first  learned  these  details 
on  March  7th,  in  a  conversation  with  the  Turkish  Army  Commander.  Andranik 
appeared  in  the  uniform  of  a  Russian  brigadier-general.  He  was  wearing  the 
Order  of  Vladimir,  Fourth  Class,  and  the  Cross  of  St.  George,  Second  Class, 
as  well  as  the  Military  Cross  of  St.  George,  Second  Class.  He  was  accompanied 
by  his  Chief-of- Staff,  the  Russian  colonel,  Zinkewitsch.  In  the  evening  before 
his  arrival  Colonel  Morel  informed  us  that,  according  to  a  telegram  received 
from  Andranik  at  Kopri-Koj,  machine-guns  were  to  be  employed  to  shoot  down 
all  cowards  who  attempted  to  escape  from  Erzerum.  Immediately  after  his 
arrival  Andranik  took  over  the  command  of  the  fortress;  Colonel  Morel  was 
subordinate  to  him,  and  we  to  Morel. 

On  the  day  of  Andranik's  arrival  the  whole  of  the  inhabitants  of  Tepe-Koi, 
which  belonged  to  my  command,  were  massacred — men,  women,  and  children. 
The  officer  on  duty  in  this  section  communicated  the  tragic  news  to  me,  and  I 
immediately  reported  it  to  Andranik  in  our  first  conversation.  In  my  presence 
he  gave  orders  for  twenty  horsemen  to  be  despatched  to  Tepe-Koj  to  bring 
back  at  least  one  of  the  criminals.  Up  to  the  present  day  I  have  never  heard 
the  result  of  this  step. 


The  Armenian  Question  291 


•Colonel  Torkum  turned  up  again  in  the  town,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
Armenian  artillery  colonel,  Dolukhanoff,  made  his  reappearance  in  Erzerum. 
His  first  announcement  was  that  he,  an  Inspector  of  Artillery,  would  hence- 
forward rank  as  my  superior  officer.  I  replied  that  I  held  the  rank  of  a 
Divisional  Commander  and  did  not  require  a  superior  officer;  otherwise,  I 
added,  I  should  leave  the  service.  It  was  thereupon  announced  that  Colonel 
Dolukhanoff  would  carry  on  the  administrative  work  of  the  Garrison  Artillery, 
and  that  consequently  his  instructions  to  me  would  not  be  issued  under  his  own 
name,  but,  as  before,  under  that  of  Andranik.  One  day  the  Armenian  lieu- 
tenant, Djanbuladion,  who  commanded  the  artillery  battalion  under  my  orders, 
also  made  an  attempt  to  interfere  with  my  affairs.  When  I  directed  that  all 
guns,  searchlights,  and  dynamos  were  to  be  transported  towards  the  rear,  he 
replied  that  he  would  not  allow  any  withdrawal  of  material,  as  the  Armenians 
intended  to  take  all  the  administrative  posts  in  the  command  into  their 
own  hands,  and  might  only  use  the  Russian  officers  as  executives;  they  also 
wished  to  use  them,  without  their  realising  it,  in  establishing  Armenian 
independence.  Had  the  Russian  officers  grasped  the  purpose  they  were  intended 
to  serve  the  majority  of  them  would  have  resigned,  and  the  Armenians  would 
have  been  left  with  an  inadequate  number  of  officers.  The  following  statements 
of  Captain  Peliat,  temporary  O.C.  of  the  7th  Battalion  of  Caucasian  Mountain 
Artillery,  show  how  gravely  the  Armenians  feared  the  resignation  of  the 
artillery  officers.  When  the  Armenians  learned  that  the  7th  Battalion  Mountain 
Artillery  were  holding  themselves  in  readiness  to  withdraw  to  San  Kamisch  on 
February  7th,  they  seized  the  commanding  officer  on  the  5th  of  that  month; 
and  although  at  the  orders  of  the  Army  H.Q.  they  were  obliged  to  set  him 
at  liberty,  they  repeated  the  attempt  three  times. 

The  Armenians  of  Erzerum  threatened  H.Q.  to  drown  the  town  in 
blood  if  the  guns  were  withdrawn.  The  Army  Commander  was  consequently 
forced  to  cancel  the  order  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  artillery.  An  attempt 
had  to  be  made  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  the  officer  commanding  the 
7th  Artillery  Battalion.  We  agreed  secretly  that,  in  case  the  Armenians  should 
attempt  to  force  the  hands  of  the  Russian  artillery  officers  and  officially  propose 
that  they  should  ally  themselves  with  the  Armenian  cause,  we  would  help  one 
another  mutually.  We  possessed  considerable  war  material,  guns,  machine- 
guns,  and  officers.  The  officers  of  the  Mountain  Artillery  tried  to  find  billets  as 
near  as  possible  to  one  another  in  the  town,  and  we  of  the  Garrison  Artillery 
collected  as  far  as  possible  in  the  Turkish  quarter,  where  our  headquarters 
had  been  situated  since  the  occupation  of  the  town. 

Since  Andranik's  arrival  at  Colonel  Morel's  side  the  fears  of  a  rising  of 
the  inhabitants  of  Erzerum  had  greatly  increased.  The  Colonel  ordered  that 
an  efficient  Russian  officer  should  be  put  in  command  of  Fort  Medjedie  to 
direct  the  bombardment  in  the  event  of  a  rising,  which  might  follow  the  arrest 
of  the  instigator  of  the  unrest.  We  all  received  the  order  to  leave  the  Turkisn 
quarter  and  transfer  ourselves  to  the  Armenian  quarter.  As  we  had  lived  in 
this  quarter  for  two  years,  and  were  always  in  sympathy  with  the  Mohammedan 
population,  we  thought  this  suggestion,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  remarkable. 

The  Russian  artillery  officers  unanimously  declared  that  they  had  remained 
in  the  service  to  fight  a  worthy  foe,  and  would  never  agree  to  fire  on  women 
and  children,  for  it  was  quite  clear  that  the  Armenians  would  use  a  threatened 
Turkish  rising  as  a  pretext  to  open  a  bombardment  of  the  Turkish  quarter. 
As  to  the  transfer  to  the  Armenian  quarter,  it  was  impracticable  for  three 
reasons  :  Firstly,  it  was  impossible  to  effect  the  removal  in  the  time  given ; 
secondly,  the  withdrawal  of  the  Russian  officers  from  the  Mohammedan  quarter 
would,  of  course,  be  followed  by  a  fresh  massacre;  and  thirdly,  in  view  of  the 
strained  relations  that  had  existed  for  some  time  between  them  and  the 

T2 


292  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Armenians,  it  would  have  been  risky  for  the  Russian  officers  to  venture  into 
their  midst. 

The  officers  of  the  Mountain  Artillery  Battalion  who  did  not  belong  to  the 
cadre  of  the  Garrison  Artillery  also  rejected  the  proposal.  Finally  the 
Armenians,  who  were  left  with  no  choice  but  to  do  their  own  dirty  work,  began 
to  arrest  some  alleged  agitators. 

As  Colonel  Morel's  proposal  to  bombard  the  town  was  very  significant,  I 
considered  it  necessary  £p  call  together  all  the  officers  under  my  command.  We 
met  twice  in  the  course  of  three  days.  The  first  meeting  was  attended  by  all 
artillery  officers  in  Erzerum,  as  well  as  by  two  English  officers  who  had  arrived 
a  few  days  before;  also  by  Colonels  Morel,  Zinkewitsch,  Dolukhanoff  and 
Torkum,  Andranik  and  Dr.  Zavrieff.  Our  object  in  inviting  the  English 
officers  was  to  let  them  see  the  relations  existing  between  the  Russian  officers 
and  the  Armenian  Command.  It  would  also  give  them  an  opportunity  of  finding 
out  what  resources  the  Russians  had  at  their  disposal  to  prevent  Armenian 
atrocities,  so  that  on  their  return  they  might  support  their  observations  by 
tangible  proofs.  As  I  had  no  telephonic  or  telegraphic  connections  under  my 
personal  control,  I  was  convinced  that  telegrams  sent  by  me  would  never 
reach  their  destination.  I  therefore  seized  the  opportunity  of  this  meeting 
to  describe  in  the  greatest  detail  all  that  I  had  myself  observed  and  heard  from 
reliable  sources  as  to  the  atrocities  and  horrors  perpetrated  by  the  Armenians. 
I  described  to  my  hearers  the  degree  of  insubordination  that  prevailed  among 
the  Armenian  troops,  and  cited  examples  I  had  heard  from  the  lips  of  General 
Odischlidze  himself.  I  concluded  with  the  words  :  "  We  Russian  officers  who 
have  remained  in  Erzerum  have  not  done  so  with  the  object  of  placing  our 
uniforms  at  the  service  of  the  Armenians  as  a  cloak  to  conceal  their  ghastly 
crimes,  but  simply  and  solely  in  obedience  to  our  superiors  and  to  protect 
Russia.  Unless  the  Armenian  atrocities  are  suspended  during  our  stay  in 
Erzerum,"  I  added,  "  every  Russian  officer  will  insist  on  leaving  the  town  and 
resigning  his  post."  Some  other  officers,  speaking  after  me,  emphatically 
confirmed  what  I  had  said. 

In  his  reply  Andranik  intimated  that  the  Armenians  would  be  eternally 
grateful  to  Russia,  that  the  Armenians  formed  an  integral  part  of  the  popula- 
tion of  Greater  Russia,  and  that  they  had  no  other  end  in  view  than  that  of 
serving  Russian  interests.  As  to  the  so-called  massacres  committed  by  the 
Armenians,  they  were  the  result  of  the  enmity  existing  between  Armenians  and 
Turks.  He  added  that  the  principal  object  of  his  mission  in  Erzerum  was  to  put 
down  such  crimes,  and,  should  he  fail  to  bring  the  Armenians  to  reason,  he  would 
be  the  first  to  leave  the  town.  The  business  of  the  meeting  was  carried  on  through 
the  medium  <?f  an  interpreter.  Questioned  as  to  his  views  on  allowing  officers 
who  wished  to  do  so  to  leave  the  town,  Andranik  replied  that  he  considered  it 
desirable  that  all  those  who  were  not  too  confident  of  their  own  courage  should 
leave  the  town,  and  he  would  himself  assist  their  departure  as  far  as  possible. 
Colonel  Zinkewitsch  declared  before  the  whole  meeting  that,  once  convinced 
that  the  contimied  presence  of  the  Russian  officers  in  Erzerum  would  serve 
the  interests  of  Russia,  he  would  remain  solely  for  that  reason.  In  the  end 
all  officers  decided  to  remain  ten  days  longer  and  to  regulate  their  conduct 
by  the  future  course  of  events,  according  as  these  might  confirm  or  refute 
Andranik's  pledges. 

The  meeting  had  been  held  on  February  2oth  or  2ist.  Shortly  afterwards 
Colonel  Dolukhanoff  expressed  to  me  and  other  Russian  officers  his  astonish- 
ment at  the  contempt  and  even  horror  with  which  the  Russian  officers  regarded 
the  Armenians.  On  the  next  day  Andranik  proclaimed,  on  large  wall-posters 
written  in  Turkish,  that  any  man  who  killed  either  Armenians  or  Mohammedans 
would  be  arrested  and  punished  by  death ;  further,  that  the  Turks  might  resume 


The  Armenian  Question  293 

their  occupations  without  fear,  and  that,  in  the  event  of  any  one  of  the 
Mohammedans  engaged  in  labour  in  the  fields  failing  to  return  from  his  work, 
he  would  hold  the  entire  detachment  in  charge  of  the  supervision  of  the  work 
responsible.  As  I  was  riding  through  the  streets  the  following  day,  accompanied 
by  the  Armenian  captain,  Djanbuladian,  we  noticed  many  people  reading  the 
posters.  Djanbuladian  assured  them  in  Turkish  that,  provided  the  Mohammedan 
population  refrained  from  revolt,  they  would  have  nothing  to  fear  from  the 
Armenians.  The  reply  was  that  for  two  years  the  Mohammedans  had  committed 
no  crimes,  and  that  there  was  no  intention  of  doing  so  in  the  future ;  all  they 
asked  was  that  the  Mohammedans,  who  were  unarmed  and  without  any  means 
of  defence,  should  not  be  killed  without  reason.  I  asked  the  captain  to  tell 
the  people  that  I  was  the  Russian  artillery  commander,  and  to  state  that  I  and 
my  Russian  comrades  were  sympathetic  towards  the  Mohammedan  population, 
and  would  continue,  as  before,  to  look  after  these  poor  people.  Some  of  the 
Turks  present,  two  or  three  especially,  confirmed  my  words,  saying  that  I  had 
with  my  own  hand  saved  their  lives  during  the  massacre  of  February  7th. 
Djanbuladian,  who  acted  as  interpreter,  was  himself  a  member  of  the 
Armenian  Committee. 

At  the  second  meeting  Russian  officers  were  present,  the  only  foreigner 
admitted  being  Dr.  Zavrieff.  The  following  points  were  discussed  :  That 
an  attempt  should  be  made  to  define  clearly  the  status  of  the  2nd  Garrison 
Artillery  Regiment  of  Erzerum,  in  the  sense  that  this  regiment  was  not,  as  the 
Armenians  imagined,  an  Armenian  artillery  regiment,  but  a  Russian  regiment; 
not  one  of  its  officers  had  voluntarily  enlisted  in  Armenian  service,  not  one 
of  us  bad  made  any  agreement  to  do  so.  If  the  regiment  was  Russian  we 
insisted  on  preserving  Russian  status;  if  Armenian,  we  desired  the  right  to 
leave  the  town  at  will  in  order  to  serve  with  the  Russian  Army.  The  state 
of  siege  had  only  served  to  prevent  the  departure  of  those  officers  who  wished 
to  leave  in  order  to  serve  on  another  than  the  Caucasus  front.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  current  rumour  materialised  and  the  Trans-Caucasus  had  split  off 
from  Russia,  it  would  certainly  be  necessary  to  grant  leave  of  absence  to 
the  Russian  officers  if  we  were  not  to  find  ourselves  strangers  in  a  foreign 
land. 

After  prolonged  discussion  we  reached  the  conviction  that,  according  to  the 
circular  we  had  received,  every  officer  had  the  right  to  apply  for  transfer  to  a 
Russian  Army  Corps  or  to  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  War  Ministry.  1 
therefore  consented  to  forward  all  such  applications  to  the  proper  authorities. 

During  the  meeting  the  experience  of  Lieutenant  Yermoloff,  of  the  yth 
Battalion  Caucasus  Mountain  Artillery,  was  brought  up  as  a  striking  example. 
He  had  asked  to  be  transferred  from  the  new  Armenian  battalion  to  which  he 
had  been  assigned.  Colonel  Morel  had  first  tried  to  dissuade  him,  then,  in  face 
of  this  officer's  fixed  determination,  he  had  added  to  the  written  form  of 
application  that  the  officer  in  question  had  shown  himself  incompetent  for  his 
duties,  that  he  would  therefore  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  General  Staff 
of  the  Front,  and  would  receive  orders  to  leave  Erzerum  within  twenty-four 
hours.  Thus  was  the  honour  of  an  efficient  officer  attacked,  for  the  sole  reason 
that  he  refused  to  serve  Armenian  interests  and  had  been  indiscreet  enough  to 
declare  that  Colonel  Morel  had  allied  himself  to  the  Armenian  cause. 

Dr.  Zavrieff  repeated  word  for  word  Andranik's  statement  given  above.  He 
said  that  by  remaining  in  Erzerum  until  the  conclusion  of  peace  we  should  be 
serving  Russian  interests.  Officers  belonging  to  a  civilised  nation  had  no 
right  to  adopt  such  a  line  of  reasoning  as,  for  example  :  "  Let  the  Armenians 
and  Turks  settle  their  own  quarrel !  Let  them  cut  each  others'  throats !  Why 
should  we  Russians  interfere  with  their  affairs?  Let  them  go  to  the  devil!  " 

At  the  conclusion  of  his  speech,  which  had  not  made  the  desired  impression, 


294  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

Dr.  Zavrieff  said  that  if  we  wished  to  serve  humanity  it  was  our  duty  to 
remain  in  Erzerum  to  prevent  butchery  of  the  Turks. 

Andranik's  promises  were  not  fulfilled,  nor  had  the  Mohammedan  population 
ever  placed  any  faith  in  them.  Shops  remained  closed  and  terror  continued 
to  reign.  Not  a  living  soul  showed  himself  in  the  Mohammedan  quarters. 
Only  a  few  shops  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Town  Hall  opened  their  shutters, 
and  there  a  few  Mohammedans  collected  during  the  day. 

Not  a  single  Armenian  was  punished.  To  keep  up  the  pretence  of  Armenian 
innocence  the  question  was  asked  whether  the  innocent  were  to  be  punished  for 
the  sake  of  Andranik's  promise.  But  when  the  Russian  officers  replied  that  they 
had  themselves  handed  over  various  Armenian  offenders  and  accused  them 
before  the  authorities,  this  irrefutable  argument  was  received  in  silence. 
Murder  still  went  on  and  was  merely  concealed.  It  was  practised  in  the  more 
remote  villages,  no  longer  before  the  eyes  of  the  Russian  officers.  The  Turkish 
inhabitants  of  the  villages  round  Erzerum  disappeared,  and  nothing  was  heard 
as  to  their  fate. 

Arrests  in  the  town  increased  in  number  on  the  excuse  of  a  possible  rising. 
To  my  ironical  question,  what  happened  to  the  prisoners,  and  whether  they 
all  ran  the  risk  of  being  slaughtered,  Colonel  Morel  replied  that  some  would 
be  taken  to  Tiflis  under  adequate  escort,  others  would  be  kept  in  Erzerum  as 
hostages.  In  the  streets  Armenian  bands,  formed  of  Armenian  deserters, 
murdered  the  passers-by — partly  from  fear,  partly  to  rob  them  of  their 
possessions;  in  any  case,  robbery  was  the  chief  motive.  Before  Andranik's 
arrival  the  companies  refused  to  go  into  the  front  line.  Afterwards  they  obeyed 
the  order,  but  only  to  desert  in  the  most  craven  fashion.  Andranik,  on  horse- 
back, tried  to  drive  them  back  with  his  sword  and  fists.  To  have  him  at  their 
head  was  the  dearest  wish  of  all  Armenians  of  the  Russian  artillery.  They 
were  apparently  incapable  of  grasping  that  the  Garrison  Artillery  required  the 
services  of  trained  artillerymen  and  an  adequate  number  of  infantry.  But  it 
ivas  easy  to  guess  their  secret  thought  :  when  the  moment  came  for  withdrawal, 
to  escape  under  cover  of  the  guns.  Subsequent  events  have  proved  the  truth 
of  this. 

The  opening  of  peace  negotiations  at  Trebizond  was  delayed.  We  learned 
through  the  General  Staff  at  Erzerum  that  the  negotiations  fixed  for 
February  i7th  had  been  postponed  until  the  2oth  or  25th.  As  my  Staff  was 
separated  in  opposite  ends  of  the  town,  and  the  telephonic  communication 
was  in  an  inefficient  state,  I  was  compelled  to  make  the  journey  twice  a  day. 

According  to  information  I  received  from  Colonel  Morel  and  his  Staff  in 
the  course  of  an  official  visit,  there  were  no  regular  Ottoman  troops  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Erzerum;  we  were  fighting  Kurdish  bands  and  villagers, 
togethet  with  a  few  regulars,  relics  of  the  Turkish  Army  of  1916.  It  was 
understood  that  these  bands  had  been  raised  by  some  Ottoman  officers  who  had 
come  to  the  neighbourhood  to  protect  the  population.  These  troops  had  only 
two  mountain  guns,  which  had  been  left  in  Erzindjan  by  the  Armenians.  They 
could  advance  by  the  Erzindjan-Olti-Jeni  road,  or  from  the  other  side  from 
Kars  and  Palan-Dogno.  Colonel  Morel,  on  what  grounds  I  do  not  know, 
assumed  that  the  attack  would  be  made  from  Qlti.  The  intelligence  service 
was  conducted  by  the  Armenians  most  inefficiently.  They  were  chiefly  occupied 
in  murder  in  the  villages  and  driving  off  any  herds  of  cattle  they  came  across. 
Their  reports  were  lies  from  beginning  to  end.  If  they  reported  that  the  patrol 
had  been  attacked  by  an  enemy  force  of  2,000  men,  one  could  be  sure  that  there 
had  actually  been  200  at  most.  They  were  not  ashamed  to  admit  having  fled 
before  an  attack  by  300-400  men,  in  which  their  sole  loss  was  one  killed  and 
one  wounded.  One  day  an  Armenian  officer  reported  over  the  telephone  that 
his  detachment  had  been  attacked  by  400  of  the  enemy;  it  transpired  that  two 


The  Armenian  Question  295 

unarmed  men  had  emerged  from  a  neighbouring  village  and  immediately  with- 
drawn into  their  houses.  From  the  evacuation  of  Erzerum  until  the  Turkish 
occupation  the  Armenian  scout  patrols  only  once  succeeded  in  making  a  capture 
— a  single  Turkish  horseman.  He  was  probably  suffering  from  frozen  feet,  or 
was  prevented  by  some  other  reason  from  escaping. 

After  our  second  officers'  meeting  some  officers  had  applied  for  transfer  to 
other  posts.  When  these  applications  were  submitted  to  Colonel  Morel  he 
was  very  angry,  and  said  that  he  would  refuse  to  permit  their  departure  on 
the  grounds  of  a  court  martial  decision.  When  I  pointed  out  that  the  guns 
were  still  in  the  hands  of  the  Russian  officers,  who  could  reply  to  such 
unjustified  severity  with  artillery  fire,  and,  moreover,  that  as  the  applications 
were  absolutely  legal  and  could  not  be  stigmatised  as  an  attempt  at  desertion, 
it  was  necessary  to  comply,  he  retorted  that,  if  the  officers  insisted,  he  would 
give  them,  as  he  had  done  in  the  case  of  Captain  Yermaloff,  papers  which 
would  compromise  their  records.  I  replied  to  Colonel  Morel  that,  as  Colonel 
Dolukhanoff  had  justly  declared  in  Tiflis  and  Batum,  officers  who  were  forced 
to  remain  at  their  posts  against  their  will  could  not  be  expected  to  give  good 
service.  He  replied  that  for  this  reason  he  had  asked  for  sixty  English  officers 
to  be  sent  to  Erzerum,  and  had  already  received  formal  consent.  On  this 
occasion  I  also  heard  of  another  incident  :  a  Russian  or  Polish  soldier  who  was 
acting  as  station-master  in  Erzerum  bad  refused  to  continue  his  duties.  He 
had  been  at  once  arrested  and  forced  to  carry  on.  Under  the  pretext  of 
facilitating  a  more  rapid  circulation  of  orders  I  ordered  my  officers  to  billet 
themselves  as  near  to  one  another  as  possible;  in  reality  my  object  was  that  we 
might  be  in  a  better  position  to  help  one  another  in  case  of  need. 

Captain  Yermoloff  had  departed  on  February  25th.  I  had  asked  him  to 
break  hi?  journey  at  Sari-Kamieko  to  inform  Generals  Wischinsky  and 
Gerassimoff,  artillery  commanders,  of  the  serious  position  in  which  we  were 
placed  in  relation  to  the  Armenians,  and  to  urge  him  to  free  us  as  quickly  as 
possible  from  this  cul-de-sac. 

On  February  24th  I  sighted  a  Turkish  aeroplane  reconnoitring,  and  concluded 
that  the  enemy  was  at  Erzindjan  or  even  Mama-Khatum.  The  same  day  Colonel 
Morel  informed  me  that  he  had  received  the  Turkish  proposal  regarding  the 
evacuation  of  Erzerum.  After  the  Turkish  occupation  I  learned  from  Corps 
Commander  Krazim  Bey  that  this  proposal  had  not  been  a  worthless  scrap  of 
paper,  but  an  official  document  bearing  his  own  signature,  whereas  Colonel 
Morel  had  deliberately  led  me  to  believe  that  this  official  ultimatum,  signed  by 
the  Officer  Commanding  the  Army  Corps,  was  mere  bluff.  The  General  Staff  of 
the  fortress  announced  on  February  24th  and  25th  that  no  danger  was  imminent. 
Only  a  band  of  Kurds  had  been  seen  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Teke-Deressi, 
and  their  advance  had  been  checked  by  a  detachment  sent  out  against  them. 
It  was  also  stated  that  a  detachment  sent  out  from  Erzerum  had  thrown  back 
the  enemy  a  few  kilometres  beyond  Ilidja.  Meanwhile  we  heard  that  on 
February  26th  the  Armenian  detachment  at  Teke-Deressi  had  been  attacked,  and 
that  those  who  had  been  able  to  escape  had  fled  like  the  wind  to  Erzerum;  the 
Ilidja  detachment,  completely  broken  up,  was  also  running  away  in  the  same 
direction. 

I  had  received  from  Colonel  Morel  verbal  orders  to  open  artillery  fire  on 
the  attacking  enemy,  but  I  could  see  no  target.  On  the  Charput  road  only 
fleeing  Armenian  soldiers  were  visible,  and  on  the  Trebizond  road  Armenian 
detachments  retreating  on  Erzerum  in  close  formation,  as  if  on  the  parade 
ground.  In  the  course  of  the  afternoon  it  became  known,  also,  that  an  enemy 
detachment  was  halted  close  to  Guoz-Koj.  I  estimated  it  at  1,500  men;  it  did 
not  look  like  Kurdish  bands,  but  a  properly-led  regiment. 

Andranik    attempted    to    muster  the  fugitives  and  send  them  against  the 


296  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

enemy,  but  these  cowards  took  to  their  heels  as  soon  as  they  came  into  touch 
with  the  foe.  The  artillery  fire,  however,  was  maintained  until  midnight. 
Immediately  the  Kurd  offensive  was  opened  and  we  had  got  to  work,  no  more 
was  heard  of  departure  from  the  Russian  officers,  who  carried  out  their  assigned 
duties  honourably. 

I  could  not  induce  the  Armenian  infantry  attached  to  my  batteries  at  Buyuk- 
Kiremidli  to  attack ;  instead  they  deserted  the  batteries  and  withdrew  persistently 
towards  the  Charput  gate.  The  Armenians  who  had  fled  at  Teke-Deressi 
even  carried  off  in  their  flight  the  herds  of  cattle  and  slew  the  defenceless 
isolated  peasants  they  encountered  on  their  way.  The  Turkish  advance  on 
Erzerum  came  as  a  complete  surprise  to  the  Russian  General  Staff;  no  battle 
orders  had  been  issued,  or,  if  they  had,  I,  at  any  rate,  had  heard  nothing  of 
them.  My  task  was  very  simple  :  it  consisted  of  keeping  the  enemy  under  fire 
to  prevent  him  from  piercing  the  belt  of  forts  which  surrounded  the  town.  In 
the  advanced  positions  were  also  infantry  and  mountain  artillery,  which  were 
not  under  my  command. 

On  the  same  day  the  Armenian  militia  busied  themselves  in  the  town  until 
evening  in  seizing  all  male  Mohammedans,  including  old  men  and  sick.  When 
questioned  as  to  the  object  of  these  measures,  the  reply  was  that  men  were 
being  collected  to  clear  the  railway  of  snow.  In  the  evening  I  learned  that 
an  Armenian  student,  with  his  band,  had  forced  an  entry  into  my  house,  in 
spite  of  my  name  on  the  door,  on  the  excuse  of  searching  it.  As  my  wife 
resisted  this  deliberate  intrusion  he  did  not  succeed  in  his  attempt,  and  was 
also  prevented  from  carrying  off  the  owner  of  the  house,  an  old  Turk,  together 
with  some  Kurdish  servants;  he  cursed  roundly  at  this  thwarting  of  his  plan. 
The  student  declared  that  the  searchings  were  being  carried  out  at  the  order 
of  Andranik.  I  at  once  had  a  communication  door  cut  so  that  the  old  man  could 
take  refuge  with  us  in  case  they  came  a  second  time  to  fetch  him. 

I  had  recently  been  in  the  habit,  each  time  I  visited  Andranik  and  his  Staff, 
of  taking  with  me  Captain  Yulkewitsch,  the  chief  of  the  Mobilisation  Depart- 
ment, as  a  witness  of  my  relations  with  these  men.  One  evening  he  accompanied 
me  to  an  officers'  meeting.  When  we  entered  the  meeting  had  already  begun. 
Those  present  were  Andranik,  Dr.  Zavrieff,  Colonels  Zinkewitsch  and 
Dolukhanoff,  and  a  few  others.  On  my  arrival  Zinkewitsch  began  to  read 
aloud  the  following  telegram  from  the  Commander-in-Chief,  General  Odiche- 
lidze  :  "  I  have  received  a  wireless  message  from  Wehib  Pasha,  commanding 
the  Ottoman  forces,  in  which  he  states  that  his  troops  have  orders  to  occupy 
Erzerum.  Destroy  the  guns  of  the  fortress  and  withdraw  with  the  troops. 
(Sgd.)  Odichelidze." 

This  belated  order  left  us  no  time  to  destroy  the  guns.  After  Andranik  had 
given  vent  to  his  fury,  he  announced  his  decision  to  hold  Erzerum  two  days 
longer,  to  enable  the  destruction  to  be  carried  out,  and  then  to  evacuate  the 
fortress.  When  Dr.  Zavrieff  pointed  out  that  nothing  was  being  done  to  suppress 
the  firebrands  who  infested  the  town,  and  that  the  Mohammedan  aged  and  sick 
had  been  seized  and  despatched  to  an  unknown  destination,  he  replied  that  orders 
had  already  been  given  to  put  down  this  disorder.  But,  as  with  all  the  others, 
these  fine  promises  were  never  carried  out. 

After  discussing  the  best  way  of  carrying  out  Andranik's  decision  we  with- 
drew. As  to  the  question  of  holding  Erzerum  for  two  more  days,  considering 
the  strength  of  the  troops  and  of  the  advanced  position,  the  town  could  have  held 
out  for  another  forty-two  c\ays,  not  only  against  the  Kurds,  but  even  against  a 
regular  army4. 

As  Ottoman  H.Q.  had  officially  stated  in  the  course  of  the  armistice  negotia- 
tions that  they  could  not  be  responsible  for  keeping  the  Kurds  in  order,  it  was 
our  duty  to  take  all  necessary  measures  against  a  possible  attack  from  them. 


The  Armenian  Question  297 

When  I  returned  to  my  Headquarters  I  gave  the  necessary  orders  for  the 
destruction  of  the  guns,  which  in  any  case  could  have  been  rendered  useless 
within  two  days.  I  learned  from  the  reports  of  my  officers  that  the  infantry, 
under  cover  of  darkness,  had  deserted  the  trenches  and  taken  to  flight.  I 
communicated  this  news  to  Colonel  Morel,  who  assured  me  that  it  would  give 
rise  to  no  danger  at  all,  as  reinforcements  had  been  sent  up.  I  returned  home 
and  went  to  bed  about  one  o'clock. 

Between  one  and  three  I  heard  isolated  shots  in  the  town,  and  soon  after 
I  could  hear  the  voices  of  Armenians,  the  sound  of  doors  being  smashed  in  with 
axes,  and  the  despairing  cries  of  the  poor  unhappy  Mohammedans,  who  had 
been  attacked.  Two  thoughts  gave  me  anxiety  :  In  the  first  place,  our  honour 
was  threatened,  for  anyone  who  had  not  witnessed  personally  the  cowardly 
cruelty  of  the  Armenians  (fighting  for  freedom  !)  might  assume  that  these 
inhuman  brutalities  were  being  perpetrated  with  the  connivance  of  the  Russian 
officers,  and  we  should  have  to  share  the  blame  with  these  wild  beasts;  in  the 
second  place,  as  it  was  not  in  accordance  with  the  views  of  G.H.Q.  to  engage 
the  regular  Turkish  forces,  the  result  might  be  that  the  orders  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  would  not  be  obeyed  if  a  misunderstanding  should  arise  among  the 
attackers.  With  regard  to  these  two  points  I  came  to  the  following  decision  : 
To  call  on  Colonel  Morel  first  thing  in  the  morning  and  suggest  to  him — first, 
that  the  Armenians  must  be  prevented  from  perpetrating  fresh  outrages,  even 
if  the  only  method  of  doing  so  were  to  turn  part  of  our  guns  upon  them  and 
so  control  them  to  heed  our  orders;  secondly,  envoys  should  be  at  once  sent 
with  a  flag  of  truce  to  the  Turkish  troops  to  inform  them  that  in  two  days  the 
town  would  be  ceded  without  bloodshed.  Moreover,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
raise  detachments,  excluding  Armenians,  in  order  to  suppress  the  disturbances 
by  force  of  arms  and  prevent  the  butchery  of  the  Turks  by  the  Armenians. 

When,  in  the  early  morning,  I  went  to  see  Colonel  Morel,  accompanied  by 
Captain  Yulkewitsch,  I  met,  near  the  artillery  munition  dump,  the  Armenian 
second  lieutenant,  Bagratonian,  who  was  on  duty  at  this  depfit.  He  told  me 
that  when  the  order  came  to  withdraw  he  would  like  to  blow  up  the  dump,  but 
would  wait  for  orders  from  me.  This  statement  astounded  me,  for  the  ammuni- 
tion dep6t  was  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Dolukhanoff,  and  no  orders 
had  been  received  to  blow  it  up.  I  gave  him  to  understand  that  such  an 
explosion  might  cause  injury  to  the  Russian  officers  as  well  as  to  the  civilian 
population,  advised  him  to  abandon  his  project,  and  finally  succeeded  in 
convincing  him.  In  this  way  I  saved  the  ammunition. 

As  I  approached  Colonel  Morel's  quarters  I  saw  that  everyone  was  taking 
flight.  The  house  of  the  American  Consul,  which  stands  opposite  his  quarters, 
was  in  flames.  Colonel  Morel  and  Colonel  Torkum  were  mounted  and  ready 
for  flight ;  their  baggage  had  been  loaded  on  to  a  motor-car  and  several  carriages. 
It  was  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning.  I  inquired  as  to  the  situation.  I  was 
told  that  the  order  for  withdrawal  had  been  issued  at  5  a.m.,  and  astonishment 
was  expressed  that  I  had  not  received  it.  This  is  what  I  had  feared  :  the 
Armenians  succeeded  in  escaping  under  the  protection  of  the  Russian  officers 
and  the  artillery.  But  while  the  Russian  officers  were  working  the  guns  single- 
handed  and  beating  back  the  onslaught  of  the  attackers,  the  Armenians  were 
at  full  liberty  to  slaughter  the  Mohammedans  and  take  to  their  heels.  If  I  had 
not  appeared  no  Russian  officer  would  have  known  of  the  order  for  withdrawal. 
I  thought  for  a  moment  of  running  to  Fort  Medjedie  to  send  a  farewell  of 
shrapnel  into  the  brave  Armenians  who,  clad  in  bullet-proof  tunics,  were  fleeing 
unhindered  along  the  Kars  road.  But  it  occurred  to  me  that  there  might  be 
one  or  two  innocent  men  among  them,  so  I  abandoned  the  idea. 

It  was  also  a  result  of  the  cunning  and  cowardice  of  the  noble  Armenian 
looters  that  the  guns  could  not  be  put  out  of  action.  When  I  reurned  to  my 


2y8  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

quarters  I  heard  in  an  obscure  street  cries  of  pain  and  the  crackle  of  a  terrific 
rifle  volley.  As  I  was  at  a  street  corner  I  could  not  see  what  was  happening, 
but  the  bloodstains  in  the  snow  showed  that  a  fight  had  taken  place.  I  got 
down  from  my  carriage  to  continue  my  journey  on  foot;  but  when  I  saw  the 
Armenian  Commanding  Officer  of  the  Militia  on  horseback,  coming  out  of  a 
side  street,  I  could  imagine  the  scene  of  horror  that  had  been  enacted. 

When  I  was  back  in  my  quarters  I  gave  orders  to  the  batteries  to  sound 
the  retreat  at  the  same  time  as  the  infantry  and  to  get  the  carriages  ready  for 
the  artillery  officers.  I  was  told  that  the  outriders  had  already  escaped  in  the 
night.  Armenian  deserters,  armed  to  the  teeth,  had  taken  the  horses  belonging 
to  the  carriages,  and  galloped  off  two  on  each  horse.  As  my  groom  had  put 
up  a  resistance  they  had  not  been  able  to  take  my  horses,  but  they  wounded 
one  of  them  with  a  shot.  Of  the  fifty  carriages  we  were  left  with  only  three, 
which  some  of  the  officers  used.  Soon  afterwards  we  learnt  the  Turkish  army 
had  entered  the  town,  and  were  at  last  able  to  ascertain  that  they  did  not  consist 
of  bands  of  Kurds  collected  together  haphazard,  but  regular  troops.  The  brave 
Armenian  infantry  took  advantage  of  the  night  to  dash  off  with  all  speed  along 
the  Erzerum-Kars  road.  A  hurricane  could  hardly  have  swept  Erzerum  so 
thoroughly  of  the  Armenian  dirt  in  so  short  a  time. 

Neither  in  the  firing  trenches  nor  in  the  town  were  there  any  wounded 
Armenians  to  be  found.  This  proves  afresh  with  what  courage  and  audacity 
they  had  defended  Erzerum.  The  only  prisoners  were  Russian  officers,  so  the 
Armenians  can  boast  of  having  taken  a  negative  part  in  the  defence  of  the  town. 

After  receiving  news  of  the  occupation  of  the  town  by  the  Turks  I  went 
with  my  adjutant  to  headquarters  to  report. 

As  I  passed  along  the  streets,  the  Turks  I  met  expressed  in  most  moving 
fasjiion  their  gratitude  }o  me  for  saving  their  lives.  This  gratitude  included  all 
the  Russian  officers,  for  if  the  Russian  officers  had  not  been  there,  the  Turkish 
troops  reoccupying  Erzerum  would  not  have  found  a  single  Turk  alive. 

The  Russian  author  Petronius  says  of  the  Armenians  :  "  The  Armenians  arc 
certainly  human,  but  at  home  they  go  on  all  fours."  The  Russian  poet 
Lermontoff  sings  their  praises  in  the  following  words  :  "  You  are  a  slave,  you 
are  a  coward,  for  you  are  an  Armenian." 

ERZERUM,  April  2Qth,  1918. 

(Signed)  LT.-COL.  TVERDOKHLEBOFF,  Provisional  Commandant  of  the 
Fortresses  of  Erzerum  and  Deveboynu,  Commanding  the  2nd  Garrison 
Artillery  Regiment,  Erzerum. 

Now,  honoured  readers,  what  do  you  think  of  the  humanity  of 
the  Armenians  ? 

No  !  no  !  don't  judge  the  two  peoples  unjustly  ! 

It  was  not  their  fault,  but  that  of  Muscovite  policy  which 
had  hounded  them  on  one  against  the  other.  The  Muscovite, 
who  had  no  other  wish  than  to  slay  the  Turk  and,  after  destroy- 
ing the  thousand-year-old  national  glory,  to  usurp  the  inheritance 
of  the  Turk;  the  Muscovite,  who  delighted  only  in  swimming 
in  blood,  and  egged  on  the  Armenian  against  the  Turk.  The 
result  of  this  was  to  put  into  the  mind  of  the  Turk  the  definite 
conviction  that  "  it  is  necessary  to  slay  the  Armenian  if  we  Would 


The  Armenian  Question  299 

have  our  own  lives  safe/'  while  the  Armenian  said  that  in  order  to 
rise  again  and  recover  his  majority  he  must  strangle  the  Turk. 
This  is  what  paved  the  way  for  the  tragic  events  we  have 
witnessed.  600,000  Armenians  on  the  one  side,  1,500,000  Turks 
and  Kurds  on  the  other  are  said  to  have  met  their  death.  And 
now  it  is  Russian  policy,  which,  like  its  imbecile  confederates  of  the 
Morgenthau  stamp,  is  impervious  to  all  feelings  of  shame,  to  throw 
all  the  blame  on  to  the  Turks,  whom  they  would  like  to  annihilate, 
filling  the  Press  of  the  whole  world  with  their  ravings. 

Mandelstamm  says  that,  except  in  Van,  the  Armenian  nowhere 
made  the  slightest  attempt  at  revolution.  I  have  already  said  that 
I  had  no  knowledge  of  the  events  which  took  place  in  the  vilayets 
of  East  Anatolia  and  in  the  rear  of  our  army  in  the  Caucasus ;  on 
the  other  hand,  I  am  perfectly  acquainted  with  the  condition  of 
affairs  within  the  sphere  of  my  own  army.  The  incidents  which 
took  place  in  Zeitun  and  Urfa,  in  the  middle  of  1915,  were  nothing 
more  nor  less  than  an  armed  rising  of  the  Armenians.  The  rising 
at  Mussa  Baba  is  also  a  part  of  this  organised  revolution.  A  fact, 
in  my  opinion  absolutely  irrefutable,  is  that  at  the  moment  when 
the  Dardanelles  campaign  was  at  its  crisis,  the  Armenians  were 
ordered  by  the  French  and  English  Commanders-in-Chief  of  the 
Forces  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  to  rise.  They  had  certainly 
judged  that  an  Armenian  rising,  beginning  in  Rein-ul-Hinzir,  in 
the  Gulf  of  Alexandretta  and  spreading  over  Dort  Yol,  Mussa 
Baba,  Aleppo,  Aintab,  Ursa,  and  Zeitun,  might  well  signify  an 
operation  ending  in  the  severing  of  Syria  from  Asia  Minor.  More- 
over, the  Armenians,  who  had  made  their  preparations  in  these 
places  a  long  time  beforehand,  were  only  waiting  the  signal  to 
begin. 

Can  the  responsible  authorities  of  the  Governments  in  question 
maintain  that  my  statements  are  untrue  ?  Now  that  the  war  is 
over,  I  should  regard  it  as  a  chivalrous  act  if  the  true  facts  with 
regard  to  this  were  placed  before  the  public. 

If  Mandelstamm  still  insists  on  maintaining  that  these  incidents, 
far  from  being  a  rising,  were  nothing  more  than  an  attempt  at 
resistance,  a  resort  to  arms  in  justified  self-defence,  then  I  must 
point  out  to  him  that  his  Allies,  the  French  and  English  officers 
who  organised  this  rising,  will  think  this  ridiculous.  This  is  my 
conviction  and  my  opinion  about  the  Armenian  massacres.  Now 


300  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

that  the  war  is  over,  and  Syria,  Mesopotamia,  and  the  Arabian 
Peninsula,  the  brightest  jewels  in  the  Ottoman  crown,  are  severed 
from  the  Mother  country,  Turkey  is  beginning  afresh  the  struggle 
to  prevent  the  loss  of  the  sacred  ground  of  Anatolia,  which  alone 
remains  to  the  Turks.  If  there  is  anything  left  to  console  poor 
Turkey  for  having  sacrificed  over  3,000,000  men  in  the  course  of 
a  world  war,  it  is  the  fact  that  our  hereditary  enemy,  Czardom, 
has  been  vanquished  and  destroyed. 

Among  the  States  which  have  been  newly  formed  as  a  result  of 
what  has  happened  in  the  Caucasus  we  see  to-day  an  Armenian 
Republic.  But  we  can  also  be  sure  that  the  Turkish-Armenians, 
with  Zaven  Effendi,  the  Patriarch  of  Constantinople  at  their  head, 
will  stop  at  no  intrigue  to  exasperate  the  Turks.  The  Turks  are  in 
no  way  opposed  to  the  foundation  of  an  Armenian  republic,  with 
Edjmiadzim  and  Erivan  as  centres;  but  they  do  most  definitely 
desire  that  that  republic  should  remain  on  the  best  of  terms  with 
the  republics  of  Azerbaidjan  and  Georgia,  which  were  formed  from 
various  national  elements  from  the  Southern  Caucasus,  as  well 
as  with  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the  incontestable  owner  of  Asia 
Minor,  and  not  throw  covetous  glances  at  what  is  its  property  by 
undeniable  rights. 

Above  all  things,  I  advise  the  Ottoman  Armenians,  in  the 
interest  both  of  their  own  peace  and  happiness,  and  especially 
in  the  interests  of  the  Turks,  to  give  up  their  hare-brained  dreams 
that  Erzerum,  Bitlis,  Van,  Diarbekir,  Mamuret-ul-Asis  shall  ever 
become  part  of  Armenia. 

On  the  day  when  the  Turkish  Armenians  definitely  show  that 
they  have  given  up  this  impossible  hope  they  will  begin  to  live  in 
honourable  friendship  with  their  Turkish  and  Kurdish  compatriots. 
It  is  always  open  to  those  among  them  who  wish  to  be  Armenians 
and  Armenians  alone  to  settle  in  the  republic  of  the  Armenian 
Caucasus.  But  for  those  who  wish  to  remain  in  Turkey,  it  is  an 
absolute  condition  that  they  should  show  themselves  true  Otto- 
mans and  refrain  from  any  activities  which  might  throw  suspicion 
on  their  loyalty.  Henceforward,  there  will  no  longer  be  a  place 
among  the  Armenians  of  Turkey  for  the  Dachnakzutium,  the 
Hintschak,  and  other  parties,  and  I  am  convinced  that  such 
organisations  can  only  do  harm  to  the  Armenians  of  the  Caucasus. 

At  the  present  moment  the  task  before  the  three  Caucasian 


The  Armenian  Question  301 

Republics  and  the  Ottoman  Empire  is  to  help  one  another 
mutually  and  to  devote  their  powers  to  the  restoration  of  their 
devastated  countries,  the  organisation  and  establishment  of  their 
administration.  There  is  yet  another  task  before  these  four 
States :  that  of  using  every  necessary  measure  to  prevent  the 
Russian  torrent  from  breaking  over  the  Caucasus  mountains.  To 
ensure  this  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  for  these  four  States  to 
form  a  defensive  alliance  against  the  Muscovite  invasion.  Zaven 
Effendi,  the  present  patriarch  of  the  Armenians,  knows  better  than 
anyone  else  the  friendliness  towards  the  Armenians  with  which 
I  am  inspired. 

When  I  came  to  Constantinople  in  December,  1915,  Zaven 
Effendi  visited  me  in  the  Pera  Palace  Hotel  and  handed  me  a 
memorandum  from  the  Patriarchate  thanking  me  in  the  name  of 
the  whole  Armenian  nation. 

As  I  hear  that  he  is  now  being  employed  as  a  tool  in  the  in- 
trigues of  the  Greek  Patriarch  of  Constantinople,  I  beg  him,  as  a 
friend  of  the  Armenians,  to  examine  the  advice  I  have  given  above. 
Consideration  of  the  advantages  which  my  view  would  offer  to  the 
Armenians  might  perhaps  prevent  him  from  becoming  the 
plaything  of  the  Greek  Patriarch. 

If,  as  I  have  said  already,  we  four  nations  of  the  Near  East 
do  not  conclude  a  formal  alliance  of  defence  against  Russia,  if  we 
do  not  co-operate  in  the  foundation  of  a  republic  of  the  North 
Caucasus  and  include  it  in  our  alliance,  we  cannot  doubt  that 
we  shall  fall  victims  to  the  power  of  Russia,  who,  for  years,  has 
yearned  to  bring  us  under  her  yoke. 

Who  knows,  perhaps  the  day  will  come  when  the  poor  Arabs 
and  Persians  who  have  fallen  under  the  influence  of  the  French 
and  English  may  slip  out  of  the  hands  of  their  present  masters 
and  join  our  alliance  ? 

The  nations  of  the  Near  East  can  only  live  in  freedom  if  they 
make  themselves  absolute  masters  of  their  fate. 

I  believe  that  this  political  ideal  which  I  have  sketched  out 
for  the  Ottoman,  Armenian,  Georgian,  and  Azerbaidjan  politicians 
is  calculated,  in  less  than  twenty  years,  to  transform  the  Near 
East,  hitherto  regarded  as  a  hot-bed  of  intrigue  and  unrest,  into 
a  paradise,  and  to  give  it  a  status  which  will  make  it  independent 
of  the  foreigner. 


302  Memories  of  a  Turkish  Statesman 

For  the  Turks,  who  form  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  this  ideal  is  of  fundamental  importance.  If 
the  Armenian  minority  desires  to  remain  Ottoman,  it  has  only 
to  prove  that,  like  the  Armenians  of  seventy  years  ago,  it  is 
inspired  with  feelings  of  loyalty  and  true  Ottoman  ideals. 

This,  in  my  opinion,  is  the  only  method  I  can  suggest  for 
finally  burying  the  blood-stained  past  and  preparing  the  way  for 
a  rich  and  happy  future.  I  and  my  compatriots  are  always  ready 
for  discussion  with  anyone  who  can  produce  a  better  solution. 


THE    END. 


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